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This study is an exposition of Zimbabwe’s post-independence indigenization and economic 
empowerment policy, with a specific focus on how the policy unfolded in the country’s mining 
sector. The indigenization policy was adopted as a conscious strategy towards overcoming 
Zimbabwe’s historical legacy of settler colonialism. The colonial government’s systematic 
racial discrimination and policy of separate development meant that the post-colonial 
government inherited a society characterized by gross economic and social inequalities along 
racial lines. In this, black citizens played a marginal role in the country’s economy and were 
scarcely represented across the main sectors, particularly in the minerals industry. Hence the 
government’s insistence that the indigenous population, defined as those and the descendants 
of those who experienced systematic discrimination before independence in 1980, control at 
least 51 percent of the major economic enterprises across all sectors of the economy. As such, 
through the lenses of state power, class relations and Zimbabwe’s position in the world-system, 
this study problematized the conceptualization and the implementation of the policy as it 
unfolded in the country’s mining sector. It sought to identify the factors that determined the 
process and the outcomes of the indigenization policy in the said sector. 
The study used a qualitative methodological approach. Data was gathered through in-depth 
interviews and email correspondence with government officials, private sector players, 
academics, mineworkers, activists and journalists. Purposive sampling was used to identify and 
reach key participants. Documentary and online material including government reports, videos, 
social media statements from verified accounts of government officials and scholars were also 
key sources of data. 
The findings of the study demonstrate that the indigenization policy in the mining sector was, 
by and large, unsuccessful. The large-scale mining sector is still dominated by an oligopoly of 
a few powerful foreign-owned companies. Numerous attempts at indigenous takeover 
(dominated by politicians) of foreign-owned mining failed because of lack of capital. Out of 
the 61 Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) established as vehicles through which 
rural peasant communities could gain 10% share ownership in mining companies, only one 
Trust actually had shares transferred to it. Further, only one mining company transferred shares 
to the workers under the Employee Share Ownership Trust (ESOT) scheme. The artisanal and 
small-scale mining (ASM) sector which comprises predominantly indigenous players has been 
thoroughly disempowered and disenfranchised by the state. The study cites the weak state, and 
Zimbabwe’s position in the world-system as a peripheral player among some of the major 
determinants of these outcomes. An absent indigenous bourgeoisie and the disorganized 
working class, ASM players and peasant communities immobilized by state repression meant 
that the politicians dominated the indigenization policy.  
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 Introduction: the focus and scope of the research 
 
The question of indigenization and economic empowerment in Zimbabwe is one whose import 
traverses both the country’s history and the present. Its origin could be traced to Zimbabwe’s 
almost 100 years of settler colonialism during which indigenous people were subjected to 
severe economic, social, and political disenfranchisement. The colonizers invaded modern-day 
Zimbabwe in 1890 through a 500-man strong Pioneer Column sponsored by Cecil Rhodes’ 
British South Africa Company (BSAC) (See Chikuhwa, 2013). This occupation of modern-day 
Zimbabwe followed the signing of the Rudd Concession between the Ndebele king Lobengula 
and representatives of the BSAC led by Charles Rudd on 30 October 1888. The concession 
granted Britain the full control and ownership of all minerals in Matabeleland and 
Mashonaland. In return, Lobengula was promised a 100-pound salary and some rifles 
(Mazarire, 2006). Bourne (2011) articulates how the colonizers immediately dispossessed the 
indigenous people of their economic resources upon settling in their territory: 
 
Recruits for the war against Lobengula in 1892 were offered 6,000 acres to farm, twenty gold claims, and 
a share of looted cattle. In 1895 Rhodes gave Alfred de Fonseca 33,000 acres of Ndebele land, and he 
awarded Cape MPs tracts of land in Rhodesia as freely as he gave them shares in his Chartered Company, 
to buy support. By 1899, 15.7 million acres had been given to Europeans…. Seen from the African 
viewpoint, it was a tale of unmitigated dispossession. The cattle, symbol of wealth for the Ndebele 
especially, were taken from them. An alien approach to land ownership was foisted on them. The best 
grazing land was now in the hands of the Europeans. (2011: 19-20) 
 
Fisher (2010:1) describes the above as an “early act of white dominance” which has significant 
implications for the future. Good (1974: 11) also points out that Pioneer Column contingent 
was the “nucleus of the future settler society”. It was precisely at this point that a vicious 
century-old class struggle that continues to unfold to this day was set in motion. Having 
conquered the indigenous people, the chartered BSAC became the de facto colonial 
government tasked with managing the Rhodesian colony on behalf of the British monarchy. 
The company immediately imposed a monetary economy and forcefully drafted the Rhodesian 
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territory and its people into the global capitalist system (Clarke, 1980; Chikuhwa, 2013). The 
imposition of a capitalist system opened up the economy, especially the mining sector, to 
international investors who had the capital, thus excluding indigenous people to whom capital 
was an alien concept. This explains why Zimbabwe’s economy from agriculture to banking, 
finance and mining, like any other post-colonial state, is dominated by Multi-National 
Corporations (MNCs). The preponderance of MNCs in the vital sectors of the economy is 
indeed the anti-thesis of the indigenization and economic empowerment discourse.  
 
As it were, on attaining independence in 1980 the new Zimbabwean government inherited an 
economy that was structurally configured to reproduce and reinforce the rigid social and racial 
relations of privilege and poverty. It was an economy veritably and unassailably dominated by 
the white settlers and international companies, while systematically excluding indigenous 
people and consequently condemning them to abject poverty (Sachikonye, 2011). Indeed 
Mandaza (1986) was spot-on in branding post-colonial Zimbabwe a ‘post-white-settler-
colonial-state’. Such a characterization aptly captured the economic and political domination 
of the white-settler minority at the dawn of independence and thus the overwhelming strength 
of the forces of continuity. Citing evidence of racial inequality, Raftopolous and Compagnon 
(2003: 15) note that 63% of senior management posts in the industrial, financial, commercial 
and other sectors were held by whites. In the vital agricultural sector, about 4000 white farmers 
owned 15 million hectares of the prime agricultural land while millions of black families had 
to make do with arid sub-prime communal lands (Moyo, 2007; Scoones et al, 2016).  
 
In the same volume Kanyenze (2003: 37) corroborates these observations citing evidence of 
wide income inequalities between whites and blacks. The latter made up 97 percent of the 
population and controlled just 60% of the income, while the former controlled 37% of the 
income despite making up 2 percent of the population. There was also an international 
dimension to the economic inequality. Clarke (1980) meticulously documented the historical 
grip international companies have had on the various sectors of the Zimbabwean economy such 
as mining, transport, banking and manufacturing. In the mining sector, which is the focus of 
this study, foreign oligopolies have historically crowded out potential local investors 
(Chikuhwa, 2013). According to Sibanda (2018), the mining sector makes up between 12 and 
16 percent of Zimbabwe’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Consequently, the spotlight was 
focused on how the nationalist post-colonial government was going to handle the issue of 
economic inequality and exclusion (especially that of land redistribution) which was the very 
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raison-detre of the armed liberation struggle. This is also the core premise of the economic 
indigenization programme which the government has dubbed the third phase of the liberation 
struggle or the ‘Third Chimurenga’ (See Zanu-PF Manifesto, 2013). Hence, this research is an 
inquiry into the post-colonial government’s efforts to change the ownership structure and 
reduce the influence of foreign capital in the mining sector through the indigenization and 
economic empowerment policy. The research explores and critiques the conception, 
methodology, and process of the indigenization programme with a view to finding a 
comprehensive explanation for the outcomes of the policy thus far. It is a historically grounded 
and context-based inquiry on the implementation of a potentially transformative policy within 
the context of Zimbabwe’s unique institutional framework, power politics, and external 
relations.  
 
That said, this chapter serves primarily as a broad layout of this research inquiry. The first 
section of the chapter is dedicated to defining the research problem and the following section 
outlines the main objectives and core questions that this study seeks to address on the post-
independence indigenization project in Zimbabwe. The objectives and the key research 
questions will help delineate the scope and focus of the study. A tabulated chronological 
account of what the author considers to be Zimbabwe’s most important milestones in nation-
building stretching from its pre-colonial era to the present period will be presented. Such an 
account places the indigenization policy into perspective in the context of some of the moments 
that defined the course of the country’s history. Moreover, this chapter will also discuss a series 
of concepts that have dominated the indigenization discourse such as indigeneity and 
citizenship, nationalism and the national question, class formation and property rights. Finally, 
the justification for the study and the structure of the dissertation will be the subjects of the last 
two sections of the chapter. 
 
1.2 Contribution of study to academic inquiry 
 
A lot has been said and written about Zimbabwe’s indigenization and economic empowerment 
policy (Mufema, 1998; Raftopolous and Compagnon, 2003; Chikuhwa, 2013; Magure, 2014). 
Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy, which is a quest to build a more inclusive society 
unencumbered by the legacies of settler colonialism, is an urgent issue across countries that are 
trying to emerge from colonial experiences. While there are studies that have discussed the 
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indigenization of the mining sector in Zimbabwe (Saunders, 2008; Magure, 2012), no study 
has yet been undertaken on the same subject whose scope transcends the pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-independence eras. Thus, what makes this study unique is that it is a comprehensive 
and in-depth investigation of Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy in the mining sector that draws 
from the past to the current dynamics. It probes the historical, ideological, political, legal, 
social, economic and geopolitical contexts which not only possibly shaped the outcomes of, 
but also influenced the structure, content and process of the indigenization policy. The study 
relies on a historical and critical-interpretivist approach to investigate how the state, class 
dynamics and Zimbabwe’s external relations combined to shape the trajectory of the 
indigenization programme in the mining sector.  
 
That said, this research was based on the following hypothesis: 
1. There is a relationship between the class character of state power and the trajectory of 
indigenization in the mining sector. 
 
2. The indigenization of Zimbabwe’s mining sector is significantly determined by the 
prevailing balance of power amongst the various class forces in the mining sector. 
 
3. Zimbabwe’s position in the prevailing world order and the concomitant implications it 
entails may significantly affect the implementation of the indigenization policy in the 
mining sector. 
   
1.3 Key research questions 
 
This research inquiry was guided by a series of questions that underpin the different dimensions 
of the research problem which include the historical, socio-political and international contexts. 
The subsidiary questions will help unpack the main research question in a more nuanced and 
systematic fashion. The questions are not arranged in any particular order but each of them 
sheds light on different aspects of the indigenization policy. Some of the questions address the 
wider political and economic dynamics which shaped the environment in which indigenization 




i. How has Zimbabwe’s historical experience of settler-colonialism shaped its 
indigenisation and economic empowerment policy? 
 
ii. What is the history, significance, and the structure of the mining sector in Zimbabwe? 
 
iii. What has been the qualitative impact of the political, socio-economic context and 
external relations on the process and outcomes of the indigenization programme in 
Zimbabwe’s mining industry? 
 
 
iv. How much influence does foreign capital have in the minerals sector in Zimbabwe in 
the context of the indigenization policy?  
 
v. To what extent has Zimbabwe’s post-independence indigenization project achieved its 
objectives of an equitable distribution of wealth to the previously disadvantaged in the 
mining sector? 
 
1.4 Research objectives 
 
The main objective of this research is to describe and analyse the process of the indigenization 
policy in Zimbabwe’s minerals sector. An in-depth descriptive account is likely to reveal as 
yet unknown facts about the application of the policy and help build a comprehensive 
explanatory account of both the process and outcome of the policy. 
i. To give an account of the bearing of settler colonialism on Zimbabwe’s decision to 
pursue economic indigenization. 
 
ii. To describe the history and structure of Zimbabwe’s mining sector 
  
iii. To critically analyse the implementation process of indigenization policy in the mining 
sector with a view to identifying the factors that advanced or militated against the goals 




iv. To understand how the state framework, class relations and Zimbabwe’s position in the 
global order shape the course of transformation in the minerals sector. 
  
v. To evaluate the extent to which Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy has realised its key 
objective of promoting the representation of local players in the mining industry. 
 
1.5 Justification for the study                            
 
This study is a modest and timely intervention in the current discourse on Africa and the larger 
post-colonial world’s developmental crisis. Decades after the attainment of independence, 
socio-economic transformation has proved to be an elusive goal for the majority of the former 
colonies. Economic stagnation, acute dependency syndrome, widespread poverty and severe 
underdevelopment still dominate the narrative on post-colonial societies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2013; Moyo and Yeros, 2011). By casting the spotlight on Zimbabwe’s much talked-about 
indigenization and economic empowerment initiative, the study touches on an urgent issue that 
resonates with most post-colonial countries and their people. The indigenization policy in 
Zimbabwe represents a search for an alternative strategy to combat the crippling development 
inertia. However, the search for effective policy alternatives must be premised on an adequate 
understanding of the context that post-colonial societies find themselves in.  
 
This research is a historically grounded probe of Zimbabwe’s experiences and efforts at 
transforming and indigenizing its minerals sector (one of its most lucrative economic sectors), 
in the post-independence era. The quest to indigenize Zimbabwe’s mining industry has 
revealed some of the underlying determinants and forces that can help yield new insights on 
the trajectory of socio-economic transformation in the country. This study uses the tripartite 
framework of state power, local class struggles, and the global order as the primary 
determinants with significant influence on the course of economic indigenization. The tripartite 
framework enables a dynamic explanation of Zimbabwe and other post-colonial societies’ 
present malaise from a careful and systematic synthesis of internal and external dynamics. The 
historical exploration of this dynamic triad may lead to new theoretical and conceptual vistas 




This study was focused on the mining sector which is one of the more than a dozen sectors that 
have been targeted for local takeover in the 2007 Indigenization and Economic Empowerment 
Act. The mining sector will be very important in contributing to the successful indigenization 
of the Zimbabwean economy for a number of reasons. According to the Zimbabwe Investment 
Authority (ZIA) report in 2015, the mining industry is the second most sought after by foreign 
and domestic investment after manufacturing. In 2014 ZIA approved 38 investment projects in 
mining to the value of $488 million (ZIA, 2015). The new Emmerson Mnangagwa-led 
administration has announced plans to create a US$12 billion mining industry making it the 
center of the country’s economic turnaround strategy (Samaita, 2019). This perhaps also 
justifies or explains why the indigenization drive made the mining sector a priority with some 
of the biggest indigenisation deals having been concluded with big mining companies (Impala 
Platinum - $900 million; Mimosa - $536 million) (New African, 2013). The mining sector has 
the potential to be the proverbial goose that lays the golden eggs hence this study’s interest in 
efforts to transform the sector in Zimbabwe. 
 
1.6 Research methodology: paradigm and approach 
 
This study is informed by an interpretivist research paradigm. Interpretivism is a research 
paradigm that places emphasis on the interpretation of data be it from a subject or a document 
(Dean, 2018). It is a search for meaning in the words and actions of subjects. According to 
Ryan (2018:8) “interpretivism argues that truth and knowledge are subjective as well as 
culturally and historically situated based on people’s experiences and their understanding of 
them”. Interpretivism is based on the view that social reality does not exist independent of 
human consciousness, rather, it is created through consciousness. Reality is complex and 
multilayered and can only be understood from the perspective of the subjects in their 
interactions with each other (Searle, 1996). There are as many realities as there are subjects. 
The interpretivist enables a deeper understanding of the context and is appropriate for the case 
study method used in this research (See Cao Thanh and Le Thanh, 2015). Central to 
interpretivism is context which is deemed essential in making systematic understanding 
possible. The researcher makes an effort to make sense out of the data gathered through 
interviews, texts, and observation of behaviours, events and actions by thinking through the 
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information (Kivunja and Kuyini, 2017). An interprevist paradigm is appropriate for the nature 
of the present study which is highly contextual and historical. The paradigm will help 
understand and process the actions and decisions of actors and stakeholders in the 
indigenization of the mining sector in Zimbabwe. The implementation of national policy is not 
a mechanical process. It depends on the subjective experiences and perceptions of the people 
involved.  
 
The research methods that were used in this study relied on a qualitative approach. Qualitative 
approach is an investigation of the processes of the social world that places a premium on the 
meaning and motivation that individuals attach to their behaviours, actions and choices 
(Hancock, Ockleford and Windridge, 2009). According to Shank (2002) qualitative research is 
an empirical and systematic search for meaning. Astalin (2013) is of the view that qualitative 
research seeks to build a holistic description of a social phenomenon. Qualitative research 
makes possible an in-depth description and analysis of a complex world that cannot be easily 
captured by figures. Although flexible, qualitative approach is highly systematic. The 
qualitative approach makes possible a rich and in-depth study of the social phenomenon under 
investigation. Unlike a quantitative approach, the qualitative uses words, bodily movements, 
actions among other things to understand social processes (Ospina, 2004). Thus, qualitative 
research enables a better understanding of how and why certain events occur or why individuals 
make the choices they make (See Kielmann, Cataldo and Seeley, 2012). Some research 
methods used in a qualitative approach include case studies, unstructured interviews, 
participant observation and documentary analysis among others. The qualtitative methodology 
is appropriate for the present research because of its ability to go beneath the surface and 
unearth new perspectives while remaining sensitive to context. The indigenization policy 
implementation involves a lot of actors who must coordinate their actions. A qualitative 
approach would help to understand why actors may do things differently and their possible 
motivations because these affect the trajectory and the outcome of the policy. This study seeks 
to understand the indigenization of the mining sector in Zimbabwe from its complex history of 





1.6.1 Case study approach: ‘Casing’ Zimbabwe’s Indigenization Process 
 
A significant part of what we know about the social and political world comes from case studies. 
(Venesson, 2007: 223) 
While colonialism was a transnational historical fact experienced by a large number of 
countries in the global south, the forms it assumed varied from country to country. The existing 
body of knowledge about colonialism is really an accumulation of case studies done in different 
colonial societies (Fanon, 1961; Ranger, 1985). There was no universal experience of 
colonialism – only varying experiences structurally and aesthetically proximate enough to 
share the label of colonialism. In the same manner, the quest to undo the damaging legacies of 
colonialism has led to the birth of universal (at least in post-colonial societies) concept of 
decolonization. However, decolonization is seldom anything more than a shorthand description 
of the strikingly diverse strategies adopted by post-colonies in redressing colonial injustices. 
Hence, it is the position adopted in this study that the story of decolonization can only be 
effectively told through case-studies which are also the building blocks of the knowledge of 
the phenomenon. This study intends to contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon 
through an exploratory and interpretative case-study of Zimbabwe’s post-independence 
indigenization policy in the mining sector that seeks to redistribute mineral wealth from the 
foreign-owned companies to indigenous Zimbabweans who were previously excluded from the 
mainstream economy under the colonial government. Thus, the first and fundamental 
methodological decision of this study was to make it a case study of a historical and continent-
wide phenomenon that has certainly impacted on the course of Africa and Zimbabwe’s post-
colonial history. 
 
Case studies’ epistemological value has been evidenced through their use in some of the most 
important works dealing with social transformation (Skocpol, 1979; Adedeji, 1981; Evans, 
1995). There are many definitions of case studies that lay emphasis on different aspects. 
According to Yin (2009) a case study is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context”. Zainal (2007) adds that one of the defining features 
of case studies include “a detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or 
conditions and their relationships”. Rose, Spinks and Canhoto (2015: 1) define a case study as 
the “investigation of one or more specific instances of something that comprise the cases in the 
study”. Case studies can also come handy in clarifying the structure of a larger phenomenon 
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by improving on theoretical explanation (See Venesson, 2007). A case study approach places 
the researcher in a better position to scrutinize information on a specific phenomenon within a 
specific context paying attention to detail. This approach has the potential to enrich or challenge 
an established theoretical framework or even trigger a revision of an accepted theory.  
 
The case study method adopted in this study is by no means a fragmentation of a broader 
transnational phenomenon. Indeed, even though the variation of decolonization strategies and 
experiences from country to country has been palpable it is seldom so radical nor fundamental 
as to make these experiences utterly foreign to each other. Zimbabwe, like other post-colonial 
societies, possesses unique political, historical and cultural characteristics whose possible 
impact on the trajectory of the indigenization and redistribution policy merit deeper 
interrogation. The epistemological import of a case-study approach lies in its potential to reveal 
new aspects of a continent-wide historical process that has become a permanent part of post-
colonial Africa’s political discourse. Thus, the representation of the Zimbabwean experience 
has the potential to make new scientific contributions to the indigenization discourse in Africa 
and beyond. 
1.7 Data collection: sources and procedures  
         
1.7.1 Research population: Sampling and selection of respondents 
 
This study is an interpretive exploration of Zimbabwe’s post-independence efforts to transform 
the minerals sector through the indigenization of mining enterprises. It explores the dynamics 
that have shaped the process and the outcome in significant ways. The indigenization policy in 
Zimbabwe has affected different constituencies in different ways and its implementation has 
involved a network of actors located in different spheres of the society. As such, to construct a 
nuanced and inclusive narrative it was necessary to cast the net wider and deeper by consulting 
the representatives of various constituencies on their perspectives on and experience of the 
indigenization policy. The target population for the study included government officials, 
members of parliament, academics, civil society activists, private sector players, trade unionists 




The respondents were selected through purposive stakeholder sampling and snowball sampling 
techniques. Palys (2008) notes that stakeholder sampling is important in policy analysis 
research as it enables the researcher to gather the insights of the main actors in the 
implementation process. It is a non-probability sampling technique in which the researcher 
relies on their discretion and judgement in the selection of research respondents. Snowball 
sampling is also a non-probability type of sampling that relies on respondents to identify other 
respondents who may be knowledgeable about certain aspects of the research topic (Biernacki 
and Waldorf, 1981). There are many people who participate in the policy implementation 
process but work in obscurity. In such cases, people who are familiar and close to the processes 
can help identify other people with more information. Snowball sampling was used to locate 
more potential respondents while purposive stakeholder sampling was useful in selecting 
which respondents to interview. The criteria used in purposive sampling were the extent and 
nature of one’s involvement in the indigenization of the mining sector and their expertise or 
knowledge of the same. 
 
Using the sampling strategies just outlined, this study conducted in-depth interviews with 
people located and working in different organizations and capacities related to the 
implementation of the indigenization policy in the mining sector. Interviewees were drawn 
from the Ministry of Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment; Ministry of Mines 
and Mining Development, the Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines, the University of Zimbabwe, the 
Parliament of Zimbabwe, Gwanda Community Share Ownership Trust, Umguza Community 
Share Ownership Trust, The Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF), Indigenous Business 
Women Development, Zimbabwe School of Mines; National Mineworkers Union of 
Zimbabwe (NMWUZ); Associated Mineworkers Union of Zimbabwe (AMWUZ); National 
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB). The sample reflected the 
diversity of the participants in Zimbabwe’s mining sector which include government officials, 
legislators, private sector players, civil society organizations, academics, workers, politicians 
and community leaders among others. 
Table 1.1: Number of interviewees from various organizations 
Organization/Occupation Number of interviewees 





Ministry of Mines and Mining Development 7 
The Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF) 5 
Mineworkers representatives 4 
Chamber of Mines 1 
Academia/Civil society 6 
Legislators 1 
Total 36 
 *Include interviewees drawn from the Ministry, NIEEB, NIEEF and CSOTs 
The one-on-one interface with the key informants who are close to the policy making processes 
furnishes the researcher with first-hand information in addition to allowing for a deeper 
exploration on specific elements of the topic at hand (Kumar and Phrommathed 2005: 114). 
The main aim in conducting the interviews was to gather the perceptions and beliefs of the 
various stakeholders on the indigenization process as it was implemented in the mining sector. 
These perceptions were important in comprehending how the interests of the various actors 
related to each other concerning the indigenization process in the minerals sector. This 
information is crucial in that it can shed light on the nature of political relationships and power 
dynamics that underpin the decision-making within the context of policy implementation and 
compliance and also performance in terms of the extent to which the objectives of the policy 
are achieved. 
 1.7.2 Interviews (2017-2018) 
 
Interviews constituted one of the chief techniques used to collect data for this study. Interviews 
are a systematic and orderly way of conducting a conversation with a research participant in a 
way that elicits deep exploration of the topic of interest in order to produce new knowledge 
(See Kvale, 1996). One of the advantages of interviews over other techniques is that they 
capture the feelings and motivations of the respondents making it possible to understand their 
views of reality which shape the decisions they make (Alshenqeeti, 2014). For a study based 
on a subjective interrogation of the indigenization process in Zimbabwe, interviews were the 
most appropriate method of gathering data. Unlike documentary sources, interviews give the 
researcher an opportunity to seek clarification on relevant matters from the respondents whose 
actions inform the text of the documentary sources in the first place. Interviews also make it 
possible for the interviewees to request clarity on the precise meaning of the questions posed. 
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Interviewees for this study included government officials, academics, small-scale miners, 
large-scale miners, trade unionists, and members of the civil society. 
  
Before each interview began the researcher would give the interviewees a context of the 
interview by citing relevant government documents and other sources. The interviewee would 
be given the informed consent form to read and sign where appropriate. The first part of the 
interviews was a standard background check of the interviewees in terms of their profession 
and their role in an organization. The second and more important part of the interviews 
consisted of semi-structured and open-ended questions designed specifically for the 
interviewee in question. Semi-structured questions have the advantage of allowing the 
interviewee to express their feelings and views and give comprehensive answers to the 
questions posed, while also simultaneously allowing the interviewer to retain control of the 
interview especially the issues and themes discussed. The background of the interviewees for 
example Member of Parliament (MP), ministry official, trade union, civil society, or small-
scale miner were known before the interview. This made it possible to construct and structure 
the interview questions in a way that was relevant for the interviewee. All interviewees signed 
the informed consent form as an expression of their agreement to participate in the interview. 
  
The interviews were recorded through an audio-recorder upon the permission of the 
interviewee. Some of the interviewees, especially government officials were very reluctant to 
put their responses on record as they feared what one of them referred to as ‘political 
persecution’ if their responses happened to reach the ears of their superiors. This reflected how 
politically sensitive the issue of indigenization is in Zimbabwe. The languages used to conduct 
the interviews were a mixture of local languages, Shona and IsiNdebele, which the research 
was all comfortable with and English. The flexibility over the use of languages proved 
extremely advantageous as it allowed the interviewee to express themselves without any 
inhibitions or limitations. 
 
The process of getting access to the interviewees most of whom held leadership positions in 
the private sector, in civil society, government and academia was notoriously difficult. The 
potential interviewees lead very busy work lives and most could only be accessed through their 
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secretaries. Sometimes even sticking to the previously agreed-on appointment times proved a 
challenge for some of the respondents when appointment times clashed with unscheduled work 
meetings or other engagements. In a number of cases the researcher had to go back and forth 
several times before I successfully got the opportunity to talk to the respondent. This was very 
costly in terms of time and financial resources. The interviewees were located in different parts 
of Zimbabwe but the majority reside in Bulawayo and Harare which meant a lot of travelling 
between the two cities that are more than 400 kilometers apart. Most of the interviews were 
done in the two cities because most of the stakeholders (legislators, civil society activists, 
ministry officials and mining company offices) are located there. The researcher also held 
interviews in Gwanda town which had one of the most successful Community Share Ownership 
Trusts and some of the biggest mining companies in the country. They also travelled to 
Zvishavane town which hosts the platinum minning company, Mimosa. However, the several 
efforts made in securing an interview with the CEO were unsuccessful due to factors beyond 
the researcher’s control. The contact details of the interviewees were obtained online or from 
their places of work through the administrators. In a number of cases, respondents had moved 
offices without changing the details on their official websites which made locating their new 
work stations a difficult challenge. Some of the potential respondents’ contact numbers seemed 
to be dysfunctional which made communication all but impossible.  
 
Also, in some cases the researcher had to contact the targeted respondents through their social 
media pages on Facebook and Twitter if they were available on those platforms. 
Communication with a good number of respondents was initiated through social media 
platforms which I found very convenient, faster and cheaper. Some respondents preferred using 
email platforms which, while very efficient, curtailed the ability to follow-up on some of the 
answers to the questions posed. In other cases, respondents would ask to view the questions 
first a few days before the interview took place so they could prepare their responses. There 
was no problem with this. Some respondents though responded to the questions impromptu. 
This did not seem to affect the quality of the responses. In the case of Parliament, the researcher 
had to seek the permission of the administration and also attend a few sittings just to get access 
to the parliamentarians. Moreover, there were also cases were respondents asked to be ‘given 
something’ which meant monetary awards. Such requests were politely turned down as they 
violated research ethics code. Fortunately, the respondents understood my situation and still 
continued with the interviews. There were also some occasions where the researcher had to 
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interview three or four respondents at the same time especially amongst government officials 
who shared office space providing an unscripted focus group set up. Although unplanned, this 
was a bonus as it meant more diverse views on the topic being discussed. At the same time, 
this may have inhibited the respondents’ ability to freely give their opinions. The researcher 
suspected this was the case as most of their answers to the questions asked tended to be in 
agreement. 
 
The first few interviews were in many ways a learning curve. A lot of mistakes, omissions and 
commissions that weighed negatively on the quality of the interviews could have been avoided. 
The author went into the interview without having researched the background of the 
interviewee, and without adequate information on the details of their organization and their 
role in the organization. In some cases, the researcher cited information they had read 
elsewhere to challenge some statements they would have made to which they did not take very 
kindly. Such gaffes affect the quality and flow of the conversation. However, there was 
improvement with time and the quality of the responses also improved markedly. Another 
concern was the way the interview questions were structured. Questions that were politically 
sensitive often attracted long and winding answers short of substance. At times, interviewees 
would avoid answering questions they thought were too political. The interview questions had 
to be structured in such a way as to divest them of possible political trappings which may result 
in responses that defend one’s political views and affiliations. 
 1.7.3 Documentary sources 
 
Besides interviews, the other major source of information for this study consists of 
documentary materials. Documentary research refers to the analysis of documents that have 
recorded information regarding events, processes or entities under study (Ahmed, 2010). Public 
and private documents were consulted in gathering data for this study. Most important among 
these were government documents such as Acts of Parliament comprising of the various 
legislations on indigenization and Parliamentary Hansards containing parliamentary debates 
and minutes of parliamentary committee meetings. Other government publications (including 
policy statements and regulations, government gazettes, government departments’ reports, 
statistical reports and ministerial reports), also provided invaluable information on the 
indigenization programme. Complementing public documents were private publications 
(including political party reports, company reports, civil society organizations research papers) 
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which also provided useful information on the indigenization programme. Moreover, reports 
from Community Share Ownership Trusts, companies that were targeted for indigenization, 
trade unions, and associations like the Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines and Human Rights Watch 
were important in filling in information gaps or corroborating available information on the 
indigenization policy. Journalistic reports from private and public electronic and print media, 
especially investigative reports on the sale and acquisition of shares in mining enterprises and 
reports on government policy pronouncements proved invaluable as credible sources of data 
(Chikanga, 2003; Chiriga, 2004). It is important to note that documentary research is much 
more than a mere regurgitation of recorded facts. It involved a rigorous and meticulous process 
of locating the information obtained within a theoretical framework that improves the 
intelligibility of the phenomenon being investigated. 
  
In dealing with documentary sources for this research four quality control principles were 
strictly applied: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Scott, 2006). This 
was done to ensure that the information contained in the documents came from credible sources 
and could be meaningfully incorporated into the analysis of the indigenization programme in 
the mining sector. The challenge in relying on documentary evidence, especially on a 
programme as politically sensitive as indigenization, is that there is a lot of misinformation and 
misrepresentation done with political motives. There were several instances where even highly 
regarded national newspapers in both the public and private sectors published stories with 
misleading information on the indigenization policy1. Getting reports from government 
departments proved to be a challenge as most of the reports were classified as sensitive and 
confidential and one had to go through an arduous process to get access. 
  
                                                          
1 The Herald, 13 July 2013, reported that 50 Community Trusts each worth US$10 million had been set up across 
the country. However, most Trusts had value far below that amount. 
The Chronicle, 16 October 2011, reported that Zimplats handed ten percent shareholding to Ngezi Community 








It goes without saying that in this age of digital revolution, the internet has increasingly become 
an important intellectual platform that has created new vistas for scholarly research. In this 
study, the internet proved to be the go-to place for historical and current information. Advances 
in information and communication technology has made possible the collection of data through 
cyber and virtual ethnography (Hetland and Morch, 2016). Cyber ethnography is also referred 
to as digital ethnography, internet ethnography and netnography. According to Black (2016: 
105) cyberethnography involves collecting data using online participant observation, blogs, 
online focus groups, social media sites, chats, Skype and YouTube. Hallet and Barber (2014) 
point out that with the proliferation of the internet, online spaces have become crucial for social 
interaction, identity formation and recreation of relationships. They suggest people now have 
an online habitat in addition to a physical habitat (2014: 307). Emails, Facebook, Twitter, blogs, 
websites have replaced print media as preferred sources of information. Important data can be 
gathered in these online platforms. Thus, online communities are increasingly becoming field 
sites where researchers can collect information from their research participants. Hetland and 
Morch (2016) are of the view that internet ethnography is less time consuming, less prone to 
intrusion and uses less resources. This study used such sites as Twitter, Youtube and Whatsapp 
and other online platforms to collect data some of which pertains to the implementation of the 
indigenization policy in Zimbabwe. 
 
Through various video-streaming such as YouTube I was able to watch and listen to 
parliamentary debates and inquiries, political speeches, media interviews that had valuable 
information on the indigenization policy. Social media was also important especially because 
a lot of people in leadership positions in government and in the private sector and companies 
and institutions have verified social media accounts where they posted information pertaining 
to the indigenization programme. The major advantage of social media sites like Facebook and 
Twitter is that they provided the opportunity to identify and have interaction with potential 
research participants. Company websites and ministry websites also became a reliable source 
of information. However, most government departments in Zimbabwe including those 
responsible for the indigenization policy have dysfunctional digital pages lacking any useful 




Just like the documentary sources, internet sources were also subjected to a thorough vetting 
before being incorporated as admissible evidence. The biggest challenge about using the 
internet for information is that it is open to everyone and anyone can upload anything. As such 
the importance of thoroughly verifying the credibility and quality of a source before admitting 
it cannot be overemphasized. Two sets of 5Cs models for verifying internet sources were 
faithfully and diligently applied. The first set includes content, credibility, critical thinking, 
copyright and citations. The second set includes currency and continuity, censorship, 
connectivity, comparability and context (Kaushik, 2012). Although a significant number of 
sites failed to make the grade, it was pleasing to note that the majority of internet sources were 
of high quality 
1.8 Data analysis and interpretation   
 
Data analysis is a crucial phase of a research that systematically establishes order, coherence 
and meaning in an otherwise non-descript mass of raw data. According to Schwandt (2007) 
data analysis is about making sense of and deducing overarching theories or statements on 
collected data. As already stated this study collected extensive data on the process of the 
indigenization of the mining sector in Zimbabwe. The chief aim of the study was to understand 
the indigenization process from the experiences, actions and decisions of the various actors 
who were close to the indigenization policy processes in the mining sector. Thus actions, events 
and decisions related to or surrounding the state, mining firms, government officials, 
government agencies, trade unions, mining community leaders, international leaders and 
organizations, civil society players provided the raw data for this study. Statistics from 
specialist agencies like the Zimbabwe Investment Authority and the Central Statistics Office 
among others were also collected as data. The actions and attitudes of different actors 
occupying different places in the production relations of the mining sector and also the opinions 
of experts in this topic constitute the data that this study dealt with. Informed by a critical 
constructivist perspective, the data gathered for this study were put through a rigorous 
qualitative analysis process using thematic, content, textual criticism, and historical analysis 
techniques. 
  
Thematic analysis was one of the chief techniques used to construct relevant themes and 
concepts that like rays of light illuminate an otherwise opaque and mysterious phenomenon. 
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Alhojailan (2012:40) recommends thematic analysis as a valuable and effective tool for 
“analyzing classifications and presenting themes” which contribute to the intelligibility of the 
social world. Maguire and Delahunt (2017) emphasize that thematic analysis involves much 
more than summarizing data – it is instrumental in making sense of the data gathered. Braun 
and Clarke (2006) even go further to point out that thematic analysis should be the foundational 
method for the analysis of qualitative data as it also enables the researcher to learn other forms 
of qualitative analysis. In the process of conducting a thematic analysis for this study, some 
procedures learnt from methodology literature were applied (Nowell et al, 2017; Castleberry 
and Nolen, 2018). The first step was to compile the data from the interviews, documentary 
material and various internet sources into a workable format. This involved the laborious 
process of transcription of interviews and video evidence and arranging them in files depending 
on which subset of the target population they were coming from. For example, the 
transcriptions were filed and classified according to the interviewee’s background as 
government officials, civil society, academics, politicians, workers or private sector player 
among other indicators. Documentary and internet sources were also reduced and summarized 
into a form that could be used for analysis. 
  
The second step involved disassembling the raw data grouping items into identifiable patterns 
of concepts, themes and ideas that are interlinked and interrelated. Disassembling was 
conducted through coding of specific words, phrases, sentences or lines of thinking to identify 
similarities and differences and note the emerging patterns. According to Theron (2015: 4) 
coding can be described as a method to “organize data so that the underlying messages 
portrayed by the data may become clearer to the researcher”. Coding was done manually by 
going through every file of data and colouring the themes and items which I thought relevant 
for analysis. While this consumed a huge amount of time, it also made me more intimately 
familiar with the data. The next step was to reassemble and regroup the coded data into various 
themes on class relations in the mining sector, corruption, patronage, state capacity, economic 
empowerment, decolonization, successful and failed indigenization deals, foreign domination, 
power and political relations, the hierarchical world-system, justice and history among others. 
Organizing the data into themes made its interpretation, which is the next and final step in 
thematic analysis, possible. The data was presented in the form of tables, graphs, figures and 
texts (consisting of excerpts from interviews, speeches, official reports from various entities 
and media from media reports). In quoting the responses of the interviews, the interviewees 
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were identified by their names. Where interviewees asked to remain anonymous their identity 
was presented as Interviewee – 1(I-1) or Interviewee – 2 (I-2). The numbering was determined 
by the time they were interviewed in relation to other interviewees. The presentation of data 
and its interpretation was done simultaneously. 
   
Content analysis is another effective technique of data analysis employed in this study. Content 
analysis can be understood broadly as a research strategy that uses the presence of certain words 
or concepts within texts to draw valid inferences from a text (See Weber, 1990). Neuendorf 
(2002) suggests that content analysis is the systematic and objective analysis of message 
characteristics. Kripperndorf (2004) identified empiricism, exploration and prediction as the 
defining attributes of content analysis. The difference between content and thematic analysis 
is that whereas the latter focuses on underlying themes that can be derived from the data, the 
former is literally a record of the frequency of certain expressions, words or concepts in 
statements. It is concerned with how many times certain words are used and by whom. Thus, 
content analysis does not only identify themes but also enables the researcher to determine 
which theme is more dominant than others. As such these two techniques are complementary 
in the sense that content analysis provides the raw material for the formulation of themes. 
  
Zimbabwe’s political-economy is to an important extent the product of the country’s history. 
The dynamics of the indigenization policy cannot be fully grasped if past events that have 
defined the course of the country’s history are not taken into consideration. Hence this study 
incorporated the historical method of analysis in understanding the current indigenization 
policy as it has been applied in the mining sector. Historical analysis involves a dynamic 
interpretative approach to the understanding of past events with regards to how they have 
shaped the present. Thus, it is more than a mere description of what happened in the past but 
rather a scientific and systematic undertaking to reveal the historical phases of the development 
of a phenomenon (Kumar, 2013). According to Wyche et al (2006) historical analysis is a 
method of learning from records, narratives and accounts of what happened in the past in order 
to formulate insights into a current phenomenon. Thies (2002: 352) refers to historical analysis 
as the “use of primary historical documents or historians’ interpretation thereof in service of 
theory development and testing”. This study goes back in time to the precolonial, colonial and 
post-colonial eras to understand how the past has contributed to the character of the dynamics 
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within the structure of Zimbabwe’s mining sector, which has arguably been the centerpiece of 
the country’s economy. In various chapters of this research, historical documents are constantly 
referred to in placing the indigenization policy into proper perspective. 
1.9 Challenges encountered 
  
The execution of this study was beset by a myriad of challenges and obstacles which, although 
distressing, served as a learning curve and a valuable lesson on research. The first challenge 
was having to go through a cumbersome bureaucratic process to secure gatekeepers’ letters 
from the government offices which took ages to be released. This considerably delayed the 
commencement of the fieldwork. Another issue was getting access to the respondents most of 
whom were senior government officials who had busy schedules. At times I had to travel back 
and forth as a result of dishonored appointments for interviews. While in most cases the 
interviews eventually took place after several attempts there were some instances where the 
researcher ended up abandoning efforts to get the interview due to the continued unavailability 
of the respondents. This had the obvious effect of reducing the potential number of interviewees 
and thus possibly undermining the depth of the research. However, the use of snowball 
sampling helped to find new respondents through recommendations from other interviewees. 
  
One worrying difficulty was the connected issues of anonymity and confidentiality on the one 
hand, and the validity and reliability of the information I got from secondary and primary 
sources. Firstly, some of the interviewees had reservations about the guarantees of their identity 
and what they said to the researcher being held in confidence despite the researcher’s best 
efforts to allay their fears. This may have had the unfortunate effect of interviewees not willing 
to open up and offer their honest opinions on the facts surrounding the policy. I gave them 
assurances during the interview that their identity will be strictly confidential and there was 
nothing to worry about. Secondly, the indigenization and economic empowerment policy has 
led to intense polarization such that the information presented even in the documentary and 
online could have been motivated by political interests. Thus, the fear of respondents and the 
politicization of the indigenization policy debate may have had a negative impact on the quality 
and integrity of the information on the facts of the policy. The lack of reliable information can 
undermine the validity of the study. As such the researcher tried to ascertain the credibility of 
the information as thoroughly as possible. 
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Further, one of the challenges the researcher faced was a personal one. As a Zimbabwean 
citizen who is also affected by and interested in the implementation of the indigenization 
policy, the researcher struggled to locate myself as an objective outside observer. It is not easy 
to cast aside one’s pre-existing opinions and inclinations on public matters that have been 
formed over a lifelong process of socialization. This possibly affected not only the way they 
interpreted and analyzed the information they got from the data sources, but also shaped the 
construction of the subject of the research and framing of the research questions. A conscious 
effort was made to prevent feelings from clouding my approach to the subject of the study. 
Moreover, this research is centered on a case study of one country which may limit its 
generalizability and validity beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. Admittedly, a comparative study of 
two or more countries that have at one point in their history adopted the indigenization policy 
would have yielded more insights into the dynamics that impact on its implementation. 
However, no two countries are exactly alike. Therefore, despite the limitations that come with 
a single case study research, case studies have the potential to contribute unique insights into 
widely held views about social phenomena.  
1.10 The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy: The Framework  
 
Zimbabwe’s Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy (hereafter the IEEP) was 
adopted in 2010 following the enactment of the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment 
Bill by the Zimbabwean parliament in 2007 and signed into law by former President Robert 
Mugabe on the 7th of March 2008 (See Zeldin, 2008). The policy is intended to expedite the 
redistribution of wealth and economic power from foreign-owned companies to indigenous 
Zimbabweans. The IEEP is an equity-based transformation initiative that seeks to increase the 
equity participation of indigenous people in multinational companies (MNCs) that are valued 
at over US$500 000 with a particular focus on mining MNCs. The targeted industries range 
from transport, tourism, insurance, mining, agriculture, banking and finance, communication, 
construction, energy and manufacturing. Section 3(a) of the IEE Act states that 51% of the 
shares in the foreign-owned businesses should be owned by indigenous people including 
companies and individuals. This meant that local people should have a controlling stake in 




To demonstrate its commitment to the empowerment of the rural poor and the workers, the 
government of Zimbabwe through the IEE Act created Employee and Community Share 
Ownership Trusts (ESOTs and CSOTs). These are mechanisms designed to ensure that workers 
and local communities get a fair share of the profits of indigenized businesses. According to 
the 2010 General Regulations issued under Statutory Instrument 21, the law required that 10% 
of the shares which form part of the 51% that qualifying businesses have been directed to 
dispense to indigenous Zimbabweans shall be reserved for the local communities that host 
those businesses. Under the same Act the ESOTs are entitled to a minimum of 5% share 
ownership of the companies they work for (IEEA Section 14, 2007). CSOTs are an important 
component of the indigenization policy in Zimbabwe as they are the chief vehicles through 
which the rural communities will be empowered and ultimately benefit from the mining 
operations located in their geographical areas. Section 14B (2) amendment of the IEEA General 
Regulations (2010) provides for the establishment of CSOTs which is a platform through which 
local communities are meant to partake in the economic activities of their areas. The section 
states that: 
A community share ownership scheme or trust that complies with this section may be taken 
into consideration when assessing the extent to which a business has achieved or exceeded the 
minimum indigenization and empowerment quota. 
Section 14(1) of the IEE Act (2007) provides for the establishment of Employee share 
ownership schemes (ESOS) by the qualifying business2: 
An employee share ownership scheme or trust that complies with this section may be taken into 
consideration when assessing the extent to which a business that is a company has achieved or 
exceeded the minimum indigenization and empowerment quota. 
The indigenization law of 2007 also provided for the establishment of the institutional 
mechanisms to facilitate the process of redistribution. The two prominent institutions created 
for this purpose include the National Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Board 
(NIEEB) (IEEA Section 7, 2007) and the National Indigenization and Economic 
Empowerment Fund (NIEEF) (Section 12). The functions of the NIEEB include advising the 
government on empowerment strategies, administering the fund, and to oversee compliance 
with the law (Section 8, 2007). The purpose behind the establishment of the NIEEF was to 
                                                          
2 Qualifying businesses in this case refers to the foreign-owned companies which meet the minimum threshold 
of the indigenization and economic empowerment policy. 
24 
 
provide financial assistance to indigenous Zimbabweans for share acquisition, to avail funding 
for business start-ups and to finance market research that enhances the objectives of the law 
(Section 12, 2007). Indigenization entails the localization of capital by creating opportunities 
for indigenous Zimbabweans to participate in the mainstream economy of the country and not 
just remain on the sidelines. Whether (or not) the legislation is an adequate instrument to 
effectively address the challenges it is purported to address, is a moot point. Although at the 
time of writing (2019) the IEE Act still exists as law, the new Emmerson Mnangagwa-led 
government that came to office in November 2017 has indicated its intention to tone down the 
Act by limiting it to diamond and platinum mining sectors only (Mugabe, 2017).  
 
1.11 Structure of dissertation 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and methodology 
Chapter 1 was a broad introduction and background to the dissertation. The chapter discussed 
the main objectives and the central questions that this research intends to answer. The 
importance of this study and its contribution to academic inquiry was also stated. The chapter 
also outlined the methodological approach that underpinned the study including the data 
collection and analysis techniques. Essentially this chapter is the anchor of the whole 
dissertation since it sets the tone, the scope and the direction that the research work takes as it 
explores the government of Zimbabwe’s efforts to transform and restructure the mining sector.  
Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
The second chapter focuses on an extensive and incisive analysis of the existing scholarship on 
economic indigenization and empowerment particularly in the natural resources sector. The 
utility of this chapter lies in its effort to place the present research in the context of the existing 
body of knowledge on the phenomenon of indigenization and economic empowerment. 
Literature whose geographical and time scope varies widely were consulted with a view to fit 
the focus of the present research within the purview of existing scholarship. Hence the literature 
review covers the evolution of the indigenization discourse in Zimbabwe and other African 
countries’ experiences. This chapter also covers some of the important themes that this research 
focused on. The themes were revisited in data presentation and analysis in chapters 6 and 7 so 
as to gauge any differences or similarities with the findings of this research. 
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Chapter 3: Indigenization of Zimbabwe’s Mining Sector: Through the Lenses of the State, 
Class Relations, and the World System 
The third chapter of the dissertation develops a theoretical framework to explain and make 
sense of Zimbabwe’s experiences in trying to promote local participation in the country’s 
mining sector. The theoretical framework uses a three-pronged approach centred on the state, 
class relations and the world-economic system as its principal elements. It explains how these 
three elements connect with each other to shape the character of the indigenization programme 
in Zimbabwe. The chapter also builds three hypotheses based on each of the principal 
components of the theoretical framework. The advanced hypotheses capture expectations on 
how each of the elements may have impacted on the course of the indigenization programme. 
 
Chapter 4: Class Formation in Zimbabwe’s Mining Sector: A Historical Background (1890-
2000)  
This chapter explores the history of the mining sector in Zimbabwe from precolonial times 
through the first two decades of the post-colonial era. As Zimbabwe was drafted into the world 
capitalist economy upon being colonized, a whole new mode of production of mineral wealth 
was imposed by the colonial government. This new mode of production produced new groups 
of people whose varying roles in the production process were perpetuated by asymmetrical 
power relations. This chapter articulates the history of the development and the evolution of 
Zimbabwe’s mining sector through spanning the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. 
It reveals the class struggles that have shaped the structure of the industry as it appears to date 
and how this has informed the Zimbabwean government’s approach to indigenization.  
 
Chapter 5: Data Presentation and Analysis: Indigenization in the Large-scale Mining Sector 
(1995-2017) 
Chapter 5 delves deeper into the implementation of the indigenization policy in Zimbabwe’s 
large-scale mining sector where the government wanted to promote local ownership. The 
chapter relies on the data collected during the course of the research through interviews with 
key participants, searching the archives and use of verified government and private sector 
reports to explore how the policy was applied on individual foreign-owned mining enterprises. 
This approach yielded significant insights on the impact of state power, class relations and the 
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nature of the world economy on the trajectory and the outcome of the indigenization policy. It 
enabled a closer scrutiny of the workings of the government, of the balance of class forces 
outside the state and how Zimbabwe’s precarious position in the world order influenced the 
pace of the indigenization programme. More importantly it also brought into relief the limits 
of the powers of the state machinery in terms of determining the relations of production in the 
mining industry.  
Chapter 6: Downstream indigenization: Artisanal and small-scale miners, working class, 
and the peasant communities 
This chapter is a continuation of the data-based assessment of the implementation and outcome 
of Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy in the mining sector. Whereas the previous chapter 
discussed indigenization attempts within the large-scale mining sector, chapter 6 shifts focus 
to the small-scale sector, workers struggles and peasant communities that host big mining 
companies. These groups constitute a vital part of the mining sector’s class structure on which 
the mode of mineral wealth production is based. The chapter reveals how the small-scale 
miners, working class and the rural peasants have been greatly disadvantaged and 
disempowered in the fight for the indigenization of the mining sector. The working class is 
repressed through legal and extra-legal means, the peasants have been neglected and the small-
scale miners have been marginalized and criminalized. The chapter also revealed an 
exploitative relationship between the ruling class and small-scale miners in which the former 
use the state apparatus to exploit the latter. The treatment of these classes, of whom the 
overwhelming majority are indigenous people, has greatly undermined the main objective of 
the indigenization policy, which is to promote the representation of indigenous people in 
various sectors of the economy including the minerals sector.  
 
Chapter 7: Summary of Findings, Further Research Areas and Conclusions 
The last chapter presents a general conclusion of the research. The first part of the chapter 
summarizes and synthesizes the major findings and the prominent themes emerging from the 
research conducted in relation to existing previous studies on economic indigenization in post-
colonial states. The chapter also makes recommendations on how the research on 
indigenization can be moved forward and how the issue can be approached from a policy-





2.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
That every independent country with a state apparatus, territory and population should own 
and control its economy and resources for its own survival is a normative given. However, this, 
as empirical evidence has consistently revealed, has not been the case in many African 
countries, a situation which in itself is, broadly speaking, a normative, logical, moral and 
structural aberration that merits further inquiry3. It is also a reflection of Africa’s peculiar 
historical and contemporary circumstances. Kwame Nkrumah’s ‘political kingdom’4 has not, 
decades after its attainment, been followed by what Bracking (2004) called the ‘economic 
kingdom’ thus defying and dampening the high expectations triggered by political 
independence. Ramose (2006: 3) laments the fact that the decolonization process left the 
economic power of the colonial rulers untouched arguing that it “constitutes a very grave 
concern over the structural economic dependency of contemporary Africa”. The political 
kingdom was expected to provide the needed impetus to underwrite efforts to secure economic 
independence and sovereignty. That has turned out not to be the case. Interestingly however, 
that African governments’ effort to reverse the colonial legacy of economic discrimination has 
not won unanimous acceptance from the academia, and has been at best embraced with caution 
in some circles, reflects the delicate and not-so-clear-cut nature of the issue. The lack of 
consensus (as will be explored below), is possibly due to subjective ideological and political 
inclinations (Andreason, 2010). Likewise, Zimbabwe’s indigenization programme and other 
similar programmes in African countries, which at least on face value appear to be earnest 
attempts at reversing past injustices, have elicited mixed responses from the academia and the 
media (Chengu, 2013; Kurebwa, 2014), perhaps not least because of their mixed outcomes. 
 
                                                          
3 In the majority of post-colonial countries the overwhelming numbers of economically disenfranchised 
indigenous people remains an elephant in the room that cannot be ignored. Attempts to indigenise the 
economies in countries like Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and Zambia have largely been unsuccessful (See Adedeji, 
1981). 
4 A phrase adapted from Kwame Nkrumah the first president of independent Ghana’s famous statement: ‘Seek 
ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto you’. This statement was widely interpreted to 
mean that political independence would make it possible for African countries and peoples to assume economic 
control of their countries (See Deng, 1998) 
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After the achievement of political independence, new African governments in Ghana, Nigeria 
and Zambia among other cases pursued economic indigenization in varying scopes, scales and 
intensity accomplishing varying degrees of success or lack of it (Adedeji, 1981). The post-
colonial governments were under no illusions about the flawed economic systems they 
inherited which condemned the majority of the people to desperate social and economic 
circumstances. Right across an otherwise highly variegated post-colonial world socio-
economic transformation, even if loosely defined, was universally accorded precedence on the 
agendas of the newly independent states (Deng, 1998). Having secured the support of the 
people in the anti-colonial struggles dangling the carrot of economic empowerment, the need 
to empower the hitherto disadvantaged indigenous people has often anchored and informed the 
economic policies of post-colonial governments. The establishment of equitable economic 
structures to expedite and facilitate the emancipation of the impoverished native populations 
was roundly stated as the central objective of the majority of the first four or five-year 
development plans declared in the morrow of independence. Tanzania’s first five-year 
development plan (1964-1969) was anchored on improving education and literacy as the 
cornerstone of Tanzanisation of the mainstream economy by replacing expatriate workers with 
indigenous ones (See Nyerere, 1968). As part of its First National Development Plan (1966-
71), Zambia promulgated the 1968 Mulungushi Reforms through which the government sought 
to nationalize foreign owned enterprises by acquiring majority shareholdings. Hence 
indigenization and other related efforts towards socio-economic transformation have been 
long-standing items on the agenda of academic research in Africa and beyond (Adedeji, 1981). 
Some African leaders even developed philosophies to explain and justify strategies of black 
emancipation. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is known for African socialism, Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana developed what he called Consciencism, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia came up with 
Humanism while Jomo Kenyatta proposed Harambe. 
 
A sift through literature on the same subject reveals a dense terrain of assumptions, assertions 
and counter-assertions highlighting different understandings, versions and visions of the 
indigenization programme. Disagreements pervade the literature on indigenization and not 
even the seemingly impeccable moral basis of the policy on which it is largely anchored has 
been spared (See Mupfema, 1998; Raftopoulous and Compagnon, 2003; Matyszak, 2011; 
Chengu, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Bwoni, 2015; Musewe, 2016). The debate is polarized 
between scholars who support the policy and those who are critical of it. For example, Chengu 
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(2013) confidently asserts that Zimbabwe’s indigenization programme fits the bill for adoption 
in the economics discipline as a model for African economic decolonization. Bwoni (2016) 
concurs as he lauds the indigenization policy as the only reliable and effective route towards 
an equitable global economic system. However, Museweni (2016) did not mince his words in 
his disapproval of the indigenization policy unequivocally stating that “the indigenisation act 
must go because it is wrong policy at the wrong time for the wrong reasons”. In much the same 
tone Mufema (1998:8-11) dismisses the indigenization drive as a political project of the ruling 
class designed to consolidate their political and economic hegemony. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 
11) laments what he refers to as the “nativization” of political discourse in which indigenization 
amounts to a manipulation and caricaturing of the nationalist ideology by the ruling class to 
purchase political legitimacy. He argues that nationalism should be an inclusive and 
progressive force and cannot be used to enforce arbitrary discrimination based on one’s skin 
colour or place of birth. 
  
Scholars have also argued for different models of indigenization and economic empowerment 
with a view to maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of such policies (Adedeji, 1981; 
Chowa, 2013; Gono, 2013). Part of the discourse has been centered on the very need for the 
policy in the first place with some economists like John Robertson5 quoted as saying “all talk 
of indigenisation should be abandoned” labelling it as morally unjust to seize other people’s 
properties (Munyuki, 2014). At the other end of the spectrum of the debate are scholars like 
Ramose (2006) who are convinced that such policies are long overdue and previously colonized 
peoples deserve distributive and restorative justice. Other scholars (Andreasson, 2010; 
Matyszak 2011) have pointed out that the narrow definition of indigeneity monopolizes 
property rights in land and resources to people defined as organic and belonging (sons and 
daughters of the soil) and strips the sizeable minorities like African immigrants, coloureds, 
Indians and the whites of any claims to assets. Magure (2015) notes that villagers in Svosve, 
Zimbabwe, who invaded white-owned farms in their area in 1998 claimed that settler 
colonialists displaced their forefathers to establish commercial farms on their land. The 
implication is that the white farmers were conducting farming on land in which they had no 
property rights. This argument can also be extended to the indigenization of the mining sector 
to claim that the international corporations are actually conducting mining activities on lands 
                                                          
5 A renowned economics professor at the University of Zimbabwe who has been perhaps the fiercest critic of 
Zimbabwe’s Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act. 
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belonging to the indigenous people of their host areas. These viewpoints underscore the 
centrality of the contested notions of property rights underpinning the economic indigenization 
policy in Zimbabwe.  
 
However much of the debate has rather focused on the specifics, implementation, provisions 
and how best to structure the indigenization programme to maximize its transformative 
potential. Some of the central issues discussed include the relationship between indigenization 
and foreign direct investment (Raftopoulous and Compagnon, 2003; Bwoni, 2015; Magaisa, 
2015). Further, literature has also discussed the roles of the different stakeholders in the 
indigenization debate including the state, the private and public sectors, civil society, the 
workers and the rural peasant communities. Often the extent and nature of the roles of these 
various stakeholders have far reaching implications on the outcomes of the policy (Verhoef, 
2004; Machinya, 2014; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2015).  
 
The indigenization policy in Zimbabwe, if successful, would enable possibly the largest 
transfer of wealth in any post-colonial state, if not in absolute terms, then definitely in 
proportion. About US$7 billion is likely to be transferred from the targeted companies to the 
indigenous people through the IEEA (Zanu PF Election Manifesto 2013: 36). Given the 
country’s record of implementing the largest land reform in Sub-Saharan Africa6, it is difficult 
not to take seriously its efforts towards economic indigenization (Mamdani, 2008: 3). This 
extroverted assault of the neo-colonial system is an unadulterated expression of a shared 
irritation with the stubborn legacies of colonialism that continue to frustrate efforts to empower 
previously disadvantaged people in most post-colonial societies (See Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). 
That said, this chapter conducts an extensive and empirical review of the scholarship on 
indigenization and decolonization of the post-colonial economies zooming into the key aspects 
of these policies. The first section is a brief rundown and identification of the salient issues that 
dominate the content of the indigenization discourse deemed fundamental to the policy. The 
following sections will delve deeper into how these issues have been dealt with in the literature 
                                                          
6 Zimbabwe embarked on a land redistribution programme at the turn of the 21st century. The programme saw 
more than 300 000 families resettled on more than 11 million hectares of land previously held by 6000 white 
farmers (See Moyo, 2011). 
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with a view to identifying gaps and limitations, the resolution of which will enrich the existing 
body of research.    
2.2 Conceptualization of indigenization and empowerment 
 
An enormous amount of literature has been produced on the economic empowerment 
programme in Zimbabwe and Africa in general. The definition and clarification of the concepts 
of indigenization and empowerment have pre-occupied scholarship on the topic. In an effort to 
demystify current government policies aimed at reversing colonial legacies, scholars have 
grappled over what precisely entails the concepts of indigenization and empowerment. 
Zimbabwe’s (IEEA) (2007) has a rather clear and straightforward definition of indigenization. 
It defines indigenization as the “conscious involvement or participation of the indigenous 
population in the economic activities of the country to which they previously had no access to 
ensure the equitable ownership of the nation’s resources” (2007:2). The definition is 
conspicuously silent on the method to be used to achieve indigenization. Matunhu (2012: 9) 
describes indigenization as the “practice of transferring the ownership of privately-owned 
economic entities into public ownership underpinned by the notion that previously 
marginalized people should be given an opportunity to improve themselves”. Kurebwa 
(2014:5) opines that the essence of indigenization is the distribution of the benefits of economic 
growth to the majority thus making the economy inclusive and sustainable. The foregoing 
definitions make it clear that indigenization is fundamentally an economic restructuring 
programme through de-concentration of the control and ownership of wealth. 
  
Adedeji (1981: 32) offers a broad understanding of indigenization as primarily and 
fundamentally designed to achieve economic decolonization and thus reducing economic 
dependence on the industrialized countries while promoting and consolidating self-reliance for 
post-colonial countries. The indigenization or decolonization of the economy is a local as much 
as it is an international issue and therefore policymakers should also take the global context 
and dynamics into consideration. As will be argued in the next chapter, the indigenization 
policy is an attempt by Zimbabwe to change its position in the world system from domination 
by and dependence on foreign capital by promoting local capital. Success in this regard will be 
determined by the country’s ability to navigate the global forces (foreign capital markets and 
the Bretton Woods Institutions) that hold an advantageous position in the current world system. 
32 
 
Further refining his conceptualization of indigenization in more concrete and precise terms, 
Adedeji (1981), suggests that indigenization can be collapsed or classified into four types or 
categories depending on the methodology and model pursued by the policy makers in different 
countries. There is indigenization of ownership, indigenization of control, indigenization of 
technology and indigenization of manpower (1981: 31).  
 
Indigenization of ownership seeks to give or transfer the ownership of the country’s economic 
resources to the indigenes of the country under private or public ownership. Zimbabwe’s 
equity-based model of granting majority shareholding to indigenous Zimbabweans in foreign 
owned companies may fall under this category. Indigenization of control aims to increase the 
influence of indigenous citizens in the economic activities of the country by among other ways, 
ensuring that there is a critical mass of indigenes on the boards of influential economic 
enterprises. This is the model that has been followed in South Africa’s 2003 Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, whereby only companies with a certain threshold of black representation 
can do business with the government. Indigenization of manpower Adedeji pointed out, 
involves conscious efforts by the government through its policies to Africanize economic 
institutions by employing indigenous people. This is neither control nor ownership but seeks 
to improve the skills of the indigenous population by giving them employment opportunities 
in the public and private sector. South Africa has aggressively sought to increase the presence 
of black people in the mainstream economy through the Employment Equity Act of 1994 which 
has since been streamlined into the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy. Zimbabwe 
upon attaining independence also embarked on a massive Africanization of the civil service 
and the bureaucracy (Moyo, 2011; Mandaza, 1986). The fourth category is the indigenization 
of technology, whereby African countries attempt to curb their dependence on technology and 
knowledge transfers from the developed countries by developing their own. The lack of 
technology has resulted in the continent being unable to fully harness its natural resources for 
its own development thus making it vulnerable to exploitation by the countries who possess 
the technology. 
 
Some scholars have further argued that indigenization is more than just a means to material 
improvement for the beneficiaries (Deng, 1998; Ramose, 2001; Andreasson, 2010, Matunhu, 
2012). Instead, it is also among other things cultural, moral, psychological and not least 
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ideological. In his analysis on the impact of the indigenization programme in rural communities 
in Zimbabwe, Matunhu (2012) warns that an economistic understanding of indigenization is 
risky: 
However, while necessary, money is not the only factor to consider in rural development. Rural 
communities also need to be empowered ideologically to deal with the complex rural development matrix. 
Without a properly coordinated mix of skills, knowledge and attitude no amount of money will bring 
about true development in the rural communities. (Matunhu, 2012: 13) 
While this analysis is focused on the rural communities, its emphasis on the need to diversify 
and broaden the content of the indigenization policy also holds as well in the urban areas. 
Article 19 of the Government of Botswana’s Citizen Economic Empowerment (CEE) policy 
also recognizes that some barriers to empowerment are by and large psychological and not 
material. Therefore, the policy noted that if economic empowerment is to be achieved, it is 
important that a strong sense of national identity and confidence in the citizens be nurtured and 
developed (2012: 7). In the same manner, Fanon (1961) in his famous essay on decolonization 
argued that the decolonization process was a psychological battle in which the colonized 
engaged in the process in order to regain their humanity and self-confidence. Sium, Desai and 
Ritskes (2012: 3) contend that decolonization is not only about the oppressor and the oppressed 
switching places but an articulation of power, change and knowledge through a multiplicity of 
epistemologies, ontologies and axiologies. Writing on Africa’s development Deng (1998: 53) 
points out the importance of cultural capital in the continental quest to achieve sustainable 
economic development in the post-colonial era. He argues that Africa can scarcely afford to 
ignore the store of knowledge accumulated over centuries as it is important for understanding 
African history, conditions and circumstances. 
  
Moreover, Ramose (2001) is of the view that in dealing with the aftermath of colonialism, 
Africa should be guided by the philosophy of Ubuntu which defines the reality and the being 
of the Bantu-speaking people. In a comparative analysis of Zimbabwe and South Africa’s 
indigenization policies, Andreasson (2010: 432) makes the case that indigenization is more 
than just the transfer or redistribution of economic power and resources as is apparently the 
case in Zimbabwe. He points out that indigenization is a means for uprooting the notions of 
Africa as inferior and elevating African ideas and knowledge in the quest for socio-economic 
transformation. As such indigenization should be a way of promoting pride in African values 
and principles alongside materialistic advancement. This also points to a common 
34 
 
misunderstanding in the way scholars have evaluated Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. 
The success and the merits of the programme have been judged solely on the amount of 
productivity and growth of the agrarian sector following the implementation of the policy. 
However, though controversial, such non-quantitative factors as the people’s deep cultural 
attachment to the land and the pride that is felt in owning a piece of land have been overlooked 
if not completely neglected (See Mamdani, 2001).  
  
Besides indigenization, one of the crucial and central concepts in the economic decolonization 
discourse has been that of empowerment. Chirisa and Bandauko (2015:57) distinguish between 
empowerment and indigenization stating that the former is the broader economic goal of which 
the latter is an instrument. In other words, indigenization is the means to economic 
empowerment. At its core, decolonization and indeed indigenization are attempts to influence 
and transform the distribution of power (See Matunhu, 2012; Kurebwa et al, 2014; Machinya, 
2014). According to the Indigenization Act (2007:2) empowerment refers to the “creation of 
an environment which enhances the performance of economic activities of indigenous 
Zimbabweans into which they would have been introduced or involved in through 
indigenization”. This then implies that placing Zimbabweans or giving them a stake in the 
targeted businesses is logically prior to empowering them. People must be put in a position 
with resources at their disposal to help them gain the ability to improve their life chances. In a 
study of the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust (CSOT) in Zimbabwe Machinya 
(2014: 27) refers to empowerment as a broad-based process designed to facilitate public and 
community participation towards the attainment of an improved quality of life and social 
justice.  
 
Matunhu (2012: 10) argues that “indigenisation is inescapably linked with the condition of 
disempowerment and is a process by which those who have been denied the ability to make 
choices acquire such abilities”. However, while acknowledging the centrality of power in the 
whole indigenization matrix Mufema (1998) takes a different view of the empowerment 
process. He argues that indigenization is designed primarily not to empower the poor as widely 
assumed but rather to boost the ruling class in its quest to consolidate political and economic 
power (1998: 4-5). According to this opinion, indigenization is more of a struggle to 
concentrate power at the top rather than devolving power to the bottom masses. Indigenization, 
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therefore would not change the economic structure one bit, but only incorporate a few 
indigenous elite with no interest in sharing their newfound economic power with the poor 
majority. In South Africa the BEE policy has been mocked as the “Black Elite Enrichment” as 
it has often benefited the politically connected elite at the expense of the poor (Kruger, 2011). 
Bloch (2012) and Robertson (2012) argue that the notion that Zimbabwe’s IEEA seeks to 
empower the poor is illusory since what it does is to disempower the very people it purports to 
empower. They argue that indigenization policies are deliberately structured to create an 
economic disaster from which the poor are ill-equipped to cope with.  
 
Magure (2014) for example, also cite the patrimonial tendencies being displayed in the 
implementation as maneuvers by the ruling class to cement and reinforce its political power. 
The governing party Zanu-PF would always ensure that the beneficiaries of the indigenization 
programme are loyal party supporters it can control. Moreover, at the international level 
indigenization can be understood to be a power struggle between the core and the periphery 
countries, as the latter seeks to avoid exploitation by the former and moreover to gain some 
leverage in the international markets. Mufema (1998) explains it thus: 
Zimbabwe like many other developing nations depends largely on the West for the consumption of its 
primary products and supply of technology, loans and grants. Indeed of late the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) seem to have taken a center stage in determining the economic and 
macro-economic decisions of the country….This dependency limits the ruling class’ competitive capacity 
in the international system and threatens its power base in the domestic scene….Hence the promotion of 
indigenisation programmes as a political tool to enhance the legitimacy of the elite in the wake of growing 
influence of international capitalism economically and politically (Mufema, 1998:6).  
Therefore, the question of empowerment in the indigenization project is a multi-layered one. 
Who exactly is the policy empowering and how? It is clear that indigenization has far-reaching 
implications on the power dynamics at local, national and international levels. That said, it is 
important to note that there is a huge discrepancy between what indigenization should achieve 
and what it actually achieves. Rather than promoting equality through widespread distribution 
of power, it concentrates that power in a minority elite group which continues to exploit the 




2.3 The evolution of the indigenization debate in post-independence Zimbabwe 
 
The seeds of the current indigenization discourse in Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole were 
planted and have been germinating for over a hundred years since the colonial invasion. It was 
then that the class struggle at the centre of indigenization was set in motion. Writing on 
Zimbabwe, Fisher (2010) is more precise as he premises the case for indigenization directly on 
the illegality of the Rudd Concession7 signed between the settlers and King Lobengula in 1888 
which the former used to set up a colonial state. The colonial settlers prevented the growth of 
an indigenous capitalist class (bourgeoisie) in Zimbabwe through discriminatory legislative 
measures which made it difficult for the locals to set up business enterprises. The Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930 prevented blacks from acquiring land or setting up business 
ventures in areas designated for Europeans by the colonial government (Maphosa, 1998; 
Fisher, 2010; Dawson and Kelsall, 2011; Chikuhwa, 2013). Although there was a presence of 
a petty black bourgeoisie in the countryside that ran kiosks and small retail shops serving the 
black community, breaking into the mainstream economy remained almost impossible for 
blacks. Such legislation introduced by the colonial government as the Land Apportionment 
Act, Maize Control Act (1931) and the Industrial Conciliation Act (1934), amongst others 
suppressed the emergence of African capitalists at every turn.  
 
Davis and Dopcke (1987)’s case study of Gutu from 1900-1939 in Southern Rhodesia showed 
how the 1931 Maize Control Act had a deleterious impact on the accumulation prospects of 
African farmers. The Act was an intervention by the colonial state meant to cushion the maize 
farmers who were suffering massive losses because of depressed export prices. The legislation 
established a state monopoly over the buying and selling of maize through the Maize Control 
Board (MCB). The MCB fixed the buying and selling prices of maize (Ibid). However, African 
farmers in Gutu were forced to sell their maize to the state at very low prices. The MCB would 
later sell the maize to consumers for a substantial profit. The white farmers, on the other hand, 
could sell their maize to the MCB at competitive prices enough to cover their costs. The 
arrangement was such that the white farmers were effectively being subsidised by the African 
farmers whose accumulation and hence class development prospects were sacrificed (Davis 
                                                          
7 The Rudd Concession was a treaty that was negotiated and signed by Charles Rudd (an agent of Cecil John 
Rhodes) and King Lobhengula (the leader of the Ndebele people settled in Western Zimbabwe). The concession 
granted the British exclusive land and mining rights in Matabeleland and Mashonaland (Fisher, 2010). 
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and Dopcke, 1987). Shutt (1997) notes how the 1930 Land Apportionment Act segregated land 
ownership along racial lines reserving the best land for white settlers while Africans were 
moved to the reserves whose productive capacity was significantly limited. The Act also 
created Purchase Areas which was land that was sold to well-off Africans of middle-class 
status. However, Shutt argues that the creation of Purchase Areas was a political rather than an 
economic move as the farms were meant to act as a buffer zone between African peasants in 
the reserves and the white commercial farmers in prime land (1997). Moreover, the African 
farmers in the purchase areas did not receive any support from the state to develop their farms 
thus their development and growth as a class was stymied.  
  
Nicholas (1994:100) observes that while there were more than 17000 African-operated 
businesses by 1975 in Rhodesia, most of the businesses were structurally and systematically 
undermined through repressive and hostile regulations. For example, there were regulations 
that limited the expansion of black-owned businesses beyond a certain size and also beyond a 
certain geographical radius. After the attainment of independence, Zimbabwe had no 
significant presence of an indigenous capitalist class to talk about. This rendered the small 
number of indigenous capitalists politically and economically weak to make an important ally 
or to be taken seriously by the new nationalist government in 1980. The nationalist government, 
being Marxist-Leninist in orientation, was ideologically inclined to prefer state participation to 
propping up an indigenous business class (Raftopolous and Compagnon, 2003). 
 
With the advent of independence, it was inevitable that the transfer or redistribution of wealth 
was going to be an important topic in the country’s political discourse. This section tries to 
retrace the evolution of the national discourse on indigenization and economic empowerment 
in Zimbabwe after independence in 1980 which took quite interesting twists and turns. It is 
important to follow through development of the discourse because despite the expectations of 
many, indigenization was not automatically the centre-piece of the government policy post-
independence. Quite the contrary, due to obtaining political and economic realities, it was side-
lined and ignored as the government tried to propitiate the settler bourgeoisie which was 
generally considered to be the cash-cow without which the fledgling state could not survive 
(Mandaza, 1986). The country’s relatively short but eventful post-independence history has in 




In the aftermath of independence the government led by the then Prime Minister Robert 
Mugabe (later became executive president in 1987), was reluctant to address the question of 
economic inequality between white settlers and blacks despite having won the 1980 elections 
on the promise of addressing racial class divisions (Moyo, 2011). This was not least because 
of the 1979 Lancaster House constitution which protected the property rights of the settler 
bourgeoisie, a factor which also aligned with the government’s broader policy of reconciliation: 
Mugabe had good reason to compromise on white capital – foreign and local – instead of adopting 
a confrontational attitude. His most publicized ‘reconciliation policy’ was partly driven by a sense 
of ‘economic realism’, that is his understanding that Zimbabwe suffered from a double 
dependence, i.e. on world markets of minerals and agricultural products (especially tobacco) on 
the one hand, and on external industrial and banking capital on the other. (Raftopolous and 
Compagnon, 2003: 18) 
Even the burning land issue was not addressed hands-on despite the fact that most black people 
were confined to communal areas which yielded poor harvests (Moyo, 1986; 2007). As a matter 
of fact, the government unleashed violence on the peasant masses who attempted to settle into 
white-owned land in protest (Moyo, 2007; 2011). Moreover, another factor that may have 
added to the silence and lack of action on economic transformation was the political 
disorganization of the peasants in the rural areas and the working class in the urban areas 
(Sachikonye, 2011; Mandaza, 1986). Selby (2006) identified the alliance between commercial 
farmers and the post-independence state, lack of unanimity within Zanu-PF, incapacity of the 
state and the threat of the apartheid regime in South Africa as some of the factors that slowed 
down the pace of the land reform programme in the first decade of independence. The 
embryonic African business class in the country lacked the political clout to gain the audience 
of the government unlike the well-established settler bourgeoisie who had experience in 
lobbying the government for favours. Further, the new African bureaucratic class having found 
the means to accumulate wealth using the state machinery was understandably not willing to 
champion the cause of African entrepreneurs. The nationalist elite in government were 
ideologically at odds with the existing and aspiring African businessmen who wanted to operate 





The new government embarked on a moderate indigenization programme through the 
establishment of the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) in 1983 under the 
ministry of trade and commerce. SEDCO was established as a nation-wide scheme to offer 
financial and technical support to a variety of black-owned small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) (Maphosa, 1998). In effect, the institution was the primary vehicle mandated to execute 
indigenization and economic empowerment through helping small businesses grow especially 
in the rural areas where the most disadvantaged people lived. Courting organisations like the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), SEDCO managed to fund and help some small businesses 
around the country (SEDCO Annual report, 1986). However, the establishment of SEDCO in 
some ways confirmed the government’s willingness to brush the issue of indigenization under 
the carpet. For starters, SEDCO was far from sufficient as a mechanism to spearhead the radical 
transformation of the country’s economic structure not least because it was chronically 
underfunded. Maphosa (1998: 188) bemoans SEDCO’s lack of political support, incompetent 
management and undercapitalisation that hamstrung its initiatives. By 1988, five years after 
the establishment of SEDCO, Africans owned less than 3 percent of manufacturing units 
(Nicholas, 1994). Moreover, the Zanu-PF government in 1980 believed in the government 
control of the economy and therefore placed little importance on the development of African 
entrepreneurs. 
 
The discourse on indigenization gained traction in the early 1990s championed by the 
Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) with the support of President Mugabe 
(Raftopoulos and Compagnon, 2003). A national workshop organized by the University of 
Zimbabwe in August 1994 conducted under the theme “Indigenization of the Zimbabwean 
Economy: Problems and Prospects”, captured the mood thus: 
Economic indigenization relates to the control and ownership of the economy. In Zimbabwe 
economic control has been concentrated in a small section of its society and multinationals. This 
state of affairs has hardly changed since independence 14 years ago….Such developments as the 
formation of the IBDC in 1990, the Parliamentary Committee on Indigenization, and the Cabinet 
Taskforce on Indigenization represent attempts to solve this anomaly…. (Chiwawa, 1994: 1).  
Thus, it was not just the civil society, but the state was also intensifying efforts towards 
indigenization. The IBDC was formed by a group of black business people (including Strive 
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Masiyiwa, the founder and chairman of the biggest Zimbabwean-owned multinational 
telecommunications enterprise Econet Wireless) to lobby the government to create 
opportunities for black economic empowerment. It was comprised of various lobby 
organizations that included among them Women in Business, Zimbabwe National Farmers 
Union, and Zimbabwe Transport Organization (Raftopoulos and Compagnon, 2003). The 
organization’s foundational vision of economic empowerment through the creation and 
funding of small African businesses set it on a colliding course with the political elite who 
preferred indigenization through usurping the existing businesses (Raftopolous, 1999). The 
difference in strategy was likely to be a costly obstacle in the establishment of partnership 
between the government and the indigenous entrepreneurs thus dimming the prospects of black 
economic empowerment. Observers like Wild (1997) perceived the IBDC as a nationalist 
pressure group that gained attention through the manipulation of the nationalist feelings of the 
black community with a radical agenda of transformation. Dawson and Kelsall (2011) note that 
the IBDC did register a few breakthroughs as it secured several access rights from the state 
such as a quota for building contracts. 
 
The reign of the IBDC was, however, short-lived as it soon collapsed because of factionalism 
and leadership conflicts believed in some quarters to have been engineered by the government 
(Raftopolous and Compagnon, 2003). It was replaced in 1994 by the Affirmative Action Group 
(AAG) under the leadership of Philip Chiyangwa, a prominent businessman active in the ruling 
party Zanu-PF. The AAG departed from the IBDC’s original vision of indigenization which 
was centred on the promotion of entrepreneurship, arguing instead for equity participation, a 
model preferred by the political elite. It began an intense media campaign to force white-owned 
companies and multinational corporations to cede shares and leadership positions in their 
structures to indigenous people. Maphosa (1998: 186) argued that “the AAG used nationalist 
and racist propaganda to advance the interests of its members, who have extensive political and 
social connections”. The AAG appeared to be pursuing a political agenda rather than the 
genuine interests of the black business community (Raftopoulos and Compagnon, 2003). The 
organization took aim at what they alleged to be ‘institutional racism’ by the privately-owned 
banks that scuttled the growth of indigenous businesses as blacks did not have the collateral 




The efforts of the AAG were immediately vindicated when President Mugabe added the 
Indigenization and Privatization portfolio in his cabinet in 1995 under the leadership of the late 
Cephas Msipa8 (Msipa, 2015). In February 1998 the government released the “Government 
Policy Framework for Indigenization of the Economy”. In the framework, indigenization is 
defined as the “deliberate economic empowerment of indigenous Zimbabweans mainly 
through economic expansion” (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998: 2). Among the major 
objectives of the indigenization policy were increasing productive investment of the indigenous 
people, creating conditions to allow for economic development and develop a competitive 
domestic private sector to spearhead economic growth (Ibid). However, even though the 
government was beginning to take economic indigenization seriously, no laws were enacted to 
enforce the policy and as such the policy depended on the cooperation of foreign and white-
owned business and the political will of the government which was not always there. Msipa 
(2015) who was in charge of the indigenization portfolio then, laments that most businesses 
did not cooperate because there was no punishment attached to non-cooperation. Zanu-PF had 
more than 95% majority seats after the 1995 elections (See Sithole, 1997). It seems the failure 
to legislate indigenization signalled a deficiency of political will.  
 
The parliament finally passed the IEEA in 2007 when political and economic circumstances 
pushed the issue up the list of the priorities of the political elite. This was an about-turn in sharp 
contrast with the half-hearted manner or even outright contempt with which the government 
had treated the issue for the first two decades of independence. The indigenization programme 
had finally emerged from years of obscurity in the periphery of the government agenda in the 
1980s to a foremost national policy in the late 2000s. However, it is important to note that the 
legislation passed in 2007 was different in fundamental ways from the government’s 1998 
policy framework. The 1998 policy advocated a strategy of indigenization based on economic 
expansion, creating room for indigenous people through entrepreneurship. The 2007 IEEA 
expedited indigenization through the transfer of ownership of the existing companies to 
indigenous people.  
 
                                                          
8 The late Cephas Msipa was a prominent Zanu-PF politician who served in various portfolios as Mininster and 
was the Midlands province governor for a long time. 
42 
 
The amount of credit to be extended to the advocacy and activities of the AAG for the eventual 
adoption of the indigenization policy remains a moot point. A combination of political and 
economic circumstances may have left the government with no choice but to legislate the 
indigenization policy. The national elections were due in 2008, a year after the passing of the 
Indigenization law. In 2007 the government had gone bankrupt as the economy had come to a 
standstill resulting in a shortage of all basic commodities and hyperinflation (See Wines, 2006). 
It is plausible that indigenization was meant to oil Zanu-PF’s patronage machine while also 
appearing to be making earnest efforts to ease economic hardships (Magure, 2014). Moreover, 
it is important to note that while the debate was dominated mostly by the middle class, the law 
itself was tailored to benefit the working class and rural peasant constituencies through the 
Employee and Community Share Ownership Trusts (ESOTs and CSOTs) respectively. It was 
designed to appease the voters and increase its political appeal. In no other sector has the 
indigenization policy played out as dramatically as in the mining sector which will be the focus 
of this dissertation. 
2.4 Scholarship on the structure and implementation of the indigenization policy in 
Zimbabwe thus far 
 
A lot has been written about Zimbabwe’s current indigenization policy with varying emphases 
on its different aspects. The Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs), one of the most 
innovative and potentially transformative components of the policy, has been the subject of a 
significant amount of critique. The rationale for the establishment of the CSOTs was the need 
to ensure that rural communities benefit from the exploitation of natural resources in their areas 
(Kurebwa, 2014: 6; Matsa and Masimbiti, 2014). The indigenization law stipulated that 
targeted companies cede at least 10% of their shares to CSOTs in Rural District Councils 
(RDC) in which they operated. Thus, through this law, rural peasant communities would get 
an opportunity to participate in the production of mineral wealth as equity owners in big 
companies (especially mining). There have been mixed reactions from scholars regarding the 
CSOTs. Machinya (2014: 45) argued that CSOTs were necessary as a mechanism of reversing 
the ‘resource curse’ – a phenomenon that denotes the ironic relationship between the abundance 
of natural resources and widespread poverty. Moyo and Mabhena (2014) concur as they point 
out that mining corporations have been lackadaisical towards the improvement of community 
welfare and poverty alleviation. The establishment of CSOTs would provide a crucial link 




However, other scholars have been critical of the idea behind CSOTs. Wafawarova (2015) 
questioned the practicality of, and the very philosophy on which the CSOTs are grounded 
arguing that the system of direct popular control of resources is widespread but lacks a 
successful precedent. He contends that such a system of collective control is contrary to human 
nature and is grossly inefficient as it is not driven by competition and profit. The lack of 
competition and motivation may result in stagnation and eventual collapse. Crisis in Zimbabwe 
Coalition (2015: 15) took issue with the regulations which shaped the structure and the 
functions of the Trusts. They expressed unease with what they labelled as ‘a rigid framework’ 
which wrongly presumes the homogeneity of the communities’ interests and leaves no scope 
for innovation on the part of the CSOTs in the execution of their mandate. The structure of the 
CSOTs concentrates decision-making powers in the community elite and not the ordinary 
community members themselves. Analysing the standing and status of the communities under 
the law Murombo (2010: 573) poses some important questions:  
What remains unclear in Zimbabwe and other developing countries is the issue of community 
mapping. Who constitutes this group we call the ‘local community’? Is membership determined 
by birth, tribe, clan, descent or the community’s village of origin? Who is the holder of any 
rights that the local community may have at law – the totality of the community, or elected or 
hereditary leaders? To what extent can we trust that elected local leaders will be good trustees 
of the rights of local communities? Are the interests of these local communities homogeneous 
anyway? (Murombo, 2010: 573) 
Notably, failure to resolve the issues raised by Murombo may leave the CSOT schemes 
vulnerable to capture by the elites for the pursuit of narrow and personal interests. It also makes 
possible, misunderstanding and internecine fights within the community itself over who 
belongs and who does not belong to the community. 
 
The lack of legal backing for the CSOTs has also been pointed out as a major weakness 
(Machinya, 2014; Kurebwa, 2014, Murombo, 2010). Mawowa (2013) observed that “the 
CSOT program is not rights-based and is at best a half-hearted attempt at asset-based 
community development”. Murombo (2010) raised concern that the lack of legal backing for 
the Trusts might significantly undermine the whole empowerment drive since the communities 
have no defensible rights under the law. The legal void may grant companies a leeway to dodge 
or avoid funding CSOTs without any consequences (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2015: 15). 
Tshuma (2015: 34) also bemoaned the uncertainty of the current funding system for the 
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Gwanda CSOT as companies were reluctant to pay 10% of the yearly dividends as directed by 
section 14B of the 2011 IEEA regulations. The CSOTs mostly rely on the political backing of 
the ruling party which is able to threaten companies into financing the community development 
projects. 
 
A number of studies have been conducted in different communities in an effort to gauge the 
progress made as far as the CSOTs are concerned (Kurebwa, 2014; Machinya, 2014; Moyo 
and Mabhena, 2014; Matsa and Masimbiti, 2014). In an investigation of the impact of the 
CSOT programme set up in Gwanda9, Mabhena and Moyo (2014) and Tshuma (2015) found 
through field observation that the programme had made possible the construction of schools, 
clinics, rehabilitation of roads and water systems. The studies also found the majority of their 
respondents in the area (63%) had a favourable view of the CSOT programme as it had 
facilitated visible infrastructure development. However, the lack of institutional capacity to 
implement the CSOT policy in the rural areas and the entrenched culture of corruption amongst 
the elite who may appropriate benefits to themselves at the expense of their constituents had 
the potential to hamper the progress made (Mabhena and Moyo, 2014:77). Corrupt activities 
and organizational deficiency, which reinforce each other have conspired to undermine the 
potential that the CSOTs may have in effectively fighting poverty in poor communities. 
  
Matsa and Masimbiti (2014) conducted an appraisal of the performance of the Tongogara 
CSOT in Mashonaland Central which was funded by the Unki Mine operating in the area. In 
their study the authors noted lack of access to information regarding the programme as 63% of 
their respondents could not explain or lacked knowledge on what the CSOT was about. 
However, the majority of the respondents agreed that the trust was making positive 
developments through improving the state of schools, construction of a dam and the 
establishment of a nutritional garden. The programme has faced a lot of challenges which 
include the lack of professionals and administrators to effectively run the Trust (2014: 160). 
Kurebwa (2014) made a follow-up on the progress of the Bindura CSOT in the Mashonaland 
West province of Zimbabwe. The research established that 45 projects were underway in the 
concerned communities potentially benefitting over 100 000 people. Just like in other 
                                                          
9 An area in the Matabeleland South province of Zimbabwe 
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communities these projects focused on improving the state of education facilities, mitigating 
water woes through the drilling of boreholes, improving healthcare facilities and 
communication infrastructure. However, the author laments the politicization of the 
indigenization project arguing that political games dominate how the process unfolds which 
has further exposed the communities to poverty and suffering (2014: 13).  
 
Guvamatanga (2014) reporting on the Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu, Zvimba CSOT which was 
launched by President Mugabe in 2011 notes that it has yielded positive results. Having 
received a significant part of the US$10 million pledge from Zimplats10 the trust has since 
embarked on various developmental projects. The report notes that, among other things, the 
CSOT has refurbished and constructed schools, an arts and craft centre, and computerized a 
vocational training centre in the area. Ndlovu (2015) also made a study of the CSOT in Lupane 
- an area in the Matabeleland north province. The research found that although most 
respondents from the community did not know much about the operations of the trust, the few 
who were in the know did acknowledge the positive impact it has had on infrastructure 
development. 
  
Machinya (2014)’s in-depth study of the Zvishavane CSOT in the Midlands province funded 
by the Mimosa mining company revealed some interesting facts. The study observed that the 
trust had initiated and completed a number of projects like construction of schools, a mortuary 
and drilling boreholes to improve community welfare. However, there was a critical lack of 
access to information regarding the functions and the operations of the CSOT. Machinya 
(2014:73) argues the lack of access to information reflects a ‘fractured community’ in which 
there is paternalism through the chiefs’ domination of the whole process thus rendering the rest 
of the community voiceless. The study noted that ordinary members of the community 
particularly women and the youth rarely participated in the decisions and deliberations of the 
trust yet they make up the majority of the residents (2014: 83). Commenting on the Mhondoro-
Ngezi CSOT Mawowa (2013) also decries its top-down and paternalistic structure which 
severely limits the participation of ordinary residents in the activities and decisions of the trust. 
He further argues that the people who sit on the board of the trust are not elected officials which 
                                                          




raises concerns over the representativeness and the democratic credentials of the trust 
especially in the light of its mandate in spear-heading the interest of the community (2013). 
  
Some of the literature has taken issue with the legal and moral standing of the indigenization 
policy as a whole. Matyszak (2011) questions the justice of Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy 
that seeks to redistribute the ownership and control of the country’s economic resources which 
have historically been in the hands of a white minority. Matyszak questions why a young white 
Zimbabwean born at independence should be saddled with the burden of empowering black 
Zimbabweans. He argues that a policy that confiscates a significant part of an individual’s 
business simply on the basis of their race or alien status reinforces the very same inequities that 
it purports to rectify. Moreover, the use of the term indigenization, he argues, promotes racial 
discrimination against white Zimbabweans. 
 
The indigenization law has also run into legal controversies in which it has clashed with other 
acts in the constitution rendering it legally impractical. The policy requires that companies 
transfer at least 51% of their shares to indigenous people. That very clause has been shown to 
be legally devoid. Matyszak (2014: 3) and Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2015:12) point out 
that shares in companies are not owned by the company but belong to the shareholders which 
the company cannot (by law) dispose of. Matyszak (2014) also stressed that indigenization law 
requirements will be impossible to implement on some companies due in particular to their 
structure and the laws that govern their operation. Private companies governed by the Articles 
of Association on which they are founded do not allow members to dispose of their shares to 
the public but rather can only transfer their shares internally. This makes it impossible for a 
private company to indigenize its share ownership if there is no indigenous Zimbabwean 
amongst its shareholders (ibid: 3). Moreover, for large public companies with thousands of 
shareholders who buy and sell shares frequently it might be impossible to ensure the thousands 
of transactions that take place keep indigenous shareholders in the majority (ibid: 3). The ruling 
party Zanu-PF mentioned in its 2013 manifesto that the government was going to set up an 





Other scholars have problematized the legality of the indigenization law in Zimbabwe in terms 
of the principles of international law (Chitsove, 2014; Mapondera, 2010). Chitsove (2014) 
conducted a study to investigate how the indigenization law in Zimbabwe stands against the 
provisions of the international law which governs the relationship between the state and 
investors. The research sought to establish the extent to which Zimbabwe’s IEEA can be 
classified as non/expropriatory as well as the extent to which they are compensable under 
international legal provisions. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (2004) defines expropriation thus: 
Expropriation or “wealth deprivation” could take different forms: it could be direct where an investment 
is nationalised or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright physical 
seizure. In addition to the term expropriation, terms such as “dispossession”, “taking”, “deprivation” or 
“privation” are also used. International law is clear that a seizure of legal title of property constitutes a 
compensable expropriation. 
While the above definition deals with direct expropriation, indirect expropriation is also 
common and is an important part of the international law. According to El Attar et al (2009: 9) 
indirect expropriation refers to subtle or covert interference with the use of property leading to 
the deprivation of the owner of the use or expected benefit of the property even if not to the 
benefit of the host state. Chitsove (2014: 66) argues that the indigenization measures in 
Zimbabwe amount to expropriation since they deprive the investor of the ownership of shares 
and the degree of the loss is permanent. The study concluded that under the principles of 
international law the indigenization measures, although expropriatory, are proportional to the 
objective of redressing historical imbalances and as such they are non-compensable. In his 
scathing assessment of Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy Bloch (2008) warned that 
expropriative and enforced indigenization would be disastrous for the country’s economy.  
 
The research corpus on indigenization just reviewed has unearthed far-reaching and valuable 
insights on Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy. However, the majority of the studies focus on 
the CSOTs while neglecting the Employment Share Ownership Trusts (ESOTs) which were 
included in section 14 of the principal Indigenization Act of 2007 (Mawowa, 2013; Machinya, 
2014; Moyo and Mabhena, 2014). Despite this apparent neglect, the ESOTs are an important 
vehicle of empowerment for the indigenous people who work in the foreign-owned businesses 
especially mining enterprises. Only one study (Sibanda, 2013) has been conducted to take stock 
of the progress made by the ESOTs vis-à-vis the indigenization drive. As such, it seems as if 
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the literature on indigenization is telling the story in bits and pieces. By overlooking the 
performance of the ESOTs, scholarship is casting a blind eye on an important part of the 
programme which seeks to address class-based injustice. The ESOTs give expression to the 
egalitarian and redistributive thrust of the policy which is one of its fundamental tenets, bent 
on reducing inequality and also eliminating the exploitation of labour by capital. 
  
Further, the indigenization policy is a broad and comprehensive programme with a wider and 
interconnected cast, the focus on the CSOTs makes the study of the policy narrow and only 
tells a part of the story. Moreover, the studies conducted thus far seem to miss the bigger picture 
(Guvamatanga, 2014; Kurebwa, 2014; Ndlovu, 2015). They fail to historicize the position of 
rural peasants in the relations of production and the resultant class struggle. Most studies are 
concerned with how the CSOTs use money donated by the multinational companies without 
interrogating whether the Trusts secured the shareholding in the companies as promised by the 
policy. Neither do they contextualize the policy within the framework of state power in 
Zimbabwe and the world capitalist system which are central to the idea of the indigenization 
policy in the first place. The present study tries to remedy these shortcomings by placing the 
various indigenization mechanisms in a historical and macro-structural context that shapes the 
outcomes of the policy. 
 
2.5 Mining sector indigenization: The past, prospects and possibilities 
 
….while prior to independence there was no legal restriction on black Zimbabweans starting and owning 
mines -- and a number did -- impediments to acquiring skills and finance, and a traditional aversion to 
mining (most mineworkers were from Mozambique and Malawi prior to 1980), meant that there were only 
half a dozen black Zimbabwean mine managers at Independence. Predictably therefore the main feature of 
the mining sector in post-Independence Zimbabwe has been the direct investment by government in it in 
order to rectify this imbalance. (Hollaway, 1997: 30) 
From Hollaway’s observation above, the need to transform the mining sector to broaden 
ownership and create room for new players was obvious and urgent since the attainment of 
independence in 1980. The structure of the mining sector today reflects the colonial legacy of 
monopoly and foreign dominance. Chikuhwa (2013: 406) points out that “the country’s leading 
gold producers are Anglo-American Corporation, Ashanti Goldfields, Falcon Gold, LonRho 
49 
 
Zimbabwe and Rio Tinto”. The platinum and diamond sectors were dominated by foreign-
owned companies like South African companies Mimosa, Zimplats and the Chinese company 
Anjin in Marange diamond fields. Although, with the advent of independence, there has been 
a surge in small-scale mining by indigenous people, they are still structurally disadvantaged by 
lack of capital and hostile legal and policy environment (Hawkins, 2009). This section will 
conduct an extensive survey of the literature on Zimbabwe’s mining sector with a view to 
identifying the emerging important themes around indigenization. 
The government of Zimbabwe was keenly aware of the need to restructure the mining sector 
early on in the 1980s. The state established the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation 
(ZMDC) (1982) and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) (1983) as 
part of its efforts to transform the mining sector. The ZMDC was earmarked to increase state-
ownership of mineral wealth which would also pave way for domestic private entrepreneurs 
both in the large and small-scale sector. It achieved modest success in increasing local 
participation in the small-scale mining sector as registered claims increased from 1000 in 1983 
to 10 000 in 1990 (Mawowa, 2013: 925). The MMCZ was granted a monopoly over the 
marketing of mineral produce in Zimbabwe, which meant that the state was in firm control 
over the flow of minerals in and out of the country (Hollaway, 1997). This meant more state 
control of the sector. 
 
Saunders (2008) notes how Zimbabwe’s mining sector has, since independence, attracted new 
groups of foreign investors without acceding space to local investors and entrepreneurs. In the 
1990s amidst the structural adjustment programs that liberalized the mining sector, it was 
foreign investors, not domestic capitalists who dominated the sector. Even in the 2000s as the 
government held fast to the mantra of economic sovereignty, regional investors from South 
Africa swiftly replaced the international investors in mining who had fled the macro-economic 
and political crisis. Saunders argues that empowerment took on a regional rather than local 
meaning as the mining sector soon opened doors to new black South African players. Black-
owned South-African based companies like Metallon Gold, Mwana Africa, and Mmakau 
Mining soon took advantage of the new openings in the sector and acquired substantial 
holdings. Saunders also points out that China made significant investments as well during this 
time. China Machine Building International won a US$1,3 billion contract in coal mining and 
thermal power generation construction in 2006. In the following year Sinosteel, a Chinese 
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company, paid US$200 million to purchase a controlling stake in Zimbabwe Mining and Iron 
Smelting Company (ZIMASCO), which was the country’s leading ferrochrome producer and 
the fifth largest in the world. Saunders bemoans the negligible role played by Zimbabwean 
players as major partners in the new mining investment acquisitions. Some of the companies 
have prominent politically-connected local participants, but due to lack of transparency, their 
position and real influence in those companies remains a matter of speculation. Moreover, there 
has been increasing undermining of communities, local business people and state institutions 
and apparent reluctance or inability on the part of the government to reinvest mining income 
for the benefit of the public and the larger economy (2008: 74). 
 
Saunders (2008) further expressed disappointment in the way indigenization and empowerment 
has been approached in the mining sector. He argues that the “elite-driven and partisan” 
indigenization policies have promoted tension and distrust amongst the elite and also 
undermined transparency especially regarding the distribution of mining proceeds, thus 
effectively disempowering the public. While Saunders does acknowledge the increased 
participation of the locals in the small-scale sector, he however laments their constant 
victimization and harassment in the hands of the government. Most recently, the government 
unleashed a violent operation Chikorokoza Chapera in a bid to end perceived illicit dealings in 
the small-scale sector which includes smuggling of minerals through the parallel market 
(Mawowa, 2013). Moreover, even the mineworkers have come under constant harassment by 
the government because of their perceived support of the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) (2008:76). Saunders is of the view that empowerment in the mining sector is 
compromised by patronage networks which have become the key determinant of investment 
patterns and empowerment deals. This, he notes quite rightly, has also eroded the state’s 
supervisory capacity which is the baseline of any successful policy implementation. 
 
Tony Hawkins (2009) in his wide-ranging intervention concerning the prospects of 
Zimbabwe’s mining sector, in the aftermath of the 2000-08 crisis, is reasonably pessimistic, if 
at times downright dismissive of the government’s indigenization policy. Hawkins argues that 
having just emerged from a debilitating economic crisis, Zimbabwe faces enormous 
infrastructure and investment deficits, and should necessarily prioritise creating a conducive 
economic and political environment to attract foreign investment and boost production in the 
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mining sector. He argues that due to this massive setback, indigenization or nationalist policies 
would not be feasible and encourages the government to review or scale downwards, its 
indigenization requirements. Hawkins (2009) does not view the ownership-focused 
indigenization strategy as the best way forward in terms of economic empowerment. Mineral 
wealth, he argues, can only be depleted and governments should be astute in terms of how they 
manage profits or rents from mining. He cites countries like Botswana, Malaysia and Norway 
that have created strategies of reinvesting mineral wealth in creating productive assets like 
human capital and infrastructure. Thus, true economic empowerment in the mining sector, 
according to Hawkins, should be measured by the effect that it has on other sectors of the 
economy, not only equity ownership in the mining companies (Hawkins, 2009: 31). He 
proposes a series of recommendations on how best to go about maximizing economic 
empowerment in the mining sector. Firstly, the country needs a comprehensive resource 
management strategy that takes into consideration the depletion of the resource and devises 
ways of exploiting it in a sustainable manner. Secondly, the government can ensure economic 
empowerment through the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF).11 A wealth fund would 
shield the government and the country from fluctuations in mineral prices and also promote 
responsible investments of the mining proceeds into other productive activities. Thirdly, 
creating sufficient fiscal space in terms of managing how government spends its money to 
avoid currency overvaluation will be vital to the resuscitation of the mining sector which 
depends the export market. 
  
Hawkins also points out the need to create a level playing field and the avoidance of 
discriminatory agreements. The government should come up with a uniform and stable fiscal 
and mining regime, which will be uniformly used in dealing with large and small mining 
enterprises especially in the context of the indigenization policy. Large mining companies have 
been able to draw on their financial and political power to negotiate favourable terms of 
exchange rate when selling their produce, an advantage that is not available for smaller 
enterprises. Larger companies are also able to get regular power supplies by paying the 
Electricity Authority in hard currency and also retain and attract skilled manpower at the 
                                                          
11 Broadly defined, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are government-owned investment corporations that invest 
their funds – mostly – in foreign currency assets. Usually, the funds are managed separately from central bank 
reserves, though, as in the case of the very successful Norwegian Fund, management may rest with the central 
bank. Unlike other publicly-owned funds, such as pension funds, SWFs do not have any explicit liabilities. (See 
Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008) 
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expense of the smaller mines. The government will have to find ways of solving these structural 
imbalances between small and large mining enterprises, if empowerment in the mining sector 
is to be achieved (Hawkins, 2009: 47). While Hawkins’ recommendations are sound, his 
analysis suffers from a lack of problematization of the government or state on which the success 
of his recommendations depends. The view of this researcher is that the mining sector, and 
indeed every other economic sector, and the government are intimately connected and co-
constitutive of each other (See Magure, 2012). The problems in the mining sector, as this 
dissertation strives to show, reflect the nature of the government in Zimbabwe.  
 
Other scholars investigated the plight and conditions of the country’s artisanal and small-scale 
mining or Amakorokoza/Makorokoza as they are locally known in Zimbabwe’s Ndebele and 
Shona languages respectively (Mawowa, 2013; Bello and Bybee, 2014 and Steckling et al, 
2014). Small scale mining has the potential to be an important pillar of the national economy 
and is thus an important aspect of the government’s indigenization policy: 
Artisanal gold mining has the potential to deliver great benefits to the local economy and mining 
communities. Through artisanal mining, many previously unemployed labourers can contribute to the 
economy. It thus serves a poverty alleviation function, helping to keep thousands of poor citizens 
economically afloat. As a mechanism for the creation of rural employment, artisanal mining also
 reduces instances of urban migration. Being rooted in local communities, it draws on the 
local workforce, through which income and rents generated are fed back into the community. This can also 
fund other entrepreneurial undertakings in mining communities. (Bello and Bybee, 2014: 2) 
UNIDO (2007) estimated that more than 2 million people had become dependent on small-
scale mining for survival at the height of the economic crisis. In central Zimbabwe alone, 
Mawowa, (2013: 936) notes that there is believed to be 600 000 active gold panners. Small-
scale mining is believed to have contributed more than 30% of Zimbabwe’s gold output of 11 
tonnes in 2012 which is testament to the growing importance of the sector (Bello and Bybee, 
2014). Thus, small-scale mining has become a vital poverty reduction strategy amongst 
Zimbabweans raising issues on how the government can assist the miners to enhance economic 
empowerment in this sector.  
 
However, Mawowa, (2013) bemoans the violence that characterizes the sector that is linked to 
the fight for claims amongst the Makorokoza on the one hand and the antagonistic relationship 
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between the state and the Makorokoza on the other. He relates how Makorokoza are always 
looking over their shoulders in central Zimbabwe in fear of reprisals by the police and rival 
mining groups. This points to the lack of policy or initiative on the part of the government to 
invest resources in bringing order and certainty to the sector. There is no political will within 
the ruling Zanu-PF since its top officials including President Emmerson Mnangagwa are 
believed to be benefitting from the disorder in small-scale mining (See Mawowa, 2013). 
Spiegel (2009) notes that small-scale miners viewed the new indigenization law as elite-driven 
with no benefits for them. He also cites other factors like the lack of funding from the 
government, the lack of access to information that undermines miners’ ability to take advantage 
of opportunities, lots of red tape in government processes and an unfair marketing structure 
whereby miners do not get their payments in time as some of the main policy issues to be 
addressed (2009: 42-43). 
 
Murombo (2013) and Dhliwayo (2014) take issue with the legislative framework governing 
the mining sector as embodied by the Mines and Minerals Act (hereafter MMA) (Chapter 21: 
05 of the constitution) as the major obstacle to the transformation of the sector. The legal 
system and regulatory regime remain central to the indigenization efforts in the sector: 
As noted previously the regulatory frameworks developed during the colonial era were oriented towards 
promoting maximum extraction of resource. In Zimbabwe the mining laws remain premised on the colonial 
models hell-bent on efficient extraction and trade in mineral resources. In both countries, consciously or 
unconsciously, local proxies and elites stepped into the shoes of the colonial powers and multinational 
companies. Hence the call for indigenization in Zimbabwe and nationalisation in South Africa are not 
without merit. (Murombo, 2013: 36) 
A clear legal and regulatory regime is important for the maximization of benefits accruing from 
the natural resource sector resulting in the “resource curse”12 phenomenon. Dhliwayo (2014) 
argues that the MMA focuses more on extraction of minerals rather than sustainable 
development. The legislation is also inimical to transparency and accountability thus denying 
the public any power to influence what happens within the sector. Most of the mining contracts 
are negotiated in secrecy and are not subject to parliamentary and public scrutiny. This 
                                                          
12 Resource curse theory is a body of scholarship that has shown how natural-resource rich countries fail to 
translate that advantage to benefit the broader economy. Instead of investing the profits made from natural 
resource exploitation, government focus on spending the profits on consumption rather than investing in 
productive assets that may generate even more income for the economy. (Di John, 2010; Polterovich, Popov 
and Tonis, 2010) 
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undermines the aims and objectives of the indigenization and empowerment policy since access 
to information is key to empowerment. Poorly drafted contracts, under the cover of secrecy, 
may also harm communities that host the mining enterprises and also small-scale miners who 
lose access to land and claims. More importantly, the MMA does not make value addition and 
beneficiation compulsory. Mining companies usually export low value mineral ores which 
generate limited foreign exchange and undermines the potential of the sector to contribute to 
economic growth. It is estimated that the country loses more than $10 billion due to the lack of 
value addition and beneficiation (Dhliwayo, 2014). 
  
Another concern with the mining law is that it does not encourage participation and 
representation of stakeholders in the decision-making processes but only accommodating the 
state and the big mining firms. The Mining Affairs Board does not have representatives of the 
communities and civil society (Dhliwayo, 2014). The decision-making is not democratic since 
it does not include key stakeholders who oftentimes are directly affected by the government’s 
mining policies. This has resulted in the marginalization of mining communities which have 
been victims of land, air and water pollution, seizure of land for mining, desecration of cultural 
sites and sometimes relocation without adequate compensation. Over 1800 households were 
relocated without immediate compensation to pave way for diamond mining in the Marange 
area surrounding the diamond fields (Dhliwayo, 2014). The African Union (2009) corroborates 
these concerns, stating that there should be platforms and channels through which local 
communities, local government and trade unions are incorporated in the resource exploitation 
process and oversight. 
2.6 Indigenization: Possible models and strategies 
 
The subject of this research, indigenization and economic empowerment, is in many ways a 
moving target whose dynamism and historicism renders it ill-suited to a generalized model. 
There are as many strategies of indigenization as there are policies of the same. Any policy of 
indigenization should be conceptualized and operationalized in cognizance of the unique 
cultural, political, social and economic circumstances that come with time and place (See 
Adedeji, 1981; Magure, 2012). Literature focusing on the political economy of the economic 
empowerment schemes across the African continent is rich in empirical evidence from various 




In an analysis of indigenization policy in Nigeria, Ezeife (1981: 170) distinguishes between 
three models of indigenization: the public-sector, private-sector and mixed economy models. 
Basically, the public-sector model is nationalization by another name. Nationalization has been 
relied on by a number of countries as the most effective strategy of placing the control of the 
economy in the hands of the people through the state (See Mkandawire, 2009). This was 
justified on the grounds that most industries are beyond the reach of the locals’ capacity to 
invest in because of the high capital requirements. In the case of the shortage of local capital 
and entrepreneurs the state steps in on behalf of the people. This is what happened in Egypt in 
the 1950s-60s during Colonel Abdel Nasser’s time where the state confiscated industries that 
were largely owned by French and British companies in what was referred to as 
‘Egyptianization’ (Mansfield, 1973: 677). Nasser, a military general who came to power 
through a coup, was bent on cultivating and building an image of an independent and strong 
country that played a significant role in international affairs (Mansfield, 1973). By 
nationalizing the industries in Egypt, the state could have a strong base from which to exercise 
its influence on the country’s neighbours and beyond (Meredith, 2010).  
 
In Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda in the 1970s, having been disillusioned by the heavy-
handedness of the multi-national corporations in the copper industry, the government decided 
to pursue nationalization. Hundreds of industries were rapidly placed under government control 
which suddenly established an omnipresence in the economy (Adedeji, 1981). Guinea under 
Sekou Toure also treaded a similar path in defiance of France, its former colonizer. Toure 
confiscated the industries owned by French investors leaving the state in total control of the 
economy soon after independence in 1958 (Meredith, 2010). Nigeria in the 1970s exercised 
selective nationalization of heavy industries while designating other industries for local private 
investment. The widespread policies of nationalization across the continent as a way to achieve 
economic indigenization were squarely the product of their time. The rapid and almost all-
round adoption of nationalization seems to have been informed more by the politics and the 
passions of the day rather than a calculated and rational strategy of economic development. 
  
Mkandawire (2009) premises the issue of indigenization in post-colonial states on a critique 
of the constitutive and qualitative elements of nationalism. He argues thus: 
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Nationalism is inclined to prefer a mode of redistribution that underplays the heterogeneous components 
within the nation while emphasizing differences and inequalities between citizens and foreign groups that 
have lorded over them in the past. This can encourage focus on inter-national or inter-racial levelling while 
tolerating or even encouraging intra-racial or intra-national differences. In such a context, social policy is 
less likely to deal with class distributional issues than with race relational issues. It does not help much to 
argue that redistribution is not socialist or that it is creating a national bourgeoisie, which may indeed be 
the whole point! Most of the indigenisation programmes were carried out in full recognition that they could 
lead to inequality among the indigenes. (Mkandawire, 2009: 138)  
Nationalization turned out to be a monumental failure in most cases. For example, Zambia and 
Tanzania suffered economic collapse after their leaders’ respective decisions to nationalize 
their countries’ industries (See Ake, 1996; Ngowi, 2009). Not only in terms of economic 
performance but also in the redistribution of wealth and restructuring of the economy. The 
scourge of widespread poverty and inequality that nationalization was expected to address 
actually worsened in most cases (Ake, 1996; Mkandawire, 2009).  
 
The parastatals that mushroomed overnight in most African countries (Zambia, Tanzania, 
Egypt, Zimbabwe among others) immediately became pyramid schemes of making quick 
money for politicians and the bureaucrats (See Meredith, 2010). Not only were they 
understaffed and incapacitated to carry out the task they were supposed to perform, but they 
were also cesspools of corruption and a huge drain on government coffers. Instead of being the 
vehicles of redistribution to establish a more equal society, most parastatals created new and 
more crude contours of inequality within the black community (Mufema, 1998). The result was 
the creation of what scholars refer to as the state bourgeoisie (Fanon, 1961; Moyo and Yeros, 
2011; Compagnon and Raftopolus, 2003). Moreover, nationalization schemes were launched 
without giving due regard to the capacity of the state and the government and the vagaries of 
the international economy. The governments lacked resources in terms of skilled personnel to 
carry out their policies, it lacked the moral resolve to ensure that policies were implemented in 
good faith. Moreover, since African economies were intimately linked to the global economy, 
the government simply could not match the prowess of the multi-national corporations in 
production and technology.  
  
Another prominent strategy of indigenization was what Ezeife (1981) referred to as private-
sector model. This model advocates that the state defers economic role to the private citizens. 
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Under this strategy the government strives to promote and protect the growth of an indigenous 
business class which will be an agent of economic redistribution through creation of jobs and 
reinvesting in the country. Such policies were adopted by countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Ivory 
Coast, South Africa and Senegal. The private sector strategy is based on the philosophical 
assumption that humans are inherently individualist and perform at their best when they have 
something to gain from what they are doing. The private sector was viewed as more effective 
and efficient than the lethargic state parastatals. In Kenya, the government led by Jomo 
Kenyatta nurtured indigenous citizens to venture to industries previously reserved for 
foreigners and settlers. In Ivory Coast, President Felix Hophouet-Boigny adamantly refused to 
nationalize the industries arguing that the government had no capacity to run the industries 
efficiently. In South Africa, the economic empowerment of the black entrepreneurs was an 
initiative of the private sector which made loans available on generous terms to finance black 
people’s acquisition of shares in various businesses (Marcus et al, 2007). The South African 
government put in place mechanisms to assist aspiring black business people to set up their 
own businesses or establish partnerships with existing businesses.  
 
This is also the model that Zimbabwe follows in its current indigenization policy where the 
state has established a National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF), to 
fund the acquisition of shares by black business people. However, such models have also been 
a dismal failure just like nationalization. Oftentimes state officials take advantage of their 
proximity to power to benefit from the funds made available by the government to the detriment 
of honest and genuine businesspeople. People who win contracts or funds are those related to 
the politicians (Ake, 1996; Saunders, 2008). This has rather worsened poverty and inequality. 
Moreover, in most African countries, the culture of entrepreneurship is still relatively alien, as 
such a business class big enough to play any meaningful role in the economy rarely exists. The 
economy ends up being dominated by foreigners who simply exploit the country’s resources 
without reinvesting (Saunders, 2008). This model is easily vulnerable to patrimonial schemes 
of the political elite who seek to consolidate their political power by distributing opportunities 
to loyal supporters (See Magure, 2012).  
 
Supporters of the private sector model believe that the indigenization initiative should be 
calibrated and designed in a way that is compatible with the hard facts of economic realities 
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(Bloch, 2012; Chikuhwa, 2013; Musewe, 2014). Rationality, according to this camp should be 
the cardinal point of departure for any socio-economic transformation policy with hopes of 
success. The passions and emotions of nationalism, that informed the nationalization drive, 
should be replaced by sober and dispassionate calculations of capital accumulation and 
entrepreneurship. Those who hold this view argue that indigenization programme should be 
designed and implemented in a way that encourages foreign direct investment, increases 
economic growth and productivity (Bloch, 2008; Robertson, 2012). This line of argument is 
more concerned about the economic efficiency of the policy. Defending this approach 
Chikuhwa (2013) points out that indigenization should be part of a broad strategy of economic 
growth that boosts financial investments and the growth of productive sectors. Economic 
growth, it is argued, will mitigate poverty and inequality and thus it is compatible with the 
objectives of indigenization (Sibanda, 2013; Musewe, 2016). Integration into the global 
economy based on free trade and respect for property rights is paramount for those who 
subscribe to this rather economistic perspective. 
  
Former Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono (2013) proposed, in the case of 
Zimbabwe, the adoption of the Supply and Distribution-based Indigenization and 
Empowerment model (also known as SADIE). Gono argued that the participation of the 
indigenous people in the economy can be achieved by making a favourable deal for them in 
the supply of inputs to established businesses. The government can direct established 
businesses to procure at least 51% of their inputs from local indigenous suppliers. This, he 
argued, is better than the equity-ownership model under which indigenous beneficiaries have 
to wait for uncertain dividends to be availed. More so, such a model is more realistic since the 
majority of indigenous people cannot afford to purchase shares in the big companies. Sibanda 
(2013) is of the view that for the economic indigenization to be successful in Zimbabwe, the 
government must consider adopting an approach sensitive to the different sectors of the 
economy and different regions of the country rather than a blanket approach. He argues that 
local people need different skills to operate in the different sectors of the economy, while some 
sectors may be amenable to indigenization others can prove more challenging. He goes on to 
urge the government not to start from ground zero but identify existing enterprises owned by 
indigenous people and help them grow: 
Government should broadly define and de-radicalise indigenisation, allowing for democratic, 
inclusive non-partisan, non-racial process of empowerment driven by economic ideas and 
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business considerations that respect the rule of law and focus on sustainable growth and 
development of the various sectors of the economy. (Sibanda, 2013: 30) 
 
2.7 Indigenization and Economic Empowerment: The African experience 
 
Just like political decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s became a continent-wide phenomenon, 
post-independence Africa has been similarly gripped by the mantra of economic decolonization 
in the form of indigenization of capital. Emerging from broadly identical historical 
backgrounds of colonial exploitation, the question of how to rectify colonial injustices was one 
that every country had to deal with. Many countries in Africa – Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast among others have made efforts to indigenize their economies 
and empower their people (Adedeji, 1981). Despite a considerable degree of uniformity in the 
causal circumstances, African states responded to this challenge using unique approaches 
tailored to fit the conditions of their socio-economic and political terrain. This being the case, 
an examination of other African countries’ experiences of indigenization and economic 
empowerment draws out differential dynamics of the phenomenon that would otherwise be 
missed focusing on a single country. This section runs through the considerable literature that 




One of the first countries in Africa to embark on a significant programme of economic 
indigenization was Tanzania under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. Nyerere strongly favoured 
the collective or communal ownership of the country’s wealth (Adedeji, 1981). He argued that 
wealth could only be redistributed effectively through public institutions like the state endowed 
with a popular mandate to ensure the economic security and welfare of the people (Nyerere, 
1968: 2-5). Ngowi (2009) writes about Tanzania in the aftermath of independence: 
The economy continued to be mainly within the hands of the British colonial masters and Asian 
businessmen. Industries, plantations, banks, mines and relatively large commercial activities 
continued to be under the British and Asians. (2009:262). 
This was the status quo that Tanzania made an effort to change through its policies of 
facilitating the transfer of wealth to the indigenous Tanzanians. This policy was based on a 
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political document christened Arusha Declaration in 1967 which announced the country’s 
intentions to restructure its economy from a privately-owned and market-oriented system to a 
state-owned and centrally planned economy. Under the Arusha declaration, the government 
aimed “to exercise effective control over the principal means of production and pursue policies 
that facilitate the way to collective ownership of resources in this country” (TANU, 1967). 
 
In implementing its economic decolonization and indigenization programme, Tanzania 
followed a state-based model in which the state drove the process (Ake, 1996; Ngowi, 2009; 
Etekpe and Okolo, 2010). An elaborate and expansive system of parastatals across various 
economic sectors was created. Under the National Development Corporation formed in 1965 
parastatals were formed in the financial sector to spearhead the industrialization of the country. 
These included the Tanzania Development Finance Corporation, the Bank of Tanzania, the 
Central Bank of Commerce, and the Tanzania Investment Bank (Ake, 1996). According to Dias 
(1970) all commercial banks belonging to British, Indian, Dutch and Tanzanian citizens were 
nationalized. The National Bank of Commerce was immediately set up to provide funds for 
public programs intended to increase productivity. Agriculture, the mainstay of the economy, 
was placed under two parastatals, the National Agricultural and Food Corporation and the 
National Agricultural Company. The State Trading Corporation was created to manage retail 
activities. By 1966 Tanzania had 43 parastatals and by 1973, 112 (Ake, 1996). However, Ake 
(1996) points out that not much was achieved in terms of local ownership and control of the 
parastatals themselves as the foreign stake kept increasing. In 1967-70 external funds 
contributed 13 percent of parastatal expenditure. As Tanzania pursued indigenization and self-
reliance, the external contribution to parastatal expenditure rose steadily and steeply: 20 percent 
in 1970-71, 56 percent in 1971-72, 73 percent in 1972-73, and 59 percent in 1973-74 (Ake, 
1996).  
 
Tanzania’s transformation had a mixed outcome. This is highlighted by the fact that even as 
the policy resulted in the state effectively controlling a bigger part of the economy through a 
network of parastatals, the parastatals were not well-run. Ngowi (2009) also argues that the 
nationalization policies of Tanzania were, on balance, a failure. He points out that the new 
public enterprises were cesspools of corruption and mismanagement and it was not long before 
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they collapsed under heavy debt. However, Dias (1970) presents a different picture; according 
to the author Tanzania’s nationalization policy was a huge success:  
The NIC was able to report that its business had more than doubled during March, 1967 and all through 
the fiscal year 1967-68 was able to sustain this doubled rate of business. The NBC in its first full year of 
operation made a profit of Sh. 17.2 million despite a loss of about Sh. 12.1 million due to the devaluation 
of the British Pound….During 1968 the National Development Corporation was able to plough back profits 
of Sh. 30 million into developmental activities. The previous year, among the developmental activities 
completed were 57 bridges, 3283 miles of roads, 46 schools, 44 dispensaries and 44 new settlements. The 
State Trading Corporation made a profit of £250,000 in the first 8 months. (Dias, 1970: 74) 
2.7.2 Nigeria 
 
Like other post-colonial African states, Nigeria also had to confront the problems of a 
disarticulated and structurally imbalanced economy whose vital sectors were overwhelmingly 
dominated by foreigners. The country soon embarked on a programme of indigenization and 
economic empowerment to stem the preponderance of foreign players in the economy. 
Balabkins (1980) articulated the situation thus: 
In a study of 1320 firms showing the distribution of ownership and corporate control of public companies 
registered before 1969 revealed that in large firms with paid up capital ranging between R36 000 and R1. 
82 million, expatriate firms and individuals held over 80 percent of the capital. Nigerians also knew that 
the retail and wholesale sectors were in the hands of Syrians, Lebanese Cypriots and Greeks, this they did 
not like. (1980: 21) 
The public mood was clear, political and economic logic made economic restructuring 
paramount and urgent more so in the aftermath of a bloody civil war13, the country could hardly 
afford anymore chaos. Further, indigenization of the economy would also serve as a much-
needed national rallying point to help heal the divisions deepened by the civil war. 
 
Nigeria had a double headache of how to take control of the economy from foreigners and also 
how to create and nurture a dynamic local business class to lead the industry (Mohamed, 1985). 
There was a prevailing feeling amongst the ruling class that political independence was hollow 
without economic independence or would lead to what Balabkins (1980:21) refers to as 
                                                          
13 Nigeria endured a decade-long civil war in which the South-East (Biafra) fought the federal forces in an attempt 
to secede from Nigeria. The Federal army was victorious and managed to prevent the secession with the war 
coming to an end in 1970 (Ake, 1996). 
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“pseudo-sovereignty”. Ake (1996) argues that Nigeria consciously avoided indigenizing the 
economy through nationalization but instead preferred the hard task of nurturing a private 
indigenous business class. This, it was reasoned, would also complement efforts to attract 
foreign private investment which became crucial in sectors where Nigerians lacked adequate 
capital to make sound investments.  
 
The ‘Nigerianisation’ of business and industrial enterprises began in 1960 as the government 
was concerned about 'foreign' or 'alien' ownership of leading industries (Verhoef, 2004: 89). 
Unlike the Tanzanian model, Nigeria’s indigenization was not averse to private ownership 
although state governments had to step in to acquire shares in companies designated for 
indigenization where private indigenous citizens could not (Mohamed, 1985: 4). This was part 
of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972, under the country’s second 
development plan of 1970-1974. The primary objectives of the NEPD included creating 
economic opportunities for indigenous business people, profit retention in the country’s 
economy and encouraging foreign investment in capital goods productions (Verhoef, 2004: 
95). The NEPD place Nigerian businesses under two categories: Schedule 1 and Schedule 2. 
Enterprises under schedule 1 were to be reserved exclusively for indigenous ownership. This 
category included businesses engaged in bread and cake making, candle manufacture, casinos 
and gaming centres, hairdressing, laundry and dry-cleaning radio and television broadcasting 
among others. Schedule 2 excluded foreigners under certain conditions, depending on the size 
of the operation and level of indigenous share participation. Businesses under Schedule 2 were 
those in which there was a lack of indigenous capital or expertise mostly in manufacturing. 
Some of the businesses in this category included beer brewing, furniture making, construction, 
estate agency, wholesale distribution and shipping among others (Ogbuagu, 1983). Essentially, 
what the decree achieved was to arrange an accommodation between indigenous and foreign 
capital; it reduced the chances of conflict and deepened the vested interest of the indigenous 
leadership in capitalism (Ake, 1996). However, Verhoef (2004), points out that the measures 
met with limited success as only a few foreign owned companies were complying with the 
government directive. Only a third of the 950 affected enterprises (314) fully complied after 




General Obasanjo’s government embarked on a second phase of indigenization when it 
assumed power in 1975. The NEPD/77 added a new category of enterprises (schedule 3) in 
which at least 40% of Nigerian equity participation or interest was guaranteed (Mohamed, 
1985; Balabkins 1981). About 39 enterprises were listed under this category, especially a broad 
range of manufacturing industries and required joint indigenous and foreign ownership. 
Amongst these were engineering industries, manufacturing of basic industrial chemicals and 
major export industries. The government reasoned that large capital-intensive industries were 
required to have 60 per cent foreign and 40 per cent Nigerian participation due to lack of local 
capital (Uzor, 2008). All commercial and industrial ventures, except single non-renewable 
projects, were fully indigenized. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board (NEPB) was 
satisfied with compliance: of the existing enterprises 77,5 per cent were issued with letters of 
provisional compliance, but of the new enterprises (the joint venture with foreign 
entrepreneurs) only 11,4 per cent complied (Verhof, 2004). Mohamed (1985: 296) lauds 
indigenization as a success as he notes that Nigerians invested a capital of over 900 million 
Naira across 1 447 companies. The government also participated in the acquisition of equity in 
the banking sector. Federal Government had secured majority shareholding (40 per cent) in all 
of the eleven commercial and merchant banks in Nigeria. Of the more than 700 schedule three 
enterprises, only 81 (11,4 per cent) offered their shares for sale on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
- a total value of N210 million. Another 29 companies sold shares to Nigerians via private 
placements to the value of N14 million, while the remainder sold shares privately (Verhof, 
2004). These developments, seriously undermined the intention to promote an egalitarian 
society through indigenization (Ake, 1996). 
 
The benefits of indigenization did not broaden the basis of Nigerian participation in the 
economy - it promoted unequal share ownership. Analysts strongly argued that Nigerian 
government officials and the existing business élite had manipulated the indigenization process 
in both phases, leading to wealth concentration at the expense of the Nigerian masses and the 
perpetuation of the profitable operation of multinational corporations (Mohamed, 1985; Uzor, 
2008). In the end, concludes Ake (1996), indigenization turned out to be only a strategy of 
incorporation; at best the indigenous political class improved the ownership of the economy 
but not its control. The drive for indigenization did not alter the division of labor between 
foreign capital and the indigenous political class, although it might have improved the access 
of the latter to business opportunities. It also created opportunities for rent-seeking especially 
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on the part of the state officials who may have cut deals with companies wishing to evade 
compliance with the law. 
 
2.7.3 South Africa 
 
Like Zimbabwe, post-apartheid South Africa confronts burning issues of socio-economic 
transformation. The country emerged in 1994 from an apartheid system that worked to ensure 
that the white population disproportionately enjoyed the country’s wealth while deliberately 
denying the majority black population (Shava, 2016). The apartheid government had for 
decades presided over and perpetuated a system of racial inequality where white citizens 
monopolized the economic pie while blacks and other minorities settled for crumbs. Nowhere 
was economic injustice perpetrated in a vulgar and crude manner than it was in South Africa 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 4). The need to empower black people economically was high 
on the post-apartheid government’s agenda. The Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
occurred in two phases. The first phase started in the early 90s and was almost entirely private-
sector driven without any deliberate policy from the state. The second phase started in 2003 
with the adoption of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act. This 
phase saw the state become more proactive and setting up the institutional framework to 
expedite economic transformation.  
  
The first phase of the BEE in the early 90s the empowerment programme was largely private 
sector-driven (Ponte, Roberts and Sittert, 2007). The first phase of BEE was focused on 
increasing black equity participation in the companies with a view to keeping the economic 
system within the free market system (Acemoglu, Gelb and Robinson, 2007). Tangri and 
Southall (2008) point out that between 1994 and 1998 the white-dominated private sector 
companies initiated empowerment deals in which they sold stock to black buyers without the 
government forcing them. This was on the back of the realization by the white business owners 
of the need to bring in black people into the mainstream economy. In 1991 SANLAM, a 
prominent insurance company, sold 10 per cent of its equity in its subsidiary, Metropolitan 
Life, to a black-owned company. After two years SANLAM sold another 20 per cent of its 
shares to Methold and in August 1994 Methold was listed on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange as NAIL (New Africa Investments Limited) (IOL News, 2004). This pioneering 
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transaction was privately financed (with no state involvement or funding) and without statutory 
enforcement (Verhof, 2004). It was a unique instance of the private sector taking on the black 
empowerment drive without waiting to be goaded by the state. 
  
BEE transactions gained momentum in the early 90s. In 1995: 22 BEE deals were concluded; 
another 45 in 1996 and by the end of 1998 the number of deals stood at approximately 100. 
Between 1998 and 1999 only, the deal flow rose by 320 per cent. After the path-breaking 
SANLAM deal many other transactions followed suit (Verhoef, 2004). In 1994 when apartheid 
officially came to an end there was no single black owned company listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) while the market capitalisation of BEE companies listed on the JSE 
stood at R4 billion. In the following year black-owned companies constituted around 0,5 per 
cent of the total market capitalisation of R4,6 billion. By late 1996 the figure had risen to 6,3 
per cent before increasing to 8,6 percent in the first half of 1997, representing a market 
capitalisation of R36 billion. By January 1999 35 black controlled companies were listed on 
the JSE, with a combined market capitalisation of R58,7 billion or 5,5 per cent. There were 76 
black influenced companies, controlling assets to the value of R18bn out of the total value of 
R115bn of those companies (Verhoef, 2004). According to Theobald et al (2015) BEE deals 
undertaken by the JSE’s 100 largest companies since 2000 translate into R317 billion. At the 
end of 2013 black economic interest on the JSE was estimated to be around 23% mainly 
through BEE deals and direct individual investment. Though company acquisitions are 
occurring at a very slow pace, it has been remarkable how black people have managed to 
penetrate the mainstream economy. Barchiesi (2003) also notes that by 2000, 332 black males 
and 53 black females were company directors in white-dominated companies. He however 
criticizes this development as a mere public relations ploy by companies associated with 
apartheid to gain legitimacy in the post-apartheid era. 
 
Moreover, the BEE was not only for the middle-class black elite. Some of the major trade 
unions in the country moved swiftly to acquire shares in private investments. For example, 
SARHWU (South African Railways and Harbour Workers' Union) bought shares in a number 
of businesses. These include Mercantile and Lisbon Bank Holdings (8 per cent), 50 per cent in 
Bond Industries, 5,3 per cent in Safrica Insurance, 10 per cent in Screenworld and 10 per cent 
in Supergroup among others (See Verhoef, 2004). The first unions to actively seek investment 
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through their own companies, were the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu), the Cosatu-
linked National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the South African Clothing and Textile 
Workers' Union (Sactwu) (See Letsoalo et al, 2015). The unions had long demanded influence 
over investments made by their pension funds, but the union investment companies were 
separate from the pension and provident funds. By 1999 the value of investments controlled by 
unions exceeded R10 million. More than 60 investments were made by more than 10 union 
investment companies. The most prominent was SARHWU Investment Holdings, Cosatu's 
Kopano ke, the National Union of Manufacturing Workers (NUMSA) Investment Trust and 
the NUM Matla Investment Company, often investing together with the SACTWU Investment 
Company (Barchiesi, 2003; IOL News, 2004). However, amidst the flurry of empowerment 
deals, frustration was growing within the black business community in the late 90s on the BEE 
process being controlled by whites and taking place at a very slow pace. These complaints led 
to the setting up of the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEECOMM) in 1998 led 
by the current president Cyril Ramaphosa to probe the issue of empowerment further (Tangri 
and Southall, 2008). The Commission’s report in 2001 concluded that black empowerment had 
been frustrated and that the private sector was not committed to empowerment. The 
Commission called for greater government intervention in the process (including legislation if 
possible) – a controversial recommendation that inspired a fierce debate and set the stage for 
the transition of the empowerment policy to the second phase (Tangri and Southall, 2008; 
Mokgobinyane, 2017). The white-dominated corporate sector feared that enforcing the 
empowerment process through legislation would collapse the market.  
 
After all the debates and back and forth consultations, the South African parliament passed the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act 53 in 2003 as a legal instrument 
with which to increase the representation of black people in the country’s economy. This 
marked the second phase of the BEE. The BBBEE was defined as “the viable economic 
empowerment of all black people, in particular women, workers, youth, people with disabilities 
and people living in rural areas, through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies” 
(2003: 12). Section 1 of the Act defines black people as a generic term that includes Africans, 
Coloureds and Indians who are citizens of South Africa by naturalization, birth or descent 
(ibid). The objectives of the policy as outlined in Section 2 of the Act include: 




b) achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and management structures and in 
the skilled occupations of existing and new enterprises;  
c) increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises own 
and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure 
and skills training; 
d) increasing the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new enterprises, and 
increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training;  
 
Whereas the model of the first phase focused on the transfer of ownership, the new model went 
beyond ownership. According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2018) the 
BBBEE Act is underpinned by a scorecard with seven elements which include ownership, 
management control, skills development, enterprise and supplier development, localisation, 
and socio-economic development (DTI, 2018). The various elements are accorded a weighting 
that is used to assess compliance of the companies with the Act’s requirements. Unlike 
Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy whose major aim was to increase black ownership in the 
existing enterprises, the BBBEE looks more holistic and multidimensional. Acemoglu, Gelb 
and Robinson (2007) argue that it was imperative for the post-apartheid state to deal with the 
legacy of apartheid through direct intervention in the distribution of assets and opportunities 
and the BBBEE was going to be the perfect instrument to achieve this. 
 
In line with the BBBEE goals, the government has also acted to promote the development of 
Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) by establishing funding institutions. The First 
was Khula Enterprise Finance Facility (KEF) mandated to finance SMMEs as an independent 
company capitalised by government (DTI, 2018). In a study of 72 companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) focusing on ownership transfer to BEE partners, Sartorius 
and Botha (2008) found that 27 companies had transferred 10 percent or less. Only 3 companies 
had transferred about 30 percent, 23 had transferred between 20 and 30 percent while 19 were 
between 10 and 20 percent. Only 26 companies met the required target of 25 percent transfer 
of ownership. Patel and Graham (2012) indicate that 1399 BBBEE deals were achieved 




However, despite the presence of the BBBEEE Act, the empowerment process has been very 
slow and seemingly benefits only the black elite thus creating and widening inequality within 
the black community. Tangri and Southall (2008) note that names like Patrice Motsepe, Cyril 
Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Saki Macozoma secure equity worth billions of Rands in 
various companies in the communication, banking, transport and mining sectors. Patel and 
Graham (2012) also conclude that in the 1399 deals they studied the majority benefitted 
individual politically connected beneficiaries rather than broad-based organizations. Out of a 
thousand deals signed between 2004 and 2006, only about 100 deals had broad-based 
beneficiaries. Thus, the black empowerment policy in South Africa has also been fraught with 
difficulties almost identical to those that affected Nigeria’s transformation process. It seems 
the economic transformation process got off to a false start as the representation of blacks in 




On attaining independence in 1964 Zambia possessed great potential for economic 
development as a result of its huge deposits of copper which also happened to be doing well in 
the world market (Burdette, 1997). However, the legacy of colonialism, although the settler 
population in Zambia was not as high as it was in Zimbabwe and South Africa, had a visibly 
debilitating effect on the social, political and economic prospects of the indigenous Zambians. 
The lack of training and education amongst the indigenous people meant that Zambia faced a 
chronic shortage of personnel to carry out the administrative tasks of nation and state-building 
(Ake, 1996). Moreover, the huge influx of rural dwellers who had hitherto been prohibited 
from settling in urban areas presented a housing and unemployment crisis since the cities and 
towns were ill-equipped to satisfy the sudden demand.  
 
In the light of the underdeveloped economy and the inequalities that went with it, the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda who was also 
the country’s first president championed the policy of Zambianisation. This policy of 
indigenization was well encapsulated in the Mulungushi Reforms of 1968 (See Libby and 
Woakes, 1980). The government made known its intention through the Mulungushi document 
to acquire majority equity holdings (51%) in vital foreign-owned firms to be controlled by a 
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parastatal conglomerate named the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) (See 
Burawoy, 1972). To Chanda (2015) it was clear “that the main thrust of the Mulungushi 
Economic Reforms was to put the country’s economy ‘firmly’ in the hands of Zambians”. The 
affected industries included manufacturing, transport, distribution and construction. In line 
with this policy the Zambian government moved to acquire majority holding in major foreign 
mining firms like the Anglo-American Corporation and the Rhodesia Consolidated Mines 
(RCM). These were to be managed by a parastatal known as the Mining Development 
Corporation (MINDECO). Some of the reasons cited by the government for these takeovers 
included the following: 
 The failure by foreign firms to reinvest in the Zambian economy 
 Excessive repatriation of profits at the expense of Zambia’s development  
 Acute economic inequalities between rural and urban areas on the one hand and between the 
indigenous Zambians and foreigners on the other. 
 Failure by private sector players to develop local human resources resulting in virtually all aspects of 
the economy falling in the control of foreigners. 
 Disproportionate economic influence wielded by multi-national companies 
 The inability of the government to take charge of the pace and direction of economic development  
 
The Finance and Development Corporation (FINDECO) was used by the Zambian government 
to gain control of the insurance industry and building societies. However, the government 
attempted without success to take over foreign-owned banks like Barclays and Standard 
Chartered. In 1971 INDECO, MINDECO and FINDECO were merged under the Zambia 
Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), with the country’s president Kenneth Kaunda as 
Board Chairman. ZIMCO was a state holding company whose mandate was to supervise and 
monitor the operations of the parastatals to protect government interests. At its height the 
nationalisation crusade brought 80% of the country’s economy under state supervision with the 
private sector taking up 20% (Burdette, 1997). Some of the major state companies that came 
into existence during the wave of nationalisation include the State Lotteries Board, Dairy 
Produce Board, Development Bank of Zambia, Mulungushi Textiles Limited, Zambia National 
Tourist Board, Medical Stores Limited and the National Savings and Credit Bank among 
others. Through nationalisation of the economy the government hoped to accomplish the 
following objectives: 




 Restore economic power to the government and through government to the people of Zambia. 
 Stem the haemorrhage of profits to ensure that earnings were reinvested in the country.  
These measures led to an unprecedented growth in the size and influence of the parastatal 
sector. By 1972 the public sector accounted for 53% of manufacturing output and 42% 
employment in the same sector. By 1980 the share of the public sector in the total GDP and 
formal employment were 56 per cent and 54 per cent respectively (Burdette, 1977). 
However, the performance of the parastatals left a lot to be desired. In the manufacturing 
sector the government sought to diversify the country’s economy through the import 
substitution industrialization strategy. High tariffs were put in place to protect the country’s 
mining sector, price controls for major commodities and over-valued exchange rates were 
also some of the instruments the government deployed to expand the economy. In doing 
this the government was guided by the philosophy of humanism which sought to establish 
an egalitarian society through the expansion of social service provision such as welfare, 
education, health, sanitation and nutrition. The mines supported socio-economic activities 
in their host communities through the building of roads, schools, shops and by providing 
housing and medical aid facilities for their workers. Ake (1996: 20) points out that the 
mining companies were nationalized under the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, later 
known as the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation. In doing so, Zambia incurred a 
huge debt in compensation payments to foreign shareholders and the hostility of the 
expatriates who controlled the management, technology, and production in the mines. This 
hostility forced Zambia to retreat from its ambitious goals to the point that by 1982 the 
program of indigenization was largely reversed. 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
 
Thus, the indigenization policy in Zimbabwe seems to have many faces. In one dimension 
it’s a historical justice project meant to help redress to the injustices of the past (See 
Ramose, 2001, 2006; Sium, Desai and Ritskes 2012). It has also been portrayed as a 
fundamentally well or ill-devised economic project meant to unlock the economic potential 
of the indigenous people (Matunhu, 2012; Bloch, 2008). Other scholars view indigenization 
as a largely political project meant to entrench Zanu-PF’s stay in power (Mufema, 1998; 
Magure, 2014). Others criticize indigenization as racist (Matyszak, 2011) and nativist 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009) and based on a distortion of history. Yet others like Chengu 
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(2013) and Bwoni (2015) see the policy as a blue-print of economic emancipation worthy 
of emulation by other former colonies across Africa. This goes to show the extent to which 
the debate on indigenization is polarized. From the briefly examined cases of empowerment 
policies in Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, the emerging trend is that 
indigenization in these countries ultimately failed largely because of lack of local capital 
and government incompetence. No significant indigenous business class with enough 
capital was present to take over the businesses and industries that were targeted for 
indigenization. As such, Zimbabwe would have done better to think of ways of raising 
capital to bankroll the indigenization project if it was to be successful. The next chapter 





















Indigenization of Zimbabwe’s Mining Sector: Through the Lenses of the State, Class 
Relations, and the World System 
 
Whatever else we may also have in mind, we mean by theory the processes by which 
individual facts, findings, observations, or analyses are organized into larger intellectual 
structures. The point of theory building, they held….was instead to build hard-hitting, critical 
analyses that challenged unsatisfactory social conditions, showing the discrepancies between 
what is and what ought to be. (Rule, 1997:25-28) 
 
3.1 The framework 
 
Post-colonial Zimbabwe is to a considerable degree a microcosm of the larger post-colonial 
world and a polity whose relatively short but eventful post-independence history has been 
defined by a frantic search for a path forward. A search for a decisive break from a devastating 
past whose dominant shade in the present is evidence that the wheels of history have resolutely 
refused to turn effectively keeping the post-colony almost frozen in time. The evidence of 
former colonies failing to drag themselves out of the shade of colonialism is well demonstrated 
in the light of underperforming economies, dependency, inequality, poverty, political conflict, 
weak public institutions among other things (Amin, 1980). While empirical evidence of the 
post-colonial countries’ failure to effect transformation is neither in doubt nor dearth, the 
challenge is to explain the causal dynamics and interlocking co-determinations of the persistent 
lack of progress in that front. This research effort probes and zooms in on Zimbabwe’s post-
independence efforts to decolonize and transform its mining sector, one of the most lucrative 
economic sectors, through indigenization. The mining sector holds a special place in the 
country’s history since it was largely the assumption of its potential that motivated Zimbabwe’s 
colonization at the end of the 19th century (See Bourne, 2011; Chikuhwa, 2013). As part of this 
effort, the primary aim of this chapter is to develop an explanatory framework or strategy that 
is going to guide further inquiry into the transformation effort in Zimbabwe’s minerals sector 
in the subsequent chapters.  
  
The largely unchanging and stagnant socio-economic situation of post-colonial societies carries 
with it a misleading impression of being natural and inevitable and for that reason beyond 
resolution or redemption. However, a scratch below the surface reveals a dizzying gridlock of 
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cross-currents, conjunctures and contingencies springing from diverse sources whose 
aggregate effect is the preservation of the socioeconomic status quo. This research employs a 
comprehensive, contextual and historically grounded approach that seeks to demystify and 
illuminate the working of the obscure and deceptively ‘behind-the-scenes’ forces that have 
shaped the trajectory of post-independence transformation and decolonization in Zimbabwe’s 
minerals sector. To accomplish this task, this study will use, as its explanatory tool kit, a 
dynamic triangular axis that includes the state, class relations, and the world economy as its 
principal elements. While each component retains a qualitative and analytical distinction, it is 
important to note that they do not operate in water-tight compartments independent of each 
other. Instead, they interact with each other in mutually-reinforcing ways to dictate the pace 
and character of the indigenization and transformation programme in the mining sector. 
 
A theory of social change and transformation is also a theory of the state – to borrow, in an 
inverted version, Miliband (1969:1)’s opening phrase. The implication, which the history of 
social revolutions has consistently proven to be true, is that the state plays a decisive and 
determining role in the evolution of social structures and institutions – especially the relations 
of production. Social transformation, of the magnitude and scope envisaged in Zimbabwe’s 
indigenization policy, can only take place within the auspices and framework of the state (See 
Cox, 1987; Skocpol, 1979; Evans, 1995). The theoretical framework to be advanced herein 
uses the concept of state power – as distinct from the state apparatus - as one of the major 
explanatory variables that can shed more light on how Zimbabwe has gone about its efforts to 
restructure and transform the mining sector. State power refers to the manner in which the state 
apparatus has been used to intervene in the mining sector. It is the mode and character of state 
intervention in the society. While the state apparatus – which refers to the institutional complex 
of the state – is still important as the repository unique powers, this research suggests that it is 
the control of the state apparatus that matters. The state institutions do not have the agency to 
act on their own. They are controlled by state officials who harbour motivations and interests 
of their own. Hence the state power concept focuses attention on the way state institutions 
endowed with special powers are used to intervene in the mining sector. The tussle for the 
control of wealth is always about power (social, economic and political power).  
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The second element of the explanatory strategy adopted in this research is the articulation of 
the existing class relations amongst the various, mostly antagonistic, classes involved in the 
mining sector. Classes herein denote those groups that occupy more or less similar position in 
the relations of production (See Cox, 1987). The class structure comprises the power 
relationships amongst various groups involved in production (the foreign investors, the state 
elite, the labour movement, indigenous capitalists, small-scale and artisanal miners and the 
peasant communities). It is the relations between the existing class forces that the 
indigenization policy is earmarked to alter in the first instance and for that reason constitute 
the prime focus of the programme. Class conflict between the powerful and weak groups, 
centered on demands for a recalibration of the relations of production in terms of ownership 
structure and distribution of profits, is one of the powerful determinants of the scope and form 
of transformation. Workers demanding higher wages, indigenous business people demanding 
more opportunities for ownership or the petty bourgeoisie demanding governmental support 
and protection all exert pressure on the policymakers. The pace and character of transformation 
are not only shaped by forces of change but also by the ability and the capacity of the forces of 
continuity, especially the big capitalists and some in the ranks of the state elite to resist change 
(Fisk, 1989). Capitalists have at their disposal considerable human, financial and technological 
resources and the state elite has at its disposal legitimate authority and coercive organizations 
like the military and the police they can use to contain or slow down pressures for 
transformation. Reciprocal influence between the balance of class forces and the state is likely 
to determine the prospects of indigenization in a significant way. Class relations, which are 
fundamentally power relations, are also constitutive of state power as will be demonstrated 
below (Mamdani, 1977). 
 
An analysis of the post-independence indigenization project in the mining sector requires a 
diligent and in-depth understanding of the international context. Indeed, there is truth in Amin 
(1980: 25)’s observation that “…value is a world and not a national category (globalization of 
the productive process); its distribution results, in the final analysis, from class struggles and 
alliances on a world and not a national scale.” Zimbabwe was incorporated into the global 
economy at the inception of colonialism as a peripheral and dependent player – a situation that 
remains largely unchanged. As the fifth chapter in this dissertation will show, the modern 
mining industry in Zimbabwe was born of capital raised in the London and New York financial 
markets. Its umbilical cord is tied to the capitalist centres in the Western capitals. Ever since 
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its inception at the beginning of the colonial era in the late 1890s, the minerals industry has 
relied on the alliance between the local ruling class and the transnational bourgeoisie boasting 
considerable financial and technological muscles (See Nkrumah, 1970; Phimister, 1976). 
States in the developing world lack adequate capital to invest in mining which forces them to 
rely on international financial markets and agents. The value of the minerals is not determined 
by states themselves but international buying agencies in the world market. The state’s duty is 
to ensure the adequate supply of labour and the protection of property rights. Even the private 
indigenous business people and the small-scale miners depend on capital from international 
houses. The internationalized exploitation of mineral resources means that the transformation 
of the sector is contingent on how the state can manoeuvre its way around systemic obstacles 
at the global level. 
    
The main proposition underpinning this inquiry is that the indigenization of the mining sector 
in Zimbabwe is largely determined by the interaction of the three levels of the state, existing 
relations of production and the world system or order. More to the point, the distribution of the 
ownership and control of mining value in Zimbabwe’s mining sector or any other economic 
sector for that matter is, this research intends to demonstrate, to varying degrees, a function or 
manifestation of the operations of the aforesaid factors. Zimbabwe’s post-independence efforts 
to transform its economic structure should be studied and assessed within the context of the 
dynamic triad of the state, class relations and the world-economy that collectively exert a 
significant impact on the structure and organization of the production process in the minerals 
sector. This chapter will develop a systematic exposition of the three-pronged explanatory 




The term postcolonial (different from the hyphenated post-colonial) has generated a lot of 
debate in recent years over its meaning and relevance as a concept and as a theory (See Dirlik, 
1994; Young 2004). Young (2004) is of the view that the term postcolonial lost its relevance 
in Africa since the 1980s when state collapse began to set in across many African countries. 
He argues that the erosion of state capacity in terms of monopolizing power over a specific 
territory and producing public goods such as health, education and economic growth, meant 
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that any resemblance with the colonial state had been severed. Therefore, the continuities 
between the colonial and post-colonial state were fast disappearing which meant Africa had 
moved beyond the post-colonial era. Mbembe (1992) made a somewhat similar argument 
stating that the majority of the people in Africa in the 1990s did not have any direct experience 
with colonialism. Hence, the history of colonialism was losing its space in the public memory 
which made the term post-colonial, with its rootedness in colonial history, somewhat 
anachronistic and irrelevant. Thus, due to the changing political and economic conditions and 
the passage of time, the relevance of the term post-colonial was increasingly being questioned. 
 
However, for other scholars postcoloniality is more than a marker of time in Africa’s political 
history (Oyegoke, 1998; Abrahamsen, 2003; Zein-Elabdin, 2011). It provides a theoretical lens 
for understanding an analysing the dynamics of Africa’s contemporary politics. Dirlik (1994) 
identified three meanings of the term postcolonial. Postcolonialism refers to the description or 
an account of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in former colonial societies. It also 
denotes the impact of the end of colonialism on global political and economic dynamics. 
Thirdly, postcolonialism is a discourse of the conditions prevailing in both the post-colonial 
societies and the global environment that seeks to create particular epistemologies and to 
dissect and possibly discard grand and dominant theories. Abrahamsen (2003) argues that as a 
discourse, postcolonialism is an approach to the understanding and critiquing of colonial 
domination and pervasive Eurocentric ideologies that continue to hold sway over colonized 
peoples. Postcolonialism is an effort to articulate and bring into relief the way in which the 
imposed understanding the colonized mixed with their cultures and nature to produce hybrid 
identities. Colonial domination was not imprinted on a blank slate, but was transformed and 
shaped by the history, culture and identity of the colonized.  
 
Oyegoke (1998: 8) observed that postcolonialism that “does not no longer derives from its 
demarcation of temporal points on the political continua of recent history, but from its new 
spatial spread; and the spatialisation of postcoloniality, like many other political phenomena, 
has been served by theory”. He argues that postcolonialism, as a theory, is not only applicable 
to the post-colonial societies but to the developed countries as well due to the diversity of their 
populations which have significant numbers of black people. Zein-Elabdin (2011) points out 
that postcolonialism is committed to unravelling the interconnectedness, continuities and the 
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nuances of the past and the present, the global North and South, the colonizer and the colonized. 
In the same vein (Oyegoke, 1998) emphasizes that postcolonalism pays attention to the 
complexities of contemporary politics to exposing and rectifying the shortcomings and the 
untruths peddled by the dominant theories about precolonial, colonial and post-colonial times. 
Thus, postcolonialism is a critique of the practices and institutions of power and how they are 
perpetrated and reproduced in contemporary politics. This study is an inquiry on the historical 
conditions prevailing in Zimbabwe as a former British colony. It is an analysis of Zimbabwe’s 
attempts to rectify the injustices of colonialism that perpetuated the economic and political 
discrimination of the indigenous masses. Postcolonial theory helps to understand Zimbabwe’s 
present situation and the obstacles it has to negotiate as it seeks to indigenize its economy.   
3.3. The Concept of the State 
 
An abiding and seemingly fundamental congruency within the diverse literature of socio-
economic transformation struggles in diverse contexts has been the curious and compelling, 
almost omnipresent, problem of the role of the State (See Skocpol, 1979; Cox, 1987; Evans, 
1995; Fisk, 1989). Hay and Lister confidently declare that “no concept is more central to 
political discourse and political analysis than that of the state” (2006: 1). It increasingly seems 
that the impact of the state on the socio-economic life of any modern society simply cannot be 
ignored. The state has evolved dramatically over the years into a universal and pervasive force 
infiltrating and penetrating ever deeper and wider into the fabric of modern societies (See 
Anter, 2014). Held (1984: 11) succinctly captures the dramatic expansion of the state pointing 
out that it “appears to be everywhere regulating the conditions of our lives from birth 
registration to death certification”. In a similar view, Miliband (1969) was hardly exaggerating 
when he presented the problem of the state thus: 
More than ever before, men now live in the shadow of the state. What they want to achieve individually or 
in groups now mainly depends on the state’s sanction and support. It is to an ever greater degree the state 
which men encounter as they confront other men. This is why as social beings they are also political beings. 
A theory of the state is also a theory of the society and of the distribution of power in that society. 
(Miliband, 1969: 1)  
The state evolved and, in the process, redefined its material and institutional framework and 
normative functions to meet the changing local and international political dynamics. While the 
state has grown to be a universal institution, it is the striking variation of its structure and impact 




Liberal states, developmental states, communist states, authoritarian states, welfare-nationalist 
states are some of the representations of historical variations in state structure amidst which 
emerged qualitatively different socio-economic orders in their societies. Such observations 
resurrect pertinent questions about the nature of the relationship between the state and the 
socio-economic and political order – an object of interest in this work. Comparing Zaire’s 
predatory state and the developmental state in East Asian countries’ impact on socio-economic 
development, Evans (1995) rightly points out that variations in developmental outcomes can 
be attributed to fundamental differences in state structure and state-society relations. Moyo and 
Yeros (2011) classified developing world states into fractured; radicalised; stabilised; and 
occupied states whose unique structural characteristics have led to differences in development 
outcomes in the global south.  
 
The relationship between the state institution and the socio-economic and political structures 
is a centuries-old mystery that remains unresolved. No manual exists for it, every state has a 
unique relationship with its society shaped by historical circumstances. The present work 
problematizes this relationship in a bid to understand the dynamics of post-independence 
transformation outcomes in Zimbabwe’s mining sector. As already stated, economic 
indigenization and transformation is a programme of change whose intention is to radically 
alter the socio-economic order obtaining in Zimbabwe. How can the role of the state be 
understood in Zimbabwe's transformation project in the minerals sector that has been going on 
for more than two decades? Answers to this question may yield helpful insights into explaining 
what has, so far, been futile socio-economic transformation projects in post-colonial states.  
  
Sifting through the literature, one gets the sense that there is something approaching a 
consensus on the distinctive empirical, though by no means essential, features of the state 
whose presence makes the threshold of its definition. Recent scholarship has been able to 
identify key empirical features that form the basis of a state’s constitution (Steinberg, 2004; 
Chernilo, 2007). Specific geographic territory, administrative centralization, legitimate 
monopoly of force, system of diplomatic relations, and the public nature of its actions are 
among some of the distinctive and definitive elements of the state institution (Weber, 1923; 
Hay and Lister, 2006; Chernilo, 2007; Anters, 2014). There is a huge amount of qualitative 
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variation of these features from one state to the other as states may have more or less of one or 
more of the attributes just identified. For example, some states do not have a complete 
monopoly of force like in countries like Nigeria and Syria among other countries whose 
monopoly is under serious challenge from terrorist outfits and rebel groups. Some states such 
as Ukraine and South Sudan do not yet have stable geographical boundaries while most states 
in the third world are scarcely administratively present beyond the capital cities. As such not 
every state possesses every element of what are considered to be the distinctive characteristics. 
 
These exceptions considered, the possession of legitimate monopoly of force and territorial 
centralization makes states truly exceptional entities with uniquely far-reaching powers. Theda 
Skocpol in her seminal analysis of the causes of socio-economic revolutions in China, France 
and Russia conceived of the state as: 
….a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed and more or less 
coordinated by an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from 
society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations. 
(Skocpol, 1979: 29)  
That said, we may think of the state as a special macro-structure comprising a complex of 
legally circumscribed institutions invested or endowed with a legitimate monopoly of rule-
making, rule-applying, rule-adjudicating, rule-enforcing and rule-defending functions over a 
specific territory (See Therborn, 1978; Skocpol, 1979). A state as such is a special institution 
with special powers. Weber (1921: 650) conceived of the state as “a human community that 
successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory”. Miliband (1969) makes the point that the state is not any special thing but a system 
of carefully assembled institutions that include the government, the administrative arm, the 
judiciary, lower levels of government, the representative assemblies, the police and the military 
that work together to achieve set goals. It is these institutions, which Poulantzas (1978) referred 
to as a “special apparatus”, which constitute and express the actual reality of the state system. 
For Steinberger (2004) the state goes beyond physical structures and institutions set up to serve 
it. He argued that the state represents the collective judgment of the society on how things 
really are in the world and how people can structure their collective lives to adapt to this 
superior reality. Whatever form it takes, the state penetrates the psyche, the culture, the 
geography and dictates the rhythm of political and economic orientations of the society. The 
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Zimbabwean state, although saddled by a colonial heritage, does satisfy, to an appreciable 
extent the afore-mentioned attributes to fit the definition. 
 
3.4 The Problematic of State Power 
  
The globalisation of the modern state institution bequeathed to mankind a more or less truly 
global inter-state system which over the years has proved handy in facilitating trade, 
diplomacy, dialogue and interdependence between nations and civilizations across the world’s 
populace whose forefathers were perfectly ignorant of each other’s existence. The emergence 
of the global inter-state system underwrote ‘flat-earth’ notions of formal politics, promulgating 
and celebrating the academic convenience which came with the minimization (perhaps the 
trivialisation) of political dissimilarities that complicated the work of comparative political 
science (Hague, Harrop and McCormick, 2016). Formal political institutions like parliaments, 
independent judiciary, executives, bureaucracies, political parties, universal suffrage, and 
constitutions among others attained global widespread. However, the uniformity of the 
institutional framework does not mean that the effect of states in their societies is also uniform 
and ahistorical (See Heywood, 2014). This premise grounds the analytical distinction in this 
study between state apparatus and state power. Notably, even though state apparatus has been 
universalized, state power remains fundamentally historical and analytically distinct from state 
apparatus. In assessing the role of the state in Zimbabwe’s efforts to transform its mining 
sector, this study will focus on the character of state power and not the state apparatus per se. 
  
Given the above conception of the state, it then follows that state power denotes the legally 
circumscribed mode and process of intervention in the society effected by and through the state 
apparatus (See Therborn, 1978; Evans, 1995). Although the state apparatus or system is 
invested with unique powers, it is however the control, character and manifestation of that 
power, particularly its class character, that is of interest in the present work. In other words, the 
class character of state power is hereby assumed to be a major determinant of the trajectory 
of the indigenization process in Zimbabwe’s minerals sector. The forms state power can 
assume include the laws made by parliament, judgements handed down by the courts, the 
repressive activities of the military and the police, policy formulation and implementation of 
the executive and administrative arms and decisions of independent agencies. It may also 
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manifest itself in the lack of action or withholding of decisions by the state officials. These are 
forms or techniques through which the state intervenes in the society with calculated political, 
economic, ideological and even cultural effects. The study of Zimbabwe’s experience of post-
independence socio-economic transformation project is also a study of the geography and the 
anthropology of state power its evolution, and ultimately its effect on the social structure of 
accumulation. For the purposes of this dissertation, state power will be considered as the way 
different institutions of the state intervene in the mining sector and their impact on the 
organization of the production process. The state intervenes in any economic sector, including 
mining through the class groups that take part in the production and accumulation processes, 
therefore state power often manifests itself in terms of class character. 
 
According to Therborn (1978) holders of state power act to ensure that what is done through 
the state apparatus contributes to the reproduction of a state of affairs in which they hold 
significant economic, political and social advantages. Thus a particular class group can be said 
to hold state power if the effects of state interventions in the society enhances and bolsters its 
position in relation to other rival groups. The dominant class in the production process is 
identified by the content of state decisions and policies and their impact on the positions of 
various social forces. Cox (1987) argued that state power is at the disposal of the dominant 
social forces who also determine the course of state practice and policy in a way that protects 
and promotes their interests. The dominant or hegemonic bloc may be made up of a coalition 
of economically, militarily and politically powerful groups, which oftentimes transcend 
territorial borders. The state may sometimes act in a way that is favourable to a weaker class 
yet disadvantageous to the dominant groups but seldom to the extent of undermining the 
dominant position of the hegemonic bloc. Fisk (1989) calls this a ‘pattern of justice’ which 
entails putting a floor on the losses of the vulnerable groups and a cap on the benefits of the 
well-off for purposes of maintaining political stability and also fulfilling normative functions. 
For example, the state may increase the corporate tax in order to subsidize health and education 
services for the poor or it can set a minimum wage or change labour laws to improve working 
conditions and reduce the incidence of strikes and maintain public order.  
 
That said, it is reasonable to assume that there is a relationship between the class character of 
state power and the trajectory of indigenization in the mining sector. Indigenization is a policy 
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that is implemented and enforced by the state using relevant institutions in a bid to restructure 
the socio-economic space – the relations of production. The main hypothesis is that the course 
of transformation and reform in the mining sector reflects the class character of state power. 
The intervention of different state institutions from the parliament, to the executive, to the state-
owned mining corporations leans in favour of the interests of one class or another. At one point 
a certain bloc or coalition of classes may hold sufficient state power to block or push forward 
the transformation agenda in the mining sector. The assumption being made here is that the 
state and pace of reform in the said sector or lack of it in the post-independence era reflects at 
any given point the balance of state power between classes who are against and those who 
support the policy.  
 
This is not to argue that the state is simply an instrument of the dominant classes in Zimbabwe’s 
mining sector. Quite the contrary, the state remains an independent entity inclined to protect 
and advance interests of its own – the first and fundamental one being its very own preservation 
(See Marx, 1852). The very adoption of an indigenization legislation that is decidedly against 
the interest of the dominant classes is evidence that the equation of state interests with those of 
a particular class is dubious at best. The preservation of the state may coincide with the 
dominant classes or weaker classes’ interests – hence the class character of state interventions 
may shift from time to time depending on the circumstances. The intervention of the state in 
the mining has an effect on the different classes participating in the production process in the 
sector. Since indigenization is about changing the relations of production in the mining sector, 
any intervention of the state in the sector related to that goal is manifested by its impact on the 
positions of class groups. 
    
3.5. The Politics of Class Relations  
 
Theda Skocpol in her comparative analysis of the Chinese, French and Russian revolutions 
emphasized that: 
One must be able to identify objectively conditioned and complex intermeshing of the various actions of 
the diversely situated groups, an intermeshing that shapes the revolutionary process and gives rise to the 
revolutionary regime. (Skocpol, 1979: 14) 
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In line with Skocpol’s observation, this study acknowledges that a broad-based radical socio-
economic transformation programme such as Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy often has 
multiple anchor-points and co-determinants of which the state is only one. The last section 
established and articulated how state power is a potentially important explanatory variable 
concerning the trajectory and the dynamics of the post-independence policy aimed at increasing 
local participation in the mining sector. The second pivot in the explanatory framework being 
developed here is premised on the relations of production or the class relations that prevail in 
the mining industry which determine the manner and the mode of accumulation. Relations of 
production here denotes the regime or the rule structure that governs the delegation and 
discharge of roles and responsibilities (or the division of labour amongst) by the various groups 
(classes) who participate in the production process that creates mineral value. Cox (1987) 
identified three fundamental features of the relations of production.  
 
First, is the social context or the culture which determines what is valuable and what is 
produced and also the way social power relations organize the production process. The second 
feature is the rule-bound production process that clearly outlines the roles in the process and a 
structure of authority based on the ownership of the means of production. Thirdly there is the 
distribution of the rewards of production based on the balance of social power and power 
struggles in the production process. The rule structure not only governs the production process 
but also shapes the manner in which the mineral value thus produced is distributed and the 
powers of decision-making concerning investment and expansion. The control of the 
distribution and sharing of mineral value under the current regime has been the major point of 
contention within the indigenization debate. Since the primary objective of the indigenization 
policy is to redistribute mineral wealth in an equitable manner, it is reasonable to assume that 
the unfolding of the policy will largely hinge on the dynamics in the relations of production 
which determine the control of the means of production and the distribution of wealth in the 
first place. 
  
Before delving deeper into the possible and probable impact of production relations on the 
transformation process, a brief historical context of the development of the former in 
Zimbabwe is perhaps appropriate. Owing largely to Zimbabwe’s historical experiences of 
settler-colonialism and the present influence of neo-colonialism, the structure of the relations 
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of production in its mining sector generated a highly uneven, variegated and polarized 
patchwork of classes. Phimister (1980) noted how the BSA Company state in Rhodesia 
partnered with international capitalists to supply thousands of cheap and forced labourers to 
work in the growing mining industry at the end of the 19th century. As a result, Van Onselen 
(1973: 402) cites, the number of black mineworkers grew from 17000 in 1906 to 74000 in 1935 
reflecting the growth of the mining industry itself. Such actions generated a class structure that 
had, on the one hand, a contingent of mostly foreign capitalists from the industrialized countries 
who invested huge sums in large scale mining operations and drew immense profits from their 
investments. They enjoyed state protection since they made considerable contributions to the 
state coffers (Phimister, 1980; Bradbury and Worby, 1985). On the other hand, was a largely 
indigenous and African working class literally force-marched by the colonial state to labour in 
the mines, further disempowered by a hostile legal system (Phimister, 1980).  
 
The BSA Company state relied on African collaborators like the compound police, the native 
police and native messengers of the state and the recruiters of the Rhodesian Native Labour 
Bureau (RNLB) to ensure a regular supply of cheap labour (See Van Onselen, 1973). Playing 
an indirect but nonetheless important role of facilitating the production process was the state 
elite who exercised heavy-handed repression of the black working class. Due to the country’s 
scattered distribution of small gold claims, there also existed a small-scale mode of production 
comprising hundreds of thousands of petty mine-owners operating informally in most cases, 
using outdated machinery and employing a few people if at all. This sector was first dominated 
by white-settlers who operated small claims assisted by the state with financial resources 
(Phimister, 1980). Moreover, owing to the colonial laws around property ownership that sought 
to constrain business opportunities for black people, a class of potential indigenous business 
people was shut out of the sector. The result was that local black people were either exploited 
or shut out of the industry altogether while the foreign capitalists and local white-settlers used 
their resources and state support to generate huge sums of profit. 
 
Such was the structure of the production relations which the post-independence government 
inherited in mining and other sectors of the national economy. Bradbury and Worby (1985) 
explain how the post-colonial state actually struggled to tame the power of big capital to the 
point of being overpowered and side-lined: 
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We are especially concerned with the manner in which emerging class forces have moulded the state and 
the way in which the pre-1980 economic sub-structure has been transferred almost untouched into the post-
independence period. In essence the role of the state has become subordinate to the forces of capital and 
the government's policies have become articulated with the needs of capital reshaping the socialist 
programme and modifying any attempts to promote worker control and ownership of the means of 
production. Today, nearly five years after Independence, the state reflects the needs of big business and 
transnational capital, to a large degree adopting a social democratic economic, social and labour model to 
work within the interstices of capital. (Bradbury and Worby, 1985: 143) 
The need to undo such a class structure and overturn the prevailing relations of production in 
a way that promotes the participation of local people in the mining industry is the very raison 
d'être of Zimbabwe’s post-independence indigenization programme. The above excerpt from 
Bradbury and Worby (1985) demonstrates convincingly that class dynamics in the mining 
sector have an explanatory potential on the success or failure of the transformation programme. 
Hence the second guiding hypothesis on which the present study is premised is that the 
indigenization of Zimbabwe’s mining sector is significantly determined by the prevailing 
balance of power amongst the various class forces in the mining sector.  
 
Class relations are governed by and deeply entrenched in material, cultural and political factors 
that may not be possible to erode and eliminate overnight. They are anchored on historically 
defined, derived and evolving institutions that distribute and legitimize roles and 
responsibilities in the production process through the relations of power, domination and 
exploitation depending on the mode of production. The distribution of roles and responsibilities 
categorizes participants in the production process into the exploiting and the exploited classes 
and sometimes the facilitating classes. A class can be defined herein as a group of people 
“playing the same part in production, standing in the same relation towards other persons in 
the production process” Bukharin (1925: 278). Conflict ensues from the timeless Marxist 
observation that the distribution of the produce almost always involves the expropriation of 
surplus produce by one class to the disadvantage and at the expense of another. The 
appropriation of surplus labour by the dominant classes has meant that production relations are 
shaped by an incessant class struggle as the exploited classes fight to escape exploitative 
relations. Cox (1987) also pointed out that the relations of production are marked by conflict 
and contradictions. Mamdani (1977) in his analysis of the class struggle in Uganda argued 
along the same lines stating that:  
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Class relations are contradictory relations. Secondly, class relations are relations of appropriation: central 
to a class relation is the appropriation by one social group of the labour of another group. Thus class 
relations are relations of power. They are political relations. (Mamdani, 1977:8) 
 
The indigenization policy is taking aim at and seeks to weaken the grip and the power that the 
dominant classes possess in the production process in the mining sector. At the same time, it 
seeks to give more voice and power to the workers and the peasant communities over the 
production and distribution processes and decisions. To achieve such an ambitious 
reconfiguration the policy-makers must devise effective ways and strategies of transforming, 
wholesome, a system whose agents and beneficiaries are unlikely to voluntarily yield to 
indigenization pressures. As such the capacity of the foreign capitalist class who own large-
scale mining companies and the section of the state bourgeoisie class aligned to them 
(collectively the dominant class) to resist such measures intended to weaken their stranglehold, 
has the potential to dictate the pace and ultimately the fate of the indigenization policy. For 
example the capitalist class that owns large-scale mines in South Africa has for decades used 
its technological, financial and political power to successfully resist transformation efforts in 
the country’s mining sector. In 2018 the Minerals Council South Africa (MCSA) that 
represents the mining industry took the South African government to court over the 2018 
Mining Charter which proposed that mining companies increase their black empowerment 
shareholding from 26% to 30% (Fabricius, 2019; Seccombe, 2019). The MCSA argued that 
such a move would make the mining sector unattractive to investors and was unfair to mining 
companies (Fabricius, 2019).  
 
On the other hand, the capacity or (lack of it) of the labour class, the indigenous business class 
and the local communities who are the intended beneficiaries of the policy to organize for a 
transformation of the status quo in the relations of production may also have an impact on the 
trajectory of indigenization. State policies, argued Cox (1987), tend to be circumscribed by 
“what the class structure makes possible in the first place”. The aim of the indigenization policy 
is to change some of what Fisk (1989) called the fundamental “tendencies” of the capitalist 
system of production relations which include “accumulation, exploitation and wages” among 
others that give rise to a skewed distribution. By supporting that workers be granted at least 5 
percent of shares in mining companies, Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy takes the worker-
employer relationship beyond the paying of wages. It increases workers’ stake and influence 
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in the accumulation process. But policies are not magic wands that can transform an established 
system simply by being promulgated – it is to be reasonably expected that the system will reset 
to a self-preservation mode in the face of an onslaught. 
 
The class struggle, however, does not take place in a vacuum. Although the relations of 
production and the framework of the state theoretically exist apart in different spheres, they do 
share a reciprocal orbit in which they mutually reinforce each other (See Bukharin, 1925). The 
nature of the relations of production can hardly be completely understood apart from its 
association with the state. For example, the first two decades of settler colonialism in Rhodesia 
involved the state’s use of coercive powers not only to ensure the regular supply of cheap 
labour but also to determine labour conditions in the mining sector (See Phimister 1976, 1980; 
van Onselen, 1973). Samir Amin (1980: 23) rightly pointed out that “if we want to understand 
the real dynamic of the class struggles we must raise questions of the state, nation and politics”. 
Karl Marx (1848) famously argued that the state is created to be the guarantor of the production 
relations and thus is part of the support structure of the dominant classes. Cox (1987) and Fisk 
(1989) also pointed out that the state was an interested party in the reproduction of the relations 
of production since it had vital material interests that go directly towards its survival. 
Poulantzas (1978) also observed that the state exercised significant influence in the relations 
of production even “entering into their constitution and hence their reproduction”. 
 
The character of the struggle in Zimbabwe’s mining sector is circumscribed by the ideological, 
legal and policy environment. The exact role of the state in production relations in the sector is 
a moot point that has to be interrogated, cognizant of the prevailing historical dynamics of a 
particular society. The dominant classes use the state to protect their privileges and advantages 
in the mode of production in which they dominate (Marx, 1848). At other moments the 
disadvantaged classes can apply sufficient political pressure to draw favourable reactions from 
the state in terms of policy or legislation (See Fisk, 1989). This research adopts the Marxist 
notion of the systematic and structural connection between state power and class structure. The 
class structure and the state structure are co-constitutive of each other such that state power is 
almost always manifested in a particular class character and class power is always manifested 
as state power. Classes are the channels which link the state to the production process, the point 
of convergence between politics and economics (Cox, 1987). Class groups are the direct 
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participants in the production of mineral value and the state, on the other hand, depends on the 
royalties and taxes paid by mining houses for its revenue that maintains its coercive and 
bureaucratic institutions. The structural link between the classes and the state means that the 
latter is inherently inclined to reproduce an economic arrangement from whence it derives the 
wherewithal for its continuity. As such, the dominant classes are likely to work together to 
control or exercise influence over the levers of the state to reproduce the status quo and promote 
the mode of production in which they continue to dominate. The dominant class coalition may 
go beyond the mining industry itself to include even the state elite in the government, military, 
police and bureaucracy who may be beneficiaries of the accumulation structure. However, the 
class-state power nexus should be interrogated from a historical perspective and is likely to 
assume characteristics informed by a constellation of unique historical, cultural and political 
circumstances. 
 
The class structure of Zimbabwe’s mining sector involves various groups with a stake in the 
production and accumulation processes in the sector. Firstly, there is the state elite that controls 
the state apparatus responsible for policy formulation and implementation and also the making 
and enforcement of laws. The state elite includes the executive from the president himself, to 
the ministers of mines and finance, the bureaucrats who work for these ministries, the officials 
who control state mining parastatals like the ZMDC and the MMCZ, the police and the military. 
Also included here are members of the parliamentary portfolio committee on mines and 
minerals who are responsible for making laws. The second class include the international 
capitalists who by virtue of their financial and technological muscle have monopolized the 
large-scale mining sector running big mines like Mimosa, Metallon Gold and Freda Rebecca 
amongst others. Although small, there is also a group of indigenous black entrepreneurs who 
have ambitions to control the large-scale mines. This group was vocal in its support of the 
indigenization policy seeing it as an opportunity to grow its material base in the minerals sector. 
The fourth group in the mining sector is the working class. The labour movement has a long 
and tumultuous history in Zimbabwe’s mining sector having suffered brutal repression both 
from the employers and the state. The workers also have a stake in the indigenization policy.  
 
Small-scale and artisanal miners who number over 1 million in the country constitute the fifth 
class category and represent the alternative mode of production to the large scale sector. Small-
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scale mining supports over 2 million livelihoods making it an important sector in the country’s 
political economy (See Gutu, 2017: 1; Pact, 2016: iv). The sector also has an illustrious and 
long history in Zimbabwe’s minerals sector and remains a stakeholder in any transformation 
policy. Lastly, while they remain an unconventional class in the sense that they do not 
participate directly in the production activities of the mining sector, the rural peasant 
communities which host the mining companies also constitute a class on their own. The 
operations of the big mining companies affect their local economies and environments, making 
them a stakeholder in the mining indigenization policy. The classes just identified occupy 
different locations in the structure of accumulation in the mining sector and also have varying 
relations with state power which will be discussed further in later chapters of this work.  
3.6. The World-Economy 
 
‘In all cases, the national question is a direct consequence of the history of global integration’ 
Amin (2011: 327) 
The previous sections have proposed two hypotheses highlighting and articulating the merits 
of the state structure on the one hand and class relations on the other, as possible determining 
factors in Zimbabwe’s post-independence efforts to restructure its mining sector. This may 
have understandably given the impression that the indigenization of the sector is a domestic 
issue subject only to internal political and economic dynamics. Nothing could be farther from 
the truth. One striking irony about the localisation of the mining sector in Zimbabwe is that it 
is, at the same time, a profoundly global process with profound implications, even if largely 
symbolic, at a global level. The hard reality is that Zimbabwe is part and parcel of a global 
economic system underpinned by a global value system that constrains the policies of the 
country in significant ways. The country, just like the rest of the erstwhile colonies, was 
historically conscripted into a Eurocentric world-economic system upon the advent of 
colonialism late 19th century and has ever since remained subject to it. Thus to fully and 
adequately understand the indigenization process and prospects in the mining sector, one must 
expand their horizon beyond the national and political boundaries on to the wider global arena 
(Skocpol, 1979, Amin, 1980; Evans, 1995; Moyo and Yeros, 2011).  
 
The axis of stakeholders involved in Zimbabwe’s and indeed Africa’s economic decolonisation 
and transformation project extends far beyond its territorial borders. Much more so in the 
mining sector, an ultra-extraverted sector, which at its very inception in the 1890s was handed 
90 
 
over by the colonial government to merchants of global capital to serve a global market 
(Phimister, 1976; Arrighi, 1966). Zimbabwe’s mining economy is intimately and materially 
linked to the transnational division of labour and flow of capital and any transformation of the 
sector cannot be adequately explained outside this premise. Therborn (1978) pointed out that 
one of the fundamental axes determining the transformation of production relations in any 
country is the position of the country within the world-economic system. Cox (1987) also made 
a similar argument observing that relations of production do not exist in separate national silos 
but are directly connected to a world order that impinges on them directly through their national 
states. He further argued that the global order provides a framework favourable to particular 
forms of production. Just like any other system, the world-economic system is made up of 
interrelated components located in different parts performing various functions in relation with 
other parts. Hence the third hypothesis to underpin this study is that Zimbabwe’s position in 
the prevailing world order and the concomitant implications it entails may significantly affect 
the implementation of the indigenization policy in the mining sector. 
 
Two major schools of thought – the dependency school and the world-systems perspective – 
have articulated the impact of the global order on the internal economic dynamics. These 
schools developed in response to the glaring inadequacies of the linear modernisation and neo-
liberal paradigms which largely under appreciated the historical situation of the Global South. 
Andre-Gunder Frank (1972), the chief exponent of the dependency school, forcefully and 
famously argued that the world economic system is structured in such a way that the 
development and capital accumulation of industrial countries depends and feeds on the 
underdevelopment and exploitation of the third world countries: 
 
…historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the 
historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite 
underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan. These relations are an essential part of the 
structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole. (Gunder-Frank, 
1972: 4) 
 
The capital accumulation of industrial countries is the flipside of the relentless exploitation and 
underdevelopment of third world countries within an essentially capitalist world economy (See 
Emeh, 2013). Third world countries supply raw materials (mining, forestry, agriculture) that 
first world industries use in their manufacturing factories. First world countries, on the other 
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hand, possess the technology, capital and skills base needed to extract raw materials and most 
importantly to add value to them through further processing. The mutual dependency results in 
extraverted and export-oriented economies and huge trade deficits for third world countries 
leaving very little prospects for internal and autonomous development. Ncube (2012) decried 
the lack of value addition on minerals extracted in third world countries which significantly 
reduces their earnings. Thus the world-economy rests on a division of labour between the center 
and the periphery which Moyo and Yeros (2011) label ‘principal systemic contradictions’ 
essential for the reproduction of the capitalist world system. Indigenization, then, means 
busting the global dependency cycle by ensuring not only the localisation of extraction but the 
entire production process through value-addition mechanisms. While the dependency school 
has earned wide acclaim for not only exposing but also presenting an alternative to the 
modernization paradigm, its core-periphery binary passes off as an ahistorical straitjacket 
glossing over the unique tendencies characteristic of third world countries that have yielded 
varying responses to the capitalist world-system.  
 
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) also made a decisive contribution to the understanding of the 
connection between national economies and the global economy through the world-systems 
theory. While the dependency school retained national economies as the basic units of analysis 
that are structurally linked to the first-world countries in an exploitative way, the world-system 
perceives them as simply parts of a single capitalist world-economy that operates across and 
transcending territorial and cultural divisions. For the world-system perspective, the whole is 
more important than the sum of its parts. The world-system as related by Wallerstein is “a 
social system with boundaries, structures, rules of legitimation and coherence…it possesses the 
characteristics of an organism and the dynamics of its development are largely internal” (2004: 
347). Wallerstein argued that the capitalist world-economy is underpinned by a division of 
labour between core, semi-peripheral and peripheral economic zones which places all sides in 
an interdependent relationship for goods and services. The core and periphery are structurally 
linked by a power hierarchy dominated by the core countries that ensures the systematic 
appropriation of surplus produce to the core zone (Martinez, 2001). As such the system ties the 
core and the periphery in an unequal relationship buffered by semi-peripheral states. The core 
uses its political, economic and technological power which it deploys to ensure the 




This idea was further developed by Cox (1987) in his concept of the internationalisation of 
production in which firms are able to locate different stages of their production process in 
different countries depending on the factors of production. The basic institutions that make up 
the world-system include the markets, the firms that compete for the market share, the many 
states that make up the interstate system, the households, the classes, and the status groups 
(Wallerstein, 2004: 22). The system operates in such a way that investment, technology and 
capital and most profitable industries tend to be concentrated in the core zones, while the 
peripheral zones are characterized by backward industries, scarce capital and obsolete 
technologies. Amin (2011) characterized the world-system as consisting of a world-wide 
capital, commodity and labour markets in which firms and individuals pursue profit. 
  
Despite its obvious merits, the world-system perspective comes across as underpinned by 
economic determinism thus casting a blind-eye on the non-economic aspects of the system. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) devised an explanation device he called ‘Global Coloniality’. In this, 
he argued that the modern world capitalist system is not only “a system of capital and labour 
for the production of commodities for profit in the world market”. Instead, the world system 
should be conceived of as an “entangled package” possessing racial, sexual, ideological, 
epistemic, cultural, religious, aesthetic, military and patriarchal dimensions (Ibid, 2013). In the 
same manner, Skocpol (1979) also expressed concerns about “economically reductionist” 
characterizations of the world-system. She argued that there exists a transnational military 
competition amongst states that predates capitalism and is interdependent with it. Thus, while 
scholars converge on the importance of the world-system as an analytical reference, they 
express divergent conceptions of its nature.  
  
Perhaps in no other sector or industry is the operation of the global economic system as exposed 
as it is in the mining sector. The division of labour along the core-periphery production 
processes is starkly visible in this sector (See Ncube, 2012). Minerals like diamonds, gold, 
silver, cobalt, copper, and fuels like uranium, oil and coal among others are extracted at a 
relentless pace in the third world countries by multinational companies invariably 
headquartered in industrial countries (Hawkins, 2009; Dhliwayo, 2014). These raw materials 
are then exported at cheaper prices to the industrial countries where they are processed and 
resold to the source countries at higher prices resulting in an unequal exchange. The dominance 
of the multinational companies (MNCs) - the agents of international capital in Zimbabwe’s 
mining industry and one of the most important institutions of the world system - is the very 
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antithesis of the indigenization policy. By directing that 51% of shares in foreign-owned 
mining companies be transferred to locals, the policy is envisioned to stem the dependence on 
and the dominance of the MNCs in the local mining industry. By targeting one of the central 
elements of the world-economy, Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy aims to redirect the 
concentration of value and capital from the first world to the third world. The policy is a 
rebellion against a system that is unlikely to give-in without a fight and Zimbabwe’s ability to 
push through what in all appearances is an anti-systemic policy will hinge on its location in the 
system. Hence the assessment of indigenization policy calls forth the problematization of 
Zimbabwe’s position in the world-economy. 
 
However, the world-system and as a result, Zimbabwe’s position in it, is not by any means 
unproblematic. The world system or world-economy is always underpinned by a dominant 
ideological hegemony of one state or a group of economically, politically and militarily 
powerful states (Cox, 1987). For example, during Britain’s global hegemony from the mid-
nineteenth century, an era known as Pax Britanica, it propagated the ideology of liberalism. 
Liberalism was meant to help foster and promote open and free trade amongst countries. Britain 
used its considerable military and political power to prevail on other states to buy in to its 
liberal economic ideas. Britain’s dominance began subsiding by the end of the 19th century as 
it faced competition from Germany and other countries. It was definitively upended after the 
First World War in 1919. The war interval lacked a clear hegemony and witnessed the rise of 
the welfare-nationalist states across Europe each seeking national glory.  
 
The aftermath of the Second World War marked the beginning of the neoliberal era under the 
hegemony of the United States which emerged as one of the two military superpowers 
alongside the Soviet Union (Kotz, 2000; Cox, 1987). The US was economically powerful 
enough to spread and entrench the values and ideals of the neoliberal ideology onto the world-
system to its own advantage. The neoliberal strategy was based on policy packages that 
included free and open trade, private enterprise, liberal exchange rates and limited state 
intervention among other things. Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy comes at a time when the 
US-sponsored neo-liberal hegemony that reached its zenith in the 1980s and 1990s is under 
serious challenge from China’s rising global economic and political status (See Moyo and 
Yeros, 2011). China’s increasing influence throws the world order into a structural crisis in 
terms of reducing the US and the West’s political clout jeopardizing their ability to reproduce 
the system. The rise of emerging markets like Brazil, India, Turkey and Nigeria among others 
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also adds to the political and economic challenge to the US-dominated world order. The 
question then becomes: how does a world order caught between what is seemingly the tail-end 
of US-dominance and the beginning of China’s rise affect the prospects of the indigenization 
policy in Zimbabwe? 
 
3.7 Conclusion         
 
This chapter has outlined and elaborated on the three main theoretical pillars of the present 
study that will help explain Zimbabwe’s post-independence indigenization policy in the mining 
sector. State power is central to this approach since the implementation of the indigenization 
policy is done by the state. The way the state uses its apparatus, in this case the parliament, the 
legislation, the independent institutions and the executive among others, is important in 
determining the pace and the character of the transformation of the mining sector. Evans (1995) 
examined the indigenization of the information technology sectors in Brazil, India and South 
Korea and found that the way state power was used was a determining factor in the outcomes 
of the indigenization policy in the three countries. In the same manner this study predicts that 
effect of state power will be detectable in the outcomes of indigenization policy in Zimbabwe. 
Class politics, which is the balance of power amongst class forces participating in the 
production of mineral value is another potential determinant of the indigenization policy 
trajectory. Classes are the main links between politics and production. The class balance of 
power determines which classes are able to influence the intervention of state power to their 
advantage. The state affects the relations of production through state actions and the relations 
of production also condition the structure of the state and the way it intervenes in the economy 
and the society in general.  
 
The third element is the country’s position in the global economic system. The global economic 
system determines, to a material extent, the economic policies and structures of its member 
states in varying ways. Zimbabwe is a part of the world-economy and what it does in terms of 
its economic policies is circumscribed by the dynamics of the global economy. It remains to 
be seen and worth probing whether the dynamics of the world-economy will militate against 
or facilitate the indigenization policy. While the state power, relations of production and the 
world economic order are presented here as separate and independent variables, in reality they 
interlock with and reinforce each other in a way that makes it challenging to detect the specific 
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impact of each variable apart from the others. As such, it is better to consider them not as 
separate variables but as component parts of a systematic explanation of Zimbabwe’s 






























The structure of Zimbabwe’s mining sector, as reflected in the existing relations of production, 
is a product of the country’s history that embodies the legacy of the colonial experience. In the 
same way, the quest to reverse the historical disempowerment and disenfranchisement of 
indigenous black Zimbabweans in the minerals and other sectors of the economy is a 
fundamentally historical mission. Indeed, Zimbabwe’s ruling party Zanu-PF has dubbed the 
policy a third phase of the anti-colonial struggle that began in the 1890s in which economic 
emancipation is the main goal (See Zanu-PF Election Manifesto, 2013). Hence, this chapter 
intends to explore and delve deeper into the history of the mining industry in Zimbabwe. It 
seeks to paint a picture of the broader historical context which determined the distribution of 
wealth and the nature of the relations of production in the mining sector. The first part of the 
chapter will discuss the nature of the colonial state and how its role in making and 
implementing policies shaped the class formation and relations in the mining sector. Political 
and power relations that prevailed in the colonial set up were a major determinant of the 
evolution of the class structure of the mining sector. The second part will look at the approach 
of the post-colonial state in the first two decades of its existence towards the class relations 
obtaining in the mining sector. What difference, if any, did the advent of political independence 
in 1980 make in the mining sector? Hopefully this historical detour will inform a better grasp 
of the dynamics of the current efforts to restructure the mining sector. More importantly, the 
chapter will shine a light on the historical impact of the tripartite nexus of state power, class 
relations and transnational order in shaping the structure of Zimbabwe’s mining sector.  
4.2 The genesis of mining in Zimbabwe: Precolonial era 
 
Zimbabwe boasts a long history of mining as an economic enterprise. Studies have debunked 
the widely held myths that mining was introduced by the country’s colonisers by producing 
archaeological evidence of mining activities by the country’s ancient inhabitants as far as 600 
AD (Huffman, 1974). The beginnings of the civilisation of the indigenous people whose 
descendants occupy Zimbabwe today was nurtured in no small amounts by the practice of gold 
mining. Ancient Zimbabwe accumulated its wealth and with it the political influence through 
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engaging in gold trade with the Arabs and Indians. Archaeological evidence suggests that gold 
mining in Zimbabwe began as early as AD 600 during the Early Iron Age (Huffman, 1974). 
Historians suggest that gold trade immensely transformed the structure of the society through 
giving the state leaders enormous amounts of wealth which the agriculture-dominated 
subsistence economy could never have generated (Chikuhwa, 2013). The growing wealth 
enabled the state like Great Zimbabwe, and Monomotapa to organize substantial labour force 
and establish large military contingents to expand their political dominance. Meredith (2014) 
argues that Great Zimbabwe’s control of the gold belt between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers 
and its grip on gold trade with the Portuguese in the 13th century was the major factor behind 
its rise to prominence. 
4.3. Enter the BSAC: The birth of modern mining in Rhodesia 
 
4.3.1. Creating a new society  
 
While indigenous people in Zimbabwe had begun mining centuries before the country came 
under British colonialism in 1890, the exploitation of mineral wealth was severely limited by 
rudimentary and inefficient technologies and thus ill-placed to develop to an industrial scale. 
This changed when the British South Africa Company (BSAC) under the leadership of Cecil 
John Rhodes invaded the country in 1890 boasting a 6000-men pioneer column (Fisher, 2010). 
After a violent conquest, the BSAC proclaimed ownership of the land and its resources on the 
basis of the dubious Rudd Concession signed between the company representatives and the 
Ndebele king Lobengula, effectively dispossessing the indigenous inhabitants of the land 
(Chikuhwa, 2013; Fisher, 2010). The BSAC, granted permission by the British government, 
exercised state and governmental powers in the new colony they named Rhodesia, after the 
British mining magnate Cecil John Rhodes. Members of the pioneer column that first marched 
into Rhodesia in 1890 were awarded 3000 acres of land each by the BSAC setting themselves 
up as commercial farmers (See Bourne, 2011; Fisher, 2010). The parcelling out of farms and 
mineral claims by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to the European arrivals 
immediately committed the whites to substantial economic interests thus effectively turning 
Southern Rhodesia into a white-settler colonial state (Good, 1976; Phimister, 1980). This set 
the stage for the stratification of the country into distinctive class interests along racial divide, 
with the white population commanding a dominant role (Arrighi, 1973). 
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The settler population comprised farm owners, small mine owners, manufacturers and wage 
workers who came in the form of skilled artisans employed in manufacturing, agriculture and 
mining. While nurturing a domestic capitalist class amongst the white settlers, the BSAC 
government went to extreme lengths to invite large multinational companies to invest in 
Rhodesia’s mining sector and to a lesser extent, agricultural and manufacturing sectors 
(Phimister, 1980). The BSAC’s racially biased distributive spree resulted in the 
proletarianization of the African population who lost productive land to the new settlers and 
were turned into a source of cheap labour (Good, 1974). To add to that, the indigenous 
inhabitants were saddled with onerous rent and tax obligations to force them into supplying 
cheap labour in the mines and the farms.14 Thus there was also an involuntary and coercive 
proletarization of the Africans who were forced to become labourers in white-owned 
enterprises. In 1942 the settler state introduced the Compulsory Native Labour Act through 
which the state could conscript African labour for settler farmers ostensibly to avert possible 
famine (Johnson, 1992).  
 
Thus, by the 1920s Southern Rhodesia was a melting pot of class forces that included the white 
rural bourgeoisie that owned farms and small mines; the international capitalists that operated 
large mining investments, transport and power enterprises; the white workers who consisted 
mostly of skilled artisans and management workers, the white commercial bourgeoisie that 
focused mostly on trade and retail sectors. At the bottom of the heap was the African peasant 
community that had been stripped of all economic and social rights and thus condemned to 
supply cheap labour serving the interests of the other classes (See Arrighi, 1973; Good 1974; 
Phimister, 1980). The BSAC government used its powers to create a new society riddled with 
severe racial, tribal and class contradictions which provided the context within which 
indigenous people were shut out of the mainstream economy.  
4.3.2 BSAC government’s mining policy (1890-1923) 
 
The colonial state at its inception in 1890 under the government of the BSAC immediately 
initiated legislation to promote gold mining by large companies funded by capital sourced from 
the European and American financial markets. It is also important to keep in mind that hopes 
                                                          
14 When land occupied by Africans was allocated to the arriving settlers, Africans were allowed to become 
tenants on the land on the condition that they provide cheap labour to the new farmer. A hut tax was also 
imposed on Africans also to force them into cheap labour in the mines (Fisher, 2010). 
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of finding gold deposits to rival those found in the Transvaal in South Africa, was the chief 
motive behind the colonisation of Zimbabwe. The companies, encouraged by the BSAC 
government and a speculative crest driven by the rumours of big gold deposits in Rhodesia, 
invested huge amounts of capital anticipating to make a killing. However, gold deposits were 
disappointingly scattered and compratively scarce which immediately condemned the young 
mining industry to a comatose and near-collapse. John Hollaway articulates the disappointment 
thus: 
All this might just have been acceptable had the wealth lived up to the standards of the presumptive mother 
lode, but what was found were thousands of shallow 'ancient workings' on quartz reef and shear zone 
structures of archaean and proterozoic age, with generally modest grades. As a result the regulations not 
merely severely inhibited mine development, they caused the wrong sort of mine to be built. Companies 
raised money on the stock markets of Europe and America for big mines; great sums were spent on roomy 
shafts and massive mills. Yet the mineral resources on which these developments took place were usually 
too small to justify the capital expended, and this (along with the technical, managerial and financial 
mismanagement still to be seen in many projects in Africa today) led to the ruin of many of these ventures. 
(Hollaway, 1997) 
The combination of excessive share ownership of 50% claimed by the BSAC in any mining 
discoveries and the political instability occasioned by the uprisings of the indigenous people 
from 1893 to 1896 made the mining industry risky and unprofitable (See Chikuhwa, 2013). 
Consequently, investor confidence in the mining industry slumped as evidenced by the small 
investment levels which were valued at a very modest 10 million pounds in 1904 (Phimister, 
1980).  
 
The failure of the speculative boom meant that companies failed to pay any appreciable 
dividends, this led to the drying up of the financial markets for the industry. There was a 
pressing and obvious need to restructure the industry to avoid a total crash by lowering 
development and working costs through revision of legislation and development of 
infrastructure (Hollaway, 1997). The geological and geographical conditions which were 
characterised by the scattered and shallow nature of the gold deposits around Zimbabwe meant 
that a new economic approach to mining was necessary. As such, from 1903 the BSAC 
government and the industry players collectively adopted imperatives of cost minimisation and 
maximum extraction of gold content as the anchors of the revival of the mining industry 
(Phimister, 1980; Bradbury and Worby, 1985). The appreciation of the scattered nature of gold 
deposits led to the proliferation, under the encouragement of the state, of thousands of small-
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scale gold mines. Mining became profitable in such low-capital small-scale operations rather 
than over-capitalized large-scale companies. 
  
Another challenge that the fledgling mining industry in Rhodesia had to contend with was the 
sufficient supply of cheap labour. The industry in Southern Rhodesia always had to compete 
for labour and capital investments, against heavy odds, with Cecil John Rhodes’s 
Witswatersrand gold on the Rand in South Africa. Witswatersrand was able to attract the finest 
labour force through higher wages and was also the natural first choice of the investors because 
of its larger and richer deposits (Van Onselen, 1973; Phimister, 1974, 1980). In efforts to 
respond to the challenges affecting the mining industry the BSAC government moved swiftly 
to adopt new legislation in a bid to restructure and rationalise the industry. The first of these 
was the Mines and Minerals Ordinances of 1903. Under this piece of legislation, the state 
reduced its share of the discoveries made by mining companies to 30 percent from a previous 
50 percent. The 30 percent was eventually scrapped in 1908 in favour of a 5 percent royalty 
(Hollaway, 1997). Moreover, the ordinance also allowed claim holders crushing not more 750 
tons of ore to work for profit without going to flotation15. These legislative proclamations went 
a long way in freeing small producers from the challenges of flotation and overcapitalization, 
which contributed to their accelerated proliferation. The large-scale mining companies also 
vociferously lobbied the government for similar legislative changes that would increase the 
profitability of their operations. Encouraged by the success witnessed in the small-scale sector, 
the government moved in 1907 to amend the 1903 Ordinance. This resulted in the expansion 
of the mining industry as companies were able to operate on a more profitable scale and also 
work previously unworked deposits (Ibid). 
 
The effect of these legislative initiatives on the outlook and structure of the mining industry in 
Rhodesia was immense if not dramatic. The new laws facilitated the instant proliferation of the 
small producers who increased in number from 76 in 1905 to 254 by 1907 with each having an 
output of nearly 1000 gold ounces per year (Hollaway, 1997). By 1934 the country had over 
1500 small gold producers which had visible political consequences in terms of the state’s role 
                                                          
15 Flotation is a term that refers to the process of offering a company’s shares for sale on the stock exchange. It 
is done by companies to raise capital and expand their capacity (Larrain and Velasco, 2002). 
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in the mining sector (Hollaway, 1997). The small-workers16 comprised, by and large, white 
settler petty-bourgeoisie who owned the means of production in the form of a rudimentary 
crushing equipment and also invested their labour time in the mines they owned to reduce costs. 
The small-workers became an important structural feature of the mining industry, if not its 
face. This new cohort also benefited from generous loans availed by the BSAC government 
and the local financial houses to place their mining operations on a sound financial footing 
(Dansereu, 2000; Arrighi, 1960). By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century the 
structure of the mining industry had already taken a shape that it would retain for decades to 
come: a few large foreign-owned companies surrounded by swarms of small-scale mines all 
contributing to the aggregate sectoral output. Phimister (1980) succinctly affirms the historical 
significance of gold mining in the country when he compares the role played by gold 
discoveries in transforming Southern Africa to the role played by coal in Britain’s industrial 
revolution. He argues that although the size of the output in Southern Rhodesia was smaller 
than that of the Transvaal, it became the driver of the modernization and industrialisation of 
the country’s national economy. In 1923 gold made up 47% of the country’s aggregate exports 
and 72% of the country’s national income which demonstrates the considerable extent to which 
the colonial state was dependent on mining for its very viability and existence (Phimister, 
1980). 
 
Therefore, the origins of the modern mining sector in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the 
inception of colonialism in 1890 when the BSAC invited foreign capitalists and investors to 
come and explore and work the country’s deposits. From the very beginning, the ownership of 
the mines was monopolized by foreign players with the ready help and support of the colonial 
government. The domestic white settlers controlled the small-scale to medium mines with the 
assistance of the state. Thus, the mining industry was born through the active and brutal 
marginalization and exploitation of the indigenous people for the benefit of the white-settler 
minority and the international capitalists. These are some of the contradictions that the post-
colonial government seeks to redress through the indigenization of the sector. 
  
                                                          
16 Small-workers is another term for small-scale mine producers 
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4.4 The White-Settler Colonial State (1923-1980) 
 
Lured by the promise of a ‘gold bonanza’, white immigrants flocked to Rhodesia in droves 
from as far as Australia, Germany, New Zealand and mostly from South Africa. As a result, 
the European population doubled in size between 1901 and 1911 from 11 000 to 23 000. By 
1945 the population had quadrupled to over 80 000 a number which increased to 250 000 by 
1970 constituting almost 5 percent of the total population (Fisher, 2010: 3). The settler 
population having acquired new economic interests voted in a 1923 referendum, against the 
wishes of the BSAC, to form an independent settler state governed by elected representatives. 
The results of the referendum ended the 30-year reign of the BSAC government and ushered 
into power the settler-backed Responsible Government headed by Charles Coghlan as the 
Prime Minister (See Bourne, 2011; Chikuhwa, 2013). Needless to say, having been voted into 
existence by the white-settler population, its top priority was to ensure the economic security 
of the settlers in mining, agriculture and manufacturing (Arrighi, 1973). This was a state created 
by a referendum in which only white settlers were allowed to vote. Its formation vindicated the 
fundamental argument in Charles Mills’ ‘The Racial Contract’ in which he argued that the state 
is programmed to advance white supremacy at the expense of other groups (See Mills, 1997). 
Thus, black indigenous people were politically excluded from the white-settler state by design 
– a fundamental characteristic of the new state that determined the fate of the indigenous people 
in the British colony. However, Phimister (1984) warns against viewing the formation of a 
settler state exclusively from internal colonial politics. He argues that even though the 
Responsible Government replaced the BSAC rule, it still had to obey it still had to subordinate 
itself to the larger imperial interests. After all, key industries like mining, railway system, the 
media and cattle ranching were still in the hands of foreign investment. “…the B.S.A. Company 
had fingers, occasionally a whole hand, in many pies” (Phimister, 1984: 281). Bonnello (2010) 
also argues that the settlers in Southern Rhodesia felt a sense of cultural and traditional affinity 
to the British Empire and viewed themselves as having the duty to promote British civilization. 
  
The government invested heavily in infrastructure like roads, power and communications to 
create a basis for economic expansion. There was an emergence of state boards like the Sugar 
Industry Board, Cotton Industry Board and the Tobacco Marketing Board that regulated access 
to markets and production (Bradbury and Worby, 1985). These institutions were over and 
above all else conduits through which economic power and priviledge was kept concentrated 
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in the hands of the white-settler community. The small-mine owners received loans on lenient 
terms and benefited from the provision of technical advice and processing plants that made it 
difficult for large mining companies to buy up the small enterprises. Thus, the new settler 
government departed substantially from the BSAC government’s laissez-faire inclination 
which exposed the settler petty bourgeoisie to cutthroat competition from international 
investors (Phimister, 1980). The settler government brought a phenomenon Illife (1983) 
referred to as ‘nurture capitalism’ in which the government, motivated by economic and 
political interests, aides and promotes the growth of a local entrepreneurial class. A white 
bourgeoisie class evolved in Rhodesia’s mining sector on the back of generous support from 
the state. However, as Phimister (1984) shows, the Rhodesian economy was still very much in 
the grip of international capital. 
 
A plethora of laws were enacted in line with the settler-state’s economic vision. In 1930 the 
seminal legislation, the Land Apportionment Act, was passed. It was on the basis of this 
legislation that the indigenous people were forcibly removed from their ancestral lands to pave 
way for the European settlers (Shutt, 1997). The 1930 Act saw almost 50 million acres of prime 
agricultural land reserved for purchase by 50 000 white settlers as compared to only 28 million 
acres reserved for 1 million Africans (Mutiti, 1974; Bourne, 2011). The adoption of the Land 
Apportionment law was significant in that it was a reaffirmation of the brutal disempowerment 
that the indigenous people had already suffered in the hands of the BSAC government. The 
Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1934 ensured the supply of cheap labour to settler-
bourgeoisie and international capital. The ICA was also meant to shield the white wage workers 
from possible competition from African workers by imposing a colour bar on the kind of jobs 
whites and Africans could do (Olsson, 2011). While the ICA recommended that African and 
white workers be paid equally for the same work, it blocked the advancement of Africans 
through banning unionism and denying them skills acquisition (Bourne, 2011). The availability 
of cheap labour was in the mutual interests of both white bourgeoisie and foreign capital as 
they both wanted to minimise costs as much as possible. In a move earmarked to further 
disempower the indigenous people, the Native Registration Act and The Native Passes Act of 
1936 and 1937 respectively, were passed to control and limit the movements of indigenous 
people (Fisher, 2010). Central to the operations and policies of the colonial government was 
the ideology of “settlerism” in which the white settlers were given preferential treatment in all 




The colonial settler government was a very active participant in the mining industry and played 
way beyond a merely regulatory role, especially during the post-World War 1 period 
(Phimister, 1974). One of the most important initiatives was the establishment of the School of 
Mines which was earmarked to provide technical assistance especially to the small mine 
operators. The state also created a national electricity grid which ensured that the mining sector 
had access to energy. Moreover, the government also went overboard after both world wars to 
facilitate the entry of the returning soldiers into the small-scale mining sector (Hollaway, 1997). 
In 1945 the government established the Returning Servicemen Scheme which saw over 200 
returning soldiers receiving training in mining. This led to the opening of 67 productive mining 
units generating revenue above 25 million pounds (Holloway, 1997). The government also 
introduced the Exclusive Prospecting Order (EPO), which upon evidence of competence, 
allowed a claim-holder to explore a large area for six years. The Mining Affairs Board 
comprising government and private sector representatives was established in 1953.  
 
Another landmark move that had a significant impact on the structure of the mining sector in 
the long term was the adoption of the Mines and Minerals Act (MMA) in 1961. Albeit having 
been amended on numerous occasions post-independence, the MMA is still in force at the time 
of writing and is a big factor in the restructuring and transformation of the mining sector in line 
with the vision of indigenization (Bradbury and Worby, 1985). Perhaps one of the most 
important clauses was in Section 2 of the Act which stipulated that all the rights to the minerals, 
mineral oils and natural gases are wholly and unconditionally vested in the head of state and 
government of the republic. This means that the state as represented by the Prime Minister who 
was head of government held sway in the mining sector and could impose its interests on 
powerless communities. In addition, it placed the private sector at the mercy of the whims of 
state policy. Section 6 of the Act established the Mining Affairs Board later named the Mining 
Development Board which represents large and small-scale sectors and farmers as well. The 
Board, as already discussed, was tasked with implementing government policy in the mining 
industry on behalf of the State. This meant that the private sector, having been allocated a seat 
in the board, was able to make inputs into policy formulation. Section 20 of the Act opened the 
acquisition and registration of mining rights to any permanent resident of Zimbabwe regardless 
of colour or background. Section 26 states that all communal and privately-owned land is open 
105 
 
to prospecting. This raised the possibility of forcibly relocating whole communities on the 
orders of the State upon the discovery of minerals.  
 
Section 244 of the legislation pronounces on the mineral royalty payable to the government by 
mining enterprises. The amount of royalty is decided by the government Minister in charge of 
the mining industry (The Mines and Minerals Act, 1961). Arguably the most important legacy 
of the MMA was to grant the state disproportionate power over the distribution of wealth in 
the mining sector. Although the private sector was represented in the Mining Affairs Board, 
the ultimate decision lied with the state officials (Bradbury and Worby, 1985). Conspicuously, 
the MMA did not prohibit the ownership of mines by black indigenous people. However, 
discriminatory funding, repressive laws like the LPA, ICA, and the Native Registration Act all 
but made it impossible for black people to acquire mines of their own. Moreover, even though 
the law did not differentiate between small and large-scale mines, the state went to extra lengths 
to ensure that the small-scale miners were protected. This, as the next chapter will show, was 
not the case in the post-independence era.  
 4.5 Labour in the mining industry: The disempowerment of the indigenes  
 
Any recollection of the history of mining in Zimbabwe cannot be complete without an 
examination of the labour question. Labour played as important a role in the development of 
the country’s mining sector as did capital and the state. The larger companies in the industry 
also benefitted from the early twentieth century reconstruction efforts focused on cost 
minimisation in labour, management, machinery, fuel and transport. Of these, labour was the 
most contentious and crucial since the mining industry was directly dependent for its survival 
on the steady and regular supply of cheap African labour (See Steele, 1972; van Onselen, 1973). 
Bradbury and Worby (1985) argue that the combination of the low profit margins and the 
labour-intensive nature of mining in Southern Rhodesia made the availability of cheap and 
regular labour even more important.  
 
The need for labour was met in two ways. First was the establishment of the Rhodesian Native 
Labour Bureau (RNLB) in 1904 which ensured the supply of regular and sufficient labour to 
the mining industry (Scott, 1954). The RNLB also worked to cordon off some areas in Rhodesia 
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from the reach of the Rand recruiting agents in order to guarantee supply for the country’s own 
mines (Ibid). The second way was through the underdevelopment or the conscious undermining 
of indigenous people’s participation in agriculture which made it difficult for them to compete 
with white commercial farmers in the agricultural markets (Phimister, 1980). The prospect of 
any respectable income in the agricultural sector having been removed, the indigenous people 
had to sell their labour to generate income. The mining companies paid wages that were below 
subsistence level. This meant that the cost of the reproduction of labour was passed on to the 
African families thus ensuring profit maximization for the (mostly foreign-owned) companies. 
Indeed, in some cases, mining companies, now reassured by the RNLB, were able to cut the 
already meagre wages they paid to African labour.  
 
Bradbury and Worby (1985) also point out that to ensure the regular supply of labour the state 
had to resort to “chibaro”17 or forced labour. To achieve this the colonial state regimented the 
African population into native reserves, introduced hut tax and pass laws to regulate mobility 
and tied the labourers to their employer under the Masters and Servants Act of 1891 (Leys, 
1959). Bradbury and Worby gave a telling narration of the labour situation in the mining sector: 
Close cooperation between mining companies and the agencies of state power was maintained in order to 
recruit workers and in order to maintain discipline within the mine compound. The infamous compound 
system, comprising methods of surveillance and social control, became a standard feature of mines 
throughout the colony. Such a system was the direct counterpart of a strategy to minimize labour costs not 
only through low wages, but through the provision of abysmally poor rations, housing and health care. 
Such skilled labour as was required was drawn from experienced European miners who initially had to be 
attracted by relatively high wages and benefits. This form of segmenting the labour market, so that colour 
was made to coincide with an ascribed skill-level, set the pattern for working class disunity that was to 
characterize mining trade-unionism until independence. (Bradbury and Worby, 1985: 149) 
Other scholars like van Onselen (1973) cite the important role of collaborators in ensuring 
labour supply in the mining industry in Southern Rhodesia. The collaborators included “the 
native police the 'native' police, the 'native' messengers of the administration, recruiters for the 
Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) and the so-'compound police” (van Onselen, 1973: 
403). The collaborators played an important role in controlling labour supply. Moreover, the 
settler-state also devised measures to source migrant labour from neighbouring states Zambia 
                                                          
17 A Shona word which means rape or sexual assault used here to refer to forced labour which reflects the 
egregious and inhumane nature of the colonial government’s labour policies. 
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(then Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi (then Nyasaland) (Scott, 1954; Makambe, 1980). Scott 
(1954) argued that the settler state in Southern Rhodesia had always been especially dependent 
on migrant labour in light of local labour shortages. The size of migrant labour in Southern 
Rhodesia grew from 84 155 in 1911 to 488 455 in 1951 (Scott, 1954: 30). This was despite the 
huge risks and obstacles that migrant labourers especially from Nyasaland faced as they 
travelled to and from Southern Rhodesia (Makambe 1980).  
 
The Reform Government that assumed power in 1923 passed the 1934 ICA which by and large 
informed its labour policies in the mining sector (Fisher, 2010). The new legislation granted 
preferential treatment to white workers setting them up for higher wages and more bargaining 
leverage. Conspicuously though, there was continuity in African labour management policies 
despite the winds of change in the political and economic scenes ushered in by the inauguration 
of the Reform government. Under the ICA of 1934 Africans were excluded from the category 
of employee thereby undermining their rights as workers. Management and skilled positions 
were reserved exclusively for white workers while African workers were consigned to 
rudimentary hard labour and had no right to organize themselves into unions (Dansereu, 2000). 
The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 effectively undermined or altogether eliminated 
indigenous people’s participation and reliance on agriculture thus ensuring the reliable supply 
of labour to the mining sector. 
  
The post-World War 2 climate gave rise to new political and economic conditions that resulted 
in the amendments and revision of the ICA in 1959. The increasing technical mechanization of 
the mines necessitated the training of Africans and granting them a semi-skilled status to 
operate machinery that had been previously the preserve of the white workers. The period 
coincided with the rising nationalist tide in Zimbabwe led by black activists fighting for the 
rights of the indigenous people. The Rhodesian government was compelled to adopt a limited 
conciliatory stance towards African labour, allowing limited trade unionism in order to avoid 
dealing with a full-scale revolt by (Dansereu, 2000). The emigration of European workers and 
the recruitment for World War 2 led to the acute shortage of skilled workers, a reality which 
forced the mining industry to accelerate the training of African workers. This led to the increase 
of the semi-skilled category from 4000 in the 1960s to over 14000 by 1974 with an 
accompanying rise in wages (Dansereu, 2000).  
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However, despite these reform attempts, the situation of African workers in the mining industry 
remained dire. In 1975 African workers only earned less than 20% of the wage bill while the 
unskilled African workforce took home a paltry annual salary of Z$169 which was way below 
the poverty datum line (Mandaza, 1983:56). Clarke (1975: 74) also notes that the mining 
companies continued to rely on migrant labour which made up 75% of the labour force in some 
mines. Moreover, Bradbury and Worby (1985:7) state that the labour market in the mining 
sector was still rife with racial inequalities. The white labour force which constituted only 5% 
of the total labour force was awarded 45% of the wage bill in 1973. The white working class 
successfully resisted the restructuring of the labour market in the mining sector and retained its 
dominant position. The African labourers’ hopes of having a voice were dashed by the 
increasing repression of African trade unions and political organizations which effectively 
stripped them of any impetus for a consequential struggle. Such were the colonial labour 
dynamics in the mining sector which were a major part of the class struggle in the mining sector 
and would shape the struggle long after independence was attained.  
  
4.6 Foreign investment in mining: The colonial era 
 
The anti-thesis of economic indigenization – the dominance of external interests and corporates 
in the economic sector – has its roots in the very inception of colonialism in the last quarter of 
the 19th century. The first three decades of colonialism (1890-23) saw Southern Rhodesia come 
under ‘Company Government or State’ when the BSAC was in full control of the levers of state 
power (Bourne, 2011). As it were, the government was really a business entity wrapped or 
disguised as a state whose primary concern was not social justice but maximising returns for 
its shareholders. Clarke (1980) argued that the foreign investment and finance were the source 
of modern economic development after the inception of colonialism in 1893. This is hardly 
surprising, taking into consideration that the BSAC itself was originally a chartered company 
from England that had been granted administrative powers in Rhodesia by the British Crown. 
Table 4.1 Pre-independence foreign investment in mining up to 1978 
Sub-sector Corporation Parent Co/Country Mine 
Chrome African Chrome Mines Ltd Union Carbide (USA) African Chrome 
Copper Lomagundi Mining and Smelting MTD Rhodesia Ltd 
(SA) 
Alaska  
Gold  Corsyn Cons. Ltd Lonrho (UK) Acturus/Athens 
Lithium Bikita Minerals Ltd. Selection Trust (USA) Bikita  
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Gold Banket Gold Mines Ltd.  Banket 
Asbestos Pangani Asbestos Mines Ltd. Asbestos Investments 
(SA) 
Boss 
Iron Ore Rhod. Iron & Steel Co. AAC (SA), RST (USA) Buchwa 
Chrome Rhod. Cambrai Mines - Cambrai 
Gold  Falco Mines Ltd. Falcon (UK) Dalny, Dawn 
Iron Ore Dorowa Minerals Ltd AE & CI (SA) Dorowa 
Asbestos  DSO Asbestos Mines  DSO 
Copper  ACC (SA) Epoch 
Asbestos Rhod. & General Asbestos Turner & Newall (UK) Gath’s 
Gold  - Lonrho (UK) Howe 
Copper Corsyn Cons. Mines Ltd. Lonrho (UK) Inyati 
Tin Kamativi Tin Mines Ltd. Believed external Kamativi 
Nickel Madziwa Mines Ltd. AAC (SA) Madziwa 
Gold Corsyn Cons. Ltd. Lonrho (UK) Mazoe 
Asbestos  Pangani Asbestos Mines Asbestos Investments Pangani 
Chrome African Chrome Mines Ltd. Union Carbide (USA) Rhodesian Chrome 
Nickel Rio Tinto (Rhod.) Rio Tinto (UK) Gatooma 
Nickel Rio Tinto (Rhod.) Rio Tinto (UK) Refinery  
Nickel Rio Tinto (Rhod.) Rio Tinto (UK) Smelter 
Gold  Rio Tinto (Rhod.) Rio Tinto(UK) Brompton  
Nickel  Empress Nickel Co. Rio Tinto (UK) Empress 
Gold  Rio Tinto (Rhod.) Rio Tinto (UK) Patchway 
Emeralds Rio Tinto (Rhod.) Rio Tinto (UK) Sandawana 
Asbestos Rhod. & Gen. Asbestos Corp. Turner & Newall (UK) Shabanie 
Copper Nyschere Copper (Pvt) Ltd Lonrho (UK) Shamrocke 
Nickel   JCI (SA) Shangani 
Gold Homestakes Gold Mines Ltd. Lonrho (UK) Shamva 
Chrome AAC AAC (SA) Sutton 
Nickel Trojan Nickel Mine Ltd. AAC (SA) Trojan  
Chrome AAC AAC(SA) Vanad 
Asbestos Pangani Asbestos Mines Ltd. Asbestos Investments 
(SA) 
Vanguard 
Gold Forbes & Thompson  Vubachikwe 
Coal Wankie Colliery Co. ACC (SA) Wankie 
  
Source: Clarke, D.G. (1980). Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe. Russel 
Press: Nottingham. 
 
Although the British Colonial Office did wade into the affairs of the colony from time to time, 
BSAC was effectively running the Rhodesian colony which necessarily required an 
administrative machinery. Table 5.3 above shows the number of mining ventures that were 
owned by large foreign-owned companies in Rhodesia. As the table shows, the mining sector 
was dominated by multinational companies from the United Kingdom (UK), South Africa, and 
the United States. Rio Tinto from the UK was the most dominant controlling more than 7 
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mining enterprises across all the subsectors. Anglo-American Corporation which came from 
South Africa also owned multiple enterprises in gold, chrome, asbestos and coal among other 
sectors. Companies like the Union Carbide from the USA and Lonrho from the UK were also 
formidable players in the sector. Despite the BSAC government having initially structured the 
industry around the small-workers, large companies eventually came to dominate and almost 
completely took over the industry: 
Foreign capital in mining was initially in gold, increasing the size of operations, followed by the opening 
of base mineral mines in asbestos, chrome and coal, requiring large initial investments. As a result, output 
doubled between 1942 and 1954, unit value tripled between 1964 and 1979, and volume by 85%. Mining 
ventures were now controlled by very few companies, mostly of South African and U.K. origin who 
contributed to the increased concentration of mining in the region. Many of these companies were also 
active in Zambia and South Africa, thus consolidating Rhodesia's role within the regional economy. Some 
of the biggest mining companies in the world dominated the sector such as Anglo-American Corporation, 
Lonrho and Rio Tinto. Small-workers were marginalized, mining smaller, less profitable and sometimes 
sporadic deposits, with their numbers falling from a high of 1750 operators in 1935 to 300 in 1956. 
(Bradbury and Worby, 1985: 225) 
This picture is more or less corroborated by the statistics shown on table below on the 
distribution of mines by the size of their workforce and their share of the sector’s gross output. 
Small mines with a number of employees ranging from 1 to 100 were numerically superior 
numbering 218 and hired 12% of the workforce employing a combined total of 6679 workers 
against a sector total of over 54 400. Their share of the sector output was even lower at 4.8 %. 
This perhaps reflected the numerous inefficiencies the small mines had to deal with as a result 
of, among other factors, mismanagement, lack of capital, inexperience and inadequate state 
support which militated heavily against their productivity (See Arrighi, 1966).  
 
Medium scale mines with employees of between 100-1000 numbered 54 and employed 30% 
of the work force while commanding a 21% share of the industry’s gross output. This category 
is likely to have been dominated by large foreign-owned corporates but however may have 
concentrated on minerals like chrome, nickel, and asbestos that did not fetch high value in the 
global market. Large-scale mines employing over 1000 workers only number 14 out of a total 
of 286. However, they controlled 58% of the total workforce and also enjoyed a lion’s share of 




Table 4.2: Distribution of mines, employees and gross output 




1-10 59 382 0.1 
10-100 159 6297 4.7 
100-1000 54 16480 21.5 
Over 1000 14 31674 73.6 
Total 286 54834 100 
Source: Adapted from Clarke, D.G. (1980). Foreign Companies and International Investment in 
Zimbabwe. Russel Press: Nottingham. 
 
What emerges from the table above is that the Rhodesian mining industry had undergone a 
rather dramatic structural transformation in the first 90 years of its existence. While the small-
scale enterprises had previously dominated the sector, peaking at 1750 units at one point, they 
were eventually crowded out by the large multinational conglomerates mostly through take 
overs and buyouts (Phimister, 1980). The mining industry was effectively turned into an 
oligopoly.18 The foreign-owned companies boasted of huge amounts of capital, technology and 
skills base and a far-reaching access to the export market. Arrighi (1967: 49-50) characterized 
perhaps more or less accurately, AAC as a powerful “independent super-state, an economic 
empire centered in Southern and Central Africa”. The mining companies also cultivated strong 
relations with the colonial state and the white working class. Fast forward to the twenty-first 
century, this state of affairs appears to be still prevailing 37 years into independence. According 
to Chikuhwa (2013) Zimbabwe is Africa’s third largest gold producer in Africa and the 17th 
largest in the world. Chikuhwa (2013: 406) points out that “the country’s leading gold 
producers are Anglo-American Corporation, Ashanti Goldfields, Falcon Gold, LonRho 
Zimbabwe and Rio Tinto”. All of these companies are foreign-owned and produce over 80% 
of gold output in the country. Although with the advent of independence there has been a surge 
                                                          
18 An oligopoly is a market structure in which a few firms control a disproportionately large share of the market. 
It could be two or more firms, but it is different from a monopoly where one firm enjoys. This ties into the nature 
of the world-system which creates a global economy that is based on the domination of a few multinational 
corporates (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1999).  
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in small-scale mining by indigenous people, they are still structurally disadvantaged by lack of 
capital and hostile legal and policy environment (Hawkins, 2009). 
 
The foregoing sections have painted a picture of the pre-independence environment in which 
the mining sector operated. It shaped but was also shaped by the domestic, regional, 
international political, social and economic factors. However, the outcome was the emergence 
of a very few but powerful and resourceful multinationals literally owning one of the pillars of 
the national economy. As Phimister (1984) has argued, the BSAC still owned the mineral rights 
in the country. This was aided and abetted by a state that itself metamorphosed from a quasi-
state controlled by a multinational company into a settler-state accountable to the settler 
community in Rhodesia. If this is any guide, it is perhaps unsurprising that even as BSAC 
relinquished political power in 1923, the state remained predisposed towards international 
capital. The indigenization policy in the mining sector is an attempt to reverse this legacy of 
settler colonialism. The next section looks at how the state suppressed the economic potential 
of indigenous people.  
4.7 African capitalism in Rhodesia: a fire extinguished 
 
The non-existence of any significant indigenous capitalist class across all the major sectors of 
the economy: manufacturing, agriculture, mining, tourism, transport among others, is directly 
traceable to the historical experiences of the colonial era. From the inception of colonialism, 
the BSAC ensured that the indigenous people were granted no space at all in the capitalist 
economy that they were building. Under the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) the government 
segregated the economic spheres of Europeans and Africans. The Act designated prime 
agricultural land for settlers, purchase areas for wealthy Africans and reserves for poor 
indigenous people (Shutt, 1997). Malaba (1980) is of the view that the placing of African 
people in reserves was calculated to prevent them from accumulating capital since they did not 
own nor could they produce for the market. The government developed what it called the 
Native Purchase Areas (NPAs) where capable Africans could purchase and develop plots. A 
total of 548 farms was purchased mostly by the African elite who included teachers, ministers, 
chiefs and businesspeople (Nicholas, 1994). However, government’s refusal to lend financial 
assistance to these farmers rendered them unable to develop the plots and undermined any 
indigenous entrepreneurial efforts. Shutt (1997) looked at the plight of Africans who bought 
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land in the Native Purchase Areas under the LAA of 1930. The occupants of purchase areas 
never got any government assistance or funding even though they had bought their land. This 
had the effect of limiting the development of an African middle class. 
 
Moreover, the pricing policies of the government under the Maize Control Act of 193 also dealt 
a blow to African farmers who sought to go beyond mere subsistence. The policy taxed the 
profits of African farmers who produced maize for subsistence in order to subsidize the 
production costs of the settler-farmers who produced largely for export (Nicholas, 1994: 97). 
Davis and Dopcke (1987) noted how through the Maize Control Act, the government bought 
maize at higher prices from white farmers while buying that from black farmers in Gutu at 
below production costs. Cheater (1991) also argues that capitalism and the settler-state have 
combined to exploit and undermine Zimbabwe’s rural economy by limiting their access to 
markets leading to peasant alienation. The indigenous people’s entrepreneurial potential 
continued to be suppressed through repressive legislation and policies. 
  
The Cattle Levy Act also had the similar effect of reversing accumulation by Africans thus 
beating down any entrepreneurship or class development within the African population. In 
urban centers as well African entrepreneurs faced stiff resistance from municipal councils 
which intensively regulated African enterprises in terms of the kind and size of businesses they 
could operate. The councils also determined the goods African shops could sell, the hours of 
business and the kind of customers they could serve. However, there was a breakthrough as by 
1975 there were known to be 15 000 African-owned commercial enterprises with an aggregate 
annual gross turnover of $110 million. These enterprises were mostly operated by small general 
dealers and served exclusively in the African areas (Nicholas, 1994: 53). 
 
It was apparently worse in the mining sector where, largely because of the huge start-up capital 
required, there are no records of Africans who owned mining enterprises. All the mines that 
operated in the country were run by white-settlers or international capital. Africans only 
provided cheap labour. This was due to the government’s discriminatory funding policies that 
denied Africans access to loans and credit to open mines. It was also due to the ICA under 
which Africans were not eligible for apprenticeships to acquire training as mine artisans which 
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could have created a path to ownership (Arrighi, 1967). Consequently, at independence in 
1980, the mining sector was entirely settler and foreign-owned. African entrepreneurs were not 
given any opportunity to try their entrepreneurial skills in mining. Like every other sector, 
although it may have been worse in mining, indigenous entrepreneurs were shut out and 
excluded. The monopolization of the mining sector by the settlers and foreign investors did not 
just happen overnight. It is a process with a long and illustrious history and any discussion of 
the current indigenization efforts should take such facts into account. 
4.8 The rise of the black ruling class: continuity and change in the post-independence 
era 
 
Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 signalled a sea change in the country’s political landscape 
and general policy direction. The mining industry being one of the country’s vital and strategic 
sectors of the economy, was without any doubt going to be affected by the political changes. 
The ideological rhetoric and orientation of the new nationalist government that assumed power 
in 1980 leaned heavily on a Marxist-Leninist direction which preferred a dirigisme economic 
set-up in which vital industries would come under state control (See Mandaza, 1986; Foroma, 
1996). This ideological stance, viewed as extremist in some circles, was however checked by 
the government’s insistence on the need for reconciliation, which was widely perceived to 
mean the government’s accommodation of private capital and respect for property rights. The 
new government had run an electoral campaign in the 1980 elections, on the promise of 
restructuring the various economic sectors (manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, commercial 
and mining) which were dominated either by white local capitalists or foreign investors. The 
restructuring efforts, it was hoped, would create space for the previously disadvantaged black 
people through ownership and management control (See Sibanda and Makwata, 2017).  
 
This bias was particularly pronounced in the mining sector largely because, conspiring with 
the lack of government support, the enormous capital requirements needed to start and run 
mining ventures set the bar too high for black people in the colonial era. This resulted in the 
minuscule presence of black entrepreneurs in the mining sector upon the advent of 
independence (Bradbury and Worby, 1985). Moreover, efforts were also focused on changing 
labour relations and conditions in the mining sector which had totally disempowered and 
emasculated the indigenous working class. There were high hopes that the government would 
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move swiftly to resolve the labour question especially not least because the working class was 
the lynchpin of the Marxist-Leninist ideology (Dansereu, 2005; Sachikonye, 2003). Even more 
important, the resolution of the labour question would go a long way in creating avenues of 
advancement of the black people in the mining industry since the people employed in the sector 
were the most likely to invest there because of the exposure they had gained as workers. 
However, some scholars expressed reservations on the intentions of the ruling class to address 
the issue of empowerment. They argue instead the ruling class has politicized the 
indigenization discourse to serve narrow political interests (Mufema, 1998; Magure, 2012). 
 
4.8.1 The policy and economic environment (1980-2000)  
 
The government was quick to draft an economic plan titled ‘Growth with Equity: An Economic 
Policy Statement’ in 1981. The policy document unequivocally conveyed the government’s 
desire to address the historical imbalances inherent in the economy which saw the majority of 
the country’s population shut out of the mainstream economy. Emphasizing the need for good 
governance, the government was committed to implement a social-democratic model in which 
it would pursue both economic growth and equitable redistribution to improve the 
inclusiveness of the economy. In the 1981 policy the government expressed commitment to 
reforming the ownership structure of the national resources especially agricultural land and 
minerals which it declared as belonging to the people and therefore had to serve the people first 
(Sibanda and Makwata, 2017). While the policy was based on a people-centred agenda it was 
also awake to the importance of a sound monetary policy that would ensure the country’s 
creditworthiness and therefore its access to the financial assistance it may need from time to 
time.  
 
Moreover, this policy coincided with the economic boom of 1980-82 during which the 
country’s GDP grew by more than 10%. This was induced largely by the opening up of the 
economy to international trade, foreign investment and access to credit agencies all of which 
had stopped under Ian Smith’s protectionist policies (See Mzumara, 2012). However, as much 
as these measures made for a sound policy, Kanyenze (2003) laments against the top-down 
approach adopted by the government in policy-making as the people who were expected to be 
the major beneficiaries of the policy were scarcely consulted, let alone involved. The new 
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government’s very first policy statement was awake to the need for the indigenisation of the 
economy although the idea was then pushed down the priority list in the name of pragmatism. 
Hawkins (1981) even described the policy as a climb-down on “the pre-independence 
economic policy statements by Mr. Mugabe's party, which were heavily Marxist in 
orientation”. Mandaza (1986) viewed the 1981 policy as the product of a pact between the 
black nationalists in government and the white bourgeoisie and foreign interests in the private 
sector. However, the mining sector expressed discomfort at the intention of the government to 
establish a state-controlled minerals marketing corporation insisting that marketing and selling 
of minerals were better left to the private sector.  
 
On the back of the economic boom of the first two years of independence, the government 
crafted the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) at the end of 1982 which was 
intended to cover the period 1983-85. The TNDP was to be the government’s comprehensive 
intervention to create conditions for a sustainable socio-economic transformation which was 
the central aspiration of the liberation struggle. The plan was at its inception, based on short-
term rule of thumb guide to policy, in which the government, due to the rapid economic and 
social changes happening at the time, did not have the luxury of adopting a stable policy 
position. As such, the government made it clear that it was not going to dive headlong into 
radical economic transformation: 
While the inherited economy, with its institutions and infrastructure, has in the past served a minority, it 
would be simplistic and, indeed, naïve to suggest that it should, therefore, be destroyed in order to make a 
fresh start. The challenge lies in building upon and developing on what was inherited, modifying, 
expanding and, where necessary, radically changing structures and institutions in order to maximise 
benefits from economic growth and development to Zimbabweans as a whole. (Government of Zimbabwe, 
1982) 
The TNDP, while containing a dose of the usual people-centred and radical transformation 
rhetoric, was firmly anchored on economic realism, far removed from the lofty ideals of the 
liberation struggle. The targets of the plan was to achieve an economic growth rate of 8 percent, 
increase investment to 23 percent of the GDP, and increase the rate of employment growth. 
The plan would also improve the country’s balance of payments through promoting exports, 
increasing savings to 20% of GDP, and last but certainly not least, the government also 
intended to resettle 162 000 families (Kanyenze, 2003). One can argue that the TNDP was a 
major retreat by the government from its Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to a neo-liberal and market-
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centered approach to economic management (Dansereu, 2005). The indigenisation of the 
economy was no a longer a priority but became contingent on the performance of the macro-
economic fundamentals like the GDP, balance of payments and budget deficit.  
Table 4.3: Zimbabwe’s economic performance (1980-1985) 
 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
GDP % 10.7 9.7 1.5 -3.6  2.3 7.4 
Employment % 2.6 2.8 0.8 -1.2  0.3 1.8 
Balance of Payments($m) -29.4  -202  -96.9  9.3 250.3 172.2 
Source: Kanyenze (2003) 
However, the TNDP missed almost all of its targets as it failed to achieve economic growth. 
From a high of 10.7% in 1980 the GDP growth shrunk to 1.5% in 1982 before further declining 
to -3.6% in 1983. All in all, during the TNDP period the economy only managed to grow at 
2%, a far cry from the targeted 8%. Employment only managed to grow at a rate of 0.3% quite 
a distance from the targeted 3% during the same period. The balance of payments improved 
tremendously from a deficit of Z$29.4 million in 1980 to a surplus of Z$250.3 million in 1984 
before declining to Z$172 million in 1985. Internal policies like the exchange rate, lax import 
control, profit remittances abroad conspired with external factors like the 1982 drought and the 
global economic recession (1981-1982) to create a macroeconomic crisis in the first five years 
of independence (Sibanda and Makwata, 2017). Such an unfavourable macro-economic 
environment meant that the government had no resources to fund equity and skills acquisition 
by the indigenous people in line with the goals of socio-economic transformation. The 
conditions for the take-off of the indigenisation policy were effectively non-existent, this meant 
the policy and its promises would be delayed. 
 
In 1986 the government came up with the Five Year National Development Plan (FYNDP) for 
the period 1986-1990. The plan was a response to the failures and shortcomings of its 
predecessor the TNDP. Under the FYNDP the economic growth rate was projected to take 
place at 5% per annum, investment target would remain at 20% while the number of families 
targeted for resettlement was reduced from 162 000 to 75 000. The Table 5.5 below shows how 
the country’s economy fared under the FYNDP. 
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Table 4.4: Zimbabwe’s economic performance: 1986-1990 
 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
GDP% 1.8 1.5 5.9 3.6 7.2 
Employment% 2.5 0.2 5.5 3.2 2.2 
BOP (Z$m) 11.4 103.9 64.3 -106.8 -255.6 
 Source: Kanyenze (2003) 
The economy performed better under the FYNDP than it did under the TNDP. The country’s 
GDP grew at 4% between 1986 and 1990 narrowly missing the 5% target. Employment rate 
grew at above 2% which is far above the 0.3% achieved under the TNDP but still below the 
target of 3%. The balance of payments enjoyed a surplus for the first three years of the FYNDP 
rising from Z$11.4 million in 1986 to Z$103.9 million the following year before declining to 
Z$64.3 million in 1988. However, the balance of payments fell sharply into a deficit of Z$106.8 
million and further to Z$255.6 million in 1989 and 1990 respectively. Despite this economic 
growth, there were concerns about fiscal indiscipline on the part of the government whose 
spending increased from Z$3.6 billion in 1986 to nearly $7 billion in 1990 (Kanyenze, 2003). 
  
While the country faced a series of setbacks, in the first decade of independence, Zimbabwe 
managed to maintain a fairly sound economic standing. Not much was changed in terms of the 
structure of the productive sectors of the economy which were still largely in the hands of 
foreign and local private capital. State intervention in the economy was very limited and 
redistribution of economic wealth, especially in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, was 
excruciatingly slow (Dansereu, 2005). In the contentious labour question, the scales seemed to 
be tipping in favour of the employers as indicated by the table below showing the Gross 
National Income: 
Table 4.5: Percentage distribution of national income 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Wages & 
Salaries 
47.7 49.1 53.7 49.1 47.2 47.0 
Surplus 
profits 
52.9 51.4 46.7 50.8 52.4 52.9 
Source: Kanyenze, 2003: 52 
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The statistics shown in the table above indicate that employers were taking home more than 
the workers were taking. It seems the 1980 Employment Act which increased the workers’ 
minimum wage did not go far enough (Foroma, 1996). Such a trend begged questions on the 
government’s commitment to its socialist rhetoric on the one hand, but it also indicated the 
difficulties of transforming the economy through broad-based ownership.  
4.9 The state of the mining sector (1980-1990) 
 
Having examined the nature and the performance of the government’s macroeconomic policy 
in the first decade of independence in the preceding section, this section takes a closer look at 
the state of the mining sector during the same period. The major question underlying this 
inquiry is whether the government exercised restraint on the mining industry as it did on the 
larger economy in terms of transformation and redistribution in accordance with the goals of 
indigenisation and independence. On balance, it was a mixed record, though a lot remained to 
be done for the reform and restructuring of the mining industry. The government did not waste 
much time in making clear its intentions of assuming a leading role in the rectification of the 
historical and existential imbalances that obtained in the mining sector. In 1982, just two years 
after independence, the government established the Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation (ZMDC). The new parastatal was earmarked to act as a mid-wife for potential 
indigenous entrepreneurs in mining. The ZMDC was also mandated to increase the state’s 
ownership of the country’s minerals on behalf of the public interest. By 1989 the ZMDC 
operations were responsible for 23 percent of all mining output in Zimbabwe (See Watungwa, 
2014). 
 
The Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) was formed in 1983 replacing the 
Chamber of Mines as the chief marketing agent all mining exports in the country replacing 
(Dansereu, 2000: 230). The formation of the MMCZ was intended among other things to 
reduce the illicit sale of minerals through the parallel market and also give a chance to local 
entrepreneurs to sell their produce at competitive and sustainable prices. To ensure that the 
mining industry was in line with the national development programme the government sought 
to increase local beneficiation of minerals and also transform the racial disparities that existed 
in terms of wages and skills within the sector’s workforce. One can argue that, in the eyes of 
the government, transformation in the mining sector could only be achieved through 
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nationalization. The government increased its stake in the industry and monopolized the 
marketing mechanisms placing it in a better position to promote the interests of aspiring 
indigenous mining entrepreneurs. Structurally, the mining sector was top-heavy with 
multinational foreign companies like Rio Tinto, Lonrho, Anglo-American and Union Carbide 
dominating the mining sector.  
 
Due to the scattered deposits of Zimbabwe’s minerals, there was also a significant and 
relatively prosperous but structurally disadvantaged small-scale sector populated by local 
business people that employed around 40000 workers. At the bottom of the pyramid were over 
100 000 informal gold-panners who resorted to mining as a source of livelihood following the 
economic hardships induced by drought in the early 80s (Chachage et al, 1993). Through the 
ZMDC the state now required a 51 percent stake in every new venture, a measure that had the 
potential to counter the domination of foreign-owned companies (Dansereu, 2000). Through 
the establishment of cooperative initiatives, the state also hoped to take a lead in improving 
local ownership of mining enterprises. Testament to the seriousness in increasing its foothold 
and influence in mining, the government doubled the Ministry of Mines’ budget so that it could 
amass adequate technical knowledge of mining operations and thus be in a position to provide 
technical assistance to new entrepreneurs (Hollaway, 1997). If the foregoing is anything to go 
by, the government seemed to prefer a restructuring of the mining sector more through 
nationalization than indigenization which would have brought in an indigenous bourgeoisie. 
Perhaps this was the government abiding by its Marxist-Leninist beliefs in public ownership 
of resources. On the other hand, this could be construed as the manifestation of the ruling class’ 
desire to create accumulation opportunities for itself. The possibility expressed in the latter 
seems to be corroborated in the current indigenisation context in which such ruling class 
maneouvres have become an albatross on the indigenisation process. 
 
4.9.1 Performance of the mining industry (1980-1990) 
The trends in the mining sector very closely reflect the trends in the macroeconomic 
environment of the first decade of independence. As figure 1 below shows the value of 
production, coincided with the economic boom, reaching a peak in 1980 of over US$650 
million although it experienced a slight drop in the following year to US$548 million. This was 
largely due to the country’s reintegration to the international economy which opened up for 
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exports and new investments. However, production declined between 1982 and 1986 averaging 
just below US$400 million from an average of US$600 million in the first two years of 
independence. The decline occurred in a time of international economic recession which 
reduced the demand for minerals together with their value in the international market. 
Figure 4.1: Shows value of mining production and export in Zimbabwe (1980-1990) 
 
Source: Adapted from Hawkins (2009: 6-8) 
The global economic recession may have also had a negative impact on the inflow of foreign 
investment thus dampening the productivity of the industry. Production recovered between 
1987 and 1990 averaging about US$500 million although it did not approach anywhere near 
the 1980-81 levels. On the export earnings side, the mining industry remained one of the major 
sources of foreign exchange in the country. As shown in figure 5.2, mining exports contributed 
an average of just above US$500 million to the country’s foreign exchange reserves thus 
providing a lifeline to other economic sectors like manufacturing and transport. 
 
Moreover, in terms of legislation that governed the mining industry, little was changed as the 
fundamentals of the Mines and Minerals Act that had been crafted and adopted by the colonial 
government remained largely intact. Dansereu makes a statement to the effect that the 
government perhaps became too involved with the industry to effect any change: 
The highly developed consultative mechanism between industry and government, developed during the 
previous regime, was maintained, giving industry important influence over government policy. The 
powerful Mining Affairs Board continued to act as the principal liaison between government and industry, 
retaining many of its functions, including the issuance of exclusive prospecting orders. The Chamber thus 
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preparation of amendments to the Mines and Minerals Act in 1983. The industry was also represented on 
the Minerals Marketing Board and the new powerful tripartite Retrenchment Committee that oversaw all 
retrenchments in the country, including mining. (Dansereu, 2000: 231) 
Such a cosy relationship between the government and the mining industry captains dimmed 
any prospects for any restructuring of the mining sector since the very forces reaping advantage 
from the status quo had almost captured the state. The cordial relations between the state and 
the white dominated private sector were also visible in agriculture. Selby (2006: 127-33) shows 
how the government had entered into an alliance of some sort with the white commercial 
farmers and reassured them that their place in the country was safe and the land reform was 
going to be moderate. Despite this awkward position, the government had made an effort to 
improve the conditions of labour in the mining industry. In 1981 the government repealed 
retrogressive colonial legislation which included the Masters and Servants Act, African 
Juveniles Employment Act, Foreign Migratory Labour Act and the African Labour Regulations 
Act. The minimum wage for the mineworkers was increased from $43 a month in 1981 to $133 
by 1985 with an 18 percent real wage increase (Government of Zimbabwe, 1985). It is clear 
that the mining industry was marked by palpable class tensions between the labour and capital 
in which the government had to play the role of both the umpire and a player as it had significant 
interests in the industry as well.  
 
By the end of the first decade the mining industry retained its oligopolistic image being 
dominated by a few multinational companies which claimed a lion’s share of the output of the 
country’s most important and top-earning minerals like gold, nickel, chrome, and coal among 
others (Chachage et al, 1993). Table 5.7 below shows a list of the dominant mining companies 
in Zimbabwe and the amount of production they controlled in the sector at the end of the first 
decade of independence.  
 Table 4.6: Dominant mining companies in Zimbabwe 1989 









Coal 23% Wankie Colliery 
 
23 
Cobalt Bindura Nickel Corp 
Ltd. 
100 





Nickel Bindura Nickel Corp 
Ltd. 
100 
Palladium Bindura Nickel Corp 
Ltd. 
50 
Phosphate Rock Dorowa Mining Pvt 
Ltd 
92.3 
Platinum Bindura Nickel Corp 
Ltd. 
66.7 
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Africa/Luxembourg 
Gold Falcon Mines plc 





    
Brascan Ltd (Noranda) 
/ Canada 
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(ht) Ltd 
50.0 
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Turner 6 Newall 
plc/UK 
Asbestos Shabanie and Nashaba 
Mines 
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Union Carbide 
CorplUSA 
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Zimbabwe/Zimbabwe 








 Merits Ltd 23.6 






























Tin Kamativi Tin Mines Ltd 100 
Tantalum Kamativi Tin Mines Ltd 100 
 Source: Chachage, Ericson and Gibbon, 1993: 18 
 
Zimbabwe’s mining industry was indeed oligopolistic being dominated by a few foreign-
owned companies although the government of Zimbabwe commanded a substantial share of 
the industry output. South Africa’s Anglo-American Corporation had investments spread over 
several minerals but dominated the production of nickel, phosphate rock, cobalt and platinum 
almost completely fending off competition. Lonrho UK dominated gold production with 
controlling stakes in ventures that produced 28% of the gold output in the country. Union 
Carbide from the United States dominated the chrome industry producing over 80% of it while 
Turnall from the UK monopolised the asbestos industry with 100% of the output. Interestingly 
there were only two Zimbabwean controlled companies: Forbes G. Thompson and CRM Ltd. 
The former produced 6% of the country’s gold output while the latter enjoyed a monopoly in 
Beryllium. The GoZ made a significant entry into the industry owning 40% of Wankie Colliery, 
investing heavily in platinum, copper, tin, tantalum and silver through the ZMDC. The entry 
of the government into the mining industry signalled the government’s intention to reduce the 
dominance of foreign entities in the sector. The increase of state participation was also 
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important for the long-term indigenization of the mining industry, since it would afford 
indigenous people an opportunity for managerial experience which is important for any 
successful restructuring efforts. 
 
Not much by way of radical economic transformation or indigenization was achieved in the 
first decade of independence in the national economy. This was also reflected in the mining 
industry which remained dominated by the powerful multinational corporations like Anglo-
American Corporation, Union Carbide and Lonrho UK among others. Even in the agricultural 
sector which had a comparatively more political clout, land reform suffered a false start as far 
fewer family were resettled than had been originally targeted (Moyo and Yeros, 2011). A host 
of factors effectively militated against any radical restructuring of the economy. The first 
among these was the commitment that the nationalist movement had agreed to in the Lancaster 
House constitution which emphasized the protection of private property rights (Mandaza, 
1986). Importantly, the constitution outlined a willing-buyer willing-seller mechanism for the 
first ten years of independence to govern the acquisition of land for redistribution. This was a 
very frustrating process because most of the land-owners were reluctant to let go of their land 
and what little was availed went to government bigwigs and not the intended communal lands 
inhabitants (Moyo, 2000). Secondly, the country had just emerged out of decades of 
colonialism the last two of which were marked by intense violence between the liberation 
movements and the colonial government. Under such circumstances, there was no readily 
available data which could provide a vital basis of any coherent and long-term development 
strategy.  
 
Thirdly, the government had to confront domestic political crisis in the wake of alleged 
dissident activities in the Matabeleland areas believed to be committed by former members of 
the opposition ZAPU military wing. A regiment was deployed in 1982 to try and eliminate the 
disturbances which cost the government an enormous amount of money and thousands of lives 
(See, Sachikonnye, 2011; Chikuhwa, 2013). Lastly but not least, the country had to face a 
hostile powerful neighbour in South Africa which was still under apartheid. The socialist 
rhetoric of Robert Mugabe did not go down well with the apartheid government which feared 
that the success of Zimbabwe’s independence would only work to encourage and inspire anti-
apartheid activities. The apartheid government embarked on an economic sabotage strategy by 
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withdrawing from a trade deal which had been in force since 1964. The South African 
government also delayed Zimbabwean goods in its ports and also had a hand in the Beira 
pipeline attack by the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) activities in Mozambique. 
Zimbabwe depended on the Beira pipeline for fuel and therefore had to deploy soldiers to 
protect the pipeline (See Fisher, 2010). 
4.10 The mining sector in the ESAP period 
 
At the instigation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1991, 
Zimbabwe embarked on the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). ESAP was 
a package of policy measures anchored mainly on trade and exchange rate liberalization, 
privatization of parastatals, deregulation of the financial and labour sectors and fiscal restraint 
in terms of reduced social expenditure (Kanyenze, 2003). Through these measures the 
government hoped to achieve 5 percent economic growth (1991-1995), raise savings and 
investment to 25 percent of GDP respectively, reduce budget deficit to 5% of the GDP and 
grow export earnings by 9 percent per annum. The government sought to achieve its budget 
deficit targets through the restructuring of the public sector by cutting the number of posts 
therein by 23000 in different government departments. This, it was hoped, would reduce the 
public sector wage bill from 16 percent of the GDP to 12 percent. However, as shown in table 
5.8 below, ESAP failed to reach its targets. The rate of GDP growth was a poor 2.7 percent 
while employment grew at 1.5 percent. By the end of the ESAP period in 2000 the level of 
investment in the economy was 15 percent while savings were at 14 percent, a far cry from the 
25 percent target for both. 
Table 4.7: Economic performance during 1985-1990 and the ESAP period 
 
1985-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
Real GDP growth 4.0 0.9 2.7 
Employment growth 2.4 0.8 1.5 
Investment of GDP 15.5 22.5 15.5 
Savings of GDP 16.8 16.9 14.3 
Inflation 11.6 27.6 32.6 
Source: Kanyenze, 2003: 63  
The prevailing macroeconomic environment that followed the adoption of ESAP also affected 
the mining industry in terms of investments and production levels and labour issues as well. 
127 
 
Figure 5.3 below shows that the production patterns in the industry were unstable and on 
balance less than satisfactory as compared to the previous decade. The average value of 
production in the sector was around US$500 million. Such low production levels were probably 
due to a lacklustre flow of investment which stood well below Z$3 billion in the first half of 
the ESAP period. However, the industry continued to be the country’s premier foreign currency 
generator averaging a little over US$600 million for the whole ESAP period. The discrepancy 
between the low production levels and the high export earnings is probably due to the 
unrecorded production in the informal sector. 
Figure 4.2: Export and production value of the mining industry (1991-2000) 
 
Source: Hawkins, 2009: 9 
 
Figure 4.3: Investment levels in Zimbabwe mining industry (1968-1997) 
 
Source: Hawkins, 2009: 13 
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Investment flows declined sharply in the first half of the 1990s averaging well below Z$3 
billion but then show a significant spike between 1995 and 1997 reaching Z$3.5 billion in 1997. 
Hawkins (2009) suggests that an unstable macroeconomic environment and the lack of new 
mineral discoveries explain the low investment levels of the early 1990s. However, the 
discovery of new deposits especially platinum reserves in the mid-1990s influenced the rise in 
investment in the industry. The rise in investments also reflects the impact of the liberalization 
of the economy under the structural adjustment measures. Government’s intervention having 
been reduced in labour and exchange rate matters, investment flow had less hurdles to deal 
with (Dansereau, 2000). In terms of employment, the mining industry also felt the effects of 
the ESAP. In 1980 the industry boasted a workforce of over 66 000 employees but declined 
sharply during the decade to 51 000 meaning over 15 000 jobs were lost in the industry. Half-
way through the ESAP period in 1995 the number of employees in the industry was marked at 
59 000 only to drop to 45 000 in 2000 before further declining to 38 000 in 2004 (See Hawkins, 
2009; Dansereau, 2000). Thus, the workforce of the mining industry shrunk by over 40 percent 
between 1995 and 2004 possibly impacting negatively on its political clout. 
 
The adoption of ESAP was tantamount to the abandonment of the indigenization and socio-
economic transformation in programme in many ways. Through ESAP, the government cut 
back its interference in the economy thus leaving poor black people to fend for themselves 
which they could not do without the support of the government (See Kanyenze, 2003; 
Sachikonye, 2011). ESAP was a conservative economic strategy that did not create an 
environment in which previously disadvantaged people could enter the mainstream economy. 
Instead it concentrated on pampering the people who were already priviledged thus further 
widening the income inequalities. Government’s priority towards cutting spending meant that 
little in terms of financial or even technical assistance was available to help aspiring 
entrepreneurs kick-start business ventures (Maphosa, 1998). 
  
4.11 The Artisanal and Small-scale Mining Sector (ASM) 
 
The last section focused on the large-scale mining sector. This section is a brief discussion of 
the small-scale sector which plays an important role in Zimbabwe’s mining sector. Small-scale 
mining operations have always been an integral part and continue to play a pivotal role in 
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Zimbabwe’s mining sector. Indeed, the indigenization of the mining industry will depend on 
the empowerment of the indigenous small-scale operators. The small claim workers are a 
different class on their own, much like the petty bourgeoisie of the mining industry 
commanding limited amounts of the means of production in terms of mining implements and 
employing a few people per shaft. Thus, the ASM constitutes an important part of the class 
structure in Zimbabwe’s mining sector. This section looks at the government’s policies and 
approach towards the small-scale mining communities within the context of ESAP. 
 
After having paid little attention to the ASM sector, in the 1990s the government took important 
steps towards the legalisation of small-scale operations. In 1993, through a policy document 
known as the “Harare Guidelines on Small-Scale Mining”, the government recognised the 
importance of small-scale mining as a source of livelihood for millions of poor people. The 
state issued Statutory Instrument (275) aimed at decentralizing the management and 
governance of small-mines by granting the Rural District Councils (RDCs) the power to issue 
mining licences to small-scale operators. The local government being close to the ground, it 
was reasoned, would better monitor the miners’ adherence to environmental regulations and 
standards. According to Maponga and Ngorima (2003) the Statutory Instrument 275 also 
granted local authorities the power to market the output of small-scale operations. Mining 
permits could be issued by local authorities to individuals or cooperatives with a commitment 
to adhere to strict environmental regulations.  
 
The government also facilitated the creation of links with international groups to provide legal 
and technical assistance to the small-scale miners as a step towards formalization. In areas like 
Shamva and Insiza districts, the Ministry of Mines helped establish local mineral processing 
centres where small-scale miners could take their ore for processing in return for an agreed fee. 
However, these support schemes ultimately failed and were disbanded due to mismanagement 
(Speigel, 2009). More interesting, the Zimbabwean state displayed the will to go the extra mile 
in promoting ASM by offering to buy gold from small-scale miners at improved prices to 
reduce smuggling and parallel market activities. Gold sold directly to the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ) was at times bought at higher price than the international market. To 
encourage registration and formalization the government established the Mining Industry Loan 
Fund (MILF) which was a micro-financing facility through which small scale miners could 
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access loans and credit to fund their businesses. While this was indeed an innovative way to 
accelerate the formalization and empowerment of ASM, Speigel (2009) lamented the 
corruption and political gimmicking that determined the disbursement of credit and loans 
which undermined the purpose of the initiative.  
4.12 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed the evolution of Zimbabwe’s mining industry from the beginning 
of the colonial era in 1890 to the turn of the twenty-first century about two decades into the 
post-colonial era. The colonial era, which lasted for 90 years saw the processes of class 
formation and alignment of classes which make up the context of the indigenization policy in 
the present-day Zimbabwe. Upon the inception of colonialism, the BSAC, which controlled 
the levers of power, actively sought international capitalists with the capital and technical 
capacity to invest in Rhodesia’s mining potential. The international capitalists have since 
become the dominant class in the mining industry commanding an enormous share of the 
mineral output. The scattered nature of Zimbabwe’s gold deposits forced the colonial state to 
actively support a white-settler petty bourgeoisie who worked on and exploited the small 
deposits. This class depended on state assistance in terms of credit and technical capacity to 
survive. The state elite or ruling class wielding significant influence in the production relations 
through policy formulation and implementation became a class of its own in the mining sector. 
The peasantisation and pauperisation of the indigenous black people through violent land 
dispossession and draconian legislation like the ICA and the hut tax constituted the basis for 
the formation of an exploited indigenous working class. The ICA also created a small white 
working class which got preferential treatment from the state in terms of promotion, training 
and remuneration. Thus, the mining sector in Rhodesia comprised essentially five classes 
which include the international capitalists, the ruling class, the white-settler petty bourgeoisie, 
the white working class and the indigenous working class. The indigenous working class was 
the weakest and most exploited of the classes. The state, due to the nature of its power was at 
the centre of the power dynamics between the classes in the mining sector. 
 
The second part of the chapter addressed the first two decades of the post-colonial era under 
the nationalist government led by the black ruling class. The new political dispensation initiated 
some changes in the class structure of the mining sector although the Mines and Minerals Act 
131 
 
which underpinned the framework of the mining sector remained intact. The post-colonial 
government reformed the labour relations removing racial priviledges which had worked to 
separate the white working class from their black counterparts. Perhaps the most significant 
change was the disappearance of the white working class and the white settler petty bourgeoisie 
class from the scene due to immigration and withdrawal of support from the government. In 
place of the white settler petty bourgeoisie came in a poorly supported black petty bourgeoisie 
working small claims comprising thousands of indigenous Zimbabweans. The new black ruling 
class showed its determination to increase state influence in the mining sector through the 
formation of such entities as the ZMDC and the MMCZ which were state-controlled investment 
and marketing vehicles in the sector. Through the ZMDC the state was able to increase its 
mining investments in various subsectors while the MMCZ enabled the state to control the 
pricing, exports and imports of mineral produce. Even though there were changes, the relations 
between the ruling class and the international capitalists remained essentially the same thus 
sustaining and nourishing the dominance of foreign-owned large-scale companies. Moreover, 
the new government did not commit serious resources to create a new class of indigenous 
mining entrepreneurs. This could be explained by a lack of political will and capital on the part 
of the state. Further, although colonial labour laws were repealed on the advent of 
independence, the working class remained weak and repressed by the state. Thus, although 
there were some changes in class composition and dynamics, there was also continuity in terms 
of the dominance of international capital, the exploitation of the working class, retention of 
much of the legislative framework and the absence of an indigenous class of large and medium 
scale mine owners. The state retained and even doubled down on its influence nationalizing a 
sizable portion of the sector and tightened its control of the working class. Further the post-
colonial state took steps towards creating a class of black petty bourgeoisie in the mining sector 
through the promotion of the ASM sector. However, things took a dramatic turn in the early 
years of the twenty-first century in the context of the indigenization policy. The next chapter 
examines the configuration of class dynamics in the mining sector and the broader power 













The previous chapter explored the history of the dialectical process of class formation which 
was orchestrated by the settler colonial state in Zimbabwe’s mining industry through the 90 
years of settler-colonialism. This process placed various groups of people in different locations 
and positions in the organization of production and the structure of accumulation undergirding 
the minerals sector. The resultant class structure was such that in one extreme, it concentrated 
a disproportionate share of the country’s mineral wealth and power in the foreign-owned multi-
national corporations (MNCs) like Union Carbide and Anglo-American. On the other extreme, 
through relentless state repression and violence, there emerged a disempowered and over-
exploited indigenous working class who provided surplus labour for the big mining companies. 
Also making up the class structure and no less important were the white-settler petty 
bourgeoisie who operated small-scale mines and the skilled white working class whom the 
colonial state pampered with privileges. The state itself had a vested material and institutional 
self-interest in protecting and maintaining the prevailing production relations in the mining 
sector often resorting to extra-economic means of appropriating maximum surplus labour from 
the indigenous working class. A politico-ideological framework centred on capitalism and 
white supremacy enforced through the state apparatus provided the context that underpinned 
the evolution of the structure and orientation of the mining sector in Zimbabwe, itself a 
bellwether for the orientation of the national economy. 
  
Thus, the post-colonial state in Zimbabwe was saddled with an enormous social and political 
task to heal the structural deformities of the colonial society it inherited. This it sought to do, 
amongst other ways, through the policy of economic empowerment and indigenization. The 
policy seeks to undo the colonial legacy of an oligopolistic mining sector dominated by a 
handful of foreign-owned MNCs by deliberately promoting the participation of previously 
disadvantaged indigenous people as co-owners of the big mining firms. Using data sourced 
from interviews, documentary materials, archives and online sources, this chapter delves 
deeper into the dynamics underlying the process of indigenizing the large-scale mining 
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enterprises predominantly controlled by the MNCs. The chapter pursues and unpacks the story 
of the attempted transformation of Zimbabwe’s large-scale mining sector (LSM) through a 
case-by-case basis. It explores how the implementation and process of indigenization in the 
various subsectors of the LSM in Zimbabwe unfolded. The experiences of big mining firms 
like Mimosa, RioZim, Metallon Gold, Freda Rebecca, Impala Platinum, Anjin Diamonds, and 
Blanket Mine among others will be explored in detail. This approach will reveal the nature of 
the Zimbabwean state and its subjects and their bearing on the implementation of the 
indigenization policy. Drawing from the interviews conducted during the study, this chapter 
seeks to explore in-depth the unfolding of the indigenization policy in Zimbabwe’s mining 
sector from the 1990s to the present. This is with a view to understanding how the relations 
between the state, class forces and the global context affected the implementation of the policy. 
In cases where interviewees preferred not to be identified by their name a marker (Interviewee-
1 or I-1, I-2) was used. 
       
5.2 Monopoly and Oligopoly: Ownership in Zimbabwe’s Large-scale Mining Sector 
 
Central to the indigenization crusade is the problematization of the historically derived and 
determined distribution of the ownership and control of the means of production and the power 
relations that come with it. The preliminary view underpinning indigenization is that the current 
distribution of wealth is a direct outcome of the historical systematic exclusion and 
discrimination of the indigenous Zimbabweans. A redistributive process biased in favour of 
the indigenous people seemed to the policymakers to be the best way to address the historical 
injustices of colonialism and reduce inequality. The table 5.1 below shows the distribution of 
ownership in various sectors of the country’s minerals industry.  
Table 5.1. Ownership of large mines in Zimbabwe 












   
 
Portland Holdings Ltd. (Pretoria Portland 
Cement Company Pvt. Ltd. (100%) 




Lafarge Cement Zimbabwe Ltd. (Lafarge, SA) 
(100%) 
Harare  450,000 
 
Portland Holdings Ltd. (Pretoria Portland 
Cement Company Pvt. Ltd. (100%) 
Bulawayo 800,000 
 
Sino-Zimbabwe Cement Company Ltd. (China 
Building Material Industrial Corporation for 
Foreign Econo-Technical Cooperation and 
Industrial Development Corp. 
Gweru 300, 000 










Zimbabwe Alloys Ltd. ZimAlloys (Balasore – 
100%) 
Inyala Mine 60,000 
 
Zimbabwe Mining & Smelting Co. Pvt. Ltd. 
(ZIMASCO) Zimasco Consolidated Enterprises 












Coal Zimbabwe Pvt. Ltd., [Steelmakers 
Zimbabwe Pvt. Ltd. 
Chiredzi 1,200,000 
 
Hwange Colliery Company Pvt Ltd. (Govt - 37%, 
Messina Investments Ltd - 15.08%, Mitta Steel 
African Investments - 9.76%, London Register, 
6.78%, NSSA - 6.16%) 
Hwange  5,000,000 
 




Sengwa Colliery (Private) Ltd. (RioZim Ltd.) Kadoma 5,000,000  




   
Ore, cobalt 
content 
Bindura Nickel Corporation Pvt Ltd. Bindura 800 
 
Mimosa Holdings (Private) Ltd. (Aquarius 
Platinum Ltd., Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., 
and Zvishavane Community Share Trust 
Zvishavane 88 
 




Zimbabwe Platinum Mines (Private) Ltd. 
(Zimplats Holdings Ltd.) -87.5% 
Ngezi NA 









Coke Hwange Coal Gasification Company (Private) 
Ltd. [Taiyuan Sanxing Coal Gasification Co., 
Hwange Colliery Company Ltd., and Stoat 
Mining (Private) Ltd.] 
Hwange  144,000 
 
Hwange Colliery Company Ltd. [Government, 
37.07%; Messina Investments Ltd., 15.08%; 
Mittal Steel African Investments, 9.76%;London 
Register, 6.87%; National Social Security 
Authority, 6.16%] 
Hwange  230,000 
Copper: 
   
Ore copper 
content 




Mimosa Holdings (Private) Ltd. (Aquarius 
Platinum Ltd., Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., 




Unki Mines (Private) Ltd. (Anglo Platinum Ltd.) Unki, Shurugwi 1,300  
Zimbabwe Platinum Mines (Private) Ltd. 
(Zimplats 
Ngezi 3,600 
Refined Empress Nickel Refinery (RioZim Ltd.) Kadoma 6,000 
Diamond Anjin Investments pvt. ltd. [Joint venture of 
Anhui Foreign Economic Construction-50% and 
Matt Bronze Pvt. Ltd. -50%] 
Marange NA 
 
Diamond Mining Corporation (Private) Ltd. 
[Joint venture of Pure Diam and Zimbabwe 
Mining Development Corp. (ZMDC)] 
Marange NA 
 
DTZ-OZGEO (Private) Ltd. (Joint venture of 




Gye Nyame Resources [Joint venture of 
Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp. (ZMDC) 
and Bill Minerals] 
Marange NA 
 
Kusena Diamonds [Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corp. (ZMDC)] 
Marange NA 
 
Marange Resources (Private) Ltd.) [Zimbabwe 
Mining Development Corp. (ZMDC)] 
Marange NA 
 
Mbada Mining (Private) Ltd. [Grandwell 
Holdings Ltd., Resources (Private) Ltd., and 
Transfrontier Mining Company Ltd.] 
Marange NA 
 
Murowa Diamonds (Private) Ltd. (Rio Tinto plc, 
77.8%; and RioZim Ltd., 22.2%) 
Zvishavane 430000 
 
Limpopo Minerals Resources Ltd (Rani 
Investment LLC, 80%, and Khupukile Resources 
Ltd., 20%) 




Sino Zimbabwe Development (Private) Ltd. 
[Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp. (ZMDC)] 
Marange NA 
Gold  
   
 
Artisanal miners, including small-scale miners 
and syndicates 




Blanket Mine (1983) (Private) Ltd. [Caledonia 
Mining Corp., 49%;National Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Fund, 16%; west of 
GwandaFremiro, 15%; Blanket Employee Trust 
Services (Private) Ltd.,10%; Gwanda Community 
Share Ownership Trust, 10%] 
Gwanda 1300 
 
Casmyn Mining Zimbabwe (Private) Ltd. (New 
Dawn Mining Corp.) 
Turk-Angelus 
Mine - Bulawayo 
550 
 
DTZ-OZGEO (Private) Ltd. (Joint venture of 













“ Gaika Mine, Kwe 30  

















Jena Mine (Private) Ltd. [Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corp. (ZMDC)] 
Jena Mine 450 
 




Matebeland Minerals (Private) Ltd Turk Mine 600  






















Mimosa Holdings (Private) Ltd. (Aquarius 
Platinum Ltd., Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., 








Pan Reef Mining Company (Private) Ltd. Indarama Mine 50  




Sabi Gold Mines [Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corp. (ZMDC)] 




Unki Mines (Private) Ltd. (Anglo Platinum Ltd.) Unki, Shurugwi NA  
Zimbabwe Platinum Mines (Private) Ltd. 
(Zimplats Holdings Ltd.) 
Ngezi Mine NA 
Refined Fidelity Printers and Refineries (subsidiary of 
RBZ) 
Refinery plant in 
Harare 
NA 
Graphite  Graphite Zimbabwe German Graphite Mines 
(Private) Ltd. [Kropmühl division of AMG 
Advanced Metallurgical Group N.V. and 










CINA Smelter 5000 
 
Source: Barry, J. 2014. The Minerals Industry of Zimbabwe. In US Geological Survey: 2014 (6-10) 
 
It is clear from table 5.1 above that the mining industry in Zimbabwe is dominated by a 
collection of a few giant MNCs having a stranglehold in their respective sectors within the 
industry. There is little to show for indigenous ownership, just foreign dominance punctuated 
by State ownership. In the asbestos sector the African Associated Mines - a subsidiary of 
Shabanie Mashava Mines (SMM) – enjoys a monopoly with no competition at all. In the 
cement sector, a foreign oligopoly also exists thus further entrenching the rule. Pretoria 
Portland Cement (PPC) controls the Gwanda (a town 120km South of Bulawayo) and 
Bulawayo (second largest city) cement sites producing a total of 1.8 million tonnes of limestone 
which is used to make cement. Lafarge controls the cement site in Harare producing 450 000 
tonnes of limestone per annum. Both of these companies have origins in South Africa. The coal 
sector hosts six players making it more diverse than the asbestos and cement sectors but 
oligopolic nonetheless. Hwange Colliery Company Limited (HCCL) and Makomo Resources 
are the two largest coal producers in the country. HCCL has the government as its largest 
shareholder with a 37.7% stake in the company with the rest of the shares belonging to a group 
of private largely foreign investors. Makomo Resources’ ownership is obscure with no 
information available about its share ownership structure. According to The Chronicle, 
Makomo resources is owned by Zimbabwean and South African investors and the latter hold 
40 percent stake (Mlilo, 2016). Sengwa Colliery, and Tuli Coal, the other two companies in 
the sector, comparatively smaller, are subsidiaries of Rio Zim and Senzile Resources 
respectively. Senzile Resources is a South African based mining company while RioZim is 
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also foreign controlled. There is also Coal Brick Mine and Coal Zimbabwe which is controlled 
by Steelmakers Zimbabwe Pvt Ltd.  
 
Cobalt ore and copper production is also controlled by a few foreign-owned companies which 
include the platinum giants Unki (Anglo-American Platinum), Zimplats (Implats), Mimosa 
(Aquarius and Implats). Yet again, the ownership and control is dominated by the foreign-
controlled entities. The chrome sector on the other hand comprises a significant number of 
local cooperatives and small-scale mines producing an output of 600 000 tonnes of chrome ore. 
The two large-scale companies Zim Alloys (controlled by Indian investors) and the Zimbabwe 
Mining and Smelting Company (ZIMASCO) controlled by Chinese investors also operate in 
the sector with a combined total of 360 000 tonnes output and control 90 percent of the chrome 
claims in the country. The higher production figures of the small-scale mines and cooperatives 
may reflect more on their numerical superiority rather than productivity. Worse still the small-
scale operators are forced to sell their produce to the two large-scale producers for paltry 
amounts ($35 per tonne) under tributary agreements (The Sunday Mail, 12 September 2015). 
The country’s controversial diamond sector is dominated by the State represented by the 
Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) and a host of foreign and local private 
investors. The ownership of the diamond sector will be the subject of one of the sections to 
follow in this chapter. 
  
The gold sector also demonstrates the stranglehold foreign players have on the country’s 
mining sector. The “king” in this sector is perhaps indisputably Metallon Gold, the largest gold 
producer in the country owning five mines controlled by South African investor Mzilikazi 
Khumalo. Clarity Group Capital and New Dawn Corporation also control about seven mining 
sites between them. Caledonia Mining Corporation holds the largest stake of 49% in the 
indigenized Blanket Mine. Sabi Gold and Jena Mine are controlled by the State while Freda 
Rebecca one of the biggest mines in the country is controlled by Mwana Africa, a mining 
consortium from South Africa. Artisanal and Small-scale miners numbering around 600 000 to 
1 million are also a force to reckon with in the gold sector overtaking the large-scale producers 
in terms of production (See Mawowa, 2013; Speigel, 2009). The above information shows that 
foreign monopolies and oligopolies are rife in the mining sector hence the low participation of 
the locals in the sector. This chapter will give a detailed presentation of how each of the MNCs’ 
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cases of indigenization were handled. These experiences will help construct a comprehensive 
and coherent narrative of the dynamics of the indigenization programme in Zimbabwe’s mining 
sector. The structure of the ownership in the mining sector also reflects the context which 
indigenization and transformation of the minerals industry has to contend with. The context of 
the world-capitalist system. The dominance of foreign mining corporations from and the failure 
of local investors to penetrate the sector reflects the dynamics of the core-periphery division in 
the world-system. Mining is a capital-intensive and highly technical industry that makes it 
almost impossible for a peripheral country like Zimbabwe to invest in mining since it faces a 
severe scarcity of capital, skills and technology. Only firms coming from the core or developed 
areas that have the necessary capital and technology can effectively engage in mining on an 
industrial scale. The poverty of capital and technology, itself a reflection of the structure of the 
world-system, is perhaps one of the most important determinants of the outcomes of 
Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy as will be demonstrated in the cases to be explored below.  
 
5.3 The Indigenization Context: Retaliation against the West and a pivot to the East?  
 
The decision to adopt the economic indigenization and empowerment as the flagship policy of 
the government was not entirely the function of the dynamics of domestic political economy 
and ideological convictions. It was also considerably influenced by external factors like the 
changing nature of the international order and Zimbabwe’s dynamic position in it. Skocpol 
(1979) observed that the state is a janus-faced entity whose actions are oriented by both internal 
and external circumstances. The indigenization policy was intensified after the European 
Union, Japan, USA and Canada and other multilateral organizations like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had imposed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe in 
2001 citing the violent land invasions that affected white commercial farmers in 2000 (See 
Moyo, 2007). Zimbabwe also quit the Commonwealth organization which is a platform of 
former British colonies. The sanctions imposed by the West and the destruction of agricultural 
productivity after the land reform programme had a debilitating impact on the Zimbabwean 
economy.  
 
The devaluation of currency as hyperinflation set in, acute shortages of basic commodities, 
deindustrialization and unemployment crippled Zimbabwe’s ability to clear its arrears with the 
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IMF and the World Bank among other international financial institutions (Mararike, 2018). A 
2003 IMF Press Release read as follows concerning the suspension of Zimbabwe: 
On September 24, 2001, Zimbabwe was declared ineligible to use IMF's general resources and 
was removed from the list of countries eligible to use resources under the IMF's Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (see Press Release No. 01/40). On June 13, 2002, the Executive 
Board adopted a declaration of non-cooperation with respect to Zimbabwe and suspended all 
technical assistance to the country (see Press Release No. 02/28). On September 11, 2002, the 
Executive Board agreed to initiate the procedure to suspend Zimbabwe's voting and related rights 
in the IMF. (IMF Press Release 03/80, June 3 2003) 
The World Bank also suspended Zimbabwe on account of acute differences in policy sparked 
by the chaotic land reform programme (Peta, 2001). By the beginning of the twenty-first 
century Zimbabwe, a country that had until then been a darling of the West, found itself 
isolated. The Mugabe administration berated the West and the Bretton Woods Institutions for 
pursuing an imperialistic and neo-colonial agenda on Zimbabwe. 
  
All these events happened in the context of tectonic shifts in the global power relations that 
saw China rising rapidly to challenge the economic hegemony of the United States and the 
West. Having been isolated by the West, then President Robert Mugabe announced a Look 
East policy in 2003 through which he sought to cultivate close relations primarily with China 
but also with other East Asian countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Pakistan among 
others to salvage the country’s ailing economy (Youde, 2007). The Look East policy was a 
political maneuver by Zimbabwe to reassert its identity, embrace a new set of values, and 
redefine its role and position in international relations. Zimbabwe and China relations date back 
to the days of the liberation struggle in the 1970s when China supported the liberation 
movement ideologically and materially. The Chinese Communist Party and Zanu-PF share 
deep ideological convictions (Stiftung, 2004).  
 
That said, it is plausible to argue that the indigenization policy in its content and form was to a 
considerable degree informed and influenced by the new developments in Zimbabwe’s external 
relations. Firstly, the policy may have been motivated by the desire to retaliate against western 
isolation by threatening western originating MNCs’ enterprises operating in the country. As 
will be shown in this chapter, western companies bore the brunt of the indigenization takeovers. 
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Referring to the British owned banks Barclays and Standard Chartered at a removal of 
sanctions petition rally in 2011, Robert Mugabe was quoted as saying that “the indigenization 
and economic empowerment drive should start with those companies. We must take over. Now 
it’s time we took measures”. Addressing an earlier rally in December 2010 Mugabe sounded 
like a man on a retaliatory mission: 
We should read the Riot Act to the British companies and others. To say this is only 51% we 
have taken. Unless you remove the sanctions we will go 100% and take over…if they insist the 
sanctions must remain then of course we must take over these companies. (Collins, 2010)  
It seemed Robert Mugabe was pushing back against the Western sanctions and isolation by 
threatening the property of their companies in Zimbabwe. The Chinese and South African 
capital seemed to be welcomed and exempted from the indigenization laws. At the height of 
the indigenization crusade, Chinese companies acquired controlling stakes in diamond, gold 
and chrome producing mines across the country. Indeed, China benefited immensely from 
mining deals signed with Zimbabwean authorities.  
 
Chinese investors bought controlling stakes in such big mining companies as Bindura Nickel 
Corporation, Zimasco, Anjin, and Jinan. Anjin and Jinan were two of the companies granted 
some of the largest concessions in the Marange diamonds fields upon the formalization of 
diamond mining in 2011. South African companies in the platinum, gold and diamond sectors 
also seemed to be free from the demands of indigenization policy. The sequence of events, 
demonstrates that the indigenization policy served as a retaliation against Western hostility and 
at the same time as an embrace of the western rival (China) on the global stage. The 
indigenization policy was as much a foreign policy as it was a domestic policy in the sense that 
the Zimbabwean state used it to recalibrate their external relations with the West and the East. 
Having been ditched by the western ruling class, the Zimbabwean ruling class sought to 
cultivate new economic and political partnerships with the Chinese ruling class. Hence the 
external factor, in terms of Zimbabwe’s position in international relations was an important 
element in the calculus behind the indigenization policy. The indigenization policy was a 
manifestation of a transformation or evolution of state power in Zimbabwe precipitated by a 




5.4 Indigenization: The Case of the Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) Industry 
 
Zimbabwe has the second largest known reserves of platinum ore in the world after South 
Africa occurring along the Great Dyke (a mineral rich belt stretching from the east to the west 
of the country). The reserves are estimated at 2 billion tonnes of PGM at 4 grams per tonne of 
the head grades19 (See Jourdan et al, 2012). The PGMs industry has become increasingly 
important as the country’s top foreign currency earner with its sales almost doubling from 
US$475 million in 2008 to US$889 million in 2013 dropping slightly to US$852 million in 
2017 (The Source, 2017). Since the late 1990s the industry became a political football 
following the government’s adoption of the indigenization policy in 1998 as political 
heavyweights angled for a stake in the platinum-mining companies which comprised some of 
the foremost targets of the policy (Mobbs, 1997). Mimosa is the country’s oldest platinum mine 
located in Wedza on the south side of the Great Dyke. Mining at this site started in the 1920s 
but later stopped because of political disturbances and was resumed by Union Carbide on a 
trial basis between 1966 and 1975. The Zimbabwe Mining and Smeltering Company 
(Zimasco), registered in Mauritius, assumed control of Mimosa in 1992 after acquiring Union 
Carbide assets. Mining started in 1994 soon reaching 30000 tonnes of ore per month which 
attracted investors from South Africa. In 2001 Impala Platinum (a South African company) 
acquired 35% of Mimosa and acquired an additional 15% in 2002 taking its share to 50% (IOL 
News, 27 July 2001). In the same year Aquarius of Australia bought 50% of the shareholding 
such that by the end of 2002 Impala Platinum and Aquarius Platinum had acquired a 50-50 
stake each in the company. Since then the company has grown in leaps and bounds producing 
100 000 ounces of platinum per annum. 
 
A second mine was developed in 1995 under the Hartley Platinum project, a partnership 
between two Australian companies, BHP and Delta Gold. The project, a result of an agreement 
between the government of Zimbabwe and BHP, was worth US$233 million (Anderson, 1994). 
BHP later sold its interests in Hartley Platinum to Delta Gold-owned Zimbabwe Platinum 
Mines (Zimplats). In 2001, the South African platinum giant, Impala Platinum bought 30 
percent of the shares in Zimplats from Delta Gold. The cash brought in by the sale of the shares 
enabled Zimplats to commence operations in what had been a relatively dormant mining site 
                                                          
19 Head grades is a term used to refer to the metal content of an ore that has been mined. The grade of an ore 
that has been removed from the ground before being processed (Splaine et al, 1982). 
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(Fin24, 30 June 2003). By the end of 2003 Impala had increased its shareholding at Zimplats 
to 82.5% handing it control of the company (See IOL News, 2003; Fin24, 2003). The third 
major platinum concern Unki Mine, owned by Anglo American Platinum, opened in 2010 and 
immediately produced an impressive output of 50000 ounces of platinum in 2011. Thus 
Zimbabwe’s platinum industry consists of three giants Mimosa, Zimplats and Unki all of which 
are owned and controlled by powerful foreign multinationals from South Africa, Australia and 
the USA. Such domination of Zimbabwe’s platinum industry by western firms is a classic 
instance of neo-colonialism as articulated by Nkrumah (1965) who lamented that despite the 
formal end of colonialism, Africa’s resources were still exploited for the development of the 
West. 
 
The transfer of ownership to indigenous people in the platinum sector has been an on-going 
issue over the years since the early 2000s. The first attempt at indigenization was targeted at 
Zimplats. The government struck an understanding with Zimplats in the late 1990s in which 
the parties agreed that the validity of its mining licence was going to be contingent on the 
incorporation of indigenous partners, not just as workers, but as co-owners who control at least 
15% of shares in the mine. This directive from the government elicited intense jostling for the 
newly available 15% stake in Zimplats among potential local investors (Cremer, 2003; 
Zimbabwe Independent, 15 April 2010). It is important to note that at the time, the 
indigenization directive was not legally binding as there was no law that required companies 
to cede a certain amount of shares to indigenous partners. The first to express its interest in the 
acquisition of the 15% bounty in Zimplats was the statutory body, the National Investment 
Trust (NIT) which was replaced by National Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Fund 
following the legislation of the indigenization policy later in 2007. The NIT had been set up by 
the government in the 1990s to acquire and warehouse shares in the privatized parastatals for 
distribution to indigenous Zimbabweans. The NIT, then under the leadership of the prominent 
banker Mthuli Ncube (now Finance Minister), made a bid for the Zimplats shares with a view 
to keeping them on behalf of indigenous citizens. However, the statutory body failed to raise 
the US$31 million required for the acquisition of the available 15% shares (Makoshori, 2004). 
  
Needgate Mining, a local company, represented by MacDonald Chapfika and Paul Chimbodza 
made a bid for the 15% stake in 2003 after NIT attempt had hit a brick wall. Macdonald 
144 
 
Chapfika is a prominent businessman with interests in farming and real estate and brother to 
Zanu-PF politician and former Deputy Minister of Finance David Chapfika who also later 
chaired the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (Muronzi, 2010). Paul 
Chimbodza on the other hand is a noted miner who at the time of the bid was the general 
manager of the Mzi Khumalo-owned Metallon Gold which is the single biggest gold producer 
in the country. Needgate signed an exclusive three-month deal with Zimplats under which the 
former committed to sourcing the US$31 million required to purchase the shares or else lose 
the deal. Needgate mobilised Ngezi Community Trust, the ZMDC, Graname Investments and 
Jelly Mine to form a consortium called Grassroots Investment to raise funds for the 15% stake. 
There is no information on the control and ownership of Graname Investments and Jelly Mine 
but it would be reasonable to surmise that there might have been political heavyweights behind 
the two entities. The deal did not materialize as the consortium failed to amass the required 
funds to get the shares. Asked years later about the deal, Chapfika denied that the company 
failed to raise the required funds, claiming instead that “of all the consortiums that wanted to 
buy the equity we are the only ones who had the money” (Quoted in Muronzi, 2010).  
 
Further investigations show that Needgate’s ill-fated adventure was a result of a cabinet 
reshuffle in 2004 which saw Edward Chindori-Chininga replaced by Amos Midzi as the 
Minister of Mines. Needgate was prepared to acquire the over 13 million shares on offer but 
the new minister, Midzi, declined to approve the deal citing concerns that the government was 
not represented (Chiriga, 2004). This is a clear case of government instability and overreach 
derailing the indigenization process through the change of personalities in positions of 
authority. The discontinuity that comes with the change of ministers also reflects the lack of 
effective leadership in the corridors of power and presence of disharmony amongst top 
government officials. The apparent ease with which Minister Midzi reversed and halted a 
process that had been overseen by his predecessor Chindori-Chininga begs the question 
whether these decisions are made on a collective basis at the cabinet level or are determined by 
the personal whims of the minister. 
 
While the Needgate consortium was in the thick of things trying to secure the deal, another 
indigenous entity, Barbican Bank Holdings led by Mthuli Ncube, who had previously occupied 
the post of NIT chairman, made a bid for the shares in August 2003 probably towards the elapse 
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of the 90-day period that Needgate had secured to raise the money. The Zimbabwean 
investment bank offered to buy as much as 40% of the shares at A$5/share which would have 
cost a total of US$170 million against Implats offer of A$4.74 per share. The offer was not 
only a counter-offer to the Needgate deal but was also a counter to Implats’ bid to buy out 
minority shares in the company (Chikanga, 2003). This was a rare spectacle of an indigenous 
entity going toe to toe with a powerful multinational corporation. However, Barbican had to 
withdraw its offer later in 2004 after the shares on offer had been reduced to 5% from the initial 
40% citing that the shares were too small to be of any consequence (Chikanga, 2003; 
Chanakira, 2004). It is not clear why the shares on offer were drastically reduced from an initial 
40% to a mere 5%. Implats may have had the advantage of pre-emptive rights as a minority 
shareholder to get the first preference in the share sale. 
 
A new indigenous consortium, Nkululeko Rusununguko Mining Company (NRMC) 
announced its quest to join the race for the Zimplats 15% stake which had thus far proved 
notoriously elusive in 2004. The entry of the NRMC (apparently hand-picked and having the 
support of the minister Midzi) was a knock-out punch for the Needgate consortium as it 
effectively pushed them out of the race (Makoshori, 2004). NRMC was announced by then 
Minister of Indigenisation in the president’s office Josiah Tungamirayi as the legitimate winner 
of the competition overseen by government to acquire the stake on offer at Zimplats. To put 
things into context, the NRMC is the company that was later identified during the diamond 
craze in 2011 as the agent of the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) selling diamonds on its 
behalf (See Saunders and Nyamunda, 2016). This raised the suspicion that NRMC exploited 
the close links between the military elite and the state elite to land the 15% equity in Zimplats. 
 
However, NRMC like its predecessor indigenous aspirants failed to raise the required US$31 
million to secure the 15% stake. In a telling comment, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe lamented 
the missed opportunities as a result of “gate-crashing the white metals industry riding on 
political connections” (Sandu, 2005). The history of the attempts to indigenize Zimplats 
through bringing in local players as co-owners is a history of astonishing but unsurprising 
failure. No less than four indigenous suitors hit a brick wall trying to acquire a stake in the 
company. This begs the question: why? In the case of the NIT’s failure it points to the 
government’s lack of capacity in terms of the capital and skills needed to fund and negotiate 
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empowerment deals. It is also a reflection of institutional weakness seen in the government’s 
failure to mobilise support even amongst civil servants to rally behind a common goal. The 
Needgate Mining consortium while having come the closest was later undone by the political 
dynamics that delivered a hostile minister in the mining portfolio in government. Also, 
Needgate itself seemed to be backed by political connections as evidenced by one of its front 
man turning out to be a brother to a ruling party heavyweight (Chiriga, 2004). The other leader 
of the Needgate consortium Paul Chimbodza worked for a foreign-owned gold mining 
company Metallon. It sure appeared as if he was just fronting for a foreign entity and had 
neither the intent nor the capacity to acquire the shares himself.  
 
Barbican Holdings seemed to have been ready to purchase a 40% stake in Zimplats but got no 
support from the government (Chikanga, 2003). How could a government, happy to stand on 
the moral pedestal of indigenization, fail to lend its political power to an indigenous institution 
engaged in a fight against a ‘Goliath’ that was Implats? Such a move could have easily tilted 
the scales in favour of Barbican Holdings and in the event of Barbican’s victory would have 
resulted in government surpassing (more than double) its indigenization quota. This rightly 
begs the question as to whether there was possible collusion between Implats and some in 
government to leave the bank hanging high and dry. The entry of NRMC into the bid for the 
Zimplats stake, and its subsequent failure demonstrated the shocking subordination of national 
interests to short-term political gains. This is evidenced by the fact that an unknown company 
linked to the military and with no history of mining suddenly catapulted by political favours to 
the front of the race for the Zimplats stake. It also gives credence to allegations of militarized 
patronage networks through which Zanu-PF doles out economic resources to the military in 
order to retain power (See Magure, 2012).  
 
The experiences of Zimplats also vindicate the pessimistic views of scholars like Mufema 
(1998) and Bloch (2012) who expressed misgivings on the indigenization policy, denouncing 
it as amounting to little more than a scheme of patronage and compradorianism intended to 
concentrate power in the ruling class. The government would have done better to bring all 
indigenous players on the table to form a united front. A united front of potential local investors 
pooling their resources together would have made the raising of scarce capital less of a hurdle. 
Moreover, as Maphosa (1998) observed, capital scarcity was a major factor in black 
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entrepreneurs failing to acquire stakes in foreign businesses. Most of the indigenous bidders 
for the Zimplats stake failed to raise the needed capital to acquire the shares. 
 
5.4.1 Post-2007: De’javu All Over Again  
 
The indigenization policy, as the government tried to implement it in the PGMs industry before 
2007, was not supported by law hence the lack of a clear implementation strategy. It was 
implemented in an arbitrary and ad hoc fashion which failed to inspire a unity of purpose even 
amongst government bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of government 
programmes. To lend form and force to the policy then President Robert Mugabe signed the 
indigenization bill into law in 2008 thus giving it a much-needed legal basis which would help 
shed the arbitrariness that undermined the policy implementation in the previous attempts 
(Chikuhwa, 2013). The ministry of indigenization followed up the legislation with the General 
Regulations of 2010 which laid down specific strategies to be followed in pursuit of 
indigenization towards realising the objectives of the new law. The government had been trying 
to indigenize the platinum sector for the past decade but to no avail. The major obstacle, among 
other things, being the lack of capital on the part of the government and potential private 
indigenous investors. The goal of the new policy was to ensure that at least 51% of equity of 
every foreign-owned company in the natural resources sector would be owned by indigenous 
people (Indigenization Act, 2007). 
  
At the forefront of the new approach was the National Indigenization and Economic 
Empowerment Fund (NIEEF). NIEEF was set up for the purpose of warehousing shares in 
targeted companies on behalf of indigenous Zimbabweans and also funding start-up business 
projects by indigenous Zimbabwean citizens. Armed with the new law, the government set 
forth to try and effect indigenization in the platinum sector once more. At this point the 
government seemed to have done the required groundwork and the policy engines were finally 
roaring in the direction of economic transformation and decolonization. Unsurprisingly, the 
three platinum giants that had survived the previous indigenization attempts became the 
immediate targets of the revised and rejuvenated policy. The government’s decision to focus 
on the PGMs industry was partly to set the right tone for the policy since, if successful, it would 
demonstrate the government’s seriousness. In 2012, just two years after the General 
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Regulations were gazetted the government managed to conclude indigenization deals with the 
platinum big three. Table 5.2 below shows the structure and the transaction values of the deals 
reached with the three platinum-mining companies. 
Table 5.2: Indigenization deals of Zimbabwe’s platinum mines 













Unki 1/11/2012 142.8 10% 10% 21% 10% 
Mimosa 13/12/2012 550 10% 10% 31% - 
Zimplats 11/01/2013 971 10% 10% 31% - 
Total  1.6 billion     
Source: New African Special Report (2013:67) 
 
The first to come to the table was Anglo-American Platinum’s Unki Platinum in November 
2012. Unki pledged to transfer 51% shares to the local CSOT, ESOT, a private local consortium 
and the NIEEF. The first three would get 10% apiece and NIEEF would get the lion’s share of 
21% (IOL News, 2 November 2012). About the financing of the transaction, Anglo American 
Platinum had this to say on its website: 
 “The proposed transaction will be facilitated through a notional vendor financing structure…The disposal 
of equity under the indigenisation implementation plan will be undertaken at a market-related valuation of 
Unki adjusted for debt and is subject to the requisite Anglo-American Platinum board and statutory 
approvals, as may be required”. (Anglo-American Platinum, 2012) 
Vendor financing is an arrangement whereby those who acquire shares are expected to pay for 
them through future dividends. Following Unki, Mimosa Platinum also reached a deal with the 
government to cede 51% of its equity to indigenous partners. The CSOT and the ESOT would 
get 10% each while the NIEEF would receive 31% to make up the 51% (The Herald Zimbabwe, 
14 December 2012; Karombo, 2012). Like Unki, the acquisition of the shares was going to be 
paid for through vendor financing. Zimplats, 87% owned by South Africa’s Implats, signed the 




The structure of the deal regarding the distribution of shares amongst the indigenous partners 
was identical to that of Mimosa. Giving a speech at the signing ceremony of the Zimplats deal, 
then Minister Saviour Kasukuwere hailed the deal as “a flagship of the policy objectives of our 
government’s empowerment of indigenous Zimbabweans” (Banya, 2013). Again regarding the 
financing modalities of the deal the Minister said the shares would be paid for from future 
dividends insisting that “We can’t ask poor Zimbabweans to fork out their money to buy ore 
which is in their land” (IOL News, 11 January 2013). For a moment it appeared the government 
was finally getting its way with the platinum miners. 
 
However, a few months after they were signed, President Mugabe publicly condemned the 
structure of the deals saying:  
“That is the problem, they gave us 51 per cent saying that it is a loan that we are giving you and we are 
paying for you in advance and then you can pay us back tomorrow….I think that is where our minister 
made a mistake. He did not quite understand what was happening and yet our theory is that the resource is 
ours and that resource is our share that is where the 51 per cent comes”. (Madongo, 2013) 
The then Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara shared Robert Mugabe’s criticism of the 
deals. Mutambara argued that the Zimplats deal had to take into consideration the difference 
between working capital and equity capital. Arguing that “the possession of claim rights only 
allows one to do a certain activity but does not mean ownership”. He insisted that the 
government would not pay for the indigenized mining stakes from dividends declared by the 
company but would pay from the asset underground (Zimbabwe Independent, 24 May 2013). 
This argument was consistent with President Mugabe’s understanding of how the process 
should have been designed. In 2016 then Indigenization Minister Patrick Zhuwao also came 
under criticism from President Mugabe and fellow cabinet colleagues like then Finance 
Minister Patrick Chinamasa for piling pressure on the financial sector to comply with 
indigenization (Thornycroft, 2016). It appears the cabinet, which is responsible for the 
implementation of the policy was not on the same page in terms of the conceptualisation of the 
indigenization policy thus condemning the second attempt at indigenization to a still birth. The 
differences expressed at the highest levels also signified lack of firm leadership which would 




However, it appears there were differences between the political leaders and the bureaucrats in 
charge of implementing the indigenization policy. In an interview with one of the officials at 
the National Indigenization and Econmic Empowerment Board (NIEEB) which is responsible 
for monitoring compliance with the indigenization there was a different view. The interviewee, 
henceforth referred to as I-120, stated that “For instance in the manufacturing sector it will take 
you 4 years minimum to get to 51%. And remember this 51% is not for appropriation. It is for 
value. You have to pay for the shares. If you are a black indigenous person who wants to 
participate. It is for value. It is not given for free. It was never free. Issues were to do with 
propaganda and implementation.”21 I-1 continued, seemingly attributing then president’s 
statements to politicking, saying that “It was probably more politicised than what it was 
supposed. So that’s why you get people complaining that there was no policy clarity. But it 
was really clarified if you read the Act”. Thus, not only was policy discord within the executive 
but also between the executive and the bureaucracy. The political leaders and the bureaucrats 
interpreted the indigenization law differently which undermined the unity of purpose. Magure 
(2014:9) is of the view that politicians, like Former President Mugabe, were drawn to “the 
populist rhetoric of indigenisation, empowerment, development and employment to lure, 
particularly, youthful first-time voters”. This means that politicians are concerned less with the 
practicality of the policy than with pleasing the masses to attract votes in the elections. 
  
Things were to get even worse. Two years after the signing of the deals, George Manyere, the 
chief executive of a Harare-based firm, Brainworks Capital, which played a central role 
advising the government on indigenization, poured cold water on the deals in 2015. Manyere 
was brought before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Indigenization and Economic 
Empowerment to explain the payments for the services his firm rendered in the negotiation of 
the platinum deals. Manyere told the Committee that the three platinum deals were not a 
success: “In this particular case the transactions were abandoned, there was no success to them. 
In that context we just felt we also had to abandon the expenses we accumulated”, he said, 
referring to the deals with Mimosa, Unki and Platinum. He went on to explain that “when we 
obtained these transactions they were at different stages of progression and in that, the only 
                                                          
20 I-1 stands for Interviewee 1 
21 Interview with I-1 in Harare Zimbabwe on the 20th of January 2018. 
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one which went as far as the shares being exchanged was Blanket Mine, everything else was 
never completed and we never got anything” (New Zimbabwe, 18 June 2015). 
 
Interviews done during the course of this research with officials at the Indigenization Ministry 
corroborated the claims of the Brainworks Capital head. For example, I-1 stated that the 
“NIEEF had successfully acquired 16% shares only in Blanket Mine…that is the only deal that 
has been successful. Up to now, Zimplats has never declared any dividends or transferred any 
shares”. In another interview with one of the directors in the Ministry of Indigenization 
(henceforth I-2), the respondent agreed with I-1, noting with exasperation that: “It has been 
difficult getting the policy to kick-off. Multinational corporations like Implats which controls 
Zimplats, Unki and Mimosa have refused to comply. The Chamber of Mines22 did not like the 
Indigenization Act”.23 However, I-1 went on to explain that “So the Indigenisation Act is 
basically an ENDEAVOUR to get to 51%. You need to take note of the word ENDEAVOUR. 
It is not a one-day event in which businesses have to give 51%. It had to be sector-specific in 
terms of which sector you are and how do you get to the 51%”. Here the respondent was 
referring to Section 3(1) of the 2007 Indigenization Act that reads “The Government shall, 
through this Act or regulations or other measures under this Act or any other law, endeavour 
to secure that...”. Sounding defensive, the other respondent, I-2, who claimed to have 
coordinated the drafting of the indigenization law, said that there was general misunderstanding 
of the Act as the 51% policy “The law says that AT LEAST 51 percent of the shares…and this 
may even go on to 100 percent. It is wrong to be fixated on the 51 percent. This is a process 
that starts from 0%. The fact that shares have not been transferred does not mean failure, it 
simply means we are in the process”. I-2 was referring to subsection (1)(a) of the indigenization 
policy which says that “at least fifty-one per centum of the shares of every public company and 
any other business shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans”. 
 
Respondent I-2 seemed to lay blame for the failure of the deals on divisions within Zanu-PF 
and misperceptions of the policy deliberately peddled and propagated by certain media circles: 
“Another problem is that our media has created a wrong perception of the policy through sheer 
                                                          
22 The Chamber of Mines is an organization of large and medium scale mines in Zimbabwe that was established 
to lobby the government on mining policy and represent the interests of the miners. 
23 Interview with I-2 in Harare on the 19th of January 2018. 
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ignorance or hidden agendas. The journalists in our country are struggling to make ends meet 
and can be bought for small amounts to do the bidding of third parties…… There is a struggle 
within a struggle. Zanu-PF is not a homogenous entity which has created problems for the 
implementation of the policy.” The statement seems to attribute the lack of success in 
indigenization to the ability of hostile media houses (local and international) to peddle 
falsehoods meant to portray a negative picture of the policy. A trend of media polarization on 
the indigenization policy seemed to emerge during the course of this research. Some state 
media columnists like Chengu (2013) and Bwoni (2015) touted the policy as a model of 
economic transformation for post-colonial societies worthy of emulation. Other columnists in 
the independent media (Musewe, 2015; Bloch, 2012; Robertson, 2012) were sceptical of the 
policy to the extent of calling for its immediate repeal. The politicization of the indigenization 
discourse may have led to the policy being overly hyped or unfairly criticized in the media 
platforms for political reasons. 
 
This could also be explained by the second point in which I-2 says “there is a struggle within 
a struggle” suggesting that not everyone in Zanu-PF, the ruling party, is fighting from the same 
corner. There is discord within the party in government about what indigenization means. This 
is evidenced by the fact that some of the stinging criticism of the mining deals that were 
supposed to set the tone for indigenization came from the then president himself. The then 
governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Gideon Gono publicly expressed 
misgivings about the indigenization policy model which set him on a collision path with then 
Minister of Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Saviour Kasukuwere (Newsday, 
2012; Nyakayeza, 2013). Gono vowed to shield the banking sector from being indigenized 
declaring that: 
 “as long as I am governor I will protect the sector from unintended consequences…Instead of sharing an 
existing cake, I have said those who have an appetite for banking please come forward. I will issue licences 
rather than destroy existing banks” (NewsDay, 17 March 2012).  
Without the support of the chief of the country’s central bank, the indigenization policy had no 
legs to stand on since the RBZ was needed to finance and help design the indigenization deals. 
Then Finance Minister Tendai Biti also criticized Kasukuwere’s approach to implementation 
arguing that the law did not call for an instant transfer of 51% shares but rather it was supposed 
to be a process to get to 51% (Nyakayeza, 2013). Such divisions and dissent amongst the ruling 
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class meant that the indigenization policy lacked the full backing of the government hence its 
lack of success. 
  
An exposé by one of the country’s dailies, Daily News, established that the Ministry of Mines 
and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) were never part of the negotiations for the deals. 
This indicates that the Ministry of Indigenization went at it alone without the backing of the 
relevant government departments. Moreover, the appointment of Brainworks Capital as the 
government advisor was not done through a transparent and formal tendering process as is 
required by the law but was an outcome of a verbal agreement between the ministry and the 
firm. In an interview with the paper an unnamed official at the indigenization ministry said that 
the deals put them on a collision course with the RBZ Governor Gideon Gono who:  
“took us to task over all the agreements signed but it was unfair because some of us are not in control of 
the processes that led to this as we take instructions from our bosses…some board members do not have 
details of the deals”. (Mutsaka et al, 2013) 
Not only was there disharmony at the government level, but also within the ministry of 
indigenization itself as some were kept in the dark regarding the negotiations of the 
indigenization deals. Such disharmony and secrecy bring to question the nature of the ruling 
elite and state power in Zimbabwe. It seems from the evidence presented here that the ruling 
class rank is fraught with divisions and factions such that state power becomes fragmented 
rendering state action and policy incoherent. While the state’s indigenization policy was 
undermined by chronic lack of financial resources, it was effectively rendered a non-starter by 
the apparent lack of a unity of purpose. 
 
The failure to effect change in the platinum sector and get rid of the existing oligopoly is an 
indictment on the competence of the state itself. This outcome points to the problem of 
Zimbabwe’s underdeveloped state in terms of the quality of its bureaucracy, its social relations, 
ideological clarity and its financial capacity to pursue the indigenization policy successfully at 
least in the platinum sector (See Evans, 1995). The relevant state institutions like the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe and the executive arm of the government were not in sync regarding the 
implementation of the government’s flagship policy. Hence the president’s later criticism of 
the indigenization deals that were supposed to set the tone for indigenization as having been a 
big mistake. The discord at the highest levels of the state gives the impression that the ruling 
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elite in Zimbabwe still lacks coherence which is a result of the lack of leadership. The state has 
not evolved institutional collectivism to encourage the pursuit of collective institutional goals 
on the part of the state officials. Hence after almost two decades of trying to indigenize the 
platinum sector, the state seems to have been fighting a losing battle. 
 
The failure of the government to implement the indigenization policy as demonstrated in the 
platinum sector may also be attributed to the strengths of the transnational bourgeoisie that 
controls the big mining firms. Endowed with significant financial and technological resources 
the MNCs were in a position to effectively resist the change of a status quo in which they held 
immense advantages (See Wallerstein, 1974). Using their resources, the big mining firms may 
capture various facets of state apparatus and thus amass sufficient state power at its disposal to 
resist indigenization advances (Miliband, 1969). In Zimbabwe, it is not unheard of that state 
officials receive or demand bribes in exchange for favours. In an interview with Mr Moyo who 
is an official in the Indigenization Ministry in Bulawayo, the interviewee admitted that “they 
could not monitor or let alone enforce compliance with the indigenization law from big mining 
companies because of the protection they got from the political principals. I cannot just go to 
mine X and say that I am fining you because you did not comply with the indigenization law. 
I do not have the powers to do that. That is for people at the top who give us instructions”.24 If 
this account is anything to go by, it seems the state and the big capital were in a secretive 
cordial relationship. It points to Mandaza (1986)’s theory of the schizophrenic state in which 
the state identifies with the public when making public utterances but identifies with the big 
capital in action or lack of it. Bradbury and Worby (1985) also noted how the post-colonial 
state had gone into bed with the big mining capitalists in the early post-independence era. 
 
Moreover, there are two aspects of the world-system theory as articulated by Immanuel 
Wallerstein that are reflected in the way Zimbabwe went about trying to indigenize the 
platinum giants. Firstly, Zimbabwe exhibits the classic characteristics of a peripheral area 
which include a weak and neo-colonial state which does not have the capacity to make 
independent decisions (Wallerstein, 1976). Secondly, typical of peripheral areas in the world-
system, Zimbabwe has a minuscule capital market which proved insufficient to support the 
                                                          
24 Interview with Mr Moyo (an official in the Ministry of Indigenization responsible for processing indigenization 
plans) in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe on the 8th of February 2018. 
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emergence of local investors hence the failure of the indigenous people to take over the mining 
companies (Martinez, 2001). Amin (1981) and Nkrumah (1965) contended that the neo-
colonial system was exclusively focused on the exploitation of resources and accumulation of 
capital which was invested not in former colonies but in the industrialized world. Thus, the 
outcomes of the indigenization policy strongly reflect the realities of the world-system which 
placed heavy odds against the success of the policy. 
5.5 The de-indigenization of an asbestos giant: The case of Shabanie Mashava Mine 
(SMM) Saga 
 
The story of Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy in the mining sector cannot be complete without 
any mention of the Shabanie Mashava Mine (SMM) saga. The details of the story bring a new 
perspective to the GoZ’s indigenization policy. SMM consists of two asbestos mines – 
Shabanie Mine and Gaths Mine established in 1917 and 1914 respectively and other industrial 
assets owned by a British company T & N plc (Parliament of Zimbabwe Hansard, 12 April 
2017). The company employed over 5000 people and was the world’s third largest asbestos 
producer contributing millions of dollars to the country’s GDP (Peta, 2005). In 1996 an 
indigenous Zimbabwean businessman Mutumwa Mawere through his investment company, 
Africa Resources Limited (ARL), acquired SMM Zimbabwe from T&N for US$60 million in 
a first major transaction involving a black person in the mining sector (Peta, 2005; News Day, 
15 November 2010; Parliament of Zimbabwe Hansard, 12 April 2017). According to Mutumwa 
Mawere’s website (http://www.mmawere.com/about.php) he entered into a partnership with 
South Africa’s Investec Bank Limited to “structure and mobilize financing for a mining private 
equity fund”. This acquisition happened at a time when the GoZ was pursuing indigenization 
policy in the mining sector and had set up an indigenization portfolio in the president’s office 
(Msipa, 2015). Mawere later grew his business empire spreading his investments to 
telecommunications, banking and warehousing. Under his ownership, the company employed 
over 19000 people and was valued at US$300 million. 
 
However, in a controversial move in 2004, the GoZ decided to nationalize Mawere’s assets 
using the controversial Reconstruction of State-Indebted and Insolvent Companies Act 
(RSIIC). The law enables the government to take over any company they deem insolvent 
(Chakanyuka and Mswazie, 2013). Then Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, told parliament 
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that Mawere had used a government guarantee to acquire the company which he was failing to 
pay back hence the government takeover. However, Mawere dismissed the minister’s claims 
that he used a government guarantee. Speaking to the media Mawere was quoted as saying 
“The truth is that the acquisition financing was secured by pledging SMM shares to T & N. 
The vendor was the lender. It was a sale and purchase agreement. There was no government 
guarantee and no security. The only security pledged were the shares in the two companies.” 
(News Day, 15 November 2010). According to Peta (2005), when Mawere’s business was 
seized in 2004, it was neither insolvent nor indebted to the state. Instead the takeover seemed 
to be a vindictive move by Zanu-PF on Mawere. In 2003 Mawere turned down an unsolicited 
nomination by Zanu-PF’s Masvingo province for the secretary of economic affairs. Mawere 
declined the post saying that he was not a member of Zanu-PF. Reports say that then president 
and leader of Zanu-PF Robert Mugabe was incensed by Mawere’s refusal of Zanu-PF 
membership and decided to revenge by seizing his companies (Peta, 2005). However, the mines 
literally collapsed in 2008 just four years after the government seizure. The crisis that beset the 
company saw workers earning a measly $50 a month (Machamire, 2017). Zvishavane Member 
of Parliament John Holder told parliament that the SMM had been turned into universities as 
the mines look for money to stay afloat (Parliament of Zimbabwe Hansard, 12 April 2017).  
 
In the midst of this takeover, what is more striking is the irony of a government that had 
portrayed itself as the champion of indigenous empowerment undermining one of the most 
successful cases of indigenization in the mining sector. Magure (2012: 69) argues that the way 
the Zanu-PF government treated Mawere is not surprising in view of the party’s fear of an 
independent African business class that may develop into a competing center of power. The 
party only tolerates political business people who toe the party line. Zanu-PF adopted a 
vindictive stance towards Mawere likely because he had tried to evade its patronage by turning 
down a nomination for a post in the party (See also Raftopolous and Compagnon, 2003; 
Mufema, 1998). The Shabanie Mine saga also vindicates Magure (2014)’s assertion that the 
indigenization and economic empowerment was less a genuine policy of economic 
transformation and more of an electioneering gimmick designed to keep Zanu-PF in power. 
Indigeneity, in the context of the indigenization policy, seems to have been premised on one’s 




5.6 Indigenization in the Gold Sector: A Not So Golden Record 
 
5.6.1 The indigenization experiences of Metallon Gold Corporation 
 
The gold sector has also had its own fair share of the indigenization experiences in the past 
resembling the drama of the PGMs sector. Perhaps the most prominent indigenization saga, 
among a number of others has been that of Metallon Gold (hitherto known as Independence 
Gold Mine), one of the biggest mining companies in Zimbabwe and the biggest in the gold 
sector. Metallon Gold Zimbabwe was formed when Mzi Khumalo, the poster-child of South 
Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) acquired Independence Mines from the 
British-based company, Lonmin in 2002 at a cost US$15 million (Ryan, 2006). Metallon runs 
five mines in Zimbabwe which include Arcturus, How Mine, Mazowe, Shamva and Redwing. 
At the time Metallon acquired the Independent Mines, it was the largest gold producer in 
Zimbabwe raking in 25% of the country’s export earnings (Peta, 2006). The purchase of the 
mines took place at a time the government was pushing for increased local ownership of the 
mining sector. In compliance with the Zimbabwe government’s directive for the indigenization 
of foreign owned companies, Metallon offered 30% stake to an indigenous entity, Manyame 
Consortium which was led by Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in June 2003. The consortium was 
led by well-known businessmen among them John Mukushi, Mthuli Ncube (now Finance 
Minister) and Albert Nhau. Mkushi was later appointed the chairman of Independence Mines 
by virtue of Manyame’s 30% stake (Ryan, 2006; Goko, 2005). Mthuli Ncube was a former NIT 
chairperson and Barbican bank chief executive who had twice made a bid for a stake in 
Zimplats, hitting a brick wall in both cases. According to the details of the particular deal, 
Manyame paid $1 million cash for the shares while the balance was going to be covered by 
dividends through vendor financing. So out of the asking price of $9 million, Manyame 
Consortium had only $1 million in hand (See Goko, 2005). 
 
Related to this transaction was a court case involving Stanmarker, a locally owned mining 
company, and Metallon which threatened to dampen the mining sector’s first apparently 
successful indigenization case. Upon the incorporation of Manyame into Metallon, it later 
turned out that the latter had reneged on the initial agreement it had entered into with 
Stanmarker committing to hand it the empowerment quota in Independent Mines (See Goko, 
2004). Having been sidelined in the final empowerment deal, Stanmarker protested that it was 
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unfairly treated and dragged Metallon to court claiming the latter had breached several legally 
binding aspects of their agreement made in June 2002 pending Metallon’s acquisition of 
Independence Mines. The acquisition was intended to be done through a company known as 
Newco that was to be incorporated in Zimbabwe (Stanmarker Pvt Ltd vs Metallon Corporation 
Ltd [2004] ZWSC 117). The agreement was designed as a Heads of Agreement in which 
several clauses were deemed to be legally binding. One of the legally enforceable clauses of 
the agreement stated that: 
 “From the signature date and for a period of three months thereafter, neither party shall, without the prior 
written consent of the other party, engage in or enter into discussions with any other party with an interest 
in acquiring the share capital or business of Independence or its immediate holding company and/or engage 
in or enter into discussions with any other party desirous of achieving similar objectives than, or competing 
with, Newco.” (Stanmarker Pvt Ltd vs Metallon Corporation Ltd [2004] ZWSC 117)  
 
However, Metallon breached the agreement by negotiating with Lonmin for the sale of 
Cableair, Independence’s holding company, without consulting Stanmarker. The agreement 
had been that Metallon and Stanmarker were going to acquire Independence Mining jointly 
which would see Metallon getting 60% and Stanmarker getting 40% (Stanmarker Pvt Ltd vs 
Metallon Corporation Ltd [2004] ZWSC 117). Metallon was going to provide the funds for the 
acquisition. Stanmarker was tasked with seeking the blessings of the government in accordance 
with the government’s indigenization requirements (Goko, 2004; Ryan, 2006). Stanmarker 
subsequently instituted a civil action against Metallon but the High Court was powerless to 
issue a judgment against the company since it was not yet established in Zimbabwe. In the end, 
Metallon went on to partner with Manyame Consortium and Stanmarker lost out. It seems from 
the details of the agreement that Stanmarker was being used to legitimise the foreign venture 
and act as a front. For renting legitimacy to Metallon it would then acquire 40% shares in the 
new company. Little wonder that it was peeped to the deal by Manyame who had cash in hand 
and were willing to earn the shares. 
  
The empowerment deal between Manyame and Metallon was however short-lived as in June 
2005, just two years after the deal was put in place, there came the announcement that 
Manyame had lost its stake in the company. This was triggered by Mzi Khumalo’s decision to 
list the shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in 2005. Despite the fact that the 
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public listing of the company would upset the government’s indigenization quota about it, 
government officials from the responsible ministry failed to take action against Khumalo (See 
Goko, 2005). Khumalo’s meeting with the Minister of Mines prior to the listing raised 
suspicions of bribery or underhand dealings to ensure the ministry’s support or at best inaction. 
The Manyame Consortium was also vulnerable at that time as they needed money to pay back 
the US$1 million loan they had secured from Barbican bank when they made a deposit for the 
30% stake in 2003. The loan had since gained a US$300 000 interest thus piling more pressure 
on the indigenous outfit. Being the businessman that he is, Khumalo pounced on the 
opportunity to offer a US$3million buyback proposal for Manyame rather than lending them 
some money to secure their shareholding. It is not clear how Manyame finally lost the stake in 
the company but it seems they were bought out. In an interview years later in 2014 Mr Zenzo 
Nsimbi, Metallon’s corporate affairs secretary was quoted as saying “We are 100 percent 
owned by Mzi Khumalo” (Machivenyika, 2014). Ironically, the secretary confirmed this at the 
height of the government’s indigenization crusade in which foreign owned mining companies 
were under pressure to cede at least 51% of the shares to indigenous partners as stated by the 
law. Here was another indigenization deal collapsing spectacularly due mainly to the lack of 
capital and the government seemingly could not lift a finger to help maintain black 
representation in one of the biggest mines in the country.  
 
The shortage of capital seems to have been the undoing of the indigenization deals and the 
government was not learning anything from the past failures. Moreover, the failure of the 
Metallon Gold indigenization deals was also a result of lack of effective legislation to back the 
requirement for black representation. Companies could enter into deals with local investors the 
terms of which could not be legally enforced and thus remained vulnerable as evidenced by 
Manyame Consortium which eventually lost its 30% stake in Metallon. Further, the lack of 
unity within the indigenous business class and most importantly between the latter and the 
ruling class did not help matters. Organizations like the Affirmative Action Group (AAG) and 
the Indigenous Business Development Center (IBDC) which were purportedly formed to fight 
for increased representation of indigenous people in the economy were conspicuous by their 
silence. Evans (1995) showed that countries like South Korea, Brazil and India successfully 
indigenized their information technology industries which were dominated by foreign capital 
largely because of the unity of purpose between the local business class and the State. Such 
unity of purpose behind a common goal transcending the interests of the local bourgeoisie and 
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the ruling class was clearly lacking in Zimbabwe. This was a major weakness that foreign 
capitalists exploited to shield themselves from a policy they viewed as undermining their 
interests. This reflects the absence of a strong state in the peripheral areas as observed by 
Wallerstein (1974). Moreover, again in this case as happened in the platinum industry, there 
were no local investors with sufficient capital to take over such a giant gold producer, 
confirming once more Zimbabwe’s status as a peripheral member of the capitalist world-
system. 
 
5.6.2 Freda Rebecca: Another missed opportunity 
 
Freda Rebecca gold mine is one of the biggest mines in the country located in Bindura town, 
Mashonaland East province, about 90km from Harare. It is only second to Metallon Gold 
Zimbabwe in terms of gold production. It is also one of the oldest mines in the country. Mining 
exploration started there in 1912 when Zimbabwe was still under the rule of the British South 
Africa Company, however, the mine only started producing gold in 1988. Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation acquired the mine from Cluff Gold, a London-based mining conglomerate, in 1996 
(Institute of Developing Economies, n.d.). In 2004 AngloGold Ashanti sold its entire gold 
assets to Mwana Africa Holdings. Mwana Africa Holdings, a South African private company 
that was formed by Kaala Mpinga in 2003 went on to acquire the Bindura Nickel Corporation 
in 2003 and Freda Rebecca Gold in 2005. Mwana Africa acquired 100% shareholding at the 
mine but signed an agreement obliging it to sell 15% stake to an indigenous partner. In 2012 
the company announced that it had sold 15% shares to Mr Kenneth Musanhu, a prominent 
businessman and a Zanu-PF legislator for Bindura who was also a long-time board member at 
the company. The 15% would cost Mr Musanhu US$405 000 (See The Zimbabwe Independent, 
17 July 2012; Moyo, 2017). The then Chief Executive said the completion of the deal was 
conditional on approval from South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC).  
 
However, 2015 saw a restructuring of the company during which a new Chinese-dominated 
leadership took control after ousting Kalaa Mpinga who had overseen Freda Rebecca’s 
indigenization deal. The China International Mining Group Company (CIMGC) that had made 
a $21 million investment in Mwana Africa in 2012 to get a 21% stake and its associate Mr Ning 
who owned a 7.6% stake became the major shareholders with a combined stake of 29%. Mr 
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Ning became the new Chief Executive replacing Kalaa Mpinga who had been ousted at an 
Extraordinary General Meeting in London in 2015. The company changed its name to ASA 
Group Resources (plc) a few months after the change of leadership. In 2017 it was revealed 
that at the time of his ousting Kalaa Mpinga was in the process of negotiating an indigenization 
deal with a local consortium, Zindico, led by one Ian Chikanza, a United Kingdom-based 
medical doctor with extensive business interests. The ousted founder member of the company 
had led negotiations arranging an empowerment deal with the consortium in accordance with 
the country’s indigenization laws that would see indigenous entities owning the majority shares 
in Freda Rebecca. However, the new Chief Executive, Mr Ning, ignored the Zindico-Mwana 
Africa agreement on the grounds that the agreement was not approved by the company’s board 
of directors (Ibid).  
 
The local consortium then filed court papers citing ASA Resources (previously Mwana Africa) 
as respondents in February 2017 for reneging on an empowerment deal it signed with the 
previous company directors in 2011 entitling it to a 26% stake in Freda Rebecca priced at 
US$26 million (The Herald Zimbabwe, 26 January 2017). The former Chief Executive, Kaala 
Mpinga, was quoted in The Herald Zimbawe, as saying: “I have read and understood the 
founding affidavit of the Applicant (Zindico) in this matter and I associate myself with the 
contents therein…. Mr (Kenneth) Musanhi worked with me in the identification of an 
indigenous partner(s) and subsequent discussion with Dr Chikanza and his consortium (the 
Applicant) to purchase 26 percent equity in the 4th respondent as required by the laws of 
Zimbabwe” (Moyo, 2017). The purchase and sale of shares was drafted by a South African 
lawyer who subsequently handed in an affidavit corroborating the Zindico representative, Mr 
Chikanza’s narrative. However, the agreement was not signed. Internal corporate politics got 
in the way of indigenizing one of the biggest gold mines in the country without the government 
taking any action to ensure the indigenization law was followed. A powerful mining MNC 
openly stood in contempt of the country’s law seemingly with impunity. 
  
It was not only Zindico, that was left hanging, Mr Musanhu who had bought a 15% stake in 
the company under an empowerment deal in 2012 was also querying the treatment which he 
was receiving from the new directors. In October 2017 he applied to sue Freda Rebecca and 
ASA Resources over their decision to dispose of company shares neglecting in the process the 
162 
 
pre-emptive rights of minority shareholders (Munyoro and Mhundwa, 2017). This set of rights 
commits the owners of the company to give preference to common stockholders which allows 
them to purchase issued stock on a proportional basis to maintain their percentage of the shares. 
In this case, Freda Rebecca was disposing its shares through its listed shareholder, ASA 
Resources without regard to the Articles of Association. ASA Resources, owned 85% of the 
stock in Freda Rebecca. Musanhu and his Suncraft Enterprises were concerned that the disposal 
of the shares would affect their percentage shareholding in the company. Such developments 
were a blatant undermining of the spirit and intentions of the indigenization programme. The 
standing of an indigenous partner in the gold mine was being threatened while another potential 
indigenous partner was blocked from acquiring a stake in the company. 
  
This case reveals and reflects certain complexities and dynamics that underpinned the 
indigenization process in Zimbabwe’s mining sector. The government of Zimbabwe’s apparent 
inability to enforce the indigenization law can be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, the 
Freda Rebecca indigenization case reflected Zimbabwe’s awkward position in the international 
politics. Zimbabwe was caught in a terrible dilemma between its foreign and domestic policies 
– creating new foreign allies and drumming up domestic support. The case unfolded at a time 
when the government of Zimbabwe was trying to cultivate closer relations with China as a key 
ally under the so-called ‘Look East’ policy after it had been isolated by the West since the turn 
of the twenty-first century (Youde, 2007). This might have undermined the State’s ability to 
act against the interests of a multinational company (ASA Resources) in which a Chinese entity 
was a major stakeholder. Secondly, the explanation can be located within the nature of state 
power and class dynamics in local politics. In the absence of any significant national indigenous 
bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe, the state bourgeoisie monopolized political power which they used 
to establish almost total control of the state apparatus. It served the interests of the state 
bourgeoisie to subordinate the objectives of the indigenization policy to good relations with 
the Chinese who had sufficient capital to invest in the large-scale mines and also pay kickbacks 
to the political elite. A policy crafted as a platform for local empowerment and decolonization 
soon became the pivot to China. This case also underscored the scarcity of domestic 
entrepreneurs with sufficient capital to take over the mines hence the continued dominance of 
foreign players. Moreover, having a ruling party member as an indigenous partner in Freda 
Rebecca gold mine smacks of patronage and the use of the indigenization policy for the 
retention and reproduction of the ruling class’ political power. 
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5.6.3 RioZim: Yet Another Flop 
 
RioZim is one of the country’s mining giants with interests in gold, coal, copper and nickel in 
which the indigenization policy requirements have been contemptuously disregarded. RioZim 
was formed in 1956 as RioTinto Southern Rhodesia Limited whose sights were set on getting 
the Empress Nickel Mine up and running, the company’s first venture outside Europe. RioZim 
was weaned from RioTinto in 2004 becoming a wholly Zimbabwean owned company listed 
on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) (See RioZim website). Since its existence as an 
independent venture, RioZim has not had it easy. Mismanagement and a difficult economic 
environment saw it accumulate a debt of over US$60 million owed to a number of local banking 
institutions (Chronicle, 18 May 2011; The Herald, 16 September 2011). The company was 
facing pressure from banks and risked its assets being liquidated or placed under judicial 
management. Its share price had tumbled to US50 cents. US$100 million was required to settle 
the company’s debt and also restart its operations. In 2011 RioZim tried to raise capital by 
floating a US$40 million rights issue but this was not successful as its underwriter Essar Global 
withdrew from the deal citing discomfort with the indigenization law. In the same year RioZim 
suffered a US$5 million loss for that financial year (See Nyakayeza, 2015; Muronzi, 2016).  
 
Suddenly in 2012 in its moment of need, RioZim received what was probably to them a 
godsend term sheet25 outlining plans to raise US$6.6 million through the selling of shares to 
Raintree Investments Consortium. Under the agreement, the consortium, which was a 
partnership between Raintree Mining and Global Emerging Markets (GEM) Management 
Limited,26 would get 13 325 000 ordinary shares at US$0.5 each. The new player, going by the 
name GEM amassed a 24% stake of Rio Zim after the transaction was completed. They had 
peeped a group of indigenous Zimbabweans who had partnered with Middle Eastern investors 
to the deal (Herald Zimbabwe, 7 March 2012). Another agreement was made between GEM 
and RioZim soon after for the issuance of convertible debentures27 to GEM valued at US$45 
million. Under the new agreement, it was resolved that Raintree Investments Consortium 
                                                          
25 A term sheet is a document outlining the terms and conditions of a business agreement (Foaley Hoag, 2014). 
26 Raintree Mining is a firm owned by former white commercial farmers who ventured into mining after losing 
their farms during the land reform programme. Global Emerging Markets (GEM) a London-based investments 
group that manages a variety of investment portfolios (Muronzi, 2016). 




would have the right to appoint four directors out of a total of eight to the board. The RioZim 
shareholders voted in favour of the debentures deal at an Extraordinary General Meeting 
(EGM). A new board was formed with Ashton Ndlovu replacing Josh Sachikonye as the Chief 
Executive. GEM leader Harpal Randawa (a prominent UK-based investor) managed to talk the 
banks into easing pressure on RioZim regarding its debt to them. Although Randawa was not 
on the board he seemed to be pulling the strings from behind and had even the CEO try to 
convince the board to pay him a management fee for handling the banks. After a brief resistance 
a management contract was signed in July 2012 (Muronzi, 2016). 
  
Two years after signing the US$45 million debentures agreement, no debentures had been 
issued by GEM yet. To its defence, GEM cited its concern with the indigenization law saying 
if it had paid for the debentures its stake would have gone beyond 24% and combined with Old 
Mutual’s 20%, would have violated the provisions of the law. However, in 2014 GEM 
expressed willingness to underwrite the rights28 issued by the company to raise $10 million 
capital to kick-start one of its mines (Muronzi, 2016). The GEM leader was called out by other 
members of the board on his failure to honour the 2012 debentures agreement. The issue of 
rights coincided with a significant slump in RioZim share price which had fallen to US17 cents. 
GEM managed to get on the board its loyalists after the unprofessional conduct of its leader 
Randhawa had frustrated the old board and executive members and led to a string of 
resignations. The independence of the board was compromised and it seemed Randhawa was 
set to get his way on every major decision. And get his way he did. The US$10 million rights 
issue became a major issue once again when GEM wanted the $2.887 million (management 
fees) it was owed by the company to be counted as part of the underwriting fee (See Daily 
News, 2016). In other words, Gem wanted to trade the management fees it was owed by RioZim 
for more equity. In notifying the shareholders and the board, the rights issue circular tried to 
hide the $2.887 million as money meant to finance funding for the company and other general 
purposes thus misleading the market and the board.  
 
                                                          
28 Right shares are the shares that are issued by a company for its existing shareholders. The existing 
shareholders have their right to subscribe to these shares unless some special rights reserve them for some 
other persons (Pathak and Gupta, 2018: 2) 
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After successfully underwriting the rights issue, Randhawa increased his stake in RioZim to 
44% (Daily News, 14 June 2016). The Gem RioZim Investments increased its stock by 20% 
for a paltry amount of money thus going directly against the objectives of the indigenization 
policy (The Source, 2015). To make matters worse, one of the indigenous shareholders, RioZim 
Foundation that had before, held 11.6% of the stake had its shares diluted29 to 4.2%. Thus, 
instead of indigenization RioZim indigenous partners were being bled of their stake contrary 
to the spirit and letter of the indigenization policy. It is not clear whether these changes in 
shareholding had the blessing of the indigenization ministry. Section 3 of the 2007 
Indigenisation Act states that the government shall ensure that: 
(b) no— (i) merger or restructuring of the shareholding of two or more related or associated 
businesses; or (ii) acquisition by a person of a controlling interest in a business; that requires to be 
notified to the Competition Commission in terms of Part IVA of the Competition Act [Chapter 
14:28] shall be approved unless—  
(iii) fifty-one per centum (or such lesser share as may be temporarily prescribed for the purposes 
of subsection (5)) in the merged or restructured business is held by indigenous Zimbabweans; and  
(iv) the indigenous Zimbabweans referred to in subparagraph (iii) are equitably represented in the 
governing body of the merged or restructured entity; (Indigenisation Act, 2007) 
In this case, the ministry of indigenization failed to uphold the Act it is meant to administer 
and enforce. Even more baffling is the inability of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) to act 
to ensure its rules were followed. According to the RioZim lawyers, there was a 2004 
Shareholders Agreement that Randhawa completely ignored in his acquisition of the stake 
despite being briefed about it (Daily News, 14 June 2016). Moreover, the ZSE guidelines 
stipulate that related party transactions were to be preceded by an Extraordinary General 
Meeting (EGM) in which shareholders agree to sell shares to a related party. No such EGM 
was held, instead the shareholders were not even furnished with the relevant information. 
  
In another related case, the sale by RioTinto of its assets in Sengwa Colliery and Murowa 
Diamonds was a blatant disregard and violation of Zimbabwe’s indigenization law. In 2004 
RioTinto sold its 78% stake in Murowa Diamonds and 50% in Sengwa Colliery to RioZim 
before it left the country. RioZim had owned the 22% in Murowa Diamonds and 50% in 
                                                          
29 Shares or stock dilution means a reduction or a decline in shareholders’ ownership in a company in the event 
of the company issuing new shares. (Ibid) 
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Sengwa Colliery before the sale (Muronzi, 2016). From the looks of it, the sale of the stake 
was apparently consistent with the requirements of the indigenization law30 since RioZim was 
a wholly owned Zimbabwean company (Mataranyika, 2016). However, as it turned out, the 
companies were instead sold to RZ Murowa Diamonds, a company registered in Mauritius 
owned by non-other than Harpal Randhawa the owner of GEM RioZim Investments. It was 
also surprising that Murowa Diamonds, which at the time produced more than 40 000 carats 
per month with a value of over US$6 million, could be sold for as low a value as US$19 million. 
With a capital injection of US$3 million, the mine could have easily increased its productivity 
to 100 000 carats per month thus generating over US$15 million per month (See Kachembere, 
2016). It was mind-numbing how such a valuable asset could be sold for a paltry amount of 
money to an offshore company that did not have to pay tax to the government. At the height of 
the indigenization programme, the shares and control of valuable mining companies were 
exchanging hands between agents of foreign capital. The State once again proved incompetent 
to implement and enforce the terms of the Indigenization Act which were so blatantly being 
violated. Quizzed about the issue, the then Deputy Minister of Mines said his department was 
“still investigating to verify the manner in which the shares changed hands outside the country” 
(Mataranyika, 2016). 
 
Moreover, RioTinto was also accused of disregarding the 2004 shareholder agreement which 
gave pre-emptive rights to minority shareholders should there be any sale. However, RioZim, 
now firmly under the control of Randhawa, the beneficiary of the sale, argued that the 
company’s board of directors waived the shareholders’ pre-emptive rights and everything was 
done above board (See Kachembere, 2016). The then RioZim chairman Lovemore Chihota 
argued that the decision to waive their pre-emptive rights was informed by the financial 
challenges facing the company as they could not source the required finance to acquire the 
stock. Then Deputy Minister of Mines, Fred Moyo told the parliament that his ministry was 
investigating the sale of the two mining enterprises (Mataranyika, 2016). This is an example 
that had since become the rule, in which foreign companies continue to flout the indigenization 
rules seemingly with impunity. It seems even the State lacks the capacity to enforce its own 
rules and policies. According to the Indigenization Act the Minister has every right to inquire 
                                                          
30 Indigenisation law stipulated that any restructuring of the shareholding in any entity should abide by the 51% 
indigenous equity ownership. 
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about the shareholding structure of any company for the purposes of compliance with 
indigenization rules.  
 
However, despite being briefed about the goings-on before the sale as explained by the RioZim 
chairman, Chihota, the authorities failed to stop the sale of shares that went to a foreign entity 
for a song. The merry-go-round scenario that characterised the exchange of shares in RioZim 
brought to light the impractical nature of the Indigenization Act pointedly criticized by 
Matyszack (2014) in a takedown worth quoting at length when he wrote: 
Potential problems are also evident in the case of large public companies. These companies may have 
millions of issued shares distributed over thousands of shareholders. Determining the race of each of these 
shareholders is a daunting task. In the case of a public company, the shareholding is subject to constant 
change through trade on the stock exchange. Accordingly, the extent of “indigenization” of the 51% could 
be in a state of constant flux depending upon who is purchasing the shares. To avoid this, there would have 
to be legislation requiring that the race group of each purchaser and seller of shares is disclosed, and if the 
51% is to be retained once reached, a prohibition on the transfer of shares to a person of a particular race 
once a certain threshold is reached. This would require a separate, racially determined index of 
shareholdings to be maintained at the stock exchange or racially segregated bourses – something which the 
line Ministry claimed was under serious consideration. (Matyszak, 2014:3-4) 
Thus, the law itself was poorly drafted making it notoriously difficult to implement, even more 
so for a chronically incapacitated State. Just ensuring that there is balance of shareholding 
(which is very dynamic as shares are exchanged all the time) in over 1000 companies is an 
unbearably arduous task. In an interview with officials from the NIEEB Compliance Division, 
which is responsible for monitoring compliance with the indigenization regulations, one 
official (henceforth I-4) bemoaned the lack of capacity: 
The problem is that we don’t have enough and adequate resources to effectively monitor compliance. For 
example, in the department we don’t even have a car making travelling difficult. Also, the department only 
has three staff members, to effectively discharge our duties we need at least forty people. (Interview with 
I-4 in Harare Zimbabwe, 24 January 2018) 
 
The violation of the indigenization law, in all cases without consequence, sets a very bad 
precedent giving foreign companies the confidence to disregard the laws. This has not been 
helped by the fact that some of the top government officials who have a lion’s share of the 
responsibility to implement the Act are of questionable integrity. One such official was the 
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former Minister of Mines, Obert Mpofu of Zanu-PF who was accused of taking and demanding 
millions of dollars in bribes from prospective investors31. He also displayed his disinterest 
bordering on contempt for indigenization when he was quoted as saying “What worries me 
most is that whoever speaks loudest about mining has not contributed a penny to the mining 
sector, as they have done with the rest of the economy” (News Day, 28 July 2012). He was 
responding to complaints that the mining sector had been short-changing the government in 
terms of the revenue from the mineral sales which was way below expectations. Then Minister 
of Youth and Indigenization, Saviour Kasukuwere32 in charge of implementing the 
indigenization policy also did not have a stellar record in good governance and upholding the 
rule of law. With such ministers of questionable integrity in charge of the policy, little wonder 
then that the Act, at least in the mining sector, suffered the opprobrium of being honoured in 
the breach for much of its existence. 
 
5.6.4 Duration Gold Zimbabwe: Intersection of Race and Indigenization 
 
There is also the curious story of Duration Gold Zimbabwe, a subsidiary of US-based 
investment manager, Clarity Capital, which owns Vubachikwe mine in Gwanda, Athens mine 
in Mvuma and Gaika Mine in Kwekwe. It acquired the mines in 2006 apparently from white-
owned Zimbabwean firm Forbes and Thompsons (Interview with I-5 who is a staff-member, 
23 September 2017). This transfer of ownership to foreign investors was against the 
indigenization policy of the government which, though not backed by legislation at the time, 
was taken seriously enough to be managed directly under the office of the President (Msipa, 
2015). One of their mines, Vubachikwe in Gwanda refused to join the Community Share 
Ownership Trust to which they were supposed to issue 10 percent equity of the company. The 
owners of the company apparently refused to comply with the indigenization law citing that 
they already had white Zimbabweans as major shareholders. The Minister of Indigenization is 
                                                          
31 Mpofu is a phenomenally wealthy politician with properties all over Matabeleland areas in the western parts 
of the country. It is believed much of his wealth was acquired while he was still in charge of the Mines portfolio 
in the cabinet. Recently, a prominent businessman, Lovemore Kurotwi, approached President Mnangagwa 
demanding the arrest of Mpofu saying he presided over the loss of his diamond investment after he refused to 
pay him a $10 million bribe. (Sibanda, 2018) 
32 Saviour Kasukuwere is also a fantastically rich Zanu-PF politician with a number of business interests across 
the country. He is known for his extravagant mansion in Harare and presiding over dummy checks presented by 
diamond mining companies for community trusts. He has been accused by prominent businessman, Philip 
Chiyangwa of demanding $5 million bribe when he was in charge of the Local government portfolio in the 
cabinet. (See Phiri, 2017) 
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reported to have reacted angrily quoted as saying he was “fed up with trying to negotiate with 
the Vubachikwe mine management who seem to think they are still operating in Rhodesia” 
(See Makoshori, 2012). This touches on a crucial and contentious aspect of the indigenization 
law regarding the definition of the indigenous person. It appears that Zimbabwean whites did 
not qualify as indigenous despite having been born in Zimbabwe and possessing full 
citizenship. The indigenization law defines indigenous people as those or descendants of those 
who before 1980 were disadvantaged by the discriminatory laws of the colonial government 
on the basis of the colour of their skin.  
 
Another respondent, (I-6), who leads the National Mineworkers Union of Zimbabwe 
(NMWUZ) who is also a senior employee of Duration Gold lamented this discrimination 
against white Zimbabweans:  
The second thing, is this thing was even threatening indigenous whites because they were whites. So if you 
were white this thing was not considering you as a Zimbabwean but rather as a foreigner. Regardless of 
how long your family has been here, as long as you were white you were not considered indigenous. It’s 
just like how white Zimbabweans lost their farms during the land reform programme. (Interview, Bulawayo 
Zimbabwe, 24 September 2017) 
In his 2015 book In Pursuit of Justice, Cephas Msipa, former governor of Midlands who in 
1995 served as the first Minister of Indigenization and Privatization in the President’s Office 
remarked that they preferred the word “indigenous” to “black” precisely to allay fears of 
racism. However, it is clear that white Zimbabweans are deemed to have benefited directly or 
through their forebears from the colonial system which disqualifies them as indigenous people. 
Matsyzak (2011:2) put it in stark terms arguing that “the proclaimed intention of the 
Regulations is that all foreign-owned businesses and all businesses owned by white 
Zimbabweans or permanent residents valued at a prescribed amount cede a controlling 51% 
share to black Zimbabweans”. Logically, young white Zimbabweans who were born after the 
1980 cut-off date would not qualify as indigenous persons and if they happen to own mines, 
they would be targeted for indigenization as were the owners of the Vubachikwe gold mine. 
This makes it difficult for the indigenization policy to survive charges, as has already been 





Duration Gold submitted its indigenization plans in 2013 and got approval from the Minister 
in that same year (Makoshori, 2013). However, by 2017 they had not set up or joined any 
existing community trust or an employee trust as is required by the indigenization law. 
According to the leaders of the Gwanda CSOT in an interview done in 2017, Vubachikwe was 
one of the companies that was not contributing any funds to the trust even though it fell under 
the Gwanda District (Interview with GCSOT official I-7, 17 September 2017). Only Blanket 
Mine and Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC) had complied with the indigenization law in terms 
of funding the CSOT. As far as the Employee Share Ownership Trust of the indigenization law 
which required the qualifying businesses to cede shares to their employees in order to give 
them a voice in the company, Vubachikwe did not have one, nor any other mining company. 
I-6 seemed to defend the company saying that the indigenization policy would fail because the 
owners of the mines realized that:  
“…the new shareholders were not bringing anything from indigenization. It was good on paper but there 
were no indigenous guys who were willing to pay for that 51%. They just wanted shares because they are 
Zimbabweans”. (I-6, Bulawayo Zimbabwe, 24 September 2017) 
Such sentiments touch on the issue and questions of entitlement and property, an issue central 
to the indigenization policy and how it is implemented. It appears that the intended 
beneficiaries of the indigenization policy feel entitled to own shares in mines by virtue of their 
descent and not investment in the form of capital. That is, foreigners and white citizens can 
only secure property rights on mineral resources through investing capital, and even then, they 
cannot exceed 49%. It is important to note that the interviewee used the word “willing” as 
opposed to “able” in making the point that intended beneficiaries were not willing to pay for 
the 51%. This implies that some people who might have the capital to buy the shares are taking 
advantage of the inbuilt sense of entitlement in the indigenization law to secure a “free lunch” 
as it were. In most cases, these people happen to be politicians or their proxies who may be 
trying to manipulate the laws or interpret the law in a way that facilitates primitive 
accumulation33.  
 
In an inquiry by the Parliamentary Committee on Youth, Indigenization and Economic 
Empowerment, the Duration Gold Director Raymond Smithwick accused the then Deputy 
Minister of Mines, Fred Moyo and the Zanu-PF Member of Parliament in Gwanda Central of 




pulling strings behind the scenes to scuttle company operations so that they take over when it 
fails (Herald Zimbabwe, 11 March 2016). Such attitudes from the ruling class are consistent 
with Fisk (1989: 136)’s grim observations about the enrichment of the ruling class which is 
“not through production but through some form of plunder”. The ruling Zanu-PF party 
members try to leverage their political power for self-aggrandizement and in the process giving 
bad publicity and cultivating negative perceptions of the indigenization policy. It may seem 
that in practice the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy is really the Indigenous 
Elite “Entitlement” Policy. 
 
5.6.5 Blanket Mine: Busting the Trend 
 
The only apparently successful story in the post-2007 indigenization phase amongst the large-
scale mines in Zimbabwe has been that of Blanket Mine. Blanket Mine is a gold mine located 
in Gwanda District which is the capital of Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland South province that lies 
in south-western parts of the country about 150km south-east of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s 
second largest city. The mine was acquired in 2006 by Caledonia Mining Corporation 
(Canadian firm) from its previous owners Kinross Gold Corporation also based in Canada 
(another case of violation the government’s indigenization policy pre-2007). According to 
Hubert (2016) Blanket Mine is the country’s third single largest gold producer contributing 
about 14% of industrial production and 9% of total production. On February 20, 2012 Blanket 
Mine signed an indigenization deal with the ministry of indigenization committing to 
implement measures to transfer 51% of its equity ownership to indigenous entities including 
CSOT, ESOT, NIEEF and an identified indigenous investor (Sharara, 2012; Herald Zimabwe, 
11 October, 2012). As of 5 September 2012, just months after signing the indigenization 
agreement, Blanket Mine implemented the indigenization process transferring shares to 
indigenous people as follows: 
Table 5.3: Distribution of indigenous shareholding in Blanket Mine 
Recipient Equity % 
Gwanda Community Share Ownership Trust 10% 
Management and Employee Trust 10% 
National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund 16% 
Fremino Investments (Indigenous investors) 15% 
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Source: Caledonia Mining Corporation Plc, http://www.caledoniamining.com.  
 
The value of the transaction, which like other deals was arranged to be financed through 
vendor-finance, was US$30 million.34 Interviews done with the Gwanda CSOT officials and 
the NIEEF officials confirmed that this was indeed the case. In an interview, the Chief 
Executive of the Gwanda CSOT confirmed that Blanket was one of the two qualifying mining 
enterprises to comply with the indigenization regulations and that the Trust has a seat on the 
board of the company. The other compliant company was the cement manufacturer Pretoria 
Portland Cement (PPC) while the defecting companies included Jesse Mines, Vubatshigwe and 
Farvic Mines. About the benefits thus far received by the Trust from Blanket Mine, the CEO 
of the Trust who also sits in the board of the mine had this to say: 
“They have declared dividends, Blanket Mine has declared, PPC has declared though they are not 
consistent. With Blanket Mine the dividend is forfeited to pay back the advanced dividend of 4 million 
dollars that we got from them. They gave us 1 million dollars seed capital. PPC is not consistent, each time 
they declare a dividend they deduct part of the money for the shares. The net that we get from PPC is about 
200 000 dollars per year. BM declares about 700 000 dollars per year but unfortunately until we finish that 
4 million they will continue forfeiting including interest”. (17 September, 2017) 
With dividends of 700 000 dollars per year and assuming the rate remains consistent and 
depending on the interest of the loan it would take 6 to 7 years for the Trust to complete the 
payment for the 10% shares they got from the company. However, the CEO did say that not all 
the money is forfeited as they do receive an agreed portion of the dividends.  
 
In an interview with I-1 of the NIEEB, Blanket Mine emerged as one of the few companies to 
have complied with the indigenization regulations: 
“NIEEF gets dividends which it uses to fund business projects. NIEEF has shareholding in Blanket Mine, 
PPC, RH Tungsten, and a few other companies. The most successful one has been Blanket Mine. 
Remember NIEEF also has to pay for these shares. So since 2012 they have been paying for the shares for 
Blanket Mine. They are almost finalizing the payments to blanket mine. They have been using a certain 
percentage of the dividends (60%) to pay for the shares. The 40% goes to NIEEF for immediate use”. (20 
January, 2018) 
                                                          
34 See www.caledoniamining.com  
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The total value of the indigenization transaction being $30 million and the NIEEF having 
received 16% of the shares, it is possible that they got the shares for an amount in the region 
of $5 million. However, Hubert (2016) notes that since the NIEEF or any of the indigenization 
partners did not pay for the acquisition of shares but instead got loans from the company, they 
would continue to receive an agreed portion of their dividends until they repay their respective 
loans which at 10% interest rate may take a considerably long time. 
  
Table 5.4 (a): Dividends advanced to indigenous partners $000s 
 SHARE 
% 
2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL 
GCSOT 10 - $901 $804 - $1,505 
ESOT 10 - $901 $804 - $1,505 
NIEEF 16 - $1442 $966 - $2,408 
FREMIRO 15 - $1352 $906 - $2,258 
TOTAL 51 $4800 $4596 $3080  $7,676 
 
 Table 5.4 (b): Payments accrued to indigenous partners $000s 
 SHARE% 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL 
GCSOT 10 $3,000 $2,000 - - $5,000 
ESOT 10 - $53 $35 - $88 
NIEEF 16 $1,800 - $285 - $2,085 
FREMIRO 15 - $80 $52 - $132 
TOTAL 51 $4800 $2,133 $372 - $7,035 
Source: Adapted from Hubert, D (2016:16) 
 
The information in the tables 5(a) and (b) above shows the amount of dividends and the 
payments accrued to indigenous partners between 2012, when the indigenization process was 
implemented, and 2016. No dividends were paid in 2012 since the share agreement was only 
completed towards the end of that year. No dividends were paid in 2015 as the company 
invested some money towards the expansion of the mine (Hubert, 2016). About US$4,5 million 
and US$3,08 million in dividends were declared in 2013 and 2014 respectively. The NIEEF 
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got the bulk of the dividends amongst indigenous partners at US$966 000. Fremiro Investments 
was not far off at US$906 000 while the GCSOT and the ESOT got US$804000 apiece. After 
deduction towards loan repayments Fremiro Investments got US$80000 and US$53000 in 
2013 and 2014 respectively thus receiving a total of US$133 000 in dividends payments by 
2015 (Ibid). The GCSOT and NIEEF got initial loans of US$3 million and US$1, 8 million 
respectively in 2012 and the GCSOT got a further US$2 million in 2013 as seed capital to kick-
start community development projects (Ibid). The CEO of the Trust confirmed US$1 million 
of the US$2 million they got in 2013 was a donation which was not going to be repaid. In total, 
US$7 million in payments had been made to indigenous partners by 2016 (Interview, 17 
September, 2018). Unlike NIEEF and the GCSOT, Fremiro Investments and the employee trust 
did not get an advance dividend payment which places them on track to complete payments for 
their shares earlier than the other indigenous partners. 
  
Little is known about Fremiro Investments except that they are a company incorporated in 
Zimbabwe under registration (5560/2011) (See Caledonia Mining Corporation, 2014). The 
shareholders agreement shows that the company is domiciled in Harare and its contact person 
is one July Ndlovu. Ndlovu is a prominent figure in the mining circles in Zimbabwe and was 
the Chairman of Unki Platinum at the center of its indigenization negotiations with the 
government in 2012. He had also worked as the Executive Head of Process in Anglo American 
Platinum, a powerful multinational mining conglomerate in 2001. According to the 
shareholders agreement that Fremiro Investments entered into with Caledonia, it acquired 6, 4 
million ‘A’ class shares out of the 42, 8 million shares available for uptake by indigenous 
partners. According to clause 5.1 of the agreement the shares would cost Fremiro an amount 
of US$11, 008, 536 which “shall be debited to the Loan Account” (2014:3). Clause 5.1.2 states 
that the loan shall be paid in instalments through 80% of the dividends payable to Fremiro. The 
latter would then get the balance of 20% after tax payments have been made. However, clause 
6.2 of the Agreement risks the indigenization process being reversible: 
If the Subscriber (Fremiro) is called upon to advance an amount to the Company (Blanket Mine) in terms 
of clause 6.1 above, and if the Subscriber has declined, or as the case may be, failed to comply with such 
a request in accordance with the provisions of clauses 6.1.1 and advance, CHZ (Caledonia) shall have the 
right to call upon the Subscriber to sell to CHZ such number of shares at par as shall, (own emphasis) 
after be equal to the percentage which the aggregate of loan capital and share capital contributed by CHZ 
to the Company constitutes of the total capital contributed by all shareholders by way of share capital and 




This clause places the indigenous shares in Blanket Mine in danger. The employees and 
community trusts are likely to fall victim to their shares being diluted should they fail to pay to 
advance capital to the company or in the event of the company issuing rights on new shares. 
Even Fremiro Investments itself, which acquired the shares they have through vendor finance 
may have their shares diluted should they fail to avail the capital needed to fund the company. 
It is far from a home-and-dry situation for the indigenous partners in what has so far defied the 
odds as the only successful transfer of majority shares to indigenous partners under the 
Indigenization Act of 2007. 
  
Moreover, the indigenous partners, due to the loans they owe to Blanket Mine have to cede 
management issues to Caledonia and according to clause 8 of the agreement are required to 
vote always in favour of the resolutions taken by the management or else they risk losing their 
stake (Caledonia Mining Corporation, 2014). This undermines the spirit of the indigenization 
programme because the indigenous partners’ power to make important decisions concerning 
production, distribution and investment is seriously curtailed. This too is a confirmation of 
Zimbabwe’s place in the world-system – the lack of capital. The gold sector is dominated by 
MNCs from the developed world who appear to have successfully kept the indigenization 
pressures at bay by holding on to their stranglehold in the sector. Metallon Gold, Freda Rebecca 
and RioZim were restructured in favour of foreign investors’ right at the height of the 
indigenization rhetoric without any consequences. In some cases, like in Rio Zim, the 
restructuring resulted in the dilution of shares held by indigenous entities which was directly 
contrary to the indigenization. The state did not seem to be able to enforce the law against such 
blatant violations of the Indigenization Act. The realities of a weak state and Zimbabwe’s 
position as peripheral member of the world-system starved of capital effectively rendered 
indigenization almost impossible. 
5.7 The Chromium Sector: Indigenization Remains Elusive 
 
The Zimbabwe Smelters and Miners Company (Zimasco), the country’s largest ferrochrome 
producer provides for another interesting case as far as the indigenization policy is concerned. 
The country has the largest metallurgical grade chromite ore (which is above 46%) and has the 
second largest reserves of chromite ore after South Africa (See International Chromium 
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Development Association, 2011). This makes Zimasco one of the country’s premier and most 
valued mining assets. Zimasco started producing chrome way back in 1926 through an offshore 
registered company African Chrome Mines owned by white settlers in the then Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe). It was purchased by US-based Union Carbide in 1962 which embarked upon the 
expansion and modernization of the company’s smeltering and refinery plants to enable it to 
produce high carbon ferrochrome rather than chromite ore. Zimasco was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Union Carbide and became a corporation in 1980. In 1994 Union Carbide 
completed a sale of its assets in Zimbabwe leaving Zimasco under the care of a team of 
experienced managers (See Mail & Guardian, 1997; Latham, 2014). In 1995 Zimasco 
Consolidated Enterprises (ZCE), a company registered in Mauritius, acquired Zimasco 
resulting in the formation of Zimasco Holdings Limited. ZCE was owned by white 
Zimbabweans who were residing outside the country. According to the Mail & Guardian 
(1997), President Mugabe referred to them as “former Rhodesians” while threatening to seize 
the mine if they did not come to the country to negotiate an indigenization deal with the 
government. Again, with the government’s definition of indigenous Zimbabweans 
demonstrated that it did not consider white citizens as indigenous people.  
 
In May 1997, just three years after the Union Carbide sale, former commander of the Zimbabwe 
National Army (ZNA), General Solomon Mujuru sealed a deal which saw him acquire 27% 
equity in Zimasco for Z$40 million. The deal was financed with the help of the locally owned 
Trust Merchant Bank. At the time, the deal was widely considered to be a huge bargain 
especially considering that Zimasco was valued at over Z$1 billion. The Retired General was 
not alone, he was leading a consortium of black businessmen under the name: Nyika 
Investments (See Chikuhwa, 2004). The deal was also part of the company’s intentions to sell 
50% equity to local Zimbabweans. However, the then President Robert Mugabe was left 
seething at what he called a fraudulent indigenization deal that gave one individual a 27% stake. 
The President had preferred that the shares be given to a broad-based group of indigenous 
people. He invited the new owners of the company to come to the country and negotiate an 
indigenization deal with the government failing which the government would seize the 
company. The President also claimed the new owners of the company had got the company 
from Union Carbide for a mere US$45 million, less than half of the US$100 million offer that 




It is understood President Mugabe tasked the National Investment and Empowerment Trust 
(Niet) then chaired by Justice Minister Emerson Mnangagwa (now President) to negotiate the 
indigenization of Zimasco which would see a transfer of 50% equity to indigenous partners. 
The matter was taken to court where the Nyika Consortium sought to have the judiciary stop 
the impending sale of shares to other indigenous Zimbabweans (Nyika Investments v Zimasco 
Holdings and Another [2005] ZWSC 49). General Mujuru and Mnangagwa clashed on this 
matter which marked the beginning of their long term feud. Mujuru eventually got 17% from 
his initial 27% while ZCE retained its majority shareholding as the government seemingly 
failed both to find indigenous partners with sufficient capital and to source the capital itself to 
acquire a 50% stake (IOL News, 2000). This experience with Zimasco reflected the way in 
which the divisions amongst the ruling class had become the major obstacle in the 
indigenization of the mining industry. Firstly, the fact that a whole former army general 
happened to be at the forefront of the race to acquire the shares in Zimasco was hardly a 
coincidence. It smacks of a state-capture by the ruling class exposing the narrow-based 
implementation of the indigenization process as a comprador bourgeoisie project which is a far 
cry from its national project status peddled by the government (See Saunders, 2008; Magure, 
2012). 
  
In 2007, Sinosteel Corporation, which happens to be China’s biggest chrome company 
acquired 92% of Zimasco’s holding company, ZCE but eventually increased its stake to 100% 
fulfilling an initial agreement that it would be allowed to buy the remaining 8% after two years 
(See Bridge, 2007; China Daily, 2007). This just months after the Zimbabwean parliament 
enacted the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Bill into law. However, after the 
Sinosteel takeover, Zimasco faced an increasingly difficult environment not least of which was 
the global financial crisis that dampened global demand for chrome. While the global economy 
together with demand improved in 2009, the global economy took a dip in 2011 thus affecting 
the company once again. Coupled with a difficult economic environment in Zimbabwe, by 
2015 the company had accumulated an unsustainable debt of over US$130 million which 
forced it to suspend operations and to apply to the High Court to be placed under judicial 
management. It was placed under judicial management with Grant Thornton International in 
2016. The new management was tasked with crafting a turnaround strategy that would restore 
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financial and operational viability (Zimbabwe Independent, 24 June 2016). It only came out of 
judicial management in January 2018 when the management restored operational and financial 
stability and mutually agreed on a strategy with the creditors by which Zimasco was going to 
pay its debt (The Herald Zimbabwe, 9 February 2018).  
 
However, in a surprise turnaround, the Zimbabwean government in 2016 demanded that 
Zimasco cede half of its 45900 hectare chrome claims across the country to the government 
which, the latter said, was meant for redistribution to indigenous people (Senkhane, 2016). 
According to reports Zimasco had by the beginning of 2017 ceded over 21 000 of its chrome 
claims to the government in Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central and Midlands provinces. 
The minister of mines stated that as a result of this new step the Zimbabwe Geological Services 
would be given 5000 hectares for future development, 7000 hectares would be given to small 
and medium smelter and beneficiation plants while the remaining 10000 hectares would go to 
small-scale miners (The Financial Gazette, 12 April 2017). Justifying this government action 
the then Mines Minister, Walter Chidhakwa had this to say:  
“The Zimbabwean nationals interested in the chrome industry participated only as tributors to these two 
multinational companies and other small companies that have recently entered the sub sector. In order to 
broaden the indigenisation in the chrome sector and empowering Zimbabwean citizens to create more 
employment, the government directed that 50 percent of the claims held by Zimasco and ZimAlloys must 
be released and made available to other players to ensure wider inclusion of indigenous players in the chrome 
sector,” (Quoted in the Financial Gazette, April 27, 2017)  
 
This is a certainly good move as far as increasing the representation of indigenous people in 
the chrome mining sector is concerned as spelt out in the indigenization policy. However, what 
the government is conspicuously and worryingly silent about, is how the small-scale miners 
will be assisted to make their enterprises profitable and viable. The government should put in 
place mechanisms that support the exploitation, processing and marketing of chrome product 
by the small-scale miners. Failing this, a situation akin to that obtaining in the agricultural 
sector would arise, whereby small-scale miners give up their land or resell it to multinational 
companies because of lack of capital. Small-scale miners were already operating in tributaries 
handed out by Zimasco and ZimAlloys under which they sold their chrome ore to the two 
chrome giants. The small miners constantly complained of exploitation by the two 
multinational companies which paid them US$40 for a tonne of chrome ore (The Sunday Mail 
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Zimbabwe, 12 September 2015). The success of this new arrangement, if it lasts35, is directly 
conditional upon the support of the government because leaving the small and medium scale 
operators to their devices would be a recipe for disaster. Moreover, it is hard to pin down the 
exact motivation behind this sudden somersault by the government which a few years earlier 
had gone to town touting the takeover of Zimasco by China’s Sinosteel.  
 
Why would the government seize the asset of a Chinese company, a country they would bend 
over backwards to propitiate for economic and diplomatic support at a time when the West had 
isolated Zimbabwe? One possible explanation might be that President Mugabe had finally got 
his way regarding the broad-based indigenization he had envisioned for the chrome sector when 
he blocked General Mujuru’s indigenization deal with Zimasco almost two decades earlier. 
Another possible explanation could be that the government assumed this position with a view 
to cultivating support for the ruling party in the scheduled 2018 elections. Parcelling out mining 
claims would give the ruling party something to show the electorate during the elections 
campaign, especially the burgeoning small-scale sector which has become a source of 
livelihood for millions of Zimbabweans. Magure (2014) also showed how Zanu-PF uses 
patronage to dole out resources in order to win elections. In agreement, Alexander and 
McGregor (2013: 758) also note that “control over land and mineral resources has been the 
source of immense political capital for ZANU(PF)”. In other words, it is possible that this is 
nothing more than a patronage scheme aimed at boosting electoral prospects. Further, the 
failure of Zimasco under Sinosteel, which was performing so badly it had to be put under 
judicial management in 2016 only 9 years after it took over the chrome giant, may have been 
another factor. The dismal performance was obviously prejudicing the country of millions of 
dollars in revenue through chrome exports. Perhaps the government reckoned that remodelling 
and restructuring of the exploitation of chrome, in which the small-scale sector controls a 
substantial amount, may give the sector as a whole the resilience and the dynamism to 
withstand economic shocks or hostile economic environment (domestic or international). In an 
interview, an official in the Ministry of Mines (henceforth, I-8) suggested that “the government 
                                                          
35 President Mugabe was ousted through military action in November 2017. At the time of writing, the new 
administration led by his former vice president Emerson Mnangagwa has announced that it will narrow down 
the indigenisation policy to the diamond and platinum sectors. At present, it is not certain whether these new 
indigenisation measures will be maintained or reversed altogether.  
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wanted to expand existing indigenous enterprises and crowd out MNCs by promoting artisanal 
and small scale miners (ASM) through a poly-poly model” (20 September, 2017).  
 
Whatever the motive was, the action would surely go a long way in increasing the 
representation of the indigenous citizens in the sector and if successful, might set a precedent 
to be followed in other sectors. That is, instead of looking for non-existent liquid indigenous 
entrepreneurs ready to invest in mining, preference should be given to readily available small-
scale operators. If properly planned and managed, this does not only improve the viability of 
the mining sector, but also achieves the goals of the indigenization policy. Furthermore, this 
also means a shift or realignment in class alliances to make this move successful. Better 
planning and organization on the part of the small-scale sector and the ruling class would have 
to change its attitude towards the ASM sector which up until now has suffered marginalization 
and criminalization (Speigel, 2009). The government would need to use its political power to 
create a favourable legal and policy environment for the ASM to thrive. This can also be a win-
win or mutually beneficial strategy if the large-scale sector positively engages its ASM 
counterparts to find ways of effectively and efficiently exploiting the mineral resources. 
 
5.7.1 Zim Alloys: Reversal of Indigenization 
 
ZimAlloys is another chromium mining giant whose production, at over 300 000 tonnes 
annually, is only second to Zimasco. The corporation owns over 19000 hectares of mining 
claims spread across various parts of the country which have been verified to possess over 70 
million tonnes of chrome ore. ZimAlloys was owned and controlled by Anglo-American 
Zimbabwe until 2005 when it sold the company to Benscore Investment Consortium 
comprising local businessmen in line with the government’s indigenization programme for a 
sum of Z$90 billion which was then equivalent to US$10 million (Chirara, 2006). Anglo-
American announced the development on its website in June 2005. The consortium included a 
prominent Zimbabwean banker Farai Rwodzi who is a founder member of one of the most 
successful commercial banks in Zimbabwe, the Interfin Merchant Bank of Zimbabwe (See 
NewsDay, 21 June 2012). He was partnered in this venture by one Adam Molai who owned 
and founded Pacific Cigarettes and Savanna Tobacco. At the time Adam Molai was married to 
Sandra Mugabe, former President Mugabe’s niece (See News24, 29 December 2013; Mawson, 
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2016). It is reasonable to surmise that his relations with the president may have positively or 
even decisively pushed Benscore Investments’ bid for the acquisition of stock in ZimAlloys. 
That said, this was one of the few success stories of indigenous citizens taking over a company 
previously owned by a powerful multinational. Though it was short-lived. As it turned out, just 
3 years after the takeover, ZimAlloys was forced to suspend operations in 2008 due to the 
severe political and economic problems in Zimbabwe36 compounded by a crashing global 
economic crisis (Midlands Watch, 2014). It was eventually placed under judicial management 
by the High Court in 2013 due to rising debt and imminent liquidation as the firm was fast 
running out of working capital (Mbiba, 2013).  
 
In yet another reversal of the indigenization process, the company was in January 2018 
acquired by India’s Balasore Alloys controlled by Mittal family. The Indian outfit reportedly 
paid US$16.4 million to buy 70 percent shares from the company’s shareholders while a further 
US$74 million would be injected to pay creditors and also kick-start operations. “The 
acquisition will help Balasore Alloys create synergies and expand its business base to different 
parts of the world” (Mazumdar, 2018). At the time of the acquisition, the government of 
Zimbabwe under the Mugabe administration had demanded that ZimAlloys cede half of its 
claims to the state for redistribution in furtherance of indigenization (Daily News, 4 February 
2017). Former Mines Minister, Walter Chidhakwa, was quoted as saying that ZimAlloys have 
“literally been sitting on the concessions and from their 50-year plans we established they will 
not use the land in the next 100 or 200 years” (Ibid). ZimAlloys met the same fate as that of 
Zimasco where the government spearheaded a redistribution principally earmarked to benefit 
local small-scale operators. 
  
It is not clear whether, as a result of the sudden change of guard in government following the 
removal of Mugabe and the ascension of Emerson Mnangagwa in November 2017, the 
government will hold on to this decision. In an interview in the course of this research, one 
NIEEB official, when quizzed about the future of the indigenization policy, resignedly said 
“We don’t know what will happen two months from now. We are simply waiting for the 
                                                          
36 2008 was the year that Zimbabwe reached the height of its economic crisis made worse by the breakdown of 
its political system. Hyperinflation reached over 200 million percent, companies closed in droves throwing tens 
of thousands on to the streets unemployed. 
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directives from the government”37. However, the new government has been clear that it will 
narrow down the indigenization policy to platinum and diamond sectors. This was announced 
by then Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa in his presentation of the National Budget 
Statement to the Parliament of Zimbabwe at the end of 2017: 
 “Diamonds and platinum are the only sub-sectors designated as extractive. Accordingly, the proposed 
amendments will confine the 51/49 indigenisation threshold to only the two minerals…The 51/49 threshold 
will not apply to the rest of the extractive sector, nor will it apply to the other sectors of the economy, 
which will be open to any investor regardless of nationality”. Government of Zimbabwe (2017:19)  
 
This is a radical climb-down from the wholesale indigenization policy under its predecessor 
administration led by Robert Mugabe, who held firmly to his guns amidst unrelenting criticism 
of the policy as being repellent to investors and altogether counterproductive. Chinamasa’s 
announcements heralds a “new era” underpinned by new President’s favoured “Zimbabwe is 
open for business” mantra. It is interesting to see how the new administration would move to 
follow-up these turnaround announcements with effective changes in legislation to give the so-
called “new era” the force of the law. 
  
Moreover, the ZimAlloys case demonstrates the sheer potency of structural factors like the 
macroeconomic imbalances, weak institutions and the culture of rent-seeking in undoing and 
scuttling indigenization and transformation of the mining sector (See Saunders, 2008). If 
powerful multinationals like Anglo-American, Union Carbide and RioTinto among others felt 
the pinch of a hostile economic environment, it is hardly surprising that poorly resourced local 
investors could not withstand the economic meltdown. Zimbabwe’s currency had become 
worthless, foreign exchange was scarce while inflation was on a runaway spiral (Dugger, 
2008). A few companies had the resources to survive. Many companies were either put on 
judicial management or closed shop altogether. That said, the indigenization policy will remain 
a non-starter and a pipe dream if the government’s economic policy fails to address macro-
economic fundamentals to create an environment in which domestic investors can prosper and 
thrive.  
 
                                                          
37 Interview with I-1, 20 January, 2018. 
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Cox (1987) argued that a world order is always shaped by the hegemony and the values of the 
most powerful country. By insisting on indigeneity being the criteria for property rights in the 
country’s minerals, Zimbabwe was, ill-advisedly perhaps, going against the values embraced 
by the western hegemonic bloc and further isolating itself from the world. Even the Chinese 
and Indian investors, believed to be sympathetic to Zimbabwe, could not be bound by the terms 
of the indigenization law as they acquired ownership of the two chromium giants over and 
above the indigenization quota. One of the officials interviewed in this research (henceforth, I-
9) pointed out that “the Chinese were in charge of removing indigenization. The Chinese bank, 
ExIm, which gives loans to Chinese investments, emphasizes Chinese majority ownership” (19 
September, 2017). Worse still, in the case of Zim Alloys an Indian investor replaced indigenous 
ownership by the Benscore Investments led by Farai Rwodzi (Musiiwa, 2017). The indigenous 
outfit could not cope with the harsh economic environment because it lacked the capital to 
cushion itself (NewsDay, 21 June 2012). The Zimbabwean state simply did not have the 
wherewithal to successfully challenge and undermine the world-capitalist system hence the 
glaring failure of the indigenization policy in the chromium sector in keeping with the outcome 
in other areas. One also wonders whether Zimbabwe’s Look East policy which has seen 
Western investors being replaced by Chinese and Indian investors is not simply replacing one 
exploitative and imbalanced relationship by another. In all indications, the Chinese investors, 
just like the Western MNCs, are also there to exploit Zimbabwe’s resources and accumulate as 
much capital as possible for use and investment in China (See Mlambo, 2019). As such the 
drafting in of Asian investors seems like a submission to the capitalist and neo-colonial world 
system which the indigenization policy was meant to rebel against. 
 
5.8 The Marange Diamonds Saga: A Scandalization of Indigenization 
 
Marange is a district in Zimbabwe’s Manicaland province that lies south of provincial capital 
city of Mutare. It is the district that hosts the group of Chiadzwa villages where the now 
globally (in) famous diamond fields are located, an area of about 21000 square kilometres. A 
relatively unknown and remote part of the country was suddenly thrust onto the global spotlight 
following the discovery of diamond deposits in 2006 (See Zvarivadza, 2015). Upon discovery, 
some experts estimated that the diamond fields had the potential to produce up to 40 million 
carats per year with an annual revenue in the region of US$2 billion (Partnership Africa 
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Canada, 2010). The area was believed to hold 25% of the world’s alluvial diamond (The Africa 
Report, 2014). Exploration activities in the area started in the 1990s when the De Beers mining 
conglomerate from South Africa was granted two Exclusive Prospecting Orders (EPO) to 
conduct exploration for diamonds in the area. 
Figure 5.1: Map of Zimbabwe showing the location of Marange diamonds fields 
Source: Spotlight 
Zimbabwe (2016) 
The orders expired in 
2006 and De Beers exited 
the area paving way for a 
British company: Africa 
Consolidated Resources 
(ACR) which secured an 
EPO to take over the 
search (Makombe, 2017). ACR made a large find in Chiadzwa in June 2006 after just a few 
months of searching following which they declared a find as required by Zimbabwean law. 
However the government rubbished ACR’s claim and declared the diamond fields open to 
everyone ostensibly in the interests of indigenization thus precipitating a deluge of more than 
20000 small-scale and artisanal miners from all over the country (See Human Rights Watch 
Report, 2009). An opposition party MP who was part of parliament’s investigation into the 
matter was quoted as saying “Senior government officials encouraged villagers to pan for 
diamonds and it’s difficult to rule out that they (ministers) benefited from the chaos” (Gandu, 
2007).  
 
According to the Human Rights Watch report of 2009 “the government moved quickly to 
“cancel” ACR’s legal title and rights on the grounds that they had been improperly conferred 
to ACR in the first place” (2009: 13). Despite winning a court case which declared it as the 
legitimate owner of the diamond claims, the ACR was given orders to vacate the area by 
government officials who said that the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) 
had been handed a special grant that awarded it the ownership of the claims (Mail & Guardian, 
2010). Saunders and Nyamunda (2016) point out that the then Deputy Minister of Mines Tinos 
Rusere explicitly encouraged informal miners to pan for diamonds in the area arguing that 
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ACR’s title was not legitimate. This led to an influx of tens of thousands of artisanal miners 
who descended on the diamond fields in search of fortune. The Deputy Minister encouraged 
the artisanal miners to sell their diamonds to the MMCZ agents. The expulsion of ACR from 
the Marange diamonds also reflected the state of relations between Zimbabwe and Britain at 
the time. The two countries were not on talking terms after Britain had led the imposition of 
European Union (EU) sanctions on Zimbabwe following its chaotic land reform programme in 
the early 2000s. Given such a context, it is hardly surprising that a British company was denied 
the chance to exploit what was then described as the world’s biggest alluvial diamonds find 
(The Africa Report, 2014). 
  
However, soon the MMCZ proved to be out of its depth as it had no cash to match the supply 
and the prices they offered were way too low (Interview with I-13, 18 September 2018). This 
prompted the growth of illegal marketing agents who bought the diamonds from artisanal 
miners for a song smuggling it across the borders to various destinations including South 
Africa, Mozambique, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India among others. According to the 
Human Rights Watch (2009) sometimes diamonds were exchanged for such cheap stuff as 
clothes, cellphones and cars. Illegal artisanal mining having spiralled out of control, the 
government decided to bring in ZMDC to officially conduct mining in Marange in 2006. The 
decision to grant the State mining agency, rights over the Marange claims, the government 
explained, was to restore rule of law and order and rein in the proliferation of illegal miners 
and the corresponding growth of the black market which siphoned diamonds out of the country 
almost for nothing. 
 
The ZMDC failed to bring order and stability in the diamond fields because it did not have the 
capacity in terms of capital and technology. The government decided to bring in the police in 
November 2006 under an operation code-named Chikorokoza Chapera (End of Illegal 
Mining). The operation was meant to drive away illegal miners and marketing agents who had 
descended on Chiadzwa in the diamond rush. About 600 police officers were unleashed all 
over the country arresting over 22 000 people involved in illegal mining all over the country. 
About 9000 people were arrested in Marange. The operation lasted two years in Marange 
during which the police committed atrocious human rights abuses including killing, torture, 
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forced labour38 and arbitrary arrests (Sokwanele, 2011). Instead of stopping the illegal flow of 
diamonds the police became the chief perpetrators accumulating obscene amounts of wealth as 
a result. A member of the police interviewed by the Human Rights Watch narrated his 
experiences in Marange as follows: 
During the time I was based in Marange at the end of 2007, together with a colleague we controlled six 
syndicates with a combined total of 102 members. We would grant them access to the fields, and they would 
dig for diamonds while we guarded them and then hand over the diamonds to us to sell, and then we shared 
the proceeds equally, giving 50 percent to each side. My government salary for three months was less than 
US$5, but from the diamond business together with my colleague we made more than US$10,000 in three 
months. (Human Rights Watch, 2009: 22)  
Magure, (2009) argued that the state elite in Zimbabwe use brutal force and violence to 
intimidate its opponents and to get what it wants. Moyo and Yeros (2011) also note how the 
loss of hegemony has compelled Zanu-PF to rely on force rather than social consensus. Thus, 
the use of coercive organs of the state and not the law, to establish order in Marange diamonds 
fields is a mere expression of an old culture of violence within Zanu-PF. 
 
In November 2008, at the height of the economic crisis and political tensions between Zanu-
PF and the MDC, the government launched Operation Hakudzokwi (No Return) which 
involved the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) 
and the Airforce of Zimbabwe (AFZ). The security forces were brought in with the intention 
of dealing with illegal mining once and for all. The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 
(ZLHR) described the military operation, which immediately resulted in over 200 miners being 
killed as “resembling war” (McGreal, 2008). The intervention of the army was a violation of 
Zimbabwe’s constitution which forbids deploying the army on defenceless civilians like illegal 
miners. A local miner who spoke to the Human Rights Watch said that at one time after an 
attack by soldiers they gathered 37 dead bodies which they took to a nearby morgue where they 
found another truck offloading 35 bodies. They were forced to bury the 72 bodies in a mass-
grave.39 An officer interviewed by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) narrated his 
                                                          
38 According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2009) police forced local miners to join syndicates which 
became major sources of revenue for the police. It is believed a number of police deployed into Marange became 
rich almost overnight.  
39 Human Rights Watch (2009: 30-31) 
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story as follows “Twenty to thirty people would die every day. I am talking about the ones I 
saw with my own eyes…those who were injured were being finished off” (Anderson, 2011).  
 
In class struggles, the military, intelligence and police are the silent and invisible backers of 
the ruling class. While Zimbabwe’s ruling class has always turned to the military to stifle 
political competition40 and in return treated the military to a largesse in state parastatals, it was 
the first time that the military was used to intervene in the natural resource sector. The ruling 
Zanu-PF had its back to the wall, viz a devastating economic crisis and a dismal performance 
in the 2008 March elections. Under pressure, the ruling class played the nuclear option to 
ensure the security of its accumulation channels and its political future by letting out the army. 
The HRW report (2009) states that the soldiers quickly created their own syndicates through 
which they confiscated the illegal miners’ diamonds selling them to middlemen thus 
establishing their own channels of accumulation. One local miner corroborated these reports 
saying that soldiers would cajole them into: 
 “partnering in syndicates with them, then after they would confiscate all the diamonds for themselves 
while forcing the miners to continue working. Everyday we had to be stripped naked as we were being 
searched for diamonds we might have been hiding. It was such a painful experience.
41 
Another respondent who also stays in Mutare and was a teacher at the time of the diamond rush 
said that the situation was tense with “police all over the place and roadblocks were erected 
along major roads in an attempt to curb the illicit flow of diamonds. However, in most cases, 
the diamonds whenever they were found were never surrendered to the authorities. Instead, the 
police sold them and pocketed the money”.42 
 
The situation in Zimbabwe’s diamond fields was getting out of hand. In an interview with the 
Zimbabwe Independent (24 February 2017) describing his first visit to Marange in 2008, South 
African diamond mogul David Kassel had this to say:  
                                                          
40 In the 1980s, then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe unleashed the 5th Brigade on the opposition party Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU)’s strongholds in a move wildly seen as part of an agenda to decimate the 
opposition and entrench a one-party state and thus neutralize any possible threats to Zanu-PF’s political power 
See Chikuhwa, 2013). 
41 Phone interview with an anonymous respondent (I-10) who was involved in diamond panning in Marange (22 
June 2018). 
42 Phone Interview with Michael Mugumisi 24 June 2018. 
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“There were artisanal miners digging around with steel bars, picks, shovels and carrying 
diamonds in bags. We estimated about 30000-35000 people. No one was really in control. 
Soldiers around were firing in the air, while artisanal miners were also armed fighting back….we 
were witnessing what looked like an incipient stage of a potential civil war over diamonds”.  
While this was happening, the ruling class could not care less because it was exploiting the 
situation for self-enrichment. In a move largely seen as an effort to hide the controversy in 
Marange, the diamond fields were declared a protected area under the Protected Areas and 
Places Act ostensibly to keep away illegal miners. In the midst of the chaos, the then Vice-
President Joice Mujuru and wife to former Army General Solomon Mujuru had her own claim 
in the fields which was being guarded by the police and worked by the community members 
(Sokwanele, 2011). There seemed to be no end in sight to the chaos. 
  
The events that unfolded in Marange revolve around the tussle for the ownership and control 
of the diamond resources using brutal and violent crackdowns (See Alexander and McGregor, 
2013). The ruling class, itching to make a killing, pulled all the stops in seizing the property 
rights of the ACR. Even after the ACR had won a court case granting it property rights over 
the diamond fields the ruling class could not care less as government officials blatantly 
disregarded the court ruling (Mail & Guardian, 2006). Having failed to strike a mutually 
beneficial alliance with illegal miners who had descended on Marange ironically at the behest 
of the government officials, the ruling class unleashed vicious violence on the illegal miners. 
Security personnel, first the police in 2006 and later the soldiers in 2008 were stationed in the 
fields to protect the interests of the ruling class. Government institutions like the Ministry of 
Mines and Minerals Development (MMMD), the Zimbabwe Mineral Development 
Corporation (ZMDC), the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) and the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) were also stationed in the area. The government and 
military leaders managed to form a symbiotic alliance through which they could loot the 
diamonds in Marange illegally.  
 
This was a scandalisation of the indigenization programme because despite having eliminated 
the ACR, diamonds were exploited unaccountably and unconstitutionally to benefit the ruling 
class rather than empower indigenous people. In some instances, as the KPCS (2009) report 
showed, indigenous people were exploited and enslaved by the security personnel and some 
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prominent politicians to work the diamond fields for them at times without compensation43. 
The Marange diamonds chaos descended into a violent contest amongst the so-called indigenes 
or natives of the country vying to take the place of the departed or relegated foreign capitalist. 
The ruling class with the aid of the security forces eventually claimed victory after spilling the 
blood of the people they purported to empower. Judging by these events, clearly the ruling 
class’ understanding of indigenization did not go deeper than simply taking the place of the 
foreign capitalist (See Fanon, 1961; Muvingi, 2008). The structure of accumulation propped 
up by violence and exclusionist tendencies ensured that only a few benefit from the country’s 
mineral wealth remained intact. 
 
As a member of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), Zimbabwe’s diamonds 
production had to meet certain requirements before they could be cleared for trade in the global 
market. The KPCS was established to ensure that diamonds from areas afflicted by violence 
and conflict are not granted access to the market. The body had recommended that Zimbabwean 
diamonds be banned from the world market since mining took place in the midst of gross 
violations of human rights and state-sponsored violence. After lengthy interventions by the 
KPCS, the Zimbabwean authorities finally embarked on demilitarization and formalization of 
diamond mining in Marange in 2009 in a bid to be granted access to the market (Global Witness 
Report, 2017). 
  
5.8.1 The Formalisation of Ownership of Marange Diamonds Fields 
 
Following the chaos of the aftermath of the discovery of diamonds and pressure from the civil 
society and international community, the government of Zimbabwe began to solicit investors 
to operate in the diamond fields in a bid to formalise exploitation. The government was acting 
through the Ministry of Mines, the ZMDC which pursues investment opportunities in mining 
on government’s behalf and the MMCZ which is responsible for the sale and purchase of 
minerals in the country. Between 2006 and 2008 the ZMDC had invested over US$10 million 
in an effort to formalize mining in Marange without success44. In the formalisation process the 
ZMDC as the government’s investment vehicle formed Marange Resources in 2009 which was 
                                                          
43 In an interview with Michael Mugumisi 24 June 2018 
44 Interview with an anonymous Ministry of Mines official (I-11) (25 September 2017) 
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going to be its subsidiary company in the diamond fields to partner with private investors in 
joint ventures. The maximum equity any private investor could hold in a partnership with 
Marange Resources would be 50%.  
 
Table 6.5 below shows the private companies that were selected by the government to form 
joint ventures with Marange Resources to exploit various claims in the fields. One would 
assume that the formalisation process would have afforded the government a chance to make 
what was by far the State’s most prized mining asset a model of economic indigenization. 
However, a closer scrutiny reveals an obscure network of plunder and accumulation designed 
to benefit a few in the ruling class circles and host of other shady investors from South Africa, 
China and Dubai among other countries. Broad-based indigenization and economic 
empowerment was callously and scandalously cast out of the window. 
 
Table 5.5 shows joint ventures between private investors and Marange Resources. 
Name of private 
investor 
Name of joint venture Marange Resources stake 
Grandwell Holdings Mbada Diamonds 50% 
Core Mining 
Resources 
Canadile  50% 
AFECC Jinan Mining 50% 
China International 




Glass Finish and 
AFECC 
Anjin Investments 20% 
Pure Diam Diamond Mining Corporation  50% 
Gye Nyame Gye Nyame 50% 
Source: ZMDC Report, 2012 
The first two companies that won bids to partner with ZMDC were Core Mining Resources 
from Kimberly in South Africa and Grandwell Holdings, a company registered in Mauritius. 
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The latter joined forces with Marange Resources to form Mbada Diamonds while the former 
partnered with Marange to form Canadile Miners Private Limited. The set-up of what became 
the first two companies to formally operate in Marange was finalized mid-2009. The chairman 
of Mbada Diamonds was Robert Mhlanga, a phenomenally rich figure who happened to be the 
then Mines Minister Obert Mpofu’s cousin and also served in the Airforce of Zimbabwe as 
President Mugabe’s helicopter pilot. Mhlanga’s daughter Patience Khumalo was appointed 
CEO of the company (Muzulu, 2014). Robert Mhlanga is believed to be the owner of the Hong 
Kong-based firm Transfrontier which had a 49.99 percent stake in Grandwell Holdings (Global 
Witness Report, 2017). Mhlanga emerged as the chairman of Mbada representing government 
interests while at the same time being a key member of the private investor with whom the 
government had entered into a joint venture. Grandwell Holdings in 2010 transferred 50% of 
its shares to a company named Transfrontier registered in Hong Kong (Ibid). It is suspected 
that Mhlanga was the owner of Transfrontier which through the transaction had gained 25% of 
shares in the largest diamond company in Marange. While conceding that Transfrontier’s 
ownership structure was opaque, the Global Witness Report noted that Mhlanga was the CEO 
and sole director of Liparm, a South African company associated with Transfrontier and 
Mbada. The report claims that Liparm removed information about its links with Mbada and 
Transfrontier upon inquiry. Mhlanga’s name was also linked to various companies in Hong 
Kong using a variation of the Transfrontier name. 
  
The report further claims that Robert Mhlanga operates a diamond trading company in Dubai 
and sits on the board of the Dubai Diamond Exchange (DDE) which made it possible to sell 
Marange diamonds in Dubai. However, according to Mambo and Manayiti (2017) who 
interviewed the South African investor David Kassel, who was also the chairman of New 
Reclamation that owned 25 percent in Mbada through Grandwell Holdings, Mhlanga only 
brokered the deal between New Reclamation which owned Grandwell Holdings and the ZMDC 
ushering a joint venture partnership. Kassel also contended that “Mhlanga was not a 
shareholder in Transfrontier, the 49.99% owned by Transfrontier in Grandwell Holdings was 
controlled by a consortium of Chinese investors” (Ibid). Some of the ZMDC representatives in 
the Mbada Board included Sithengiso Mpofu who, it turned out was then Mines Minister Obert 
Mpofu’s sister in-law and Dingiswayo Ndlovu who was the Minister’s personal assistant. A 
2013 Parliamentary Portfolio Committee report on Marange diamonds lamented the hostility 
and non-cooperation displayed by Mbada which even rendered legitimate state institutions like 
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the ZMDC powerless by making decisions without consulting it (2013:14). Nepotism and 
compradorism were clearly the major determinants in the governments’ decision to partner 
with Grandwell Holdings – a company whose experience in mining was questionable. 
  
The Core Mining Resources representatives in the second joint venture, Canadile, included a 
list of notorious individuals of questionable record. One was Lovemore Kurotwi the 
controversial nephew of the late former ZDF Commander General Vitalis Zvinavashe. Adrian 
Taylor had a background as a Sierra Leonian mercenary while Danesh and Ashok Pandeya 
were reported to have engaged in smuggling activities in the DRC. Cougan Matanhire was the 
chairman of Canadile Private Limited. A 2013 Parliamentary Portfolio Committee Report on 
Marange revealed that Matanhire was entangled in conflict of interest since he had worked for 
the MMCZ. This meant the integrity of the MMCZ as the issuer of KPCS certificates would be 
compromised by one of their own. Canadile’s license was later terminated in 2012 as it turned 
out that Kurotwi and his foreign investor partners had no resources to invest in the diamond 
exploitation. However, Kurotwi claimed that the reason they were not able to invest was that 
the then Minister Obert Mpofu asked for a US$10 million bribe45. He further claimed in a letter 
he wrote to the current President Emmerson Mnangagwa that the State confiscated equipment 
worth US$17 million, 1.4 million carats of diamonds and US$3.6 million cash (Ncube, 2018). 
His account was contradicted by former ZMDC Chairperson Goodwills Masimirembwa who 
told the Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Energy that Core Mining Resources where 
Kurotwi held a 46% stake did not make any investment or buy any equipment: 
Core Mining was supposed to be a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) of Beny Steinmetz Group Resources 
(BSGR) who were supposed to bring in $2 billion. But that investment never came. We ended up with 
Core Mining on its own and a ragtag team of people from South Africa. Mr Kurotwi eventually owned 
46% of the company but he is the one who had initially come in and said he was bringing in BSGR. But 
that never materialized. An audit by Grant Thornton found that no investment was brought by Core Mining. 
It was on these grounds that we then terminated their licence. Mr Kurotwi never brought a single cent but 
he is a Zimbabwean. We also discovered that Core Mining did not purchase any equipment. (Zim Stones, 
9 April 2018) 
Such contradicting details reveal lack of accountability and transparency in the way in which 
the government managed Marange diamonds. Sibanda (2019) lamented that while transparency 
                                                          




and accountability was guaranteed by Constitution under section 13(4), the country continues 
to lose billions of dollars in revenue due to lack of transparency. The fact that the ZMDC went 
into partnership with a company banking on the word of Mr Kurotwi that he was going to bring 
in investors is evidence of incompetence on the part of the State. The Core Mining Resources 
story also shows how indigenous Zimbabweans can be used as fronts by big international 
investors. Mr Kurotwi was acting for BSGR which is an investment company from Israel and 
Robert Mhlanga, if David Kassel’s narrative is anything to go by, was also fronting for the 
Grandwell Holdings using his considerable political connections. Notably, Akinsanya (1988) 
also pointed out that fronting was one of the major obstacles to indigenization in Nigeria. 
 
The information on the selection and the ownership of the companies that operate in Marange 
is a tightly guarded secret access to which is limited by the provisions of the notorious 2003 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). This law obliges government 
to withhold information from the public if its disclosure may prejudice national security or 
interests in any way. The 2013 Parliamentary Committee Report lamented that most of the 
ZMDC and company officials could not furnish the Committee with accurate information 
apparently upon the orders of the executive. The same report raises red flags on the appointment 
of Grandwell Holdings and Core Mining as ZMDC partners in the first two joint ventures 
noting that it “was not done according to any known precedence, procedures or with reference 
to any legislation in the country” (Parliament of Zimbabwe, National Assembly Report, 
2013:14). The report further reveals that upon questioning Minister Obert Mpofu about the 
selection of the two companies the Minister simply said “I was a new Minister, I was told to 
go that way and that is the way it is” (Ibid). 
 
The ZMDC chairperson at the time Miss Mawarire lied to the Committee that the selection of 
the two companies was a cabinet decision but later withdrew upon being presented with the 
minutes of the cabinet decision on the issue which simply encouraged ZMDC to find a partner 
(Parliament of Zimbabwe, National Assembly Report, 2013: 14). This then begs the question: 
who appointed the two companies? Is the State really in charge? Further inquiry noted that the 
ZMDC was not really active in Mbada only playing the role of a by-stander46. Even the 
                                                          
46 Interview with I-11, 25 September 2017. 
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appointment of board members was unilaterally done by the Minister without consultation with 
the ZMDC board members whose company was entering into the partnership to form the 
biggest diamond company in the country. It seems the ZMDC, the State representative, had 
little control and influence over the goings-on in Marange, the country’s most valuable mining 
asset. Did the State have any sovereignty or autonomy over Marange diamonds? The other 
companies that were later given concessions include Kusena (2011), Anjin Investments (2010), 
in which the ZMDC owns 10% equity, the other 40% is believed to be owned by the State 
through the military. In Jinan Mining (2010) and the Diamond Mining Corporation (DMC) 
(2010) the ZMDC owns 50% stake. Anjin, Jinan and Kusena are linked to the military and 
Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) respectively. Gye Nyame, which had 
links with the Zimbabwe Republic Police also formed a joint venture with Marange Resources. 
  
There are interesting facts around the existence and ownership of Kusena which came to light 
following the former CIO Director General Happyton Bonyongwe’s appearance before the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy on the 9th of April 2018. Giving his 
side of the story, Bonyongwe agreed that indeed the CIO had participated and was a stakeholder 
in Kusena. He said the decision to venture into diamond mining was taken in light of the 
economic distress that the country was going through which saw the government becoming 
increasingly unable to fund the activities of the CIO (Zim Stones, 2018). The agency then 
decided to venture into diamond mining to generate the revenue it needed to function 
effectively. The CIO eventually found a partner, China International Fund (CIF), which had 
the capital and the appetite to invest in the diamond fields. The CIO and the CIF partnered to 
form Kusena. The CIF brought in equipment worth more than US$10 million which the CIO 
helped to clear at the customs department. The equipment, the former DG emphasized was 
meant to be used to exploit alluvial diamonds in claims D and H in Marange which were some 
of the smallest claims around (Ibid). After exploration the investor decided to quit citing 
unfavourable returns on investment. The former DG told the parliamentary committee that they 
convinced the investor not to take the equipment arguing that they also owned the equipment 
by virtue of having facilitated its entry into the country. After the exit of the CIF the CIO then 
went into a joint venture with the ZMDC in 2011 on a 50-50 basis (Ibid). The ZMDC was 
going to run the mine while the CIO provided security since they had no pedigree in mining. 
According to Mr Bonyongwe the mine produced 833 gem carats, 784 semi-gem carats and 
11000 industrials realizing a revenue of over $1 million (Ibid). He however denied that the CIO 
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ever received any money from their partner ZMDC saying “We never got anything out of it. 
We never realized anything. That was the end of the story” (Ibid).  
 
If the Global Witness report is anything to go by, it is very likely that the CIO did get funds 
from the mining ventures which might have been used to commit human rights abuses. 
According to The Zimbabwean (11 November, 2014), the CIF is associated with one Sam Pa, 
reportedly of Chinese nationality who has exploited oil and mineral resources across Africa. 
Quoting a 2012 Global Witness Report the paper claims that Sino-Zimbabwe smuggled 
diamonds out of Zimbabwe to Hong Kong using Sam Pa’s airbus (Ibid). The paper further 
reports that Pa is closely linked with the CIO and assisted the organization in devising a strategy 
to undermine the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the 2013 elections. 
State institutions like the CIO owe their continued accumulation directly to the survival of the 
ruling Zanu-PF and therefore would do anything, including violence, to ensure Zanu-PF’s 
continued stay in power (Tendi, 2013). Kusena participated in the sale of diamonds in Antwerp 
and Dubai in 2013 after the EU lifted sanctions on the ZMDC (Global Witness Report, 2017). 
This is yet more evidence to show that the so-called indigenization and economic 
empowerment may be little else but empty rhetoric. The activities in the mining sector amount 
to a ruling class project in cahoots with the so-called foreign “investors” precisely designed to 
secure and protect its power base, and thus, its lines of accumulation. Marange diamonds 
revenue was only enjoyed by a few state elites and their foreign partners. No indigenous people 
were empowered in Marange. The only indigenous people to participate in the exploitation of 
the diamond in Marange were the already priviledged like Lovemore Murotwi and Robert 
Mhlanga who had access to the corridors of power. Instead, the indigenous people who were 
resident in Marange were forcibly relocated without adequate compensation to make way for 
mining operations (Dzirutwe, 2017). 
  
Gye Nyame, was one of the companies exploiting diamonds in Marange in a joint venture with 
the ZMDC on a 50-50 basis like other joint ventures. The private sector part of Gye Nyame 
comprised of a partnership between a local consortium and Ghanaian investors. The Ghanaians 
agreed to source the capital to fund the operation. Speaking to the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Mines and Energy on the 9th of April 2018, the former Managing Director of 
Gye Nyame, Mr Munyeza who was part of the local consortium narrated a shocking story. 
196 
 
According to Mr Munyeza, sometime after they had begun operations they were suddenly 
instructed to give the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) 20% shareholding. This was resisted 
at first but the investors gave in following a meeting with the then Minister of Mines Obert 
Mpofu. However, as per his narration the police proved difficult to work with as they were 
bossy and behaved as if the concession was theirs. At one time the police just decided they did 
not want Ghanaian investors anymore saying that they had their own preferred investors from 
Singapore. After Mr Munyeza refused to kick out the Ghanaians, police forcibly retrieved from 
him the keys to the diamond safe. The company lost the diamonds and the banks stopped 
funding the company after getting wind of what had transpired leading to its demise (Zim 
Stones, 2018). Former ZMDC Chairperson Goodwill Masimirembwa also told the committee 
that they had decided to terminate Gye Nyame’s license after due diligence on the foreign 
investors showed that they were not capable of raising the needed investment for the project to 
take-off.  
 
The ZRP officials were also quizzed about their participation in the company of which the 
former Deputy Commissioner General of Police Mr Matibiri denied any knowledge of the 
company. Three retired assistant commissioners confirmed to the committee that they were 
appointed by the former Commissioner General of Police Augustine Chihuri to the board of 
Gye Nyame. Surprisingly, the then Minister of Home Affairs which portfolio is also 
responsible for the police, Ignatius Chombo told the committee that he had no knowledge of 
the company and the police participation in the diamond venture. The former police 
commissioners also denied any knowledge of any attack on the former Gye Nyame Managing 
Director Mr Munyeza, professing ignorance on where the diamonds that were in the box the 
keys to which were forcibly confiscated from the latter were eventually taken. Even the 
permanent secretaries in the Ministries of Home Affairs and Mines and Minerals Development 
denied any knowledge about the police involvement in Gye Nyame (Ibid). 
  
Two other companies that operated in Marange, Anjin and Jinan, were linked to the 
Zimbabwean military. According to the Zimbabwe Independent, Anjin Investments is a 
partnership between Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group Co Limited (Afecc) and 
Matt Bronze Enterprises a company wholly owned by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) 
(Ibid). The company was also linked to the construction of the US$100 million National 
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Defence College in Zimbabwe through an ExIm Bank loan guaranteed by anticipated inflows 
from diamond sales. According to the ZMDC 2012 report Anjin is 50% owned by Afecc, 10% 
by ZMDC and 40% by the government of Zimbabwe (See ZMDC Report, 2012: 10). However, 
the Global Witness (2017) reported that the 40% said to belong to the government belongs to 
Matt Bronze Enterprises, a subsidiary of the ZDF. The Global Witness also reported that the 
ZMDC and the ZDF were in a 20-80 partnership in a company called Glass Finish Limited. 
The latter went into partnership with Afecc to form Anjin Investments. Rumours had it that the 
80% army-owned Glass Finish received in 2014, US$40 million for management fees in 
addition to 40% of whatever dividends were declared in Anjin.47 Jinan, another company that 
operated in Marange, is also 50% owned by the Afecc and 50% by the ZMDC (Zmdc report, 
2012). According to the Global Witness report Jinan and Anjin are closely related, share staff 
and equipment and whatever lucrative findings are made in Jinan are transferred to Anjin. 
  
Speaking to the Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Energy on the 19th of April 2018 the 
Defence Ministry Financial Director Martin Rushwaya gave the military’s side of the story 
concerning the background and operations of Anjin. He confirmed that the Defence Ministry 
with the blessings of the then president Robert Mugabe decided to venture into diamond mining 
to generate revenue since the country’s treasury was no longer able to adequately fund their 
activities due to the economic crisis. Rushwaya told the committee that they partnered with 
AFECC and got a Special Grant from the Mines Ministry to exploit diamonds in Marange 
diamonds fields. He went on to dispel the accusations that the army was mining under opaque 
circumstances where they could not be held accountable: 
The MMCZ managed the sale of diamonds. Every single carat was sold by the MMCZ on behalf of the 
company. To say that we were operating in the dark is not correct. All taxes, commissions and fees were 
collected before the company was given its dues. The final certification of the sale was done by the Ministry 
of Mines. We have the names of people we were dealing with. (Zim Stones, 19 April 2018) 
The army personnel revealed before the Committee that the company generated a gross revenue 
of US$332 million from the sale of just over 9 million carats. Of this amount, US$62 million 
went to the government in royalties, commissions and taxes, the army as the local partner in 
the company got US$54 million and the balance went to AFECC and other operational costs.48 
The money was used to fund the Defence Ministry activities, the National Defence University 
                                                          




and a number of other parastatals. However, speaking to the same Committee on the 9th of 
April 2018 the ZMDC finance officer told parliament that they only received taxes and 
dividends between 2010 and 2014 from Mbada, Jinan, Marange and Diamond Mining 
Corporation. Quizzed about Anjin’s accounts the finance officer said they had not seen any 
financial statements from Anjin and other companies like Kusena, Gye Nyame and Rera that 
were operating in Marange (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy, 2018). 
If this information is accurate, the militarization of Marange diamonds was not ended but was 
simply covered up in the post-2009 formalization process. Rather than benefitting the 
indigenous people, Marange diamonds became the property of special interests in the military, 
executive and partners from abroad. 
  
The Diamond Mining Corporation (DMC) is another controversial company that was cleared 
to mine diamonds. The company was established in 2010 as a result of a 50-50 partnership 
between the ZMDC and a Dubai company, Pure Diam. The owner of Pure Diam, Imad Ahmad, 
has a notorious reputation of engaging in illicit diamond trading across Africa. The Zimbabwe 
Independent (2009) reported that Imad Ahmad illegally used an import licence belonging to a 
Dubai company Atom DMCC to purchase diamonds from the MMCZ. However, further 
research revealed that Pure Diam did not have any business links with Atom DMCC but 
purchased industrial diamonds from the MMCZ for US$478 000 (Zimbabwe Independent, 
2009).49 The Global Witness also claimed in its report that Ahmad ran a smuggling network in 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique between 2007 and 2010 before the formalization process (Global 
Witness, 2017). The network is alleged to have involved state security personnel in the police, 
military and CIO who sold diamonds to buyers linked with Pure Diam. Pure Diam was awarded 
a concession in Marange in 2010 upon the formalization of mining in the area despite a criminal 
background. Again, this raises questions on the extent to which the ZMDC was responsible for 
the selection of the private investors it entered into partnerships with. It might be that special 
interests had captured and side-lined the State in the management (distribution and production) 
of Marange diamonds. 
 
 




5.8.2 Who benefited from Marange Diamonds? 
 
We have not received much from the diamond industry at all, not much by way of earnings. I don’t 
think we have exceeded US$2 billion or so yet we think well over US$15 billion or more has been 
earned in that area. The companies that have been mining virtually robbed us of our wealth. 
(President Robert Mugabe Interview on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 2016)50 
However, a few months after being ousted from power and amid parliamentary 
investigations51, Mugabe later backtracked telling a Zimbabwen weekly, Zimbabwe 
Independent in 2018 that the $15 billion claim “was just a story with no factual basis” (Ndebele, 
2018). Nonetheless, the flow of earnings in Marange is no less murky and controversial than 
the ownership debacle. The tracing of the diamond money reveals that the money that gets to 
the national treasury is significantly lower. Table 6.6 below shows the money made from 
diamond sales and the amount accruing to the State. 
Table 5.6 Marange diamonds exports and revenue – 2009-2016  
Year  Volume (Carats) Amount (US$) Govt remittance 
2009 1,349,172 28,900,799 - 
2010 8,424,384 320,237,120 US$174 million 
2011 7,787,923 422,926,507 US$80 million 
2012 14,957,649 740,998,085 US$45 million 
2013 9,564,278 448,635,918 US$41 million 
2014 6,367,107 480,221,832 - 
2015 3,899,385 168,612,483 - 
2016 2,322,418 123,314,734 - 
TOTALS 54,672316 2,733,847,478 340,000,000 
    
Source: Kimberly Process Certification Scheme: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com  
 
Information in the above table shows that the diamond industry produced over 54 million carats 
from 2009 to 2016 thus raking in over US$2,7 billion in sales of which the reported amount 
received by the government is a paltry US$340 million. Thus, the government of Zimbabwe 
through its investment vehicle, the ZMDC, which owns 50% of every company operating in 
Marange received only 12% of the diamond export revenues between 2009 and 2016. In an 
interview in 2013, then Minister of Finance Tendai Biti bemoaned the lack of diamond 
revenues “We received nothing at all in January for the diamonds, nothing at all in February. 
                                                          
50 Available at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNpWxuWS0Rw 
51 Mugabe was summoned by parliament to give evidence on his 2016 claims about the looted $15 billion worth 
of diamonds in Marange (Mashininga, 2018). 
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In March we received $5 million against a target of $15 million…the current situation is 
unacceptable” (Daily News, 2013). This is not surprising given that the companies operating in 
Marange seem to have been controlled by a powerful invisible hand that proved many a time 
to be above the law. There seems to be a parallel invisible State running Zimbabwe’s diamond 
sector. The above figures suggest that the ZMDC is a non-existent partner in the joint ventures 
in Marange. However, as is often said, there are always two sides to every story. 
 Table 5.7: Mbada Diamonds financials – 2010-2015 





2010 48 856 658,80 21 356 
170,75 
34 803 358 12 279 798 213 561 707 
2011 17 500 000 9 359 032 8 158 243 13 333 287 291 696 577  
2012 - 31 811 687 19 886 466 12 996 062 310 808 920 
2013 - 16 374 300 3 101 000 11 905 424 202 750 013 
2014 84 188 258 48 990 829 - 1 671 360 74 458 588 
2015 - 3 489 908 - 598 629 27 612 787 
      
  
Source: The Zimbabwe Independent, 2016, https://www.theindependent.co.zw  
 
The figures in Table 5.7 above published by the Zimbabwe Independent tell a different story. 
According to the figures, Mbada Diamonds, which was the biggest diamond miner in Marange, 
settled its dues with the ZMDC and government in the form of dividends, royalties, corporate 
tax and resource depletion fees. From 2010 to 2015 (its last year of operation) the figures show 
that the company paid a total of US$131 million in royalties, US$150 million dollars in 
dividends, US$66 million in corporate tax among others. In total the company paid the 
government over US$472 million (42% of its sales) after having made US$1.2 billion dollars 
in sales during the said period. These figures, if true, absolve the company from any charge of 
failing to honour its dues to the government. This would suggest that the people responsible 
for remitting the diamond money to the treasury were not doing it. The money seems to have 
disappeared into thin air before it reached the state coffers.  
 
The apparent diversion of money was compounded by the existence of the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) comprising bitter political rivals, Zanu-PF and the MDC from 2009 to 
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2013. Perhaps the disappearance of the diamond revenue could be seen in the light of the fact 
that the Mines ministry was controlled by Zanu-PF and the Finance ministry by the MDC. It is 
possible that the former sought to undermine the latter making it look as if the rival is failing 
to discharge its duties. It is also possible that the money may have been diverted to further the 
political interests of Zanu-PF through the funding of party activities and the security apparatus 
which was explicitly pro-Zanu-PF (Magure, 2012; Tendi, 2013). The duration of the GNU 
ironically gave rise to a fragmented and divided State where the ruling class was ideologically 
and politically divided. The state elites were divided into rival camps along party lines, a rivalry 
which extended to the State agencies they controlled. As a result, they failed to work together 
to ensure that the public benefitted from the Marange diamonds revenue.  
5.8 Changing the game-plan: Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) 
 
In 2015, almost a decade after the discovery of diamonds in Marange, and six years after the 
formalization of their exploitation, the Zimbabwean government announced a change of 
strategy. In March of that year, the government decided to form ZCDC Private Limited with 
the intention of consolidating all mining operations in the diamond fields in the interests of 
transparency, accountability and productivity. The company was formed as a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the ZMDC replacing Marange Resources. Under the plan the government would 
consolidate the seven companies: Anjin Investments, Jinan, Mbada Diamonds, DMC, Kusena 
and Gye Nyame into one entity; the ZCDC (in which the ZMDC would hold 50% stake) and 
the other companies would share the balance according to the size of their investment 
(Zimbabwe Independent, 8 December 2015). Appearing before the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Mines and Energy, former Minister of Mines Walter Chidhakwa explained the 
decision to consolidate the industry thus: 
“My challenges as the Minister of Mines were to do with the accountability of the companies. Could we 
sit as leaders of this country with companies where we owned 50 percent of the shares and not be able to 
get dividends from those companies? This is what sits on your conscience all the time. You must ask 
yourself: am I doing Zimbabwe a favour by allowing that situation? That is what drove the process (of 
forming the ZCDC). I had to make the decision and some were asking me if I was signing a death warrant. 
Whenever you make a decision in the mines they gratify one side and hurt the other but these are the things 




It is important to note that Chidhakwa was former president Mugabe’s nephew and served as 
Minister of Mines at a time when factional wars in Zanu-PF (induced by Mugabe’s succession) 
had infiltrated the security forces. According to Mambo (2017), the military was sympathetic 
to then vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa. While the CIO and the police were believed to 
be backing the so-called G-40 faction fronted by former First Lady Grace Mugabe (Ibid). The 
rift in the security was dramatically manifested when soldiers physically attacked the police 
manning a road block on a major road in Harare (News24, 2017). Then President Mugabe 
himself publicly accused the military of plotting a coup at a Zanu-PF rally arguing that 
“military involvement in the internal politics of the ruling Zanu-PF party was tantamount to a 
coup” (Ibid). These factional wars may have influenced the policy change in Marange where 
the military had enormous interests in two of the biggest companies, Anjin and Jinan. Minister 
Chidhakwa also disputed that the ZMDC was getting any dividends despite it being a 
shareholder in the joint ventures in Marange, hence his move to restructure diamond mining in 
the area. He was thus accusing the military-controlled entities in Marange of defaulting in their 
obligations to the state.  
 
While also emphasizing the need for transparency and accountability as the major factors 
behind the formation of the ZCDC, appearing before the same Committee, the former 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Mines Professor Gudyanga also argued that: 
The need to transition from alluvial mining to kimberlitic mining was one of the key factors that 
necessitated the creation of the ZCDC. You needed a big company to go to that phase. These small 
companies never did kimberlitic mining and there was no evidence that they could do kimberlitic mining. 
No company could meet the investment requirement. (Zim Stone, 10 April 2018) 
Clearly, the government and the military were not in sync as shown by contradicting accounts 
of what transpired in Marange diamonds. In February 2016 the government ordered the seven 
companies operating in Marange to stop their operations since their joint venture permits had 
lapsed and had not been renewed (IOL News, 22 February, 2016). In an interview with the state 
broadcaster, President Mugabe said “The state will now own all the diamonds in the 
country…Companies that have been mining diamonds have robbed us of our wealth that is 
why we have said the State must have a monopoly” (The Telegraph, 3 March 2016). This could 
have been a retaliation on the military that was becoming increasingly sympathetic to his 
deputy Mnangagwa. The ZCDC commenced operations under the new arrangements in March 
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2016 despite mining companies like Mbada and Anjin challenging the government’s decision 
in court.  
 
It also appears that there were irregularities in the way the company was formed. The ZMDC 
chief executive one Mr Murangari told the parliament about the circumstances around the 
formation of the company: 
We were not in favour of consolidation because of the certain clauses contained in the agreements (between 
government and various companies mining diamonds). Our preference would have been that we let the 
companies continue mining until they ran out of the alluvial diamonds. Then form ZCDC thereafter. 
However due to the fact that this was a directive coming from the government every operation had to be 
halted. The formation of the ZCDC happened at the ministry, the ZMDC was never consulted. The 
shareholding by the ZMDC only happened after parliament raised queries. Even now the CEO goes straight 
to the ministry bypassing the ZMDC. (Zim Stones, 11 April 2018) 
Such evidence from the ZMDC which is the mining arm of the government raises interesting 
questions on the formation of the ZCDC. Was it a genuine concern for the national interest that 
led to its formation or part of a counter-scheme within the ruling class in what respondent I-1 
called “a struggle within the struggle”? That is, the internal factional wars in Zanu-PF 
manifesting in fights for the control of Marange diamonds fields. 
 
In a presentation before parliament, Martin Rushwaya, the Ministry of Defence’s Permanent 
Secretary, said Anjin, which was controlled by the ZDF and their Chinese partners felt 
aggrieved by the way their company was asked to stop mining operations (Zim Stones, 19 April 
2018). He argued that Anjin was mining based on a Special Grant that had no expiration date. 
The company tried to have a dialogue with the ministry of mines to resolve the issue but to no 
avail. Rushwaya also rubbished the claims that the company had no capacity to do kimberlitic 
mining saying that they were the only company that was already embarking on conglomerate 
mining (Ibid). He also disputed the claims of the former minister Walter Chidhakwa that there 
was no accountability and transparency, claiming that everything they did from mining to the 
sale of the diamonds was done in the presence of the ZMDC, ZRP, MMCZ and KPCS 
representatives (Ibid). The police were sent into Marange to force the companies out in an 
operation code-named “Chengetedza Upfumi” (keep the wealth) (Global Witness Report, 
2017). The sending in of the police (400 armed) to act against the interests of the military gave 
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the impression that the security sector was divided along the ruling class factions thus rendering 
the state irreparably dysfunctional. 
  
Nonetheless, the company was formed and managed to produce 960000 carats in its first year 
of operation and almost doubled that in 2017 when it achieved 1.8 million carats (Chingwere, 
2018). Finance Minister, Patrick Chinamasa assured the public that all proceeds from the 
diamond mines would be directed to the treasury. However, the Zimbabwe Independent 
reported at the end of 2017 that companies like Anjin Investments were trying to use their 
military links after the fall of President Mugabe to worm their way back to diamond mining 
(Mambo, 2018). At the time of writing, the situation remains uncertain as to whether the 
Emmerson Mnangagwa – led administration will make changes to the arrangements. The new 
government has already said it will be repealing the indigenization law in every sector with the 
exception of the Diamond and Platinum sectors. President Mnangagwa was literally lifted to 
the seat of power by the military. It remains to be seen whether he will give in to the demands 
of the military-linked private investors like Anjin and Jinan who felt short-changed by the 
amalgamation move. 
 
The consolidation of the diamond sector under the majority ownership of the State smacks of 
nationalization and brings with it, sea-change in the dynamics of the class struggle that have 
characterized the sector. The first question that springs to mind concerns the state of the 
relationship between the ruling class and the military from which it derives its power. Why 
would the ruling class or elite cross paths with the military by usurping its feeding bowls in the 
diamond fields? This question is a particularly interesting one in the context of the November 
2017 downfall of the Mugabe-led administration in which the military played a central role. It 
seems the military was retaliating an assault on its accumulation interests by the government 
and moved swiftly to prevent further assault. Secondly, would the ZMDC, which was 
apparently relegated to a by-stander in the joint-ventures take the lead this time around as the 
majority shareholder in the ZCDC? If the new arrangement was formed based on the 
allegations of joint-ventures having short-changed the country in terms of revenue remission, 
it boggles the mind as to why the State did not launch an investigation into the matter. The 
failure of the State to launch an investigation to get to the root of the issue would raise questions 
as to whether this new arrangement presents genuine change. Moreover, the new arrangement 
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is still shrouded in secrecy. The shareholding structure of the new entity is still unknown. The 
government only says that the ZCDC will control a 50% stake in the company, but there is a 
lack of information on the respective amount of shares owned by the other parties it entered 
into the arrangement with. Ownership is at the centre of the class struggle because it is through 
ownership that people claim property rights and the accompanying benefits. 
  
The ‘nationalization’ of the diamond sector smacks of Zanu-PF’s phobia for an indigenous 
business class that would control key economic sectors. The ruling class already has leverage 
over the agricultural sector where farmers have no title deeds but are operating under the so-
called 99-year leases which forever places them at the mercy of the government. In the 
chromium sector, the government has moved to nationalize 50 percent of the claims although 
in that case, for redistribution to indigenous small-scale miners. It seems the default position 
of the government is to take custody of important sectors of the economy. One wonders if the 
interests of the indigenous people are best served when the government owns and controls the 
resources. The State in Zimbabwe is not known for its efficiency in running viable commercial 
entities. A lot of parastatals like the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), the National 
Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), Cold Storage Company (CSC) to mention a few have been 
victims of State mismanagement (See Chikuhwa, 2013). Their perennial underperformance has 
resulted in the unemployment of tens of thousands of people, and the drainage of state 
resources. Judging by the past performance of the government, the nationalization of the 
diamond industry hardly inspires confidence in the future of the industry itself let alone hope 
for the empowerment of the indigenous people. The State does lack the financial capacity to 
mine diamonds at an industrial scale.  
5.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has given a comprehensive account of the trajectory and the dynamics of the 
indigenization policy as it was applied in the large-scale mining sector in Zimbabwe. As seen 
in the first table, foreign capital from South Africa, China, Australia and Canada among other 
countries is dominant in the mining sector in Zimbabwe. On balance, the government has 
largely failed to achieve the desired outcomes of the indigenization policy. The attempt to 
indigenize the PGMs industry dating back to the mid-1990s to the present have so far failed 
spectacularly. The capital market in the country is too small to support an indigenous business 
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class with the wherewithal to take over the platinum sector. In the gold sector the indigenization 
programme has also been largely unsuccessful as indigenous business people have found it 
hard to penetrate and establish a firm footing. The only successful case of indigenization is 
Blanket Mine in Gwanda but even there the indigenous partners stand in a precarious position. 
Even after the enactment of the Indigenization Bill in 2007 giving the policy the force of the 
law, the going has been tough. Most of the consortiums formed by indigenous people to take 
over stakes in big mining companies consist of politicians and the politically connected. This 
gives the impression that indigenization is little more than a patronage scheme run by the 
political elite to secure its power base. Besides the lack of capital, another hindrance to the 
indigenization of the mineral economy is the dysfunctional and underdeveloped State. The 
Zimbabwean State is chronically under-resourced to drive the indigenization process 
successfully. There is a lack of leadership within the ruling class itself which is why foreign 
capital has been able to successfully resist indigenization. Moreover, the indigenous business 
class is largely absent in Zimbabwe hence the indigenization crusade has been hijacked by 
ruling party politicians. Almost 40 years after independence, the colonial legacy is alive and 
well in what is by far the country’s most vital economic sector. Indigenization efforts have hit 















Downstream indigenization: Artisanal and small-scale miners, working class, and the 
peasant communities 
6.1 Introduction 
The scope of the indigenization policy in Zimbabwe’s mining sector extends way beyond the 
purported transfers of equity in big multinational corporations to private, wealthy and 
politically connected indigenous citizens. The indigenization programme is broader than the 
fight for the control and ownership of the mining MNCs operating in the country. This chapter 
focuses attention on other stakeholders - the artisanal and small-scale miners (ASM), the 
working class, and the peasant communities in rural areas – whose various roles constitute 
crucial components of the structure of the mining industry. These three groups, while being the 
most structurally disadvantaged, have shaped the trajectory of the indigenization discourse and 
implementation in the mining sector in admittedly obscure but, nonetheless, non-negligible 
ways. Their demands and interests, though at times violently suppressed and marginalized by 
the ruling class and the international capital, have certainly, and in concrete ways, added to the 
content and complexion of the indigenization programme. The above-mentioned groups are 
the chief subjects of the ongoing and dynamic process of class formation in the minerals sector 
in Zimbabwe and cannot be possibly neglected in any assessment of the decolonization and 
transformation of the sector. 
  
Given the foregoing, this chapter seeks to shine a light on a terrain that has thus far been, by 
and large, equally shunned by the academia and the media. Using data obtained through 
interviews, documentary reports, videos, email correspondence and online sources this chapter 
critiques Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy in the mining sector from the perspective of the 
ASM, working class and peasant communities. The significance of these classes is that they 
are overwhelmingly made up of indigenous peoples who have historically been relegated to 
the margins of the mining sector. To the degree that indigenization entails a redistribution of 
wealth in favour of the indigenous citizens, it should be ultimately evaluated on its ability to 
improve the condition and the position of the above-mentioned groups in the matrix of class 




Despite experiences of marginalization, constant repression and even outright criminalization 
at times, these groups have become an indispensable element of the politics and dynamics of 
indigenization in the mining sector. The indigenization policy regulations have explicitly 
recognized the working class and the peasant communities by creating mechanisms like the 
Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOT) and the Employee Share Ownership Trusts 
(ESOT) to enhance their participation in the mining sector. On paper, the CSOTs and ESOTs 
are aimed at establishing peasant communities and the working class as co-owners of mineral 
wealth through ownership of a specified amount of shares in mining companies. This would 
have far-reaching implications in the class configuration and production relations of the mining 
sector. The policy has however remained relatively mum and ambiguous save for ad-hoc 
government interventions on the empowerment of ASM players in the industry who are 
overwhelmingly indigenous citizens. The presence of these classes in the production of mineral 
wealth unleashes an ever-evolving pantheon of social forces that have become both the 
conduits and, to an extent, the determinants of the exercise of state power in the struggle to 
decolonize and transform the sector. As this chapter delves deeper into how the ASM, working 
class and peasant communities have been affected by indigenization, there is much to learn 
about how state power intersects with class relations in objectively and historically determined 
conditions to dictate the character of the indigenization programme. 
   
6.2 The evolution of the ASM sector: Chronicles of a suppressed class 
 
Zimbabwe’s geological profile necessitated the emergence of two mining sectors – the large-
scale and the artisanal and small-scale - governed by different modes of production (See 
Hollaway, 1997). A prominent part of Zimbabwe’s mineral geology is the Great Dyke. The 
Great Dyke is 550km long geological formation that contains some of the world’s largest 
reserves of chrome, platinum and asbestos among others (See Wilson, 1996). The Dyke is 
dominated by huge MNCs like the platinum miners from South Africa and Australia (Zimplats, 
Mimosa Anglo-American) and chrome miners like Zimasco and Zim Alloys (Zhuwakinyu, 
2019). The large-scale mining (LSM) sector as already articulated in the previous chapter is 
fundamentally oligopolistic, is dominated by a few foreign-owned MNCs, and operates on an 
industrial scale. The artisanal and small-scale (ASM) sector on the other hand is a diverse group 
of more than a million operators, are largely informal and overwhelmingly dominated by 
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indigenous citizens (See Mhlanga, 2017). This section assesses the politics of the 
indigenization policy within the context of the ASM sector in Zimbabwe from 1990 to the 
present. According to the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF), an umbrella organization 
representing the interests of the sector, the income generated from ASM activities supports the 
livelihoods of over 3 million people.52  
 
The ASM sector has a long and rich pedigree in Zimbabwe’s mining sector dating back to the 
colonial era. Its origins can be traced back to the early twentieth century when the BSAC 
government realized that the country had numerous scattered gold deposits which could be 
profitably exploited at small scale rather than industrial. It was then that the colonial 
government actively encouraged the growth of the small-scale miners (Phimister, 1976). As 
detailed in the fifth chapter, the ASM sector initially comprised white settlers funded and 
supported by the colonial state which actively and explicitly discriminated against indigenous 
people. Having had a long existence in Zimbabwe, the ASM sector has managed to evolve into 
a distinctive class in the mining sector governed by the dynamics of its own mode of 
production. The ASM players mostly operate under the legal radar, sell their produce to an 
informal market, use rudimentary equipment, nomadic and difficult to manage and exist for 
subsistence purposes. A confluence of a lengthy history, geology, and the dwindling fortunes 
of the economy has seen Zimbabwe being host to one of the largest ASM sectors to date.  
 Table 6.1: Size of ASM in different countries 
Country ASM size 
Bolivia 72,000 
Brazil 10,000 
Burkina Faso 100,000–200,000 
Central African Republic > 100,000 
China 3,000,000–15,000,000 










                                                          





Papua New Guinea 50,000–60,000 
South Africa 10,000 




Zimbabwe 1 500 000 
Source: Zimbabwe Miners Federation; Buxton, 2013 
 
As the table 7.1 shows, Zimbabwe is only second to the DRC in Africa in terms of the size of 
the ASM sector and the fourth largest in the world. This makes Zimbabwe a country with 
probably the highest per capita ASM dependants. With the country’s unemployment rate 
hovering around 95% and the second highest inflation rate in the world of 300%, millions of 
young engage in mining to earn a living (Chin’ono, 2019; Samaita, 2019). The enormous 
numbers of the ASM raise two interesting possibilities or prospects.  
 
Firstly it means the sector has the potential to contribute a significant share of mineral output 
especially gold and thus earn the country much needed foreign currency. If well managed and 
allowed to flourish, the ASM sector has the potential to become an important economic player. 
Secondly, its big numbers make it too large a voting constituency for the politicians to ignore 
making it potentially politically important. One of the major reasons behind the tremendous 
growth of the ASM is the economic crisis that has plagued Zimbabwe in the recent past which 
saw people resorting to rudimentary mining for survival. Mabhena (2012) suggests that the 
1990s Economic and Structural Adjustment Policy (ESAP) forced many people out of work in 
Zimbabwe, which had many of them resorting to gold panning to make a living. Spiegel (2014) 
notes that at the height of the economic crisis in 2008 about 1 in 4 Zimbabweans depended on 
income from the ASM sector. This somehow had the effect of escalating and intensifying the 
class struggle in the sector between the ruling class and the small workers in the mining sector 
as will be detailed below. 
 
The ASM, as the name suggests, consists of two categories, the artisanal and small-scale 
miners. Artisanal miners are basically those who work small claims with simple tools like picks 
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and shovels. They do not employ any workers, they move from place to place in search of 
richer claims, are often not registered and are not permanent miners as they usually engage in 
mining when the farming season is over (See Mawowa, 2013). In Zimbabwe they are locally 
referred to as Amakorokoza/Makorokoza (gold panners). They can work individually or as a 
family. Mabhena (2012) points out that the ASM sector conducts mining in three areas which 
include old disused mines; small open cast virgin claims using simple tools like picks and 
shovels, and small underground claims. The small-scale miners are relatively more stable, some 
of them are formally registered, work comparatively bigger claims and may employ a few 
people (less than 50) (Buxton 2013). 
 
The processes involved in the extraction of gold depends on where the gold panning is taking 
place. Riverbank panning is a labour-intensive process (Pact, 2016). The first step is to explore 
the site for gold. Upon satisfaction that a specific site on the riverbank may have gold, the 
miners then dig and collect huge quantities of a mixture of soil and gold (Mabhena, 2012). The 
next step is sieve so as to separate the soil from the mud containing the gold ore. Miners use 
water to wash the gold ore from the mud. They then use a chemical known as mercury to get 
the actual gold itself by dissolving other impurities in the gold ore (Buxton, 2013). The final 
step is to burn the mixture of mercury and gold ore to remove the former and the gold is ready 
for the market. Mining in disused mines and underground claims is different from mining in 
riverbanks. Miners have to go about a kilometre underground to extract gold. They can spend 
days underground as such they take food and other implements with them to cook and battery-
powered or paraffin lights since it is dark underground (See Mabhena, 2012). Miners use 
explosives (locally known as mahora) to blast the rock thought to contain gold. The rocks are 
then carried out of the tunnel either crushed manually or sent to the millers (Pact, 2016). Once 
the gold ore is crushed, water is then used to sieve the gold and mercury is applied to get the 
gold itself. 
 
The GoZ distinguishes between LSM and ASM in terms of the size of output, the latter fall 
into the category of those who produce less than 15kgs of gold per year. Artisanal miners do 
not engage in mining with a view to accumulate profit but rather as a direct source of living or 
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survival.53 Whatever they earn from mining they spend on their basic needs. Small scale miners 
on the other hand fit, with qualification, the label of petty bourgeoisie in the sense that they 
employ a few people and, in some cases, reinvest part of their income to expand their 
businesses. However, like artisanal miners, they by and large operate unregistered which makes 
them vulnerable to victimisation by law enforcement agents. According to ZMF of the more 
than 1000 000 ASM operatives only about 40 000 are registered. The ZMF is engaged in a 
mobilization and education campaign to get more ASM players registered54. The ASM 
operators are predominantly based in the gold and chrome sectors55. The ASM sector has the 
potential to be an important economic player in the country by helping increase the generation 
of forex. According to Kuwaza (2019) the ASM sector in Zimbabwe produced 6.6 tonnes of 
gold out of a total of 10.8 tonnes in the first five months of 2019. In 2018 the ASM sector 
delivered 21,7 tonnes of gold out of a total of 33, 2 tonnes thus far surpassing the LSM 
producers and contributing hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue (Chingwere, 2019). 
 
This demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that the ASM sector is fast becoming a serious 
player in the mining sector that has to be taken seriously. It is a class of small producers, who 
if engaged, have the potential to contribute, in a substantial way, to the welfare interests of the 
country’s most vulnerable especially in the rural areas where the ASM players are largely based 
(Mawowa, 2013; Bello and Bybee, 2014). Moreover, the ASM sector is dominated, by and 
large, by indigenous citizens, if the government is serious about making the indigenization 
policy a success in the mining sector, it makes sense for the policy makers to focus on where 
the indigenous people are located within the minerals sector. A pro-indigenization approach 
would empower the ASM operators to maximize their capacity and realize better output. 
However, such a tremendous growth in the economic surplus produced in the ASM only raises 
the stakes in the battle for its appropriation.  
 
 
                                                          
53 Interview with a mineral economist at Ministry of Mines offices in Bulawayo (Henceforth I-11) (27 September 
2017). 




6.3 State -ASM relations 
 
 6.3.1 Class Alliance: Historical perspective (1990-2005)  
 
The relations between the government of Zimbabwe and the ASM sector in the country have 
been characterised by a constant state flux. The government has over the years changed its 
stance on the ASM sector from accommodative and progressive to brutal and violent. Between 
the 1990s and the mid-2000s the government had progressive policies earmarked to promote 
the ASM sector. The Mining Regulations of 1991 stipulated in the Statutory Instrument (SI) 
275 decentralized the management and administration of the ASM granting the Rural District 
Councils (RDCs) the authority to issue licenses to prospective miners and enforce 
environmental protection measures (See Spiegel, 2015; Pact, 2016). Some of the terms of the 
regulations included the prohibition of mining along river banks, working of pits more than 
one-and-half meters deep and the use of mechanised equipment was disallowed. Under these 
regulations, programmes to fund small-scale miners were developed. For example, the micro-
finance scheme called Mining Industry Loan Fund (MILF) (established in 1904) meant to 
provide credit lines to the ASM sector was revived. However, MILF was discontinued in 2000 
as the government cited administrative difficulties. It was later replaced by the Mining Industry 
Development Fund (MIDF) in 2004. Amongst other things the new fund sought to provide 
financial and material support, access to plant, equipment and tools, and subsidise the cost of 
mining (Mine Entra Exhibition, 2004). This would go a long way in improving the 
capitalization and sustainability of small-scale mines. Granting the RDCs authority to issue 
mining permits was a major step towards reforming a process that had been centralized by the 
Ministry of Mines, often to the detriment of small-scale miners because the country’s mining 
laws favoured the large-scale mines (Spiegel, 2015). The regulations coincided with a sharp 
increase in the number of ASM operators in the context of a deteriorating economy that forced 
many to engage in mining. 
  
The SI 275 was soon followed by the 1993 Harare Guidelines on Small-scale Mining crafted 
by the government in conjunction with the UN Department for Economic and Social 
Development. Under this plan, the government sought to explore strategies of streamlining and 
accelerating the formalization of ASM and providing it with means to improve their mining 
techniques and productivity. In that direction, the government passed SI 271 allowing mining 
214 
 
activities in some river banks under local authority supervision and SI 328 in 1993 which 
decentralized gold buying agencies to make the legal market accessible. International 
organizations were also roped in from countries like Germany and Sweden to help with 
expertise and knowledge on mining issues and the necessary technology. Organizations such 
as the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) and the Netherlands 
Development Association were active in districts like Insiza in Matabeleland South province 
where the ASM sector was growing (Chachage et al, 1993). They offered training programmes 
on environmental management and other effective ways of conducting mining. Another 
progressive move by the government in support of the ASM sector was to facilitate the building 
of local mill centres where small miners could process their ore and also at the same time 
receive training and education on the procedures of legalization. For example, the ITDG was 
instrumental in the establishment of the Shamva milling plant which serviced small miners 
from the surrounding areas at affordable prices (See Chachage et al, 1993).  
 
To encourage the formalization and legalization of the ASM and reduce black market leakages 
the government of Zimbabwe in the 1990s offered favourable prices for small scale miners 
which at times surpassed the international market rates of over US$300 the time (Spiegel, 
2015). As such the 1990s to the early 2000s saw the government going the extra mile in 
providing support to the ASM in Zimbabwe to encourage formalization and increase gold 
deliveries to the government. Most of the policies were designed with a win-win mindset. The 
government took steps to promote the indigenous small-scale miners through funding and 
technical assistance a move consistent with the goals of indigenization and economic 
empowerment. In the colonial era, as discussed in the fifth chapter, the government only funded 
white-settler ASM players making it virtually impossible for the indigenous people to venture 
into a capital-intensive industry like mining. Government policies between 1990 and mid-
2000s were transformative in the sense that they were expediting the representation of 
indigenes in an industry that was formerly dominated by white-settlers. A new class of 
indigenous ASM operators was formed and the government played an important role. The state 
was instrumental, albeit with limited resources, in nurturing an emergent indigenous petty 
bourgeoisie in the mining sector. However, the period after 2006 saw the relations between the 
ruling class and the ASM breakdown completely as the government dealt with the ASM in an 
unduly heavy-handed way. 
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6.3.2 Breakdown of ruling class-ASM alliance: violence and disempowerment 
(2006-2015) 
 
Towards the end of 2006 the government of Zimbabwe through the Joint Operations Command 
(JOC)56 launched a violent campaign code-named Operation Chikorokoza Chapera (End 
Illegal Mining) ostensibly to curb rampant smuggling of gold through the black market. One 
of the most prominent instigators of the intervention was the then Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
Governor Gideon Gono who argued that illegal miners were bleeding the country of hard 
currency and the government had to take drastic measures to contain the situation (See Mail 
and Guardian, 2006). He blamed the country’s declining gold production on the smuggling 
activities of illegal miners who were selling gold to illegal dealers from countries like Botswana 
and South Africa. The operation was set in the context of a deteriorating economic environment 
characterized by runaway hyperinflation (over 1000 percent) which rendered the Zimbabwean 
currency almost worthless (Wines, 2006). Amid the hyperinflation, the ASM miners could only 
get a fraction of the international prices by selling gold to the government agencies thus 
condemning themselves to losses. 
 
Despite these hostile conditions, the government was adamant that small miners deliver their 
gold to the designated government entities - the Fidelity Printers Refineries (FPR). The country 
having run dry of any hard currency, what would ordinarily be a game of cat and mouse 
between the government and the ASM miners soon became a matter of life and death. Gold 
was the only source of hard currency and the ruling class was desperate to get its hands on it to 
fund its activities. The poor ASM operators residing mostly in the rural areas had their only 
lifeline in mining. Since the country was in an economic crisis, they could only turn to mining 
for survival (See Mabhena, 2012; Mawowa, 2013). However, understandably, the ASM sector 
went around government channels and sold their gold in the illegal market where they could 
fetch far higher prices. As figure 7.2 above shows, the ASM sector continued to grow in the 
first decade of the 21st century, but there was no corresponding growth in the gold deliveries 
made to the designated government entities. 
  
                                                          
56 The Joint Operations Command is a council of Zimbabwe’s security apparatus which includes the CIO, ZDF and 
the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). (Tendi, 2013) 
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Figure 6.1: Growth of ASM and gold deliveries made to FPR between 2003 and 2009. 
 
Source: Mawowa, S. (2013: 927) 
For example, in 2009, the ASM sector produced about 25 000 kilograms of gold but only 5000 
kilograms were recorded. The deficit of 20000 kilograms was probably sold in the rampant 
black market where artisanal miners sought buyers for their gold. Having failed to tame the 
ASM and the black market, the government repealed the SI 275 that had been adopted in the 
1990s thus stripping the local government of the authority to manage local miners (Pact, 2016). 
By so doing, the government also recriminalized the ASM creating and peddling a discourse 
painting them as enemies of the national interest who sold national resources for a song at the 
expense of the country’s well-being.  
 
The process was recentralized by the Mines Ministry which accused local authorities of lacking 
the capacity to effectively oversee the activities of the ASM in their areas especially in stopping 
the smuggling of gold through the illegal market (Speigel, 2014). The repeal of the SI 275 had 
the effect of marginalizing the ASM sector which was not catered for under the country’s 
principal mining law: the Mines and Minerals Act. The SI 275 had afforded the ASM a path to 
legalization and formalization, thus its withdrawal meant that they were effectively 
delegitimized and shut out of the country’s mineral economy. Moreover, the ASM was already 
suffering from neglect by the government as shown by a weak regulatory framework which 
was even more poorly reinforced. Instead of building on the little that was there, the 
government effectively illegalized the ASM sector by discarding the SI 275. Thus, the ground 
was prepared to sell the government’s operation and justify the violent treatment of the ASM 
operators. A class struggle pitting the ruling class against the indigenous small-scale miners 




Under the guise of restoring sanity to the ASM sector, the government unleashed the nation-
wide police operation on the 21st of November 2006, which sought to forcefully remove ASM 
operators from their areas. As always, the side with the superior means of violence carried the 
day as the State ruthlessly crashed illegal miners killing, maiming and incarcerating many. 
About 600 police officers were deployed all over the country particularly in Gwanda, Insiza, 
Kwekwe and Marange where ASM operations were most intense. By the end of 2006 the 
operation was going full throttle. Just weeks after the launch of the operation, then police 
spokesperson Oliver Mandipaka was quoted as saying “according to figures coming from our 
10 provinces we have so far arrested 16 290 illegal gold panners and dealers since the launch 
of the current operation” (Mail and Guardian, 28 December 2006). Thousands of miners were 
arrested (about 25 000 according to some reports) and tens of thousands more lost their sources 
of income as a result of the disturbances (Speigel, 2015). More than US$7 million worth of 
precious minerals was confiscated by the police. In Marange diamond fields, where the 
government had earlier encouraged artisanal miners to mine for diamonds, scores of people 
were arrested while more than 200 people were killed when the police descended on the area. 
 
In an incisive research study on artisanal mining in Kwekwe, an area in central Zimbabwe, 
Mawowa (2013) lucidly reveals the structures and forces behind the primitive accumulation 
that takes place in the ASM sector. Prominent figures within the ruling party, Zanu-PF, have 
been known to use their links to the security sector and control of mafia gangs and shady 
syndicates to benefit immensely from artisanal mining. What transpired demonstrates that 
despite the government’s efforts to cast the ASM as an alien, it turned out to be the Holy Grail 
which the ruling class wanted to grab at all costs. This is because the numerous gold claims for 
which the country’s geology is famous for, were a low hanging fruit in that they yielded 
substantial returns and yet did not require huge sums of money to invest in, unlike large-scale 
mines. At the time the operation was launched, the country’s economy was on a free fall which 
made it impossible even for the country’s political heavyweights to extract rents or make any 
investment in large-scale mines. The only place that could bring relief was the ASM sector. 
Far from being marginalized, the ASM sector soon became the site of a vicious class struggle 
pitting the ruling class and the ASM operators. Mawowa (2013) reported that police syndicates 
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were formed during 2007 to extract rents from artisanal miners whom they were supposed to 
stop from carrying out any mining activities: 
A new gold-rush site in Bhamala (near Totororo) was heavily guarded by the police, who were charging 
Z$3 million (R200 – a fee equivalent to a policeman’s monthly salary in July 2007) per hour spent in the 
tunnel. Miners grateful to the police for managing access, creating order and averting violent conflict were 
happy to pay, and entered in groups of eight to ten each turn. Thus an apparently mutually beneficial 
relationship was established between artisanal miners and law enforcers in this instance, unlike the case of 
Marange diamonds. (Mawowa, 2013: 934) 
 
Zanu-PF politicians worked together with the RBZ and Ministry of Mines to obtain mining 
permits which they would use to exploit artisanal miners. Mawowa (2013) reveals that artisanal 
mining in Kwekwe was controlled by two powerful syndicates in the days of Operation 
Chikorokoza. One of the syndicates was believed to be linked to the current President 
Emmerson Mnangagwa (then Minister of Defence - 2007) rumoured to have access to the 
South African market. The other group involved a local traditional leader linked to RBZ 
officials and business people with connections to Zanu-PF (Ibid). This goes to show the extent 
to which the ruling class is deeply involved in looting and appropriation in the ASM sector. 
Members of the ruling class use their influence and access to state resources to exploit and 
extort money from defenceless artisanal miners. This mode of fighting (deploying security 
forces) soon created another class of police officers who, not immune from the economic 
hardships, did not hesitate to grab the feeding trough. The police as the go-between were 
strategically placed to extort as much money as they could from the artisanal miners at the base 
and forward to their masters at the top just enough to retain their trust (Manwere, 2007).  
  
Another study in Insiza District in Matabeleland North province where the operation and police 
violence were most intense, revealed the deeply politicised nature of the operation itself and 
illegal appropriation methods of the political elite. Speigel (2014) found in his study that a 
small mine owned by a Zanu-PF parliamentarian was left free to operate while the rest of the 
miners were subjected to intense police harassment. The operation was such that it did not 
discriminate between registered and unregistered miners as both became victims of 
dispossession.  
In the early period of the crackdown, allegations were publicly made by the Police Commissioner that elite 
politicians were benefiting from the unregulated gold rush. Later on, a wider spectrum of political elites 
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was identified as profiting heavily as Operation Chikorokoza Chapera proceeded (including powerful 
Members of Parliament and Gideon Gono, Governor of the Reserve Bank). (Speigel, 2014: 552) 
Such observations show the extent to which the ruling class and the most powerless class in 
the country’s mining sector are intimately linked. High ranking government officials and 
prominent politicians were pulling strings behind the scenes to maximize their accumulation 
from the ASM sector.  
 
When local artisanal miners were denied rights to mine in the Insiza District, six Chinese 
mining companies were granted rights to conduct riverbed mining. It is believed they paid hefty 
amounts of money to secure permission to mine from the Mines Ministry despite the amount 
of environmental damage this was causing which ironically was one of the reasons which the 
government used to justify its violent actions against the ASM in the area. One member of the 
local district council noted in an interview that “the Chinese are too big and connected to 
powerful people. They cannot be resisted, but we have received a computer and some cement 
for a school” (Speigel, 2014: 556). This gives the impression that Operation Chikorokoza 
Chapera was not motivated by the need to reverse environmental degradation or curb the 
smuggling of gold. Instead, it was a ruling class operation that sought to assert their control of 
the ASM sector to ensure they benefit themselves, far from advancing any national interests. It 
was about the ownership of the only goose that laid the golden eggs at a time when everything 
else was crumbling. 
 
The events of the ASM sector in Zimbabwe should also be placed within the context of the 
country’s politics – especially regarding the ruling party’s factional wars. Just like the Marange 
diamonds fields became a battlefield of the different factions inside the ruling party. There is 
reason to believe that the ASM sector has also become a political football amongst the political 
elite in Zanu-PF (Hunter, 2019). President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his long-time loyalist, 
who is also current Minister of State Security, Owen Ncube, have been cited as some of the 
prominent people controlling the ASM activities in Kwekwe and other surrounding areas 
(Mabhena, 2012; Mawowa, 2013; Speigel, 2014). At the forefront of calling for the violent 
crackdown on ASM miners was Mugabe loyalist, former RBZ Governor, Gideon Gono (Mail 
and Guardian, 2006). At the helm of the police was another Mugabe loyalist, former Police 
Commissioner General, Agustine Chihuri. As such, looked at from another angle, it would 
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appear that Operation Chikorokoza Chapera was an attempt by a certain faction in Zanu-PF to 
strip Mnangagwa and his loyalists of the control of a vital sector of the country’s economy. 
There are also numerous cases where ministers and high-ranking politicians in Zanu-PF have 
been embroiled in the fight for the control of small-scale mines. In a recent wave of violence, 
police arrested 63 illegal miners known as ‘MaShurugwi’57 in Mazowe, a place in Mashonaland 
Central province, who were wielding machetes and harassing local villagers boasting that they 
were linked to Minister Owen Ncube (Mushava and Sithole, 2019). A Zanu-PF Silobela 
Member of Parliament (MP) Mthokozisi Mpofu was reported by a local miner to a 
parliamentary committee for threatening to grab their mine (Matanhike, 2019). As such, the 
events in the ASM sector are a manifestation of the factional dynamics within the ruling party 
Zanu-PF. 
 
Another prominent area of focus during the Operation was the Marange diamond fields where 
a government-induced diamond rush had seen 30 000 to 35 000 artisanal miners descend on 
the area in search of fortune. This decision was made, firstly, to discard the rights of the British 
company Africa Consolidated Resources (ACR) which had made the discovery after months 
of exploration. Secondly, it was a ruling class plan to appropriate proceeds coming from the 
artisanal miners by placing government buyers on site to whom artisanal miners were ordered 
to sell their diamonds (Partnership Africa Canada, 2010). However, this strategy failed to 
materialize as the government agents were short for cash and were beaten by competition from 
illegal buyers who offered higher prices coming from South Africa and Mozambique. Livid 
that things were not going according to plan the ruling elite unleashed its police on the artisanal 
miners. Just a few months after the government explicitly gave its blessings to artisanal miners 
to dig for diamonds in the name of economic empowerment, the same government unleashed 
its police force which sought to clear the area of artisanal miners in the most brutal of ways 
(See Human Rights Watch, 2009; Global Witness, 2017). Purportedly sent in to stop illegal 
mining, the police soon became the central perpetrators and beneficiaries of the illegal 
smuggling of diamonds out of Marange: 
When the police started guarding the diamond fields in Chiadzwa, we could easily bribe them. At the end 
of 2006, we used to gain access to the fields simply by giving the police a pack of cigarettes, a can of beer 
or mutsege (roasted nuts). At one time we even devised a plan with three gwejelines (women) in my team 
                                                          
57 They are called MaShurugwi because they come from Shurugwi, a place in the Midlands province, from where 
the Minister Owen Ncube hails. 
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where the women had sex with the six police on guard and, while they attended to the police, we were 
digging for diamonds. (Human Rights Watch (2009: 20)) 
 
With time, the police could not simply accept bribes but resorted to forming syndicates with 
groups of illegal miners whom they provided with security and granted access to the fields. 
The terms binding the syndicates were that the proceeds from diamonds were to be shared 
between the police and the miners. Some members of the police-force who spoke to the Human 
Rights Watch said they had secured contacts with diamond buyers themselves such that they 
did not have to depend on the miners to sell the diamonds but could sell the diamonds 
themselves (HRW, 2009). In yet more evidence that Operation Chikorokoza Chapera was little 
more than an exercise in primitive accumulation the Sunday Times reported that: 
These so-called diamond barons were working for the personal accounts of a select wealthy few, the sharks 
at the top of the military and security services — people such as General Constantine Chiwenga, the 
ambitious, thuggish army chief; Emmerson Mnangagwa, the wealthy defence minister; the late General 
Solomon Mujuru, [former commander of the national army], and his wife, Joice, [President] Mugabe’s 
vice-president; Gideon Gono, governor of the [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe] and Augustine Chihuri, the 
powerful police chief. And, of course, the Mugabes themselves. (Sunday Times (UK), ‘Robert Mugabe’s 
dirty diamonds’, 4 April 2010) 
The operation was the culmination of factionalism within the ruling class in which one of the 
factions used state power to brutal effect trying to undermine the power of the other faction. 
The ruling class criminalized, outlawed and targeted an entire class of the mining sector 
dominated by indigenous people. The ASM sector was already the least rewarding (partly 
because it was the least supported) sector of the mining industry (See Mawowa, 2013). 
Operating in a hostile environment, the ASM sector already supported the livelihoods of 2-3 
million citizens - not a small number by any standard. Saunders (2008) also lamented that the 
elite-driven actions were victimizing ASM miners who only wanted to earn a living in mining. 
If the government was serious about indigenizing the economy and particularly the mining 
industry, then promoting the growth of the ASM sector was the best place to start. However, 
the ruling class chose instead to decimate the sector by totally criminalizing it. The ASM sector 
in Zimbabwe has the potential if adequately supported to tilt the balance in the structure of the 
mining sector away from the big foreign-owned companies. This would achieve the goals of 





The operation only succeeded in pushing indigenous Zimbabweans out of the only corner of 
the mineral economy which could be used as a springboard to climb up the ladder of the mining 
structure to the LSM sector. The operation also left implications on the nature of the post-
colonial state in Zimbabwe. First, it proved that the state had not transformed from the colonial 
state. Violence, not dialogue, was its default move in getting its way (See also Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2007; Magure, 2009). Suffice to say it was a classic neo-colonial state. Second, it 
betrayed the ideological bankruptcy of the ruling class which Fanon (1961) so thoroughly 
bemoaned. The lack of ideological grounding undermined the possibility of cohesion and 
harmony within the ruling class rank itself. Thirdly and more importantly, as Sachikonye 
(2011) also argued, the resort to the use of force to pursue looting adventures proved the decay 
of state institutions which include the parliament, the judiciary, the executive and the regulatory 
agencies. Hence state power was scandalously captured by an unholy alliance of the political 
and security elite setting light years back the transformation of the country’s mining sector. 
  
6.4 Barriers to formalization: Structural obstacles to ASM growth  
 
The success of the indigenization policy hinges on the growth of the ASM sector where 
indigenous people have the capacity to invest. However, the class formation of indigenous 
ASM players is being stunted by overbearing state intervention and regulation in the sector. 
The Zimbabwean ruling class has resorted to using state institutions and structures to 
appropriate surplus produce from the ASM players. This section discusses government-
induced structural challenges facing the ASM sector. A 2015 report by PACT revealed the 
following costs that ASM miners incur to begin operating: 
 Table 6.2a: Cost of starting a gold mine in Zimbabwe 
ITEM  COST 
Required certifications US$3,220 
Necessary Equipment  US$12,300 
TOTAL  US$15, 520 
 
Table 6.2b: Cost of operating a milling plant in Zimbabwe 
ITEM COST 
Authorization  US$12,300 
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Construction of a Mill US$68,250 
Connecting electricity US$13,000 
TOTAL  US$93, 550 
Source: PACT (2016: 54) 
 
These costs are exorbitant and beyond the reach of many in a country like Zimbabwe with a 
GDP per capita of just US$1200 (World Bank, 2018). Getting through the bureaucratic process 
to establish a gold mine takes close to 158 days while setting up a milling plant takes about 
271 days (Pact, 2016). Such huge inefficiencies and capital requirements have kept many 
indigenous citizens outside of the formal sector of the mining industry. An interview with an 
official of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF) revealed that lack of access to capital is 
one of the biggest challenges small miners have to face: 
Funding and access to capital is a problem. Banks do not trust the MMA certificate that miners hold as 
they feel it is not a title deed. In 2014 $100 million was unveiled for small scale miners but it never 
materialised. It was a loan from China trying to mechanise ASM but it didn’t work. (Interview with 
Dosman, Mangisi, 23 December 2017)  
Moreover, miners have to deal with other costs if they are operating formally. For example, 
Fidelity Printers Royalty (FPR) is the sole legal gold buyer in Zimbabwe. When miners sell 
their gold they are charged a royalty fee of 3.5% and FPR charges of 5% that include the cost 
of cash withdrawal and transportation costs for exporting the gold, thus the miner ends up 
getting 91.5% of the stated price (Pact, 2016). Further, in a meeting of ASM players held at the 
end of 2018, the ZMF president Henrietta Rushwaya lamented the payment method used by 
FPR. The government agent pays 70% US$ cash and 30% bank transfer yet the parallel market 
pays 100% cash (Sibanda, 2018). The money transferred through the banks, being in the form 
of bond notes does not have the same value as the US$, which is a further loss for the miners. 
The illegal market feeds off these cuts in profits to lure the gold miners with a better deal and 
price for their gold. The centralization of gold buying itself smacks of a ruling class attempt at 
appropriation. 
  
Operating formally is a very expensive undertaking for the majority of small-scale miners who 
have to foot a huge tax bill and other charges during operations. In an additional interview 
another ZMF member complained that there is:  
224 
 
“No harmonization of the fiscal policy58. Rural District Councils (RDC) charge miners anything between 
$50 and $700 while the Environmental Management Agency does not distinguish between large-scale 
miners and ASM”. (Interview with Gideon Moyo, 10 January, 2018)  
Miners are charged a royalty of 3% for every gold sale, they remit income taxes to the 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), a carbon tax and a quarterly Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) fee of US$250. In addition, miners are also required to pay a yearly license 
fee of US$250 to the Ministry of Mines, also pay an agreed fee to the RDC as well as pay some 
money to the National Social Security Association (NSSA) on behalf of their employees. In an 
interview with one of the country’s dailies the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF) Vice-
President bemoaned the tough environment the miners have to operate in. He said the carbon 
permit costs US$500, explosives cost about US$2000 and the Environmental Management 
Agency (EMA) charges miners up to US$5000 annually. As a result, it becomes hard for miners 
to meet production targets (Nyoni, 2017). Related to this is the incompetency and corruption 
that has tarnished EMA’s image. In May 2019 two EMA officials were suspended for soliciting 
a bribe from a mine manager in Shamva who failed to produce the mandatory EIA certificate 
for his mine (Sithole, 2019). EMA also seems to be failing to curb environmental destruction 
as a result of ASM activities in the country. According to a study conducted by the Zimbabwe 
Environmental Lawyers Association (ZELA) in 2019 in Runde Rural District, of the 171 
mining sites investigated in the area, 135 showed negative environmental impact including 
open pits, land degradation and deforestation (ZELA, 2019: 16). Langa (2019) also notes that 
EMA has complained about the majority of small-scale miners failing to respect mining 
regulations hence leading to avoidable disasters.  
 
Saddled with such exorbitant charges, the majority of small-scale miners are effectively shut 
out of the industry. Most miners prefer going the informal direction where they would not have 
to pay these costs. However informal operations suffer criminalization and victimization at the 
hands of the law enforcement agents. According to a 2015 report by Pact, artisanal miners have 
to pay fines of about US$200 to the police, US$500 to the Criminal Investigation Department 
(Minerals) (CID) and also have to bribe doctors should they get injured while mining (2016: 
55). Thus, the government is not doing any good to the indigenization agenda if it chokes 
prospective indigenous mining entrepreneurs with expenses they cannot afford. Moreover, this 
                                                          
58 Fiscal policy is the plethora of taxes and other charges miners have to pay to public institutions. 
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can also be viewed in the context of the class struggle. The government officials may be using 
this as a rent-seeking opportunity to extort more money from the small-scale miners, the most 
disadvantaged class in the mining sector. 
  
The miners in the ASM sector are subjected to legal amnesia because the MMA – the country’s 
principal mining law - does not have specific recognition of the ASM enterprises. In an 
interview, Dosman Mangisi, of ZMF complained that:  
“MMA does not have proper elaboration of ASM. Organisations like EMA, RDCs have a one-size-fits-all 
approach. They do not distinguish between LSM and ASM and thus small mines struggle to meet the 
requirements of these institutions”. (23 December, 2017)  
Excluded from the principal mining legislation, the ASM operators are stripped of any legal 
rights of its own hence its vulnerability to harassment by law enforcement officials or other 
rent-seeking government departments. ASM operators also face a legal nightmare as they have 
to contend with a long list of different laws administered by different ministries: 
The Explosives Act should be clear on what is expected of the ASM operators. Gold Trade Act should 
clarify issues around possession and declaration of gold so that people are not charged with contravening 
the law when they are selling it. We have problems with Environmental Management Act, Local Authority 
Act and the MMCZ Act which should be reformed. MMCZ should do more to promote mining and reach 
out to miners around the country. (Interview with ZMF official (henceforth I-12), 27 December 2017) 
 
The Explosives Act (Chapter 10: 08) regulates the procurement, movement and usage of 
explosives overseen by the Ministry of Mines. Miners use explosives (locally known as 
mahora) to break rock so they can drill deeper. Miners need a licence from the government to 
buy and use explosives. However, Dembetembe (2018) notes that many small-scale miners 
have been priced out of the $2000 explosives licence and hence acquire explosives illegally. 
The Environmental Management Act is administered by the Ministry of Environment while 
the Local Authority Act falls under the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Gold 
Trade Act falls under the Ministry of Finance. Other Acts miners have to deal with include the 
Rural District Councils Act (Ministry of Rural Development), the Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority Act (Ministry of Environment and Water Resources) and the Land Acquisition Act 
(Ministry of Lands). Thus, having to deal with such a huge number of government departments 
would be choking for any industry and it makes the governance of the mining sector a 
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nightmare. This is possibly part of the reason why most miners prefer not to register at all as 
abiding by all these laws is an onerous and expensive task which only the LSM (with difficulty 
even then) can afford. The government will have to streamline all these laws and the tax heads 
to promote efficiency and mitigate unnecessary losses of revenue. 
 
The indigenization and transformation of the mining sector is also dependant on the relations 
between the ASM and the LSM sectors. The latter is financially and technologically dominant 
and mostly foreign while the former suffer financial and technological limitations and almost 
wholly indigenous. One represents actual foreign capital, the other represents potential local 
capital. Buxton (2016) notes that while the LSM can bring better technologies and 
environmental management techniques, it can also push the ASM players into less lucrative 
areas. In return, the ASM can violate the property rights of the LSM operators and cause 
security problems. A good example is the case of the Marange Diamond fields where the British 
company ACR held the title to the claim. However, the discovery of the diamonds drew a large 
influx of ASM operators that the company could not control and the government was not 
willing to control. The relations of the two sectors have been tense in Zimbabwe but show some 
form of progress and cordiality of late. In an interview, I-12 had the following to say about the 
relations between the ASM and LSM sectors in Zimbabwe: 
We have a good relationship with the LSM. We struck a memorandum of understanding with the Chamber 
of Mines whereby ASM operators are allowed to mine some of the areas that large mines are not mining 
through TRIBUTE facilities. Some LSM like Falcon Gold, Metallon Gold, Freda Rebecca, Mimosa and 
all those are assisting with expertise and equipment……Millions of people depend on mining and therefore 
the local people need to have preferential treatment. We cannot allow a situation whereby some investor 
comes and pegs 1000 hectares for chrome mining and then leave them lying idle. Zimplats and ZIMASCO 
have released claims along the Great Dyke which they are not using. They are now being mined by ASM 
which has also improved productivity. (Interview with I-12 – 27 December 2017) 
 
The major reason behind the government seizing 50% of Zimasco and ZimAlloys chrome fields 
was that they had no plan to use the land in the next 50 to 100 years. Therefore, instead of 
letting the land lie unused it was better to distribute it to the small-scale miners. In this case 
though, the LSM players had to be pushed by the government to cede some land to ASM 
operators. In 2011, Duration Gold, one of the biggest mining companies in the country 
committed to assist small-scale miners in Matabeleland North province represented by the Bubi 
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Small-scale Miners Association (BSSMA). Duration Gold pledged to donate a stamp mill, jack 
hammers, compressors and also inject technical expertise to help the ASM operators conduct 
more sustainable and effective mining. The chairman of the Duration Gold had the following 
to say about the new partnership: “The BSSMA is one such strategic partner because they have 
local membership and are committed to uplifting local people through an association formed 
and managed by local people”.59 
 
Helping to capitalize and build up local-owned mining enterprises is a positive step consistent 
with the goals of the indigenization programme. However, such gestures are still more of an 
exception rather than the rule. On being asked what the small-scale miners thought about the 
indigenization policy, the ZMF representatives were clear that they did not favour the equity 
acquisition model that was being pushed by the government: “the indigenization law is good, 
but what needs to be amended are the contents. In Botswana local people are given time to 
build their shares in mining investments. It cannot just be majority share ownership at once…I 
haven’t heard of any ASM operator purchasing shares under the Indigenization policy.” 
(Interview with I-13, a member of ZMF, 27 December, 2017). 
 
The equity-based indigenization model that was pursued by the Robert Mugabe-led 
government was clearly elitist and beyond the reach of small-time players like those in the 
ASM sector (See Bloch, 2009; Musewe, 2015). It is clear that the indigenization policy was 
designed without the interests and the plight of the ASM sector in mind. The indigenization 
policy seems to have been underpinned by the ruling class desire for self-enrichment through 
the disempowerment of indigenous mining entrepreneurs. The intervention of state institutions 
in the mining sector has been used not to increase indigenous representation but to advance the 
interests of the ruling elite. State apparatus is used as an instrument to appropriate the produce 
of the poorly resourced but hardworking indigenous petty bourgeoisie of the mining sector. 
The best way to increase the representation of indigenous black Zimbabweans and grow local 
capital in the mining sector is to equip and capacitate through skills, technology and finance 
the indigenous small-scale entrepreneurs. The government of Zimbabwe could have easily 
played the mid-wife of a rising class of indigenous mining entrepreneurs by nurturing those 
                                                          
59 ‘Duration Gold launches project to assist small-scale miners’, NewsDay, 12 May 2011. 
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that were already in the sector. Instead, the government has done everything to structurally and 
violently decimate a class with the most potential of contributing to the growth of a national 
indigenous class of mining entrepreneurs.  
 
Evans (1995) detailed how dynamic states in Brazil, South Korea and India managed to 
indigenize their information technology sectors by skilfully playing the roles of regulation, 
custodial, demiurge and husbandry. However, the conditions for playing these roles effectively 
were a vibrant bureaucracy and embedded autonomy. The Zimbabwean state seems to have 
neither of these. The state is instead captured by the ruling elite and the coercive organizations 
like the military and the police who engage in plunder and primitive accumulation. It is a state 
that exhibits some characteristics of what Cox (1987) referred to as a ‘protostate’. This is a 
state that exercises monopoly over the use of political force but lacks social consent or 
administration capacity for effective implementation of economic policy. 
 
7.5 The working class, indigenization and the mining sector 
 
The labour in the mining sector is one of the pivots of the transformation programme. The 
working class has a long and protracted history and indeed the story of the indigenization and 
transformation of Zimbabwe’s mining sector would be amiss without paying attention to 
labour. As discussed in depth in chapter five, the working class bore the brunt of the vicious 
colonial system in the mining sector in Zimbabwe informed by racial discrimination. 
Indigenous peoples, only ever used as a source of cheap labour in the country’s labour-intensive 
mines, could only participate in the mining sector as an over-exploited lumpen proletariat 
without enforceable rights. The ruling class and the foreign and settler bourgeoisie worked 
together to ensure the oppression and exploitation of the working class during the colonial era 
(See Bradbury and Worby, 1985). The bourgeoisie relied on the ruling class to guarantee 
supplies of cheap labour to which the latter dutifully obliged by unleashing state violence to 
force indigenous inhabitants to work the mines. Draconian pieces of legislation like the 
Industrial Conciliation Act (1934) were used to discriminate against black workers in the mines 
in terms of promotion and skills acquisition. The labour in foreign-owned mining companies 
is made up mostly of indigenous people. Therefore, any indigenization policy in the mining 
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sector had to cater for the working class especially because they have endured a long history 
of oppression and marginalization both in pre and post-independence eras.  
 
Awake to this, the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment General Regulations of 2010 
section 14, provided for the establishment of Employee Share Ownership Trusts (ESOTs). The 
ESOTs are one of the components that count as credits for complying with the indigenization 
law in foreign-owned companies. Section 14 (1) stipulates that “an employee share ownership 
scheme or trust may be taken into consideration when assessing the extent to which a business 
has achieved the minimum indigenization and empowerment quota” (General Regulations, 
2010). Thus, the government gave the targeted companies an option to indigenize their 
companies through the ceding of shares to their employees thus giving them a voice in the 
affairs of the company. According to the regulations, the ESOTs, to be considered for 
indigenization points, should hold at least five percent of the shares in a business (Ibid). The 
regulations further stipulate that indigenous Zimbabweans should comprise at least 75 percent 
of the ESOTs beneficiaries and managerial employees shall not make up more than 35 percent 
(Ibid, Section 14(2). Moreover, the ESOTs would be managed by a board of trustees where 
trustees with 51 percent voting rights are elected by non-managerial employees. Quite 
remarkably, section 14(4) of the regulations stipulates that “not less than fifty per centum of 
the employees benefitting in a qualifying scheme or trust must be either women or disabled 
persons or a combination of both women and disabled persons”. This is a unique section that 
shows sensitivity to the diversity of the indigenous citizens. 
  
Other components of the indigenization law are silent on the demographic balance of the 
indigenous beneficiaries thus making the indigenization schemes vulnerable to domination by 
a few powerful individuals (See Machinya, 2014). Crucially, section 14(5) states that the owner 
of a qualifying business “wishing to use the qualifying scheme or trust” should submit to the 
ministry Form IDG 04 accompanied by a Deed of Trust that certifies the ESOTs. Therein lies 
the weakness of the regulations in the sense that the establishment of the ESOT does not have 
an enforceable legal basis but just an option at the discretion of the companies targeted for 
indigenization. Thus, the issue of whether workers benefit from the indigenization of foreign-
owned companies is left completely at the discretion of the company owners who, seeking to 
maximize profit, are most likely to be hostile and antagonistic to the interests of the working 
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class. The Table 7.3 below shows a list of mining companies which submitted their IDG 04 
forms to the ministry of indigenization. In an interview conducted in the course of this research, 
a mining trade union official had this to say about the workers’ position concerning the 
indigenization policy: 
We do support indigenization. But we are looking at it from a different direction. We want our workers to 
be part of the indigenization process since they have the know-how and the skills. So if they are involved 
in the process they will be better players. 
It is like if you assist…there are some who are very keen in mining. If they are assisted to form their own 
mines, then they would be better players because they have got the knowledge, skills and safety aspects 
and so on. So we feel if they are given the opportunity or funds…actually mining is good in that you don’t 
really need to give somebody cash as such all you need to do is to give them equipment and when they 
start making money they repay the loan. (Interview with Mr Mushayakarara, 20 January 2018) 
 
From the excerpt of the interview above, it is surmised that the working class were fully on 
board and endorsed the indigenization policy. Although as expressed in the response, workers 
had a different vision on how they could be better emancipated and empowered by being 
assisted to start their own mines rather than being minority shareholders in big companies 
through the ESOTs. However, the ESOTs were going to be a small step which workers could 
use to generate the money they need through dividends to start their own mining ventures. The 
ESOTs, despite lacking a legal basis, would tilt the internecine power struggles between the 
working class and the bourgeoisie in the mining sector in favour of the former albeit not 
decisively. It was a significant step in the direction of the transformation and decolonization of 
the structure and the complexion of the mining industry in Zimbabwe.  
Table 7.3: List of foreign-owned mining enterprises who submitted plans to establish ESOTs  
Company Province Percentage 
Asmoya Investments Bulawayo 5% 
Baragon Trading Bulawayo 10% 
Epigene Pvt Ltd Bulawayo 10% 
Farvic Con. Mines Pvt Ltd Bulawayo 11% 
Filibeg Enterprises Pvt Ltd Bulawayo 5% 
Fools Investments Pvt Ltd Bulawayo 10% 
Jumping Track Mining 
Company 
Bulawayo 10% 
Sentinel Energies  Bulawayo 26% 
Sharity Invest  Bulawayo 26% 
Appuyer Enterprises Pvt Ltd Harare 5% 
Currycomb Investments Harare  10% 
231 
 
Galorem Resources Harare 5% 
Kilright Industries Pvt Ltd Harare 10% 
Mezziotin Investments  Harare 5% 
Sandvik Mining  Harare  5% 
Jinding Mining Zim Pvt Ltd. Manicaland 10% 
Murowa Diamonds Manicaland 5% 
Rolldice Mining Services Mashonaland Central 10% 
C.R.G Quarries Mashonaland East 15% 
Chegutu Gold Mine Mashonaland West  5% 
Denald Mining  Mashonaland West 5% 
Longlife Minerals Pvt Ltd Mashonaland West 6% 
Multibay Investments Mashonaland West 18% 
Over&Above Profit Ent. Ltd Mashonaland West 5% 
Stern Test Investments Pvt Ltd Mashonaland West 5% 
Zimplats Mashonaland West 5% 
Ashbast Corporation Masvingo 5% 
Don-Tom Invest Matabeleland North  26% 
Blanket Mine Pvt Ltd Matabeleland South  10% 
Imani Mine Matabeleland South  10% 
Marbil Mining Syndicate Matabeleland South  10% 
River Ranch Ltd Matabeleland South  6% 
Trianic Investments  Matabeleland South  5% 
Anglo American Corporation  Midlands 5% 
Dondo Resources Midlands 5% 
Drewland Mining Midlands 11% 
Homestake Mining Midlands 10% 
Yitho Mining  Midlands 6% 
Zol Mining Pvt Ltd Midlands 10% 
Adlecraft Investments  5% 
Alcohoonec Investments  5% 
ApexPetroleum  5% 
Better Mining Pvt Ltd  2% 
Beyond Measures Solutions  5% 
Bindura Nickel Corporation  5% 
Bronco Investments  5% 
Bunday Technical Mining  5% 
Chakata Resources  5% 
Charter Explorations  5% 
Dakota Mining  5% 
Drilling Resources Zimbabwe  5% 
Exmin Mine  10% 
Freeborn Investments  5% 
Genesis Top Quality Cleaners  5% 
Gold Recovery  5% 
Gransharp Enterprises  5% 
Gypbox Mining  5% 
Ifab Mining   11% 
INDOZIM Gold Mines  5% 
Jinwo Minerals Pvt Ltd  5% 
Joubert Crashers  5% 
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Lifescape Mines Pvt Ltd  5% 
Lonekop Mining Syndicate  5% 
Mahomack Trading   5% 
Massabi Coal  5% 
Mbusera Investments  10% 
Ming Chang Sino African 
Mining 
 5% 
Mitchell Mineral Pvt Ltd  26% 
 
Total Value Alloted to 
Employees 
 US$ 302 071 218 
Source: New African, 2013. 
 
According to the information on the table 7.3 workers in Zimbabwe’s mining sector were meant 
to receive over US$300 million through the various ESOTs established by mining companies 
across the country. However up to the time of writing this research in 2018 only one mining 
company, Blanket Mine in Matabeleland South, had managed to successfully set up an 
operational ESOT where 10 per cent of the company’s shares were transferred to the workers. 
Interviews with the trade union leaders and government officials confirmed that the setting up 
of ESOT schemes in the mining sector has largely happened on paper with literally nothing to 
show on the ground. In one interview, a mining trade union official had this to say about the 
indigenization policy vis-à-vis the working class: 
It is tricky as far as trade unions are concerned. It is good on paper and we have no problems with workers 
assuming ownership because it gives them more power. But because this thing is political your concerns 
are not addressed. Workers were not expected to buy shares but were entitled by virtue of being a worker. 
Politics was a problem. Its good on paper but practically nothing is happening. It was going to help workers 
a lot in negotiations. (Interview, with Mr Isaac Ndlovu, 19 September 2017) 
 
In a separate interview, the president of the National Mineworkers Union of Zimbabwe 
bemoaned the lack of progress in the establishment of ESOTs in the mining sector: 
It is good but the problem is it is taking too long to get started. We don’t seem to be moving. But it is a 
good idea. No ESOTs have been formed or are operational in the mining sector. No workers belong to any 
ESOTs. Workers don’t own any shares in the mining companies. (Interview with Mr Mushayakarara 20 
January 2018) 
Disappointingly for the working class, eight years after the gazette of the 2010 General 
Regulations out of which the idea of ESOTs was born, only one mining company out of over 
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400 qualifying companies has managed to set up an ESOT. The dismal failure of the ESOTs in 
the mining sector is yet another defeat for the indigenous working-class people and is 
attributable to many factors. The mine workers leaders believe the problem is fundamentally 
political because the ruling class has not shown any political willingness to improve the plight 
of the working class in the mining industry thus leaving the workers without a voice: 
No nothing has changed. The problem is the nature of our politics. The guys are selfish. They keep the 
information to themselves. Anything that should benefit other people they take the benefits. So they end 
up…..indigenization is about them. It is not about everybody. Nobody wants to talk about ownership. They 
will make sure that they keep that information away from us. There is no transparency and accountability. 
Without any transparency and good governance then indigenization is as good as dead. Everything is 
secretive. (Interview with a mineworker representative (Interview with Mr Mushayakarara, 20 January 
2018)  
 
The interview responses suggest that the indigenization process has been hijacked and captured 
by a few powerful individuals in the country’s political class. In the interview the respondent 
keeps saying ‘they’. Asked to clarify who ‘they’ refers to, the respondent quipped “the so-
called political heavyweights in government”.60 In another interview, a respondent cited 
conflict of interest as the major factor which has stalled progress with regards to the ESOTs in 
the mining sector. 
 “The problem is that some of the employers serve in government in high ranking offices. They are the 
ones who administer the law and make the law which puts the workers at a great disadvantage”. (Interview 
with Mr Isaac Ndlovu, 19 September 2017) 
This suggests that the ESOTs is not just a matter between the employers and the employees but 
the ruling class who also overlap with the bourgeoisie also has a vested interest as well. 
Individuals with close connections to high ranking government officials and NIEFF had 
acquired or were looking to acquire shares from mining companies. It is unlikely that the 
government officials, themselves actual or aspiring bourgeoisie, could support ceding power 
to the employees. Indeed, it was logically in the interests of the government and the ruling class 
to keep the working class powerless so they could extract more rents from the mine owners. A 
high-ranking government official in the department of indigenization had the following to say 
responding to questions of why ESOTs have failed in the mining sector:  
                                                          
60 Interview with NMWUZ President, Harare Zimbabwe, January 2018. 
234 
 
There is a struggle within a struggle. Zanu-PF is not a homogenous entity which has created problems for 
the implementation of the policy. Elitism is hampering the policy. You find someone is a politician, 
businessman and a Minister at the same time. That is why ESOTs have not been successful. Politicians do 
not want workers to have more power. (Interview with I-2, 21 January 2018, Harare Zimbabwe) 
 
This response, for someone who is responsible for administering and implementing the 
Indigenization is very telling. The “struggle within a struggle” implies that the ruling party, 
Zanu-PF, which is the champion of the indigenization policy is not pulling in the same 
direction. Without unity and harmony, government departments may find it impossible to 
coordinate their efforts to achieve desired outcomes. The official also directly attributed the 
lack of ESOT success in the mining sector to the conflict of interest that has compromised the 
integrity and sincerity of politicians who are supposed to supervise the implementation of the 
indigenization policy. The politicians’ appetite to accumulate more wealth means they see the 
ESOTs in a zero-sum framework whereby the gain of the workers becomes their loss as 
stakeholders in the mining sector. The working class is fighting a two-front struggle – one 
against mine-owners and one against the ruling class who both seek to maximize their 
accumulation at its expense.  
 
Further, the government has been dragging its feet in realigning the country’s laws to the new 
constitution that was passed in 2013 which granted the mineworkers a right to strike. Under 
the current Labour Relations Act, mineworkers do not have the right to strike thus undermining 
their bargaining position. “Strikes are not allowed and the Labour Act makes it difficult to 
strike. Although the new constitution allows strikes, the Labour Act has not been aligned to the 
constitution”.61 The most probable explanation for the ruling class’ failure to act swiftly to 
realign the Labour Act with the constitution is that keeping the working class disempowered 
serves its interests too. The state’s foothold in the mining sector is growing and being an 
employer, it would understandably wish to maintain a docile and disempowered workforce. 
The 2015 Supreme Court of Zimbabwe judgement (Nyamande & Another v ZUVA Petroleum 
(PVO Ltd (SC 281/14) [2015]), in which the court unanimously upheld the right of the 
employer to terminate an employee’s contract upon notice and absent any default or 
misconduct, showed how much the Labour Act is biased towards the employer. Hence, the 
                                                          
61 Interview with NMWUZ official (I-13), 24 September 2017, Bulawayo Zimbabwe. 
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failure to reform the Labour Act to give mine workers the right to strike greatly undermines 
their bargaining position and leaves them at the mercy of their employers who are empowered 
to issue a notice of termination for any reason. 
  
Another factor undermining the working class in the mining sector is the lack of unity and 
harmony amongst the workers themselves. The workers are fragmented into many unions 
pulling in different directions thus giving the employers an opportunity to play them one 
against the other. The Associated Mineworkers Union of Zimbabwe (AMWUZ), the National 
Mineworkers Union of Zimbabwe (NMWUZ), the Zimbabwe Diamond Workers Union of 
Zimbabwe (ZDWUZ), the National Union of Mines, Quarrying, Iron and Steel, and the recently 
registered Progressive Mining and Allied Industries Workers Union of Zimbabwe are some of 
the unions vying to defend the interests of the working class in the mining sector. While 
admitting that the existence of many trade unions “causes a lot of confusion” a leader of one 
of the largest unions (NMWUZ) attributed the proliferation of unions to the constitutional 
guarantee for freedom of association under which people enjoy the right to belong to or form 
a union of their choice. He further accused the largest union – AMWUZ – of being captured 
by the employers and refusing to work with other unions in the interests of the workers: 
The guys in AMWUZ were compromised and we realized that once a union is compromised by the 
employers then it is no longer representing the workers. The employers have got a lot of money. They can 
actually buy you a car in order to make sure that you are ineffective. When you meet them instead of 
representing workers you just represent yourself then you get a car and move out. So basically, the workers 
are sort of disadvantaged. (Interview with Isaac Ndlovu, 23 September 2017) 
It appears that the largest union with a membership of about 30000 workers does not have the 
workers’ interests at heart. Bribed with luxurious gifts, the union leaders are not inclined to 
change the status quo since they are personally benefitting from it. Due to the current economic 
challenges in Zimbabwe, union leaders are given to accept material benefits from the 
employers at the expense of defending workers’ interests.  
 
The apparent capture of union leaders may also cause divisions and disunity within the labour 
movement itself:  
236 
 
Unfortunately, we don’t participate in the salary negotiations. We are not in the National Employment 
Council (NEC)62 our NEC is voluntary. We have got two types of NECs. We have got the statutory one 
which comes into being through the ministry of labour. Ours is a voluntary one which is what the ministry 
of labour encourages. But in our NEC, the AMWUZ, instead of trying to sort of giving us space, 
accommodating us, they are monopolizing the NEC, we try to talk to them to say gentlemen let’s put our 
differences aside when we come to negotiate for the worker because that’s one thing we have in common. 
Let’s work together and forget our differences. But they could not understand. (Interview with Mr 
Mushayakarara, 20 January 2018 Harare Zimbabwe) 
Without a unified voice against capital or to lobby the government, it would be difficult for the 
working class in Zimbabwe’s mining sector to benefit from the indigenization policy that is 
meant to empower them. Fragmentation of the labour movement in this manner implies that 
somehow the labour movement is not yet, to borrow from Marx (1848)’s words, “class in itself 
and for itself”. In other words, the failure to establish common rallying points to press against 
the bourgeoisie class means the labour movement is relegated to the margins of political 
relevance where their interests are unlikely to be taken seriously. There is no overemphasizing 
how a weak labour movement comprising mostly indigenous Zimbabweans as defined in the 
indigenization law sets back the agenda of transformation and decolonization in the mining 
sector. The table 7.4 below shows the number of job losses suffered by the working class since 
2007 when the indigenization bill was signed into law. 
 Table 6.4: Mining sector job losses in Zimbabwe between 2007-2018 
Company  Year  Number of job losses Reason 
Freda Gold Mine  2008 25 Fired for striking 
Renco Gold Mine 2008 200 Fired for striking  
Anjin Investments 2012 1500 Fired for striking 
Hwange Colliery  2013 Union bosses Fired for striking 
Freda Rebecca Gold  2013 25 Fired for striking 
Dalny Mine 2013 13 Fired for striking 
Mbada Diamonds  2015 240 Fired for striking 
Vubachikwe 2017 200 Fried for striking 
Bindura Nickel Corporation 2015 350 Restructuring exercise 
Anjin Investments 2014 950 Retrenchment 
Jinan  2014 30 Retrenchment 
Zimasco 2014 1000 Retrenchment 
Rio Zim 2012 120 Retrenchment 
Zimplats 2014 15 Retrenchment 
Hwange Colliery 2017 1000 Retrenchment 
Mimosa 2013 100 Voluntary Retrenchment 
Freda Rebecca 2007 181 Lay off 
                                                          
62 A statutory body established under section 56 of the Labour Act which brings together employees and 
employers of different industries to negotiate the terms and conditions of work. 
237 
 
Tuli Coal 2014 - Retrenchment 
TOTAL  5949  
Compiled by the author from various reports: Dube, G., ‘Chinese Diamond Mining Giant Anjin Fires 
1,500 Zimbabwean Workers’, VOA News, 3 August 2012; Freda Gold Mine fires 25 workers for going 
on strike’, The Chronicle, 29 October 2013; ‘Turk Mine workers’ pay strike enters 24th day’, Business 
Daily, 15 December 2017; ‘Masses job losses in Marange’, The Zimbabwean, 15 April 2015; ‘Hwange 
Colliery to retrench workers’, Sunday News, 5 March 2017; ‘Firms fire 1000 workers on Thursday’, 
Bulawayo 24, 24 July 2015. 
 
Thus, a total of 5949 workers have lost their jobs in the mining sector right in the midst of the 
indigenization law which was meant to empower them. Even more staggering is that despite 
section 10463 of the Labour Act explicitly protecting the rights of the workers to strike, 2203 
workers lost their jobs for striking during the said period. This undermines the right of the 
workers to take collective action to protect their interests. In most cases employers accuse 
workers of failing to follow the laid down procedures in the Labour Act before instituting a 
strike action. For example, in Tuli Mine in Matabeleland North province more than 700 
workers resorted to strike action in 2017 protesting 6-month long non-payment of salaries. 
However, the management was quick to label the strike illegal. “They were supposed to have 
given notice to management and advise the Ministry of Labour and police of their intention…in 
this case, the workers failed to follow the laid down procedures making their action illegal at 
law”, the management was quoted as saying.64  
 
In 2012 one of the companies mining diamonds in Marange fired 1500 of its workers citing 
engagement in a strike that the High Court ruled illegal where workers were demanding a pay 
increment.65 In 2013, workers in Freda Gold Mine in the Matabeleland South province went 
on strike which the management declared illegal leading to the firing of 25 workers. The 
management said the workers had been fired after defying the company orders to return to 
work.66 The Labour Act does not help by making preconditions to strike action extremely 
tedious and cumbersome. Section 104 (1) stipulates that the workers need to give two weeks’ 
written notice to the employer, employment council and the relevant trade union before 
embarking on a strike. The act also demands that there be evidence of an effort to conciliate 
                                                          
63 Section 104 (1) of the Labour Act states that all employees, workers committees and trade unions shall have 
the right to resort to collective job action to resolve disputes of interest. 
64 ‘Turk Mine workers’ pay strike enters 24th day’, Business Daily, 15 December 2017. 
65 Dube, G., ‘Chinese Diamond Mining Giant Anjin Fires 1,500 Zimbabwean Workers’, VOA News, 3 August 2012. 
66 ‘Freda Gold Mine fires 25 workers for going on strike’, The Chronicle, 29 October 2013. 
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the dispute through possession of certificate of no settlement prior to engaging in a strike. 
Moreover section 104(4) further states that workers cannot engage in a strike if a dispute 
concerns matters of right or if the parties to the dispute have agreed to refer the matter to 
arbitration. Such preconditions make it difficult for workers to exercise their constitutional 
right to strike. 
 
Apart from being criminalized as a result of strike action, workers in the mining sector have 
also been victims of retrenchment, a process in which companies are forced to lay off workers 
usually as a result of declining production. In January 2015 450 workers at Mbada Diamonds 
in Marange were retrenched without being given their financial packages as required by the 
law.67 Anjin Investments another of the diamond companies in Marange retrenched 950 
workers, Hwange Colliery and Zimasco retrenched 1000 workers respectively in some of the 
largest retrenchment moves in the mining sector. Section 12C of the Labour Act provides for 
the conditions under which employers can retrench workers. Section 12C (9) shows that the 
final decision on whether or not retrenchment can be effected lies with the Minister of Mines. 
This enables the government to protect the workers in cases of unwarranted and unprocedural 
retrenchments. Section 12C (11) of the Act makes successful retrenchment conditional upon it 
being a measure of last resort and the company having shown effort to mitigate the 
consequences of retrenchment as far as possible. The 2015 Supreme Court judgement 
(Nyamande & Another v ZUVA Petroleum (PVO Ltd (SC 281/14) [2015]) allowed employers 
to terminate employment contracts on notice. This further weakened the workers’ bargaining 
position and possibly explains the massive job losses in the mining sector. Justifying the move 
to retrench 1000 of its employees in 2017, the Hwange Colliery cited limited working capital, 
old equipment and an unfavourable economic climate which necessitated the move to reduce 
the number of employees.68 This has been a trend in most of retrenchment cases that workers 
become the sacrificial lamb whenever a company is facing an uncertain economic situation. 
 
Four decades after independence, it is clear that the working class in Zimbabwe’s mining sector 
has been ensnared and asphyxiated between a rock and hard place. Sandwiched between the 
competing and hostile interests of the ruling class and the bourgeoisie, the working class has 
                                                          
67 ‘Masses job losses in Marange’, The Zimbabwean, 15 April 2015. 
68 ‘Hwange Colliery to retrench workers’, Sunday News, 5 March 2017. 
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been paralysed by political inertia. That said, any chance the working class could be the engine 
of transformation and indigenization in one of Zimbabwe’s most important economic sectors 
is non-existent at this point. Nothing much has changed for the working class in mining since 
the demise of colonialism. What exists is rather a government ever willing to use force and 
coercion to get the workers into line69, a constitution that makes a mockery of their rights and 
an obstinate bourgeoisie class only interested in exploiting them. Partly to blame for the 
working class woes is also the lack of organization on its part. Lack of unity as evidenced by a 
proliferation of trade unions in the mining sector and the lack of incorporation of employees in 
the informal sector makes it difficult for the labour movement to gather any political clout. 
6.6 Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs): The other side of the coin    
 
6.6.1 Historical background and rationale 
 
One of lasting legacies of the colonial regime is that the architecture of its mineral economy 
survived and thrived on a multitude of contradictions which would later turn out to be the seeds 
of its undoing. One of the glaring contradictions is the parasitic relationship between the big 
mining enterprises and the peasant communities in which the former flourished on the 
pauperisation of the latter. The production of mineral wealth was corporatized yet the 
appropriation and distribution of rewards was always a one-sided affair underpinned by a 
violent infrastructure 
, which rendered the entire system a giant exercise in primitive accumulation. Indigenous rural 
communities in whose areas mineral wealth continues to be extracted by the MNCs have been 
a vital component of the structure of the mining sector in Zimbabwe ever since it was 
established at the inception of colonialism. Indeed, they are one of the cardinal pillars of the 
mining industry. It is on these communities’ ancestral lands that mining operations go on and 
the communities left to cope with the negative externalities which threatened their very 
livelihoods and survival. The rural peasant communities also served as reservoirs of cheap 
labour which the mines relied on during colonialism. The communities used their own 
resources to shoulder the great cost of producing and reproducing the labour that was exploited 
by the colonial government in the mining enterprises without getting any compensation.  
 
                                                          
69 See ‘Protesting wives beaten by the police’, The Zimbabwean, 11 October 2013. 
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Apart from incurring the costs of the reproduction of labour, indigenous rural communities 
have also suffered the devastating environmental, economic and social effects of mining 
operations in their areas (See Dziro, 2014). As it were, peasant communities were an integral 
part of the Rhodesian mining economy exploited by the state bourgeoisie and foreign 
capitalists. Despite possessing such immense mineral wealth, rural communities have had little 
to show for it except crippling underdevelopment. One can argue that the underdevelopment 
of rural peasant communities and the booming mineral economy in Rhodesia were two sides 
of the same coin. The communities helped reproduce and sustain a wealth production system 
which ironically left them poorer. Thus, using primary and secondary data and relying on class 
as the principal lens of analysis, this section takes stock of and problematizes the transformative 
potential and record of Zimbabwe’s Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) within the 
context of the indigenization policy in the mining sector. 
 
Central to the production relations that determined the class structure of Zimbabwe’s mining 
sector in the past was the criteria of ownership and property rights over the natural resources. 
The Mines and Minerals Act ascribed ownership of all land and its minerals to the State. 
Property rights and entitlement to the natural resources, on the other hand, were secured 
through capital investment. These somewhat arbitrary criteria for ownership and property 
rights meant that communities of indigenous inhabitants were little more than coincidental 
geographical animations juxtaposed to naturally occurring mineral resources. Thus, they had 
no grounds whatsoever – moral, political or economic – for entitlement to the natural resources 
– at least according to the dictates of the colonial regime. Even as they were converted to 
glorified factories of cheap labour which placed them at the centre of the relations of production 
in the minerals sector, they still were not accorded any ownership of or entitlement to mineral 
wealth thus produced. Lacking access to capital and being victims of political 
disenfranchisement, which effectively rendered them stateless, the colonized peoples were 
turned into mere accessories in the production of mineral wealth to the benefit of international 
capital and the white-settler colonialists.  
  
Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy advances a new philosophy of entitlement that seeks to rid 
the mining sector of its colonial legacy and by so doing create a basis for the transformation of 
the relations of production. According to the policy, by virtue of their descent or indigeneity, 
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indigenous people are the legitimate owners of the natural resources that occur in their ancestral 
lands. Even though the Mines and Minerals Act still pronounces the State as the owner of lands, 
as holders of political and economic rights, the indigenous people are entitled to enjoy the 
wealth produced from natural resources. In line with the new philosophy, a 2015 report 
produced by the National Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB) argued 
that “by virtue of being the owners of resources which are extracted by the mining and 
quarrying companies, communities are transformed from passive stakeholders to significant 
stakeholders” (2015: 3). Explaining the logic behind the CSOT initiative the Chief Executive 
of the Gwanda CSOT had this to say: 
The mining companies are exploiting the resources that are underground which they don’t plant 
like someone planting a crop. The natural resources belong to the people of that particular 
district. Therefore, residents of that district should own 10% of that company. 
They cannot sell the shares but they should donate them to the community. They don’t sell to 
the community. The community is simply saying you were very lucky because we did not claim 
our 10% long back. The community is simply saying give us our 10%. The company does not 
resist because they know the mineral is not even theirs.70  
 
The indigenous-centric philosophy, thriving on the support of the political establishment of the 
day, prepared grounds for the creation of the CSOT platforms earmarked to enhance the 
participation of the indigenous peasant communities in the exploitation of the mineral resources 
occurring in their lands. Not that they did not participate before – indeed they were a vital part 
of the mining system. The new legal and policy regime enabled indigenous people to participate 
as stakeholders with the ability to influence decisions on the production and distribution of 
mineral wealth. Section 14(B) (2) of the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment General 
Regulations (2010) as amended in 2011 states that a CSOT “may be taken into consideration 
when assessing the extent to which a business has achieved or exceeded the minimum 
indigenization quota”. In a way, the legality of the property rights enjoyed by foreign-owned 
mining companies became conditional on the acknowledgement of the property rights of the 
indigenous communities. Foreign-owned mining enterprises were to cede 10% of shares in 
their companies to the CSOTs established in the rural districts in which they operated. Thus, a 
                                                          
70 Interview with Mr Nkala, CEO of Gwanda CSOT (22 September, 2017) 
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new framework for the relations of production and the obtaining balance of class dynamics in 
the mining sector was laid down. 
 
 6.6.2 Up-close and critical: Empowerment Mechanisms?  
 
But how have CSOTs fared as instruments of the indigenization policy? Reports from the 
NIEEB, the national institution responsible for monitoring compliance with the indigenization 
programme, were consulted for information on the implementation and performance of the 
CSOTs. According to the NIEEB report, 61 trusts had been registered in every district in the 
country and only 14 or less than 25% were fully functional (NIEEB, 2015: 4). If every Rural 
District Council (RDC)71 has a CSOT, it means that 67% of Zimbabwe’s population that resides 
in the rural areas stands to benefit from the indigenization of the mining sector. The report 
further states that “an amount of US$38 260 000.00 seed capital had been deposited as at 30 
June 2014, into CSOTs and a significant $ 14 604 344.89 had been spent during the past two 
years” (2015: 4). This was also confirmed by the then Deputy Minister of Indigenization 
Mathias Tongofa who was quoted by the Zimbabwean daily, The Herald, as saying that “of the 
US$134 million dollars that had pledged by the targeted companies towards CSOTs, only 
US$38 million had been paid. Of that amount $14 million had been channeled towards 
development projects while $23 million remained banked” (Zinyuke, 2017). The table below 
shows a list of CSOTs that have received money from mining companies. 
 
Table 6.5: Community Share Ownership Schemes established around the country 
















50.000.000  None 







Shurugwi Midlands Unki Mine 10.000.000 10.000.000 None 
                                                          
71 The community is defined as the people resident within a specific RDC in accordance with the Rural District 
Councils Act (Chapter 29:13) 
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10% - Blanket 
Mine 
5% - PPC 
Umguza Mat South PPC 1.000.000 1.000.000 5% - PPC 
















 None  







Uzumba Mash East Lafarge 1.000.000 331.000 None 
Goromonzi Mash East Lafarge 1.000.000  None 
Mabvuku Mash East Lafarge 1.000.000 300.000 None 





















1. 122.751 None 
      
Source: Zanu-PF Election Manifesto (2013) 
Table 6.5 above displays a list of 18 CSOTs that had been established across the country by 
2013. 9 of the CSOTs had received all or part of the money that had been pledged by mining 
companies as per the directives of the indigenization policy. It is however not clear, with the 
exception of the Gwanda and Umguza CSOTs, whether the other Trusts had received any 
shares in the sponsoring companies as stipulated by the indigenization policy regulations 
(General Regulations, 2010). Only 2 of the 16 operational CSOTs are shareholders in mining 
companies operating in their districts. The Gwanda CSOT has also received shares from 
Blanket Mine and Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC). The Trust holds 10% shares in Blanket 
Mine and in PPC holds 5% shares. The other 5% is held by Umguza CSOT which is also 
sponsored by PPC. These are the only known cases of successful share transfer under the CSOT 
scheme in the country in which a rural district managed to secure shareholding in a mining 
company. An interview with an official at the Ministry of Indigenization confirmed that the big 
platinum mines never transferred shares possibly because they had the backing of some 
244 
 
political leaders72. This undermines the indigenization and empowerment objectives since 
without shares in the mining companies, communities cannot control or have a voice in 
production and investment decisions over mineral wealth. Their relationship to the means of 
production remains the same as they cannot claim any ownership. 
 
Other CSOTs were just receiving donations for social development projects not shares. Of the 
US$38 million that has been paid out, about US$30 million has gone to only 5 CSOTs. The 
Zvishavane CSOT received US$10 million from Mimosa, Mhondoro-Ngezi received US$2 
million from Zimplats, Gwanda got US$6.8 million from PPC, Gaths Mine and Blanket Mine, 
and Tongogara CSOT received $10 million from Anglo-American Platinum – owned Unki73. 
Umguza CSOT in Matabeleland North province received US$1 million from Pretoria Portland 
Cement (PPC). The distribution of the community trust funds is highly uneven, leading to a 
few districts enjoying the benefits of the indigenization policy. Only 6 mining companies out 
of the more than 400 that submitted indigenization plans have to date made 79% of the 
payments to established CSOTs across the country. Thus, even with donations, a diluted form 
of empowerment, the mining companies were not forthcoming as only a few of them made the 
donations. Msipa (2015) pointed out that most businesses were not cooperating and complying 
with the indigenization requirements in the 1990s when it was first promulgated. This was still 
largely the case almost two decades later despite the presence of an indigenization law. 
  
In an interview, an official from the NIEEB working in the compliance department confirmed 
that “the diamond companies pledged several millions of dollars but they did not fulfil the 
pledges. There were some issues around that”.74 Five diamond mining companies in Marange: 
Anjin Investments, Mbada Diamonds, Jinan, Diamond Mining Company (DMC) and Marange 
Resources made pledges in 2012, in a ceremony attended by then President Robert Mugabe, to 
contribute US$10 million each towards the Marange-Zimunya CSOT. However, two years 
after the launch no funds had been disbursed to the designated CSOT.75 If they could be 
dishonest to the President of the country himself one wonders how they could obey the orders 
of a minister. This gives credence to numerous scholars who argued that the indigenization 
                                                          
72 Interview with Mr Lucky Kandemiiri an NIEEB Compliance official (20 January 2018, Harare). 
73 Ibid 
74 Interview with respondent I-2, (21 January 2018, Harare). 
75 ‘Parly probes Marange Community Trust’, Daily News, 12 February 2014. 
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programme would be hijacked by elite corruption (Mupfema, 1998; Raftopoulous, 2003; 
Musewe, 2016; Magaisa, 2015). In 2014 a director in Anjin Investments, one of the diamond 
mining companies that had made pledges was quoted as saying: “The Zimunya-Marange 
Community Share Ownership Trust has not approached us, but we have been approached by 
(Cde) Mushohwe76. Mushohwe has even given us the bank account in which to deposit our 
pledge” (Mandizha, 2014). This statement indicates that the CSOTs were captured by the elite 
politicians (Christopher Mushowe was the governor of Manicaland province at the time).  
 
The statement claims that the company did make the payments it pledged to an account that 
was supplied by Mushowe without the knowledge of the CSOT officials. Such actions 
undermine the legitimacy of the indigenization policy as a drive to empower local people and 
confirm lingering suspicions that the policy is only meant to benefit the elite. Hence, Magaisa 
(2015)’s argument that whilst there was nothing wrong with the idea of empowering indigenous 
Zimbabweans, corruption was the biggest obstacle to genuine indigenization. Of significance 
about the diamond companies is that the state, represented by the Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corporation (ZMDC) held 50% shareholding in each company. Thus, even the 
state itself could not implement the terms of the indigenization policy in mining enterprises 
where it exercised significant influence. This points to a lack of political will and commitment 
on the part of the ruling class to the empowerment of the vulnerable indigenous people in the 
rural areas. It vindicates Fanon (1961)’s criticism of the black ruling class for failing to execute 
the revolution of the masses to its conclusion. Once black rulers get into power, they care not 
about national interests, but self-aggrandizement (Ibid). 
  
In another interview, an official at the Ministry of Indigenization conceded that in 
Matabeleland North Province the CSOT schemes had been let down by mining companies who 
were reluctant to commit their funds towards the trusts: 
“But in Matabeleland North we have just two districts with (operational) CSOTs. In other districts like 
Hwange where there is Hwange Colliery and other companies, nothing has been done. There is nothing we 
can do about it because they (mining companies) are being protected by the political heavyweights in the 
                                                          
76 Christopher Mushowe is a senior Zanu-PF politician who at the time was serving as the governor of Manicaland 
Province which hosted the diamond mining companies. 
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government. There are sacred cows in the indigenization policy” (Interview, with I-15 (a former regional 
director of indigenization and now a Cabinet Minister), 17 December 2017, Bulawayo Zimbabwe.  
The response made by this particular respondent suggests, along the lines of the comments 
made by the Anjin Investments director in Marange, that the mining companies were in bed 
with people who were supposed to oversee their conduct. The mining companies were 
apparently paying politicians to get exemptions from honouring their obligations to the CSOTs 
in their districts. Thus, the ruling class and the bourgeoisie who own the mining enterprises 
were colluding to deny the communities their benefits. 
  
However, another respondent working for the Gwanda CSOT had a different take on why there 
was a lacklustre response by the companies towards funding CSOTs in their areas of operation: 
About the companies that haven’t complied, we are engaging the government to change the legal 
instrument that was used to make these companies comply, it has some loop holes so there is still need for 
the legislature to revisit the legal instrument so that it will be able to enforce the sections of the 
indigenization act with respect to the issue of these companies complying with the law. The current legal 
instrument does not compel the companies to comply, it is just a statement. There are some loopholes to 
ensure these companies don’t comply and there is no remedy to that. (Interview with a board member of 
the GCSOT (I-16), 18 September 2017, Gwanda Zimbabwe) 
The amendment of the 2010 General Regulations in 2011 introduced the concept of CSOTs as 
part of the indigenization framework. However, section 14 (2) of the regulations states that “A 
community share ownership scheme or trust that complies with this section may be taken into 
consideration when assessing the extent to which a business has achieved or exceeded the 
minimum indigenisation and empowerment quota”. The use of the word may, suggests that the 
CSOTs are not compulsory but rather are part of the options which companies can use to 
achieve the indigenization quota. Nothing in the law compels companies to fund the CSOTs. 
Murombo (2013) also bemoaned the lack of legal basis for community participation in mining 
arguing that “the Zimbabwe situation is aggravated by the absence of any enforceable 
community rights, compounded by a severe limitation of access to justice and judicial redress 
for local communities”. Community empowerment was added as an afterthought to the 
indigenization framework and was further marginalized by the lack of a sound and justiciable 
legal basis. Thus communities will find it difficult to protect themselves in the class struggle 
in the mining sector without legal protection. It is imperative that the communities leverage 
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their voting power to lobby policy makers in government to take the situation of communities 
in mining areas seriously. 
 
6.6.3 Hitting two birds with one stone: A ruling class in crisis 
 
The indigenization policy, especially the CSOT clause, was drafted to resolve one of the most 
severe contradictions of the post-colonial economy through an effort to redistribute wealth 
from the haves to the have-nots. It was meant to transform the power dynamics in the relations 
of production that had underpinned Zimbabwe’s mining sector for over a century in which the 
rural peasant communities had incessantly and systematically suffered exploitation by the 
mining MNCs located in the countryside. The transfer of shares to Trusts representing the rural 
peasant communities – as envisaged by the indigenization policy – would mean the indigenous 
peasants stand in a new relationship to the means of production in the mining sector. However, 
despite so much promise and rhetoric, the CSOTs have suffered a stillbirth as no redistribution 
of wealth has taken place almost a decade after the policy was adopted. As a matter of fact, the 
policy has been effectively abandoned by Robert Mugabe’s successor Emmerson Mnangagwa 
who argued that indigenization was driving away much needed investment (Musewe, 2016). 
  
A closer scrutiny reveals that indigenization was a response to internal and external crises. The 
adoption of the CSOT initiative took place in a political context in which the ruling party Zanu-
PF had lost so much political power that they were forced into a power-sharing arrangement 
with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2009. Zanu-PF no longer had 
the majority seats in parliament and had won the presidency under questionable circumstances 
which undermined its very legitimacy in the 2008 election season (See Bourne, 2011; 
Chikuhwa, 2013). It was clear that the former liberation movement could not hope to regain its 
political dominance without the support of the rural masses who had been loyal to the party 
since independence in 1980. The rural peasant communities represent 67% - more than two 
thirds- of the total population in Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2018). Awake to this reality, Zanu-
PF immediately emphasized indigenization and economic empowerment as its core message 
in preparation for the 2013 elections. It positioned itself as the champion of economic 
emancipation and egalitarian principles through which the indigenous people could secure 
economic power. As Mufema (1998) argued, the indigenization programme was essentially a 
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ruling class project intended to drum up political support which may be the main reason why 
it did not resonate in any substantial way with the rural masses. 
  
These are the communities that together constitute one of the most exploited classes in the 
mining sector as they are forced to shoulder a great deal of negative externalities that emanate 
from the mining operations in their geographical areas. However, they constitute a class in 
itself, they are not yet a class for itself to put it in Marx (1848)’s terms. They have been the 
objects and not the subjects of state power that protects and maintains an economic system that 
relentlessly exploits them. The ruling class and the bourgeoisie class accumulate wealth at the 
great expense of the rural peasants. Hence the CSOTs initiative had no organic relationship 
with the rural peasant masses. It was not their baby – but was fathered by the ruling class to 
purchase legitimacy and regain political hegemony. It was an idea designed not to liquidate the 
prevailing relations of production in the mining sector and place the rural peasant community 
in a stronger position in the matrix of mineral wealth production and distribution. It smacked 
rather, of a ploy or manoeuvre by the ruling class to strengthen its own bargaining position in 
its relationship with the transnational capitalists running the targeted mining enterprises and 
other sectors of the economy. Zimbabwe had been isolated and slapped with economic and 
political sanctions by the West (especially Europe and the United States) due to the 
government’s violation of property and human rights (See Youde, 2007). An excerpt from 
Zanu-PF’s 2013 election manifesto shows how the party was emphasizing sovereignty 
nationalism in selling indigenization to the voters: 
Today the aspiration for sovereignty among Zimbabweans is expressing itself through the resurgence of 
resource nationalism among the youth, women, professionals, workers, farmers and business leaders who 
are spearheading the Indigenisation and People’s Empowerment policy to ensure that Zimbabweans 
exercise sovereignty over their God-given natural and economic resources. In essence, the goal for 
sovereignty is defined by autonomy with respect to national and foreign affairs. (Zanu-PF election 
manifesto, 2013: 18) 
 
The excerpt above has the undertone of defiance against western economic sanctions. In this 
context, it is reasonable to assume that the CSOTs and other mechanisms of indigenization 
were a mere strategy by the ruling class to retaliate against western isolation. The ruling class 
hoped to hit two birds with one stone – using the indigenization policy (threat) to regain 
domestic legitimacy on the one hand and strengthen its bargaining position with foreign capital 
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on the other. Thus, while there is a multitude of factors whose weight effectively ruled out the 
take-off of the transformation drive, perhaps the most credible explanation is that the ruling 
class never had any plan for transformation in any case.   
6.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter examined the manner in which the indigenization programme has unfolded in 
Zimbabwe’s mining sector, with specific focus on three diverse and variously located groups 
in the country’s mineral economy. The artisanal and small-scale miners, the working class and 
the rural peasants have historically occupied different but more or less similarly disadvantaged 
roles in the class structure of the mining sector in which they have been objects of exploitation. 
There is a prevailing class conflict in Zimbabwe’s mining sector in which the indigenous petty 
bourgeoisie, labour and rural peasants are the victims of various forms of appropriation. The 
indigenization policy was intended to alter these relations of production in the mining sector 
which would see an equitable redistribution of the burdens and benefits of the production of 
mineral wealth. However, after more than two decades of its existence, the indigenization 
policy has not yielded the desired transformation. As the Zimbabwean experience 
demonstrates, class conflict alone is not sufficient basis for a significant transformation of the 
relations of production. The superior organization of the ruling class which controls the levers 
of state power and the international capital continues to prevail over the relative disorganization 
and the immobilization of the disadvantaged indigenous classes in Zimbabwe’s mining sector. 
The oppressed indigenous groups do not possess sufficient resources to convert the class 
conflict into a political conflict which would enable them to effectively push for a change in 
class relations. They are immobilized by a neo-colonial-comprador state whose repressive and 
coercive machinery has been relied on to maintain and protect the status quo in which 
indigenous people continue to be exploited. It increasingly seems the indigenization policy was 
intended as a tactical move in the dynamics of the alliance between the international capitalist 
and the local ruling class rather than change the status quo in favour of the exploited and 










The chief goal of the indigenization policy, which had the former liberation movement Zanu-
PF as its foremost champion, was a deliberate and conscious reconfiguration of Zimbabwe’s 
national economy to enable the emancipation of the previously disadvantaged indigenous 
peoples. However, while the policy was clear on paper, its implementation had to contend with 
the hard realities of class politics, international order and the parameters of state power which 
significantly affected both the process and the outcome. Politicization, corruption, abuse of 
state power, lack of local capital were among some of the factors derailing the indigenization 
of the mining sector. The task of this chapter is to bring the study to a conclusion by way of 
summarizing the important findings and formulating a final analysis of some sort. The first part 
of the chapter will be a recap of some of the most important themes or findings to emerge 
related to the objectives of the study. The sections under the summary of findings will dwell 
on the outcomes of the indigenization policy as regards the positions of the various groups who 
are major stakeholders of the policy as it pertains to the country’s mining sector. It will also 
give a brief appraisal of the factors that may have played an important role in shaping the 
process and the outcome of the indigenization policy. The second part of the chapter will try to 
identify areas for further research based on the experience of undertaking this study and also 
on some of its limitations and findings.  
 
7.2 Summary of findings 
 
7.2.1 The enduring power of foreign capital and the scarcity of local capital 
 
The chief aim of the indigenization and economic empowerment policy was to replace foreign 
capital with local capital through a redistribution of ownership and control of mining 
enterprises in favour of the indigenous people. However, more than two decades since the 
launch of the policy little headway has been made in changing the ownership of the large-scale 
mining companies. Getting rid of foreign capital has proved insurmountable as local capitalists 
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and entrepreneurs have been disappointingly scarce. Chapter 6 demonstrated how the 
government of Zimbabwe has failed to promote the entry of local players into the LSM sector 
which remains oligopolized by foreign players. Since 1995 when the indigenization policy was 
officially adopted, the government has made several attempts to facilitate indigenous share-
ownership in the big platinum mines without success. Several foreign-owned entities in the 
various sub-sectors of the mining industry (platinum, gold, diamond, chrome and asbestos) 
were obliged to cede at least 51% of their shares to top indigenous people. Several consortia 
comprising indigenous businesspeople were formed to prepare bids for the takeover of the 
indigenous stakes. None of the consortia succeeded in raising the capital needed to fund the 
transfer of shares. Even the only successful indigenous consortium, Fremiro Investments, 
which got shares in Blanket Mine, got them through vendor financing and not any capital of 
their own. Manyame consortium was initially successful in raising part of the money needed 
to get a 30% stake in the gold-producing giant, Metallon, but lost the shares after a few years 
having failed to raise the rest of the money. As such, as the table 8.1 below shows, the local 
capital market in Zimbabwe proved too small to make indigenization of big mining companies 
a reality (See also Saunders, 2008). 
 
Table 7.1: Outcomes of attempts to take over equity in foreign-owned mining companies by 
indigenous people  
Name of indigenous 
consortium 





2003 Zimplats Failed – lack of capital 
Needgate Mining  2003 Zimplats Failed – lack of capital 
Barbican Bank 
Holdings 




2005 Zimplats Failed – lack of capital  
Zindico 2012 Mwana Africa 
Holdings 




Suncraft 2012 Freda Rebecca Successful – however 
in danger of shares 
being diluted 
Nyika Investment  1997 Zimasco Initially successful – 
but later failed 
Benscore Investment  2005 ZimAlloys Successful – however 
sold company to 
Indian investors due to 
harsh economy. 
Fremiro Investment 2011 Blanket Mine Initially successful but 
bought out in 2018 
Manyame Consortium 2003 Metallon Gold Initially successful but 
bought out in 2005 
Stanmarker 2003 Metallon Gold Failed 
Rio Zim 2014 RioZim Bought out by 
foreigners 
Source: compiled by the author            
 
Overall, the colonial legacy of foreign domination still grips the large-scale mining industry in 
Zimbabwe. In cases where the ownership has changed – and there are several – it has been 
from one foreign investor to another or from an indigenous consortium to a foreign investor. 
The origins of the foreign owners vary but China and South Africa are the most dominant 
which is itself a reflection of changes in Zimbabwean ruling class’ transnational alliances. 
Other foreign investors come from India, Canada, Australia and the United States.  
 
7.2.2 Nationalization: De-facto transformation strategy  
 
Despite the fact that much of Zimbabwe’s industrial mining sector remains in the grip of 
foreign capital, there have been changes in the structure of the sector in the post-independence 
era that also reflect the balance of class forces. Since independence in 1980 the state has moved 
to expand its footprint and participation in the mining sector through its investment vehicle the 
ZMDC which was established two years after independence. The Zanu-PF-led government 
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established the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) through which the 
government appropriated the responsibility of buying and selling all minerals produced in the 
country. This was a sharp departure from the policy of the colonial state which, since the 1930s, 
had steadfastly maintained a watchman role towards one of the country’s most prized economic 
sectors (See Hollaway, 1997). The government seemed to prefer nationalization as the strategy 
of transformation. Whereas indigenization facilitates the transfer of equity to indigenous 
citizens, nationalization entails the sale or transfer of equity to the state. In Zimbabwe, the state 
has since independence acquired far more mining concerns in the large-scale sector than private 
indigenous people. If there has been any transformation in the mining sector, it has certainly 
been in the direction of state ownership. The table below shows the extent of the state 
ownership of mining assets in Zimbabwe’s large-scale mining sector.  
Table 7.2: State ownership in the mining sector 
Mining enterprise Sector  Equity held  
African Associated Mines 
Pvt. Ltd. (Seized by the state 
in 2004) 
Asbestos 100% 
Zim Alloys (state took over 
50% of land claims in 2017) 
Chrome 100% 
Zimasco (state took over 
50% of land claims in 2017)  
Chrome 100% 
Hwange Colliery Company  Coal  37% 
Jena Mine Gold 100% 
Sabi Mine Gold 100% 
Graphite Zimbabwe Graphite - 
Zimbabwe Consolidated 
Diamond Company (ZCDC) 
Diamond  50% 
Minerals Marketing 
Corporation of Zimbabwe 
Responsible for the export of 
all mineral produce 
100% 
  Source: compiled by author from various sources 
The state literally owns or controls 50% of the diamond industry, the chrome industry and 
controls through judicial management the biggest asbestos mine in Zimbabwe. Until recently 
the state had owned 16% of Blanket Mine through the NIEEF under an empowerment deal. 
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Wilson (1990) explained why states choose to pursue nationalization rather than 
indigenization: 
A poorly performing market may call forth state intervention when, for example, entrepreneurial 
supply is low and local businessmen lack the resources to break into certain national markets. 
Markets most likely to be controlled and owned by foreigners are those with high barriers to 
entry, complex technologies, higher capital costs, and the need to operate on a large scale to be 
efficient. In most LDCs, only governments can mobilize the requisite domestic resources to 
operate these industries (such as mining or heavy manufacturing), and they are most likely to be 
nationalized. (Wilson 1990: 403) 
Because of the lack of indigenous citizens with adequate capital and technology, it seems the 
logical thing to do for the state was to gain a foothold in the industry itself thus exerting some 
measure of domestic influence on a sector that has become the backbone of the economy. 
However while nationalization can be informed by logic as argued by Wilson above, it can also 
stem from ideological convictions and self-serving class interests. This is especially so 
considering that the state in Zimbabwe does not have the capital nor the expertise to run 
successful mining enterprises. 
 
The state ownership of mines may have been part of the ruling party’s Marxist-Leninist 
ideological beliefs that the state as the custodian of the public interest should be at the centre 
of the economic system (Compagnon and Raftopolous, 2003). Moreover, nationalization 
dovetails nicely with Zanu-PF’s anti-imperialism stance which has placed them at loggerheads 
with the west since the turn of the twenty-first century: 
Nationalization in Africa is most frequently of an anti-imperialistic nature. Its most common goal 
is to eliminate or at least weaken the positions of foreign companies and to undermine the front 
of imperialistic monopolies. (Aleksandrovskaia and Matsen: 1976)        
This obtaining reality is a reflection, of a local politics characterized by the absence of a private 
indigenous bourgeoisie and an immobilized and asphyxiated working and peasant classes who 
despite being a demographic reality, do not yet constitute an objective political reality. Thus 





  7.2.3 The state bourgeoisie-security sector complex: The ruling bloc     
 
Like any other modern nation, Zimbabwe has a ruling bloc or alliance which retains the control 
of the state apparatus. In Zimbabwe, the dominant bloc comprises the ruling party elite and the 
security elite, especially in the military. Hence, the transformation process of the mining sector 
should be analyzed within the context of the nature and ideology of the obtaining ruling bloc. 
The formation of the dominant alliance in Zimbabwe dates back to the days of the liberation 
struggle prosecuted by the nationalists against the colonial government during the 1960s to 
1970s. The nationalist-military alliance has held sway over the trajectory of independent 
Zimbabwe. In 2001 then Commander of ZDF General Vitalis Zvinavashe openly stated in front 
of the television that the army was not going to salute anyone without a liberation struggle 
background even if they won the elections (McGreal, 2001; Tendi, 2013). This statement 
seemed to have been directed at Morgan Tsvangirai the leader of the opposition MDC who did 
not have any liberation struggle credentials.  
 
This study has shown how this alliance has been manifest in the course of the implementation 
of the indigenization policy in the mining sector. The comprador-military bloc has used its 
access to the state apparatus to influence the redistribution of mineral wealth in its favour. 
Numerous examples abound to support this notion. During the fight for the 15% stake in 
Zimplats which was reserved for indigenous players, Nkululeko Rusununguko Mining 
Consortium (NRMC) – a company owned by the Zimbabwean army, was handpicked by the 
then Minister of Mines Amos Midzi as the winner of the bid to take up the stake in the platinum 
giant. Former Army General Solomon Mujuru, used his military background to get 27% shares 
in Zimasco which is the biggest chrome mining company in the country as part of an 
empowerment deal. At the height of the economic crisis in 2006 the government deployed the 
police and the military to dispossess small-scale miners around the country who were operating 
illegally under Operation Chikorokoza Chapera (End Illegal mining). In Kwekwe, an area 
which hosts significant numbers of ASM operators studies have found that the police work 
with top Zanu-PF politicians to exploit the artisanal miners. 
  
Further, during the formalization of diamond mining in Marange in 2011, the security sector 
in Zimbabwe was one of the major beneficiaries. In a number of joint ventures formed to 
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conduct diamond mining, the three arms of the security sector formed partnerships with the 
state miner ZMDC. For example, Anjin and Jinan which were some of the companies granted 
the biggest claims in the diamond fields had the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) which is 
a subsidiary of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) as a partner. Another company, Kusena, 
was a partnership between the ZMDC and the Central Intelligence Organization. Gye Nyame 
was another joint venture in which the police were unprocedurally granted a 20% stake without 
the agreement of the other investors who were partners in that company. In Mbada Diamonds, 
the biggest company with the largest concession in the fields, a former Air Marshal Robert 
Mhlanga was appointed the Chief Executive Officer. According to the Global Witness Report 
(2017) Mhlanga owned 25% stake in Mbada diamonds. Further, Lovemore Kurotwi, the 
nephew of the late former army general Vitalis Zvinavashe was the local partner in Canadile 
Resources which was a joint venture between the state-owned Marange Resources and the Core 
Mining Resources. The militarization, and not the indigenization, of the diamond sector seems 
to have taken root.   
7.2.4 The rural peasants, mineworkers, and artisans: Sold a dummy? 
 
The Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) established under section 14B of the 2010 
General Regulations of the indigenization policy were vehicles through which peasant 
communities in Rural District Councils (RDCs) that host mining companies were to be granted 
10% ownership of the companies. Thus from their historical role as reservoirs and reproducers 
of cheap labour, peasant communities were set to become part owners of the mining companies 
that exploited mineral resources within their ancestral lands. It was a progressive step that 
would have empowered the peasant communities who for a long time had also suffered 
devastating environmental, social and economic effects as a result of mining activities. 
However, at the time of writing, of the 61 registered CSOTs across the country, only 16 were 
functional and operating. Of the 16 that were operational only the Gwanda CSOT in 
Matabeleland South province received shares from Blanket Mine operating within the Gwanda 
RDC. The other Trusts had received donations to carry out community development projects. 
The CSOT scheme turned out to be a disappointing failure as it did nothing to change the 
relations of production between the peasant communities and the big capital operating mining 




Another mechanism of transformation introduced by the indigenization policy were the 
Employee Share Ownership Trusts (ESOTs) which were intended to give workers at least 5% 
share ownership in the foreign owned mining companies they worked for. Out of a total of 400 
ESOTs registered by mining companies, there is only one in Blanket Mine that actually 
received shares from their company (NIEEF, 2015). Like the CSOTs, the ESOTs were also a 
huge failure as no transfer of shares to workers took place. Many reasons have been cited for 
the lack of success in the ESOTs one of which is the conflict of interest concerning some 
government officials who were supposed to implement the policy. Some of the government 
officials have shares or are board members in the mining companies where workers were to be 
given shares. Moreover, the ESOT clause was a policy strategy that was not backed by any 
law, hence it was not enforceable. Companies could choose not to comply with policy 
directives without facing any legal punishment and could get away with just a small fine. 
  
The government’s lack of proactive and positive approach to the ASM sector as shown in the 
study, is a major setback to the indigenization policy. Millions of indigenous people are already 
engaging in mining but suffer insurmountable structural obstacles that keep them outside 
mainstream mining. The poor indigenous citizens do not have the proper funding to capitalize 
their operations and maximize their production as they are forced to rely on rudimentary and 
inefficient tools to mine for gold and other minerals like chrome (See Moyo, 2014). Although 
the government has promised to make funding available for the ASM players, nothing has 
materialized thus far. The indigenization of the mining sector will not be successful if the 
government continues to ignore and neglect the ASM sector which holds millions of potential 
mining entrepreneurs. It is understandable that the government may not be able to fund the 
indigenous takeover of large mines because of their high capital requirements. However, it is 
inconceivable how a government that has professed its support for indigenous representation 
in the mining sector is neglecting and even suppressing a potential and promising class of petty 
indigenous mine owners. 
7.2.5 The world capitalist system: Enabling repatriation and not indigenization 
of capital  
 
In fundamental ways, Zimbabwe’s attempted transformation of its mining sector brought home 
the reality of the world-capitalist system and how the country’s position constrained its options 
and ultimately determined the course of the policy. Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy was a 
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push-back against the world capitalist system dominated by transnational companies 
originating in the West. The system is made up of center, semi-periphery and periphery 
countries bound by relations of domination and exploitation to facilitate the exchange of goods 
through the world market (Gunder-Frank, 1973; Amin, 1981; Wallerstein, 1974). According to 
Wallerstein the world-system is “a social system with boundaries, structures, rules of 
legitimation and coherence…it possesses the characteristics of an organism and the dynamics 
of its development are largely internal” (1974: 347). The world capitalist system is centuries-
old project of capitalist industrial countries in the global north whose beginning can be traced 
to the sixteenth century (See Moyo and Yeros, 2011). As discussed in chapter 5, Zimbabwe 
was conscripted into the system as a peripheral territory in the 1890s upon the advent of 
colonialism which was itself a phase in the evolution and expansion of the world capitalist 
system.  
 
It was the colonial government that opened up the country’s mining sector to the western 
multinationals whose mission was accumulation of capital through the exploitation of labour 
(See Phimister, 1976). The Western multinational corporations’ oligopoly in Zimbabwe’s 
mining sector was only an instance of what is a widespread reality in the third world where 
MNCs exploit natural resources for capital accumulation. This division of labour persists at 
present as statistics show that the African continent has a lion’s share of global mineral exports. 
According to African Trade Statistics (2017) from 2010 to 2016 mineral products and other 
raw materials have accounted for more than 50% of Africa’s exports value of around $400 
billion annually. Perhaps nowhere is Zimbabwe’s position and role in the world-system more 
clearly revealed than it is in the mining sector. Mineral exports already constitute more than 
50% of Zimbabwe’s total export value. Because the exploitation of mineral resources is done 
to service the industrial centers of the core countries, MNCs rarely reinvest their capital in the 
country. All profits are repatriated to their country of origin. Thus, capital formation and 
industrialization based on the mineral resources is practically impossible.  
  
Even as the origin of the companies change from the West to that of emerging markets like 
South Africa, China and India amongst others, their conduct is still consistent with the laws of 
the world capitalist system. Accumulation of capital is their primary objective. The ruling class 
is happy to hand over the country’s mineral resources to companies from these countries for 
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personal kickbacks and not national development. Foreign companies still exploit the country’s 
mineral resources for capital accumulation. As a peripheral country, it is no surprise that 
Zimbabwe chronically lacked the capital needed to take over the large scale mining enterprises 
and run them profitably as envisioned by the indigenization policy. Even amongst the 
politically connected who secured government support in the various indigenization deals 
signed with mining companies, the lack of capital proved to be their ultimate undoing. As a 
result of its structural location in the world-capitalist system, Zimbabwe did not have 
indigenous people with adequate capital to take over mining enterprises hence the failure of 
the indigenization policy. 
7.3 Areas for further research 
7.3.1 Subjectivist approach to statecraft in Zimbabwe 
This research was centred on the nature and operations of the state in Zimbabwe viz the 
indigenization policy in the mining sector. One of the emerging trends was how subjective 
statecraft is in Zimbabwe. To understand the decisions made by the state, it is helpful to look 
at the decision makers themselves. That is, it is important to understand the background of the 
official responsible for making the decision. The study has shown that the ruling party which 
controls the state is not a homogenous entity where members have the same interests. Different 
ministers have different interests and characters which shape their views on certain policies. 
The subjectivity of the members of the ruling party is an important factor that determines how 
they understand and implement the policies of the party.  
  
 7.3.2 The plight of mineworkers  
The history of labour in Zimbabwe’s mining sector is well-documented (van Onseleu, 1973; 
Phimister, 1976; Bradbury and Worby, 1985; Dansereu, 2000). However, there is a dearth of 
current research on the conditions of the mineworkers of Zimbabwe especially in the post-2000 
period. Workers in Zimbabwe are caught between a repressive state and exploitative mine 
owners who leverage the high unemployment rate in the country to keep wages down. The 
strategies and the agency of mineworkers in their relations with their employers and the 
government is an interesting aspect of indigenization and the mining sector that warrants 




 7.3.3 The relationship between bureaucrats and their political principals  
Another interesting area of focus for further research would be the relationship between the 
bureaucrats and the political leaders. It is difficult to draw definite conclusions on whether the 
bureaucracy is simply an instrument for implementing policies proposed by politicians or it has 
power and agency of its own. In the course of the study I noticed in two offices occupied by 
bureaucrats there was a sticker which read ‘Never outshine your master’. I asked one of the 
respondents what the meaning of the statement was, they said that it is a rule in government to 
never outshine the minister in charge. This implies that the bureaucrats are simply there to 
execute the orders of their political principals. However, things are not always what they seem. 
The dynamics of the relationship (power relations) between the bureaucrats and the political 
executive are important in understanding policy implementation. 
  
 7.3.4 The working conditions of the ASM operators 
The importance of the ASM sector to Zimbabwe’s mining industry has long been 
acknowledged (Phimister, 1980; Hollaway, 1997; Mawowa, 2013). The sector has contributed 
billions of dollars in revenue to the country in the post-independence era. A number of studies 
have been conducted on Zimbabwe’s ASM sector in different areas across the country 
including Gwanda (Mabhena, 2012), Kwekwe (Mawowa, 2013) and Kadoma (Pact, 2015). 
These studies have produced great and illuminating insights into the plight of this sub-sector 
of the mining industry in Zimbabwe. However, more studies, especially of an ethnographic 
nature, need to be conducted to understand the day-to-day lives of the ASM operators in the 
country. I think such an in-depth approach would yield better ideas on the interventions that 
need to be made to promote and empower the ASM sector.    
7.4 General Conclusion 
 
This study set out to explore Zimbabwe’s post-independence efforts to redistribute its mineral 
wealth from the MNCs to local indigenous people. The indigenization policy in Zimbabwe was 
an important process not only to Zimbabwe but to other countries whose economies are still 
dominated by a few foreign corporations. However, the study showed that the course of the 
indigenization programme in Zimbabwe has been influenced by the evolution of the country’s 
politics and the state of its external relations. Indigenization in the mining sector has been a 
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dismal failure. A weak state dominated by the Zanu-PF-military alliance has proved incapable 
of implementing the indigenization policy. The indigenization programme, initially meant to 
serve as a nation-building project, has been largely politicized to serve the interests of a few at 
the expense of the many. The state relies on coercion and violence to protect its accumulation 
channels. The class relations in the mining sector have not changed much. The peasant 
communities in rural areas still shoulder the negative social, economic and environmental 
effects of mining operations. The peasant communities are tied in an exploitative relationship 
with the MNCs where they do not have a share in the means and rewards of production. The 
working class, which is largely indigenous remains oppressed by both the state and the big 
capital for whom they work. Only one employee trust out of the hundreds that were established 
to support workers was awarded shares in a mining company. The relations of production have 
not changed at all. Moreover, foreign capital still dominates the large-scale mining sector. 
Potential indigenous entrepreneurs who made attempts to take over the large mines failed 
because of lack of capital. The Zimbabwean state has also failed to emancipate artisanal and 
small-scale miners. The ASM sector, which is populated mostly by indigenous people, has 
been criminalized and victimized by state sponsored violence. The government has succeeded 
in suppressing an emerging class of small indigenous mining entrepreneurs who possess a lot 
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Questions for government officials 
What is your understanding of the indigenisation policy? 
What are some of the efforts the government is making to promote local players in the mining 
industry? 
What are some of the challenges has the government faced in implementing the indigenisation 
policy in the mining sector? 
How does the government monitor compliance with indigenisation by the large mining 
enterprises? 
Do you think the indigenisation policy has been a success in the mining sector? 
How so you think the policy can be improved? 
 
Questions for the small-scale mining sector players 
How do you define ASM? 
What challenges does the ASM sector face? 
How can you describe your relations with the government? 
How have you participated in the indigenisation policy? 
Do you think the indigenisation policy is good for the ASM sector? 
What is the role of your organization in advancing the interests of the ASM in Zimbabwe? 
What policy recommendations, to the government, that can improve the plight of the ASM 
sector? 
 
Questions for the mine workers representatives 
How can you describe the plight of the workers in the mining industry? 
What is the workers’ view of the indigenization policy? 
To what extent did you participate in the formulation of the indigenisation policy? 
What has been the impact of the policy on the mineworkers thus far? 
How do you think workers can be empowered in the mining sector? 
 
Questions for academics and experts 
In a few words can you tell us what you understand by indigenisation and empowerment? 
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How do you think Zimbabwe’s historical experience of colonialism is reflected shaped the 
indigenisation policy? 
Based on your understanding of indigenisation, do you think the current model of 
indigenisation as pursued by the government is the correct one? 
Has Zimbabwe’s post-independence indigenisation project managed to achieve its objectives 
of an inclusive economy and social justice for the previously disadvantaged? 
 
Questions for large-scale mining sector representatives 
What is your view of the indigenisation policy? 
To what extent have your members complied with the requirements of the policy? 
What is the impact of the indigenisation policy on the productivity of the mining sector? 
What is your organization doing to promote the participation of indigenous people in the 
mining sector? 
In your view, what can be done to improve the policy? In what way do you think the policy 
could be changed so that it’s a win-win for the parties involved? 
 
          
 
 
